2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Final Document

Volume III

Part IV

Summary records

List of participants

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New York, 2001

Note

The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons consists of four parts in three volumes:

Volume I	NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)
Part I	Review of the operation of the Treaty, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference
	Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty
Part II	Organization and work of the Conference
Volume II	NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Part III)
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A. Summary records of the 1st to 12th and 14th to 16th plenary meetings

Summary record of the 1st meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 24 April 2000, at 11 a.m.

Acting President: Mr. Reyes Rodríguez .... (Colombia)
President: Mr. Baali .... (Algeria)

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Credentials of Representatives to the Conference:

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee

Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General

Adoption of the agenda

Programme of work

The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m.

Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee

1. **The Acting President** declared open the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), convened pursuant to article VIII, paragraph 3, and article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, and General Assembly resolution 51/45 A.

2. The Conference was the sixth of its kind, and the first to be held since May 1995, when the States parties had adopted decisions on the indefinite extension of the Treaty, the strengthening of its review process and the establishment of Principles and Objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, together with a resolution on the Middle East. The Conference was expected to consider the implementation of the Treaty's provisions since 1995, taking into account the decisions and resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, to identify areas where further progress was needed and to determine how such progress could be achieved.

3. In accordance with past practice, he formally introduced the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2000/1), adopted on 21 May 1999. The Committee had held three sessions during the period April 1997 to May 1999; 158 States parties to the Treaty had participated in the work of one or more of the sessions, which had also been attended by representatives of States not parties to the Treaty, specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, academia and non-governmental organizations. For the first time, representatives of non-governmental organizations had been given an opportunity to address delegations at each of the sessions.

4. The Preparatory Committee had agreed on all the main issues related to the organization of the Conference. However, despite extensive discussion of, *inter alia*, the possibility of commencing negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, nuclear disarmament, security assurances for parties to the Treaty and implementation of the resolution on the Middle East, it had been unable to reach agreement on any substantive recommendation to the 2000 Conference.

Election of the President of the Conference

5. **The Acting President** said that at its resumed session in December 1999, the Preparatory Committee had decided to recommend to the 2000 Review Conference the election of Mr. Abdallah Baali (Algeria) as President.

6. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) was elected President of the Conference by acclamation.*

7. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) took the Chair.*

Statement by the President of the Conference

8. **The President** said that in 1995, when the States parties had decided to extend the Treaty indefinitely, the nuclear-weapon States had solemnly undertaken to continue their efforts to systematically and progressively reduce their nuclear stockpiles; States that had remained outside the non-proliferation regime had been urged to join it; and agreement had been reached on a new review process. Unfortunately, many of the commitments made on that occasion had yet to be fulfilled, and the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament had given rise to a feeling of frustration on the part of many countries and of international civil society.

9. In 1998, India and Pakistan had dealt a serious blow to the global non-proliferation regime by conducting nuclear tests, as a result of which the world was facing the spectre of nuclear war for the first time since the end of the cold war. Cuba and three States with nuclear capabilities — Israel, India and Pakistan — had not yet become parties to the Treaty; the Senate of the United States of America had refused to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Russian Federation and the United States of America had made no progress towards nuclear disarmament owing to the delay in the entry into force of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and the failure to commence negotiations on START III. Other grounds for concern included the new nuclear strategies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Russian Federation; the challenges to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and the intention of the United States of America to deploy an anti-missile defence system; the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament, as a result of which negotiations on a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material had

not commenced; and the fact that there were currently 30,000 nuclear weapons worldwide.

10. However, the picture was not entirely a negative one. The Russian Parliament had recently ratified START II; since 1995, the NPT had been ratified by Chile, Vanuatu, United Arab Emirates, Comoros, Andorra, Djibouti, Angola, Oman and Brazil, bringing the number of States parties to 187 and making it the most universal of all the multilateral disarmament instruments; the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements, adopted in May 1997, had increased the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards regime; nuclear-weapon States had taken unilateral measures to reduce their stockpiles and introduce greater transparency; new treaties had established nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and South-East Asia, and efforts to denuclearize Central Asia were nearing fruition; and the CTBT had been opened for signature in September 1996, within the deadlines established at the 1995 Conference, and had been signed by 155 States and ratified by 55, including 2 nuclear-weapon States and 28 States with nuclear capabilities.

11. Regardless of the differing perspectives of States parties, much remained to be done and the outcome of the Conference would have a major influence on the future of the Treaty and of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The role of civil society was crucial to future progress, and he therefore welcomed the contribution of non-governmental organizations. He urged States parties to bridge their differences and to seek agreement on realistic measures to promote the realization of the goals of the Treaty. The global community would be following the work of the Conference with high expectations and must not be disappointed.

Address by the Secretary-General of the United Nations

12. **The Secretary-General** said that at a time of extraordinary change and challenge in the relations between and within States, it was more important than ever to focus on halting nuclear proliferation and on reducing the weapons of mass destruction that continued to threaten the very existence of human life on the planet.

13. While no one could be satisfied with the degree of implementation of the Treaty, the fact that 187 States had become parties to it testified to its global appeal, and there had been genuine progress during the past five years. The number of nuclear weapons had continued to decline since the end of the cold war; most nuclear-weapon States had declared that they were not producing fissile material for weapons; former rivals were cooperating to reduce the threats posed by their weapons; safeguards had been enhanced; membership in nuclear-weapon-free zones had grown; the CTBT had been negotiated and, although it was not yet in force, there was a de facto moratorium on testing. The Russian Federation had decided to ratify START II and the CTBT; he hoped that the ratification would enhance the prospects of those treaties entering into force.

14. Nonetheless, nuclear conflict remained a real and terrifying possibility which imposed an obligation on States parties to use every instrument at their disposal to pursue the goals of the NPT with equal and unwavering determination. The discovery of clandestine nuclear-weapons-development programmes and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remained a major threat to peace. Compliance with the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations had not always been satisfactory, and he called on all parties to increase their efforts to combat that common threat and to sign and bring into force the IAEA Additional Protocol designed to enhance assurances regarding compliance.

15. The 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan were clear evidence of the need to fight proliferation. Some 35,000 nuclear weapons remained in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers, with thousands still deployed on hair-trigger alert. For many years, there had been no disarmament negotiations on strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. The Conference on Disarmament remained the single multilateral body for such negotiations, yet its efforts had been frustrated by a lack of consensus. Much of the established multilateral disarmament machinery had started to rust, a problem due not to the machinery itself but to the apparent lack of political will to use it. Recent years had seen a reaffirmation of the nuclear-weapons doctrines of all the nuclear-weapon States. Some States retained first-use doctrines, while others did not exclude the use of such weapons even against non-nuclear-weapon States. Lack of transparency as to the number of weapons and amount of nuclear material remained a problem, and the growing pressure to deploy national missile

defences was jeopardizing the ABM Treaty and could well lead to a new arms race. He hoped that States would weigh those dangers and challenges before embarking on a process likely to reduce rather than enhance global security.

16. He believed that States parties had it in their power to meet those challenges successfully. The most effective way to do so would be to embark on a results-based treaty review process, focusing on specific benchmarks such as the entry into force of the CTBT, deep, irreversible reductions in nuclear-weapons stocks, the consolidation of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the negotiation of new ones, binding security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States parties, and improvement in the transparency of reporting on nuclear weapons arsenals and nuclear materials. Lastly, he proposed that member States should reaffirm at the highest political level their commitment to reducing the dangers that arose from existing nuclear weapons and the further proliferation thereof.

Address by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

17. **Mr. El-Baradei** (Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) said that the 1995 decision to extend indefinitely the NPT had been taken in an atmosphere of expectation that the Treaty would be invigorated through accelerated efforts towards nuclear disarmament, a strengthened verification regime and expanded peaceful nuclear cooperation.

18. IAEA safeguards played a key role in the non-proliferation regime and a number of the Principles and Objectives agreed to in 1995 had a direct relevance to those safeguards. The Agency had continued to function as the competent authority to verify compliance with safeguards obligations under article III of the Treaty. Since the beginning of 1995, a further 28 States parties had brought comprehensive safeguards agreements into force, raising the total to 128. The Agency was making every effort to encourage the remaining 54 States parties to conclude such agreements.

19. Remarkable progress had been achieved in strengthening the effectiveness of safeguards. The discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme had been both a setback and a watershed for the safeguards system. It had jolted the international community into considering urgent ways and means to strengthen the system, in particular to equip it with the ability to provide assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

20. Some of the strengthening measures could be anchored to the Agency's existing authority, but others required additional legal authority. In May 1997, after a year of deliberations, the Agency's Board of Governors had adopted a Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements, which was intended to be the standard for additional instruments to be concluded with non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The new protocol gave the Agency the means to provide credible and comprehensive assurances of compliance with non-proliferation commitments, empowering it to seek a broad range of information covering all aspects of a State's nuclear and nuclear-related activities. It also provided broader right of access for Agency inspectors to nuclear and nuclear-related facilities and contained new administrative arrangements to improve the effectiveness of safeguards.

21. Pursuant to the safeguards agreements, the Agency had the right and obligation to ensure that all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities of States was subject to safeguards; its obligation was not limited to declared nuclear material but also extended to that which was required to be declared. Under the new protocol, it would be able to provide assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material, but also of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. It was therefore disappointing that only 44 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had concluded additional protocols and that only 9 such protocols had entered into force. He appealed to those that had not yet done so to conclude additional protocols at the earliest possible date. The secretariat was developing modalities to adapt existing safeguards activities to the new strengthening measures and expected to complete the technical framework by the end of 2001.

22. The 1995 Principles and Objectives had stressed that fissile material transferred from military to peaceful use should be placed under Agency safeguards as soon as possible. Since 1996, the Agency had been involved in consultations with the Russian Federation and the United States of America to examine the legal, technical and financial aspects of

verification of such material, and significant progress had been made on a model verification agreement and technical systems and equipment.

23. The Agency had established a programme in 1995 for the security of nuclear and radioactive material to protect it against theft and other misuses and to prevent, detect and respond to illicit trafficking. A 1998 review had resulted in strengthened guidelines on protecting nuclear facilities and nuclear material in transport, use and storage against sabotage.

24. Despite the increased amount of nuclear material and the greater complexity of the facilities to be safeguarded, the Agency's budget for safeguards had been virtually frozen for over a decade as a result of a policy of zero real growth. That had led to an increasing reliance on extrabudgetary funding, which inhibited proper planning and efficiency.

25. Two cases of non-compliance with safeguards agreements must be mentioned. With regard to Iraq, the Agency had not been in a position since December 1998 to implement its mandate under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). Although it had recently been able to inspect nuclear material subject to safeguards which was still in Iraq, that inspection had been limited and was no substitute for the required activities under the relevant Security Council resolutions. Currently, therefore, the Agency could not provide any assurance that Iraq was in compliance with its obligations.

26. With regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, there was regrettably little to report since the 1995 Conference. The Agency remained unable to verify its initial declaration of nuclear material subject to safeguards and could not, therefore, provide any assurance about non-diversion. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was still in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, which remained valid and in force. It continued to accept Agency activities solely in the context of the agreed framework which it had concluded in October 1994 with the United States of America. As requested by the Security Council, the Agency was monitoring a freeze of graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities under that agreement. The degree of cooperation received continued to be limited.

27. Turning to peaceful nuclear cooperation, he said that the major goal of the Agency's technical cooperation activities had been to address the major sustainable development priorities of recipient States in a cost-effective manner. Technical cooperation among developing countries continued to be a key strategy because it promoted sustainable project activities by building self-reliance and mutual assistance. The largest proportion of Agency assistance involved non-power applications. For instance, in 1999 about 85 per cent of its technical cooperation had been in the areas of human health, food and agriculture, water resources management, environmental monitoring, industrial uses and related radiation protection and safety. Training was also an important aspect of technical cooperation activities.

28. A priority objective of the Agency was to establish a comprehensive and effective worldwide nuclear safety culture, which would be aided by a comprehensive set of international conventions prescribing the basic legal norms for the safe use of nuclear technology. The Agency would continue to strengthen its safeguards system, but without safeguards agreements it could not provide any assurances of compliance, and without the additional protocols it could provide only limited assurances that did not adequately cover the absence of undeclared material or activities. It would continue to strive for maximum efficiency in its safeguards operation but would not be able to fulfil its mandate unless those activities were fully funded. In 1999, of the 130 member States of IAEA, only 43 had pledged 100 per cent or more of their assessed target. Regrettably, 57 had made no pledges whatsoever. Although from a strictly legal point of view contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund were voluntary, they were regarded as solemn obligations that must be respected.

29. The new safeguards had strengthened the non-proliferation regime, but verification could not work in a vacuum. It should continue to be supported by effective physical protection and export control arrangements, enforcement mechanisms and, above all, regional and global security arrangements. International cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was a key component of the Treaty regime, but it required adequate, predictable and assured technical cooperation resources. To that end, all States parties should pay their target contributions in full and on time.

30. The Treaty regime, which had been painstakingly constructed over three decades, should not be allowed to unravel, and it should be made universal. Of crucial importance to that end was an unequivocal commitment by all nations to its basic tenets:

adherence to the regime and the verification system, enhancement of peaceful nuclear cooperation and transfer of technology, and above all, active negotiation towards nuclear disarmament.

Adoption of the rules of procedure

31. **The President** drew attention to the draft rules of procedure, contained in annex VI, of the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF/2000/1), which had been submitted to the Conference by the Chairman of the third session of Preparatory Committee. He took it that the Conference wished to adopt the draft rules of procedure.

32. *It was so decided.*

33. **The President**, referring to rule 44, paragraph 1, of the rules of procedure, said that requests for observer status had been received from Cuba and Palestine. He took it that the Conference wished to accede to those requests.

34. *It was so decided.*

35. **The President**, referring to rule 44, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure, said that requests for observer status had been received from the following organizations: the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the South Pacific Forum, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, the European Commission, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Arab States, the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). He took it that the Conference wished to accede to those requests.

36. *It was so decided.*

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee

37. **The President** said that, at its third session, the Preparatory Committee had agreed to recommend the following as Chairmen of the three Main Committees: Mr. Reyes Rodríguez (Colombia), Main Committee I; Mr. Kobieracki (Poland), Main Committee II; Mr. Reimaa (Finland), Main Committee III. The Preparatory Committee had also agreed to recommend that the post of Chairman of the Drafting Committee should be assumed by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States and the post of Chairman of the Credentials Committee by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States, and it had subsequently nominated Mr. Erdös (Hungary) and Mr. Widodo (Indonesia), respectively.

38. *Mr. Reyes Rodríguez (Colombia), Mr. Kobieracki (Poland), Mr. Reimaa (Finland), Mr. Erdös (Hungary) and Mr. Widodo (Indonesia) were elected Chairmen of Main Committee I, Main Committee II, Main Committee III, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee, respectively.*

39. **The President** said that consultations on the election of the Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee had not yet been concluded. The election would therefore be postponed.

Election of Vice-Presidents

40. **The President** said that the Conference had received the following nominations for the 34 posts of Vice-President: from the Group of Eastern European States: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine; from the Group of Western European and Other States: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and from the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States: Cameroon, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Islamic Republic of Iran, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, Costa Rica and China.

41. *Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belarus Cameroon, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Germany, Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Romania, Senegal, South Africa, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Viet Nam were elected Vice-Presidents of the Conference.*

42. **The President** said that the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States would submit five additional nominations after further consultations.

Credentials of Representatives to the Conference

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee

43. **The President**, referring to rule 3 of the rules of procedure, which provided that six members of the Credentials Committee were to be appointed on the proposal of the President of the Conference, said that consultations were continuing on nominations to the Credentials Committee and that he would convey to the Conference the outcome of those consultations at the appropriate time.

Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General

44. **The President** said that, at its first session, the Preparatory Committee had decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 2000 Review Conference. At its third session, the Secretary-General had nominated Ms. Hannelore Hoppe, Department of Disarmament Affairs, as provisional Secretary-General.

45. *Ms. Hoppe was confirmed as Secretary-General of the 2000 Review Conference.*

Adoption of the agenda

46. **The President** said he took it that the Conference wished to adopt the agenda as contained in annex VII of the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2000/1) and the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee in annex VIII on the allocation of items to the Main Committees of the Conference.

47. *The agenda and the recommendation were adopted.*

Programme of work

48. **The President**, referring to rule 34 of the rules of procedure, said that, after consultations, the following draft decision had been proposed:

> "The Conference of States parties to the NPT decides to establish for the duration of the 2000 Review Conference a subsidiary body under Main Committee I and Main Committee II, respectively.
>
> "The Conference further decides that:
>
> "i. The subsidiary body established under Main Committee I as subsidiary body 1 will discuss and consider the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament'. The subsidiary body will be chaired by Ambassador Clive Pearson of New Zealand. The subsidiary body will be open-ended. It will hold 4 meetings within the overall time allocated to the Main Committee. The meetings will be held in private.
>
> "ii. The subsidiary body established under Main Committee II as subsidiary body 2 will examine the regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution. The subsidiary body will be open-ended. It will hold 4 meetings within the overall time allocated to the Main Committee. The meetings will be held in private.
>
> "The outcome of the work of the subsidiary bodies will be reflected in the report of the respective Main Committees to the Conference."

49. *The draft decision was adopted.*

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

Summary record of the 2nd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 24 April 2000, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. **Baali** . . . . (Algeria)
later: Mr. **Alemán** (Vice-President). . . . . (Ecuador)
later: Mr. **Baali** (President) . . . . (Algeria)

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General debate

Organization of work

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General debate

1. **Mr. Monteiro** (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union, the associated countries Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey, and, in addition, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, said that they supported wholeheartedly the objectives set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and were committed to the effective implementation of the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The 2000 Review Conference should confirm the Treaty's fundamental role in strengthening international peace and security, pursuing disarmament and promoting the global non-proliferation regime. It must take stock of what had been achieved in those fields over the past five years and identify the areas in which and the means through which further progress should be sought in the future.

2. The European Union noted with satisfaction that, since 1995, nine additional States had acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and called on the four States that had not yet done so, in particular the three that operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to take steps to become parties to the Treaty. The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan were a cause for deep concern. The European Union appealed to countries in South Asia to make every effort to prevent a nuclear arms race, which would be detrimental not only to stability and security in the region, but also to international efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It welcomed the readiness of India and Pakistan to participate in negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and called on those countries to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It urged Pakistan to follow India's lead in establishing nuclear-related export controls.

3. The Union remained committed to the full implementation of the "Resolution on the Middle East" adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. It continued to support efforts to establish a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and appealed to the only State in the region that had not yet done so to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and place its nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The European Union called on Iraq to comply with Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) and on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cooperate with IAEA and to implement fully the agreement that it had concluded with the Agency.

4. The European Union looked forward to the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which would take place following its ratification by 44 States. The States members of the Union, all of which had signed and ratified the Treaty, were actively promoting universal adherence to that instrument. They therefore welcomed the announcement that the State Duma of the Russian Federation had approved the Treaty for ratification. However, the delay in its ratification by the United States of America was deeply regrettable. The European Union wished to underscore the need to provide adequate financial support for the establishment of the international monitoring system envisaged in the Treaty.

5. The Union called for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and urged all States to cease production of such material. It would continue to encourage nuclear-weapon States to reduce their arsenals of nuclear weapons and promote the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. It welcomed the steps taken in that direction and towards the application of the principle of irreversibility in the fields of nuclear disarmament and arms control and considered increased transparency an important confidence-building measure.

6. The approval for ratification of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) by the State Duma of the Russian Federation was an important step towards enhancing global stability and security. The European Union called for the prompt entry into force and timely implementation of the Treaty and its protocol and urged an early start to the negotiations on a third strategic arms reduction treaty. It also wished to see non-strategic nuclear weapons included in the framework of arms reduction efforts. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) was a pillar of strategic stability, which should be maintained.

7. The security assurances provided by the protocols of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and the unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States that were a means of addressing the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by assuring them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The European Union stood ready to consider further steps, which could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

8. The Union welcomed the progress made since 1995 in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which were a valuable complement to the Treaty, and it strongly supported the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols for those zones. Another positive step was the adoption by the Disarmament Commission of guidelines for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

9. The existing system of IAEA safeguards must be strengthened and the Agency's ability to detect clandestine nuclear activity enhanced in order to address successfully the proliferation challenges that lay ahead. The European Union called on all non-nuclear-weapon States to conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency, in accordance with article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and urged all States that had safeguards agreements with IAEA to conclude an Additional Protocol. It appealed to nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material no longer required for defence purposes under appropriate international safeguards and physical protection.

10. There must be international cooperation to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. States participating in such activities must be mindful of their responsibilities to use sensitive materials, equipment and technology in a way that did not jeopardize the non-proliferation regime. The establishment of an appropriate system of export controls should be regarded not as a hindrance, but as an essential element for furthering close cooperation in the use of nuclear energy and generating confidence among suppliers, recipient States and the international community that nuclear materials, equipment and technology would be used only for peaceful purposes. There was a need for greater transparency in the field of nuclear-related export controls. The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee were to be commended for their efforts in that direction.

11. The European Union called on all States with nuclear materials in their territories to maintain or improve, as appropriate, their arrangements for nuclear materials accounting, safety and physical protection and urged all States that had not already done so to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, introduce relevant physical protection and safety standards, and adopt and enforce appropriate measures and legislation to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. Lastly, it also wished to emphasize the importance of continuing international cooperation in order to enhance nuclear safety, waste management and radiological protection.

12. **Ms. Green** (Mexico), speaking also on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, said that while the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had produced a renewed commitment to nuclear disarmament, it was regrettable that little progress had been made to date. In an effort to provide some fresh impetus, Mexico and the six other countries were putting forward a flexible, realistic programme of action in a working paper entitled "Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda". The essential requirement in that connection was a clear commitment by the nuclear States to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

13. The international community aspired to a world free of nuclear weapons, and the International Court of Justice had ruled that anything short of total nuclear disarmament would be unacceptable. Accordingly, it was for the nuclear-weapon States to rise to the challenge by reducing their arsenals. That would be a major stride towards the common goal, and it would also spur the international community to greater efforts. The trend in the previous five years had rather been in the opposite direction: two States that were not parties to the NPT had tested nuclear weapons, while one non-party State had continued to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and had not renounced the option of possessing nuclear weapons. Moreover, the two main nuclear-weapon States had hardly set a persuasive example. The general picture had been one of complacency and indifference.

14. Worse yet, it was clear that nuclear weapons continued to play a central role in strategic planning; and that the possibility of waging nuclear war continued to be contemplated, despite the fact that the situation which had originally given rise to proliferation no longer existed. The attainment of a world free of nuclear weapons would require common action by all States, but the United States of America and the Russian Federation would have to display leadership in that connection. The Russian Federation's recent ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) was welcome, and the United States should complete its ratification procedure as soon as possible. All nuclear-weapon States should join in a process aimed at eliminating all their nuclear weapons, a process that should be characterized by the principle of irreversibility.

15. The total elimination of nuclear weapons would undoubtedly take time. In the meanwhile, nuclear-weapon States should adopt interim measures designed to reduce the risk of detonation, accidentally or as a result of a deliberate decision. The working paper "Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World" set forth several such measures: nuclear-weapon States should adopt no-first-use policies vis-à-vis each other, and no-use policies vis-à-vis non-nuclear States; nuclear weapons should be taken off alert status, and warheads separated from delivery systems; the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be discontinued; and non-nuclear States should be given adequate security guarantees.

16. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty had been a fundamental step forward in the nuclear disarmament agenda. Those nuclear-weapon States that had not yet ratified it were urged to do so. A treaty on fissionable materials was also essential. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, nuclear-weapon States should declare a moratorium on the production of such materials for use in making weapons, and non-party States with nuclear facilities should immediately suspend the production of fissionable materials for that purpose.

17. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the extension of existing ones, would be positive measures, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia. Organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be mandated to develop the effective monitoring procedures that a world free of nuclear weapons would require. An international conference on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, in accordance with a recent suggestion of the Secretary-General, would be a positive measure.

18. Although an overwhelming majority of States were parties to the NPT, the three non-party States that were operating unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and pursuing nuclear weapon development programmes were crucial to the attainment of the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. The Review Conference should focus on them, encouraging them to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, and seeking to have their nuclear facilities made subject to IAEA safeguards. The NPT was at a critical turning-point. The working paper, "Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda" offered a constructive means of achieving the common goal.

19. **Mr. Fasla** (Algeria) said that, by depositing its instruments of accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty on the eve of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, Algeria had demonstrated its commitment to nuclear disarmament and promoting the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. There had been a number of important developments since the 1995 Conference, including the accession of a further nine States to the Treaty; ratification by 55 States, among them two nuclear-weapon States, of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones. It was fitting that on the eve of the 2000 Review Conference, the Russian State Duma had approved for ratification the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the START II Treaty. However, other developments, particularly the nuclear tests conducted in South Asia, had shown that much remained to be done to achieve the objective of general and complete disarmament.

20. While the NPT had proved to be an effective means of stemming horizontal proliferation, it had been less successful in checking vertical proliferation, which ran counter to its letter and spirit. Furthermore, the many initiatives taken since the Treaty's conclusion had been aimed more at the reduction of nuclear arsenals, than at their elimination. In the Middle East, the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction had been stymied by the nuclear capacity of Israel, which remained outside the system of international controls. Developing countries desiring to use nuclear energy for

peaceful purposes were faced with insurmountable obstacles. In that connection, the reduction of the resources provided to IAEA was a cause for concern. The security assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon States had been undermined by the selective and restrictive approach taken in Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995). There had been little progress in the implementation of the Concluding Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and there was frustration at the slow pace of the multilateral negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament.

21. The 2000 Review Conference should reaffirm the validity of the decision on "Principles and objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted by the 1995 Conference and examine means of achieving further progress in its implementation. The non-proliferation regime must be maintained. The agreements concluded between the United States of America and the Russian Federation were encouraging steps, but new reductions were necessary and the other nuclear-weapon States must take measures of a similar scope with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

22. Every effort must be made to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Algeria had signed that instrument in October 1996 and had already begun the ratification process. There was also a need for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for military use, under which existing stocks would be subject to effective international control. Algeria had proposed the establishment within the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee for that purpose, as well as an ad hoc committee on disarmament. The security assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon States must be enhanced, must neither be open to interpretation, nor subject to veto and must be codified in a legally binding instrument. More must be done to realize the legitimate right of developing States to have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and there must be specific measures to promote the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in areas of tension.

23. Algeria had been the third African State to ratify the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). No such zone had been established in the Middle East, which was a cause of deep concern to Algeria given the close links between Africa and that region and its physical proximity. The adoption by the 1995 Conference of the "Resolution on the Middle East" had shown that that concern was shared by all the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the nuclear-weapon States. His delegation welcomed the decision to establish a subsidiary body during the Conference to consider the application of that resolution.

24. His delegation was convinced that nuclear disarmament must remain the absolute priority and that there must be a clear undertaking to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The subsidiary body established to consider the issue of nuclear disarmament during the Conference should examine the progress made in that area and the steps that remained to be taken.

25. The Conference must strengthen the political and moral authority of the Treaty and promote its universality. To that end, it must call on all States that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty and to place their nuclear installations under the control of IAEA. As to the functioning of the review process itself, the preparatory process should focus on substantive issues. It was to be hoped that the decisions of the 2000 Review Conference would constitute genuine milestones on the path to attaining a nuclear-weapon-free world.

26. **Mr. Cowen** (Ireland) noted that of late there had been some positive developments in the area of nuclear disarmament: the United States of America and the Russian Federation had undertaken bilateral nuclear force reductions, and the Russian Federation had ratified both the START II Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The two nuclear Powers that had not yet ratified the CTBT should do so: nuclear testing had no place on the small planet known as the Earth.

27. The NPT had reached a crucial point: while 182 States had committed themselves to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons, the total elimination of nuclear weapons remained a distant goal. But in accordance with the underlying bargain of the Treaty, non-nuclear States had refrained from the development of nuclear weapons in return for binding commitments by the nuclear States to eliminate their existing

arsenals. In response to that unsatisfactory state of affairs, Ireland and six other countries had put forward a working paper entitled "Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda" which was a realistic programme of action leading to a world free of nuclear weapons. It was premised on a new political undertaking by the five nuclear States to eliminate their nuclear weapons while engaging in an accelerated process of negotiation and measures leading to nuclear disarmament.

28. Such an initiative was necessary because the response to the NPT's goal of a world free of nuclear weapons had not been adequate to date: reductions in existing arsenals were being offset by modernization and research. The danger was that the NPT, the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, would wither away through complacency and neglect. Nuclear weapons, intended to annihilate entire continents and cultures, had never had general moral acceptance, and the International Court of Justice had concluded that the indefinite possession of them would be indefensible. Accordingly, a complacent approach was inappropriate: the time to proceed, with serious intent, to rid the world of nuclear weapons was at once.

29. Three non-party States, India, Pakistan and Israel, were continuing to disregard the norms which States parties had adopted. In implementing their obligations under the NPT, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike denied legitimacy to any State embarking on nuclear weapons proliferation. Nuclear weapons were not a valid response to perceived threats to security. The danger of a nuclear Armageddon must outweigh all such considerations. It was therefore essential to take measures to ensure the continued vitality of the NPT and the non-proliferation regime, and to that end the approach outlined in the working paper "Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World" was eminently relevant.

30. A treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons — a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT) — would be an important preliminary step in the NPT regime for nuclear disarmament, as it would initiate a process of extending controls over all such materials. Negotiations on such a treaty should therefore begin without delay. The pace of those negotiations should not be dictated by the three States remaining outside the international consensus on nuclear disarmament. Nor should inaction on the part of the members of that consensus be allowed to contribute to the development of the nuclear option by those States. One approach might be for the five nuclear-weapon States to negotiate the text of a draft FMCT and submit it jointly to the Conference on Disarmament for further elaboration and adoption as a multilateral instrument, while those five States themselves proceeded with the provisional application of its core provisions, pending its adoption.

31. The Conference's review of the implementation of the NPT must address the issue of compliance with its purposes and provisions, as the application of safeguards and the right to participate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were among its core features. The adoption in 1997 of the Model Additional Protocol to existent Safeguards Agreements had been an important demonstration of political will on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States to enhance non-proliferation assurances when required. The Irish Parliament was moving to ratify the Additional Protocol.

32. The review process for the NPT required strengthening, as the States parties had recognized at the 1995 Conference. It was clear, however, that the selected mechanism of a preparatory committee was inadequate for that purpose. It might be preferable to convene annual general conferences of States parties, with a view to a more systematic and regular review of implementation of the Treaty. The experience of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was instructive in that connection.

33. The NPT needed strengthening for the simple reason that the world must give up nuclear weapons as a factor in international security. Accordingly, it was essential for the Conference to agree, finally and definitively, on a common understanding of what the full implementation of the Treaty required, and what the participants' peoples expected of them.

34. *Mr. Alemán (Ecuador), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

35. **Mr. Minty** (South Africa) said that nuclear weapons were the only one of the three types of weapons of mass destruction that had not been banned, and in view of their unparalleled potential for large-scale annihilation, it was important to make the world safer by ridding it of them. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference had determined that the Treaty

should be indefinitely extended, and that the review process should be strengthened. The task of the 2000 Conference was to ensure that those objectives were attained.

36. The intervening five-year period had not been auspicious: nuclear-weapon States continued to rely on those weapons in their strategic planning, there had been nuclear test explosions in South Asia, START II was moving slowly, there were proposals for a missile defence system in the United States, there were continuing difficulties in bringing the CTBT into force, and the Conference on Disarmament had not begun negotiations on a fissile materials treaty. Moreover, the nuclear-weapon States had not eliminated their arsenals of nuclear weapons, non-nuclear-weapon States had not received effective security assurances, and the unencumbered transfer of peaceful nuclear technology had not been achieved.

37. To be sure, there had been positive developments as well: the great majority of non-nuclear-weapon States continued to fulfil their obligations relating to non-proliferation, a number of States had acceded to the NPT, and the Russian Federation had ratified START II and the CTBT. The United States and the Russian Federation were carrying out bilateral nuclear arms reductions. Such reductions, however welcome, were not to be confused with nuclear disarmament; they had to do with cold war concepts of the strategic balance of power and the like. The five nuclear-weapon States should unequivocally undertake to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, a step that would enhance confidence in the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. It would also demonstrate the validity of the core bargain struck in the NPT, namely a commitment by non-nuclear-weapon States not to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons in return for the agreement of the nuclear-weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament.

38. Other positive steps would be the full implementation of the START II Treaty and the beginning of substantive negotiations on START III, the integration of nuclear-weapon States other than the United States and the Russian Federation into the START process, de-emphasis of the role of nuclear weapons and expansion of the nuclear arms reduction process on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, and application of the principle of irreversibility in all nuclear disarmament, arms reduction and arms control measures.

39. While the nuclear-weapon States certainly bore the primary responsibility for eliminating nuclear weapons, there were useful actions open to other States. For example, the three States — India, Israel and Pakistan — that operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities should abandon their pursuit of nuclear weapons development and accede to the NPT; the CTBT should be brought into force, quickly and unconditionally, and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should conclude its negotiations on a fissile materials treaty. Those and other creative measures were set forth in the "New Agenda" that had been introduced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico in response to a deep concern about the regrettable lack of progress towards the common goals of the NPT. The key features of that very welcome initiative were an unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons, and to a step-by-step process leading to that goal.

40. South Africa welcomed the steps that had been taken since 1995 to strengthen the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the conclusion of negotiations for an Additional Protocol. Universal implementation of the Additional Protocol was desirable; unfortunately, however, some 60 States parties had not yet taken the necessary first step of concluding a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency. IAEA should make a special effort to help those States by guiding them through the process.

41. The Agency had acquired greater authority for exercising its responsibility in implementing international safeguards. At the same time, it was responsible for merging conventional quantitative safeguards and more recent, qualitative safeguards into an integrated safeguards system, one that would be flexible, effective, and above all cost-efficient. The task represented a major challenge. Certainly progress had been made, but it was clear that much remained to be done.

42. Non-nuclear-weapon States stood to benefit under the NPT in two major ways: they were relieved of the threat resulting from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and they gained nuclear technology for peaceful applications in such fields as health, agriculture and industry. The Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme was thus potentially valuable, and consequently it was regrettable that the Voluntary Technical Cooperation Fund had been unable to meet

the legitimate needs of developing countries. The previous 15 years, in fact, had been characterized by a widening disparity between needs and resources. It was important to find ways of making the Fund more stable.

43. **Ms. Albright** (United States of America) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was proving to be effective and, therefore, radical changes of course were not necessary. Bilaterally, and through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Treaty had fostered peaceful uses of the atom in such areas as cancer treatment, infant health, power supply, food production and clean water supplies. The Treaty had also facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation.

44. The Indian and Pakistani tests of May 1998, which had challenged the Treaty's ability to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, had been met with a firm international response in Security Council resolution 1172 (1998). Her delegation continued to seek universal adherence, in South Asia and beyond, to the Treaty, which deliberately lacked provisions on new nuclear-weapon States. While her delegation was not opposed to discussing universal adherence in the Middle East, the Conference should be fair and balanced and understand that the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in that region depended on the broader peace process. In the Americas, Cuba stood alone as a non-party to the Treaty.

45. With regard to universal compliance with the Treaty, her delegation strongly supported the IAEA strengthened safeguards and urged all parties to adopt them. Also in the interest of universal compliance, it believed that Iraq should not be allowed to dictate the terms of its compliance with either its Treaty obligations or United Nations resolutions and welcomed the partial progress achieved in North Korea as a result of inspections under the Treaty regime.

46. Responding to claims that the five nuclear-weapon States were not making sufficient efforts to bring about nuclear disarmament under article VI, she noted the Russian State Duma's recent action on the START II Treaty and on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which her delegation welcomed, and the United States Senate's overwhelming vote approving the Treaty several years earlier. President Clinton had dealt with concerns raised by missile defences openly and in consultation with both the United States Congress and the country's allies and other countries, including the Russian Federation and China. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty could easily be amended to reflect new realities. Moreover, the missile defence system in question, capable of repelling, at most, a few dozen incoming missiles, was not intended to degrade the Russian deterrent.

47. Since the end of the cold war, remarkable progress in nuclear disarmament had been achieved as a result of strategic negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation's ratification of START II would give fresh impetus to START III negotiations on reducing deployed strategic warheads by 80 per cent from peak cold-war levels. Progress towards continued strategic reductions would be a major goal of the upcoming summit between President Clinton and President Putin.

48. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States had dismantled about 60 per cent of its nuclear weapons. The American taxpayer had already provided over $5 billion towards the cost of nuclear disarmament programmes in the former Soviet Union, such as destroying missiles, securing fissile material, employing nuclear scientists for peaceful purposes and ending plutonium production for weapons. Moreover, since 1991, the United States had worked with its allies to reduce by 85 per cent the number of nuclear weapons within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). All those achievements were summarized in a newly issued booklet on the United States' compliance with its obligations under article VI.

49. As for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be advising the Clinton Administration on how to respond to Senators' concerns with a view to building support for its eventual ratification. In the meantime, the United States would not resume testing and urged other nations to follow suit. It also continued to support the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. In conclusion, she believed that, through solidarity, nuclear disarmament could be achieved gradually, by taking such familiar and achievable steps as adopting a fissile material cut-off treaty and adhering to the course charted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

50. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) resumed the Chair.*

51. **Mr. Sha Zukang** (China) noted that, even in the post-cold-war period, military alliances were being strengthened; State sovereignty was violated by

"humanitarian interventions"; and, in order to enhance its strategic superiority and establish its own absolute security, a certain country had stepped up the development, deployment and proliferation of its advanced ballistic missile defence system. It was regrettable that little substantive progress had been achieved in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1172 (1998). His delegation urged the two South Asian countries responsible for the nuclear explosions of 1998 to honour their commitments to refrain from conducting further nuclear tests or from impeding the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

52. China had always been firmly opposed to nuclear proliferation; it did not lend assistance to other countries for the development of nuclear weapons, or to nuclear facilities outside IAEA safeguards. In addition to abiding by the three principles of nuclear exports, it had adopted Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Exports in September 1997 and Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related Technology Exports in June 1999. It had joined the Zangger Committee, an international nuclear-export control system, in October 1997 and participated in the negotiations of the "Programme 93+2" protocol. In December 1998, it had also signed an Additional Protocol to its agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in China.

53. At a time when advanced science and technology and the globalization process were facilitating nuclear proliferation, further efforts should be made to establish a favourable international environment, characterized by stability and the peaceful settlement of international disputes; abolish double or multi-standards in the field of non-proliferation; enhance cooperation; and discourage unilateralism. The nuclear-weapon States must faithfully implement their obligations. His delegation welcomed the recent ratification of START II by the State Duma of the Russian Federation and looked forward to its early implementation and the initiation of the START III negotiations.

54. Nuclear disarmament should be a comprehensive, irreversible and genuine process, not merely a reduction in obsolete nuclear weapons while nuclear capability was actually enhanced. Global strategic balance and strict compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 were prerequisites for global nuclear disarmament. In 1999, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Chinese President Jiang Zemin had deplored the negative impact of the so-called missile defence programme on international security and stability and urged the international community to take the necessary steps to pre-empt it. Relying on its overwhelmingly superior economic, scientific and technological strength, a certain military Power, notwithstanding its large nuclear arsenals with overkill capability, was vigorously pursuing the development of a national missile defence system, which was tantamount to a nuclear arms build-up. Such actions seriously disrupted the basis for bilateral nuclear reductions by the United States and the Russian Federation and impeded the international nuclear disarmament process.

55. China used nuclear weapons only for the purpose of self-defence, had unconditionally undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons or to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States and had been one of the first States to sign the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. China would participate in nuclear arms control negotiations only if it felt secure about the global strategic balance and its own national security interests; its arms control policy would inevitably be affected by the determination of a certain country to develop a national missile defence system. While his delegation supported the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty, it believed that the prevention of the weaponization of outer space was a more pressing task in view of a certain country's determination to develop a missile defence system using outer space as a base.

56. The three major disarmament issues — outer space, nuclear disarmament and the fissile material cut-off treaty — should be dealt with by the Conference on Disarmament in a reasonable and balanced manner. While certain transparency measures were necessary, not all nuclear-weapon States should be requested to take the same transparency measures at the same time. The transparency measures that countries were willing to take were directly related to their strategic security environment; the small and medium-sized nuclear countries could not be expected to take transparency measures while a super-Power rampantly intervened in other countries' internal affairs, continuously improved its first-strike nuclear capability and spared no effort to develop an advanced missile defence system.

57. For the time being, the most rational and feasible confidence-building measures that could be undertaken by nuclear-weapon States would be to refrain from being the first to use nuclear weapons or from using or threatening to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States or in nuclear-weapon-free zones. That would help to mitigate the discrimination inherent in the current international nuclear non-proliferation regime and ultimately lay the groundwork for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. China had signed cooperation agreements on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with 16 countries, including the Russian Federation and France. It had provided assistance to developing countries in the fields of nuclear power, nuclear medical science and the application of nuclear technology.

58. At the multilateral level, China had cooperated with IAEA in the areas of nuclear power plant construction, nuclear safety, nuclear waste management and the application of nuclear technology. It had provided extrabudgetary resources to IAEA in addition to making its payments on time and in full to the Agency's Technical Cooperation Fund. China offered training to technical personnel from developing countries, dispatched its experts to provide technical services to transregional projects and give lectures at international symposia, and played an active role in cooperation in the field of nuclear science and technology in the Asia and Pacific region.

59. His delegation advocated the further strengthening of technical assistance to developing countries, the lifting of unreasonable limits on nuclear technology transfer to developing countries and active support for the efforts of those countries to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Such measures would not only promote their economic development and improve their living standards but would also prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If, however, developing countries' needs with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were ignored under the pretext of nuclear non-proliferation, the nuclear non-proliferation regime would ultimately lack support. Therefore, there must be an end to double standards or multi-standards in that regard.

60. In conclusion, it mattered little whether the final document of the Conference was a single paper containing two parts, or two separate papers as long as it included an accurate evaluation of the implementation of the Treaty in the past five years and set out practical arrangements for the coming five years.

61. **Mr. Ischinger** (Germany) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was the foundation of his country's non-proliferation policy and the binding legal basis for nuclear disarmament. Over the previous 30 years, the Treaty had played a key role in safeguarding international peace and continued to do so. Its indefinite extension in 1995 had further clarified the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States to pursue systematic efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating them. Germany attached great importance to the documents adopted at the 1995 Conference, which, together with the Treaty itself, constituted a solid and indispensable basis for future work.

62. At the current Conference, all States parties must demonstrate their commitment to honour their undertakings under the Treaty. Developments over the past five years and future tasks must be evaluated on the basis of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agreed upon at the 1995 Conference. Since 1995, nine countries had acceded to the NPT, which meant that entire continents and regions were subject to it. Nevertheless, four countries continued to stand aloof, and no effort should be spared to ensure their accession to the Treaty.

63. The test explosions in South Asia in May 1998 had placed serious strains on the non-proliferation regime. Despite international criticism, the countries concerned continued their nuclear-weapon programmes. Given the rapid development of military medium- and long-range missile technology and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, there was an urgent need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. In that connection, he stressed the obligation of all States parties to adopt and ratify Safeguards Agreements and to adopt safeguards under the Additional Protocol to enable the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to identify illegal nuclear activities more promptly and efficiently.

64. The implementation of the principles and objectives agreed in 1995 was anything but satisfactory. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was of crucial importance. Germany strongly welcomed the recent approval of that Treaty by the State Duma of the

Russian Federation. The opening of long-overdue negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices was equally important. The negotiating mandate drawn up in 1995 must not be called into question, and no country should further delay the early commencement of negotiations. It was hoped that the 2000 Review Conference would send a clear signal that the paralysis gripping the Conference on Disarmament would be a thing of the past.

65. The adapted Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) provided the basis for long-term stability in Europe, which was crucial for further progress in nuclear disarmament. The bilateral progress initiated by START I must be vigorously pursued. Germany particularly welcomed the Russian Federation's recent ratification of START II and strongly hoped that formal negotiations on START III would begin soon. Individual nuclear-weapon States had announced and partly implemented significant unilateral disarmament measures relating to transparency and irreversibility. He hoped that other nuclear-weapon States would follow suit.

66. The progress towards consolidating existing and creating new nuclear-weapon-free zones was commendable since they played an important part in maintaining regional stability and peace. In that connection, the concerns expressed by States parties in the "Resolution on the Middle East" adopted in 1995 had lost none of their relevance. The States members of the European Union had reached a consensus on the nuclear proliferation and disarmament challenges that lay ahead. The Union had risen to the task of strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Germany would continue to work long and hard in that area.

67. **Mr. Yamamoto** (Japan) said that, given the increasing concern over nuclear proliferation, it was essential to ensure that the basic framework for nuclear non-proliferation was as strong as possible. Japan firmly supported the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which had made a tremendous contribution to international peace and security.

68. The achievements of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had given the international community reason to hope that concrete measures for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament would be taken through the active and concerted efforts of all States parties to the Treaty, and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States. That hope had been bolstered by the adoption in 1996 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the 1997 agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation to effect deep reductions in their stockpiles of strategic nuclear warheads and the unilateral decisions of France and the United Kingdom to reduce their respective nuclear arsenals.

69. Recently, however, nuclear non-proliferation had been set back by the nuclear tests conducted in South Asia, the delay in the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the failure to commence negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, and the launching of missiles by a number of States. Given those adverse trends, the 2000 Review Conference was a touchstone to determine whether the Non-Proliferation Treaty could preserve and even enhance its credibility and universality. Japan strongly reaffirmed the need for the early realization of the principles and objectives that had been decided upon at the 1995 Conference and intended to submit proposals to the States parties on a number of specific points that were essential to the full and expeditious implementation of the principles and objectives and to full compliance with the Treaty. In order to consolidate the Treaty regime, the review process should be strengthened in accordance with the decision adopted by the 1995 Conference. In the light of the failure of the Preparatory Committee to achieve satisfactory results, the Conference should consider ways of enhancing the effectiveness of that Committee's work. Japan also intended to present a specific proposal on that subject.

70. As the sole country to have suffered the devastating effects of atomic bombings, Japan's policy of promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation had been motivated originally by the harsh experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Its commitment to the Treaty, which was the basis of Japan's national security, enjoyed the overwhelming support of the Japanese people. The fact that, every year since 1994, the General Assembly had adopted a resolution calling for nuclear disarmament demonstrated that the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons had been accepted around the globe as a common goal of humankind.

71. The nuclear tests recently conducted by India and Pakistan had awakened the world to the reality that nuclear proliferation had reached a new and dangerous stage. Those tests had not only altered the security landscape in South Asia but also posed a grave threat to a Treaty regime that had been a cornerstone of international security for the previous 30 years. The tests could not be condoned and underscored the need for a redoubling of global efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. States parties to the Treaty should call upon those States that had not yet acceded to it to do so at the earliest possible date. It was also important to ensure that all States parties fully complied with the Treaty's provisions by accepting the full-scope IAEA safeguards in all respects and increasing the universality of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements.

72. It was only natural, however, that those States that had abandoned forever the option of possessing nuclear weapons should demand that nuclear-weapon States make more vigorous disarmament efforts. Japan recognized the difficulty of pursuing disarmament while maintaining strategic stability in a dramatically changing security environment. Nevertheless, given their special responsibilities, nuclear-weapon States should take a number of measures. The recent ratification by the Russian Federation of the START II Treaty was an encouraging step, and the United States should commence negotiations on START III at the earliest possible date while working towards the full implementation of START II. The unilateral reductions in the nuclear arsenals of France and the United Kingdom were also welcome and should be made irreversible. Lastly, as long as nuclear disarmament by the United States and the Russian Federation continued, the other nuclear-weapon States should further reduce or at least refrain from building up their nuclear arsenals.

73. Japan had sent high-level missions to those States that had not yet signed or ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in an attempt to persuade them to do so as early as possible. It had also urged like-minded States to undertake similar initiatives. Global efforts in that area had been rewarded by the recent ratification of the Treaty by Bangladesh, Chile, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey. In addition, the State Duma of the Russian Federation had adopted the previous week a bill for the ratification of the Treaty. Regrettably, key countries, including the United States of America and China, had not yet ratified it. Japan called for a continued moratorium on nuclear tests pending the entry into force of the Treaty.

74. It was also a matter of regret that, despite the agreement of the 1995 Review Conference, little prospect existed for the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off convention, which was expected to become an important pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. The States concerned should show maximum flexibility and a spirit of compromise so that negotiations could begin without further delay. Japan also hoped that all nuclear-weapon States and States that had not accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards would observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The Japanese Government had promoted the development and use of nuclear energy in order to secure a stable energy supply and to reduce the level of greenhouse gas emissions. In so doing, it had committed itself to maintaining as far as possible transparency in its nuclear-fuel cycle policy and, in particular, its use of plutonium.

75. International cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be further expanded and the international non-proliferation regime strengthened. It was therefore a matter of regret that only eight countries, including Japan, had thus far ratified the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements. Work must be accelerated to integrate the strengthened safeguards under the Additional Protocol into the current safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and tangible steps, such as the elaboration of an international action plan, should be taken to promote universal acceptance of the Additional Protocol. As the new century dawned, Japan remained firmly committed to its three non-nuclear principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their introduction into Japan. It would continue to contribute to world peace and prosperity by working relentlessly for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation with the ultimate goal of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

76. **Mr. Robson** (New Zealand) said that, despite the lack of progress to date, New Zealand was committed to pursuing in good faith and bringing to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. It had been a very active participant in international

efforts to consolidate peace and had been proud to take its place among the peacemakers. Nations must take advantage of the opportunities that were available to prevent a new nuclear arms race, work for disarmament and secure the peace. He commended those States that had turned back from the nuclear path and taken instead the path to national and regional security as non-nuclear-weapon States. His was a vision of a southern hemisphere free of nuclear weapons that consolidated the achievements of members of existing regional nuclear-weapon-free zones and built on the initiatives of other Governments.

77. Even though it had not yet entered into force, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was a major achievement for multilateral disarmament. New Zealand gave practical support to the Treaty through the stations that it contributed to the International Monitoring System. It welcomed the recent decision by the State Duma of the Russian Federation to ratify START II, the initiative on fissile materials that had been taken by the United States, the Russian Federation and IAEA, the reduction by the United Kingdom of its nuclear arsenal, the dismantling by France of its nuclear test facilities in the South Pacific and China's continued policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. In addition, the IAEA safeguards provided in the Additional Protocol offered a new benchmark for verifying that non-nuclear-weapon States were keeping their part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty bargain.

78. There were, however, many gaps and negatives in some of those achievements. Among them were the lack of progress towards a fissile material cut-off treaty and towards the introduction of negative security assurances; continuing concerns that a few non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty were not fulfilling their obligations thereunder; nuclear doctrines that were still embedded among nuclear-weapon States and gaining new currency with the so-called re-rationalization of nuclear weapons; the failure of the United States Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, despite the positive commitment of the President and his Administration, and the fact that some countries had not yet signed and many had not yet ratified the Treaty; and, lastly, concerns over the ageing of nuclear stockpiles and over current modernization programmes.

79. While the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan were not in breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they flew in the face of the commitments made by the States parties thereto. New Zealand did not agree with the proposal that the Treaty should be adjusted to the so-called new realities and the international non-proliferation regime organized around those who challenged its norms. It was also a matter of real concern that another State not party to the Treaty, namely, Israel, operated facilities that were not subject to safeguards. New Zealand supported the "Resolution on the Middle East" adopted by the 1995 Conference and hoped that the current Conference would give a clear message that the Resolution should be fully implemented. Those States that had chosen the nuclear option would discover that it harmed their security and that they had embarked upon a very dangerous road. Others had seen and understood that and had turned back.

80. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was fundamental to non-proliferation and to disarmament, and States parties had made commitments to each other in their own vital interests, both national and collective. Those interests could be advanced by completing the work in progress, including reinforcement of the norm established under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, adoption of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreements, launching negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty and encouraging States that were not parties to accede to the Treaty.

81. The spectre of failure indicated the distance still to travel from a history of war to a culture of peace. That gap did not lie in the performance of the 182 non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty, nearly all of which were meeting their commitments in full. Nor was it explained by the actions and ambiguities of the few States that were not parties to the Treaty, despite their attempts to challenge the foundations of the Treaty's success. The core concern was the absence of enough evidence of success in the key component of the Treaty, namely, disarmament. Other causes of concern were the fact that the nuclear-weapon States, which were under obligation to eliminate their arsenals, sounded too tentative when describing it as an "ultimate" goal; claims that nuclear weapons were required for security into the "indefinite" future; the new pressures being placed on the machinery for the management of nuclear weapons and materials; the increasing difficulty encountered in attempting to gain wide support for new measures to underpin collective security; and the fact that breaches of the Treaty could not be stopped.

82. The 2000 Review Conference should provide the occasion for all States parties to renew their determination to meet their Treaty commitments. The indefinite extension that States parties had supported in 1995 was not a permit for the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. In order to finish the job, the five nuclear-weapon States should give an unequivocal commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process should also move ahead with all five nuclear-weapon States joining a process aimed at the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

83. **Mr. Hain** (United Kingdom) said that, as a nuclear-weapon State which fully complied with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, his country wanted to see the Conference take a further step forward to curb the current threat of a new nuclear arms race and pursue the ultimate objective of a nuclear-free world. The United Kingdom fully supported the statement made on behalf of the European Union, particularly with regard to the crucial subjects of universality, non-proliferation, peaceful uses and disarmament. The current Labour Government had transformed his country's role in the nuclear disarmament process, having made an unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament and taken significant practical steps in that regard.

84. He very much welcomed the Russian State Duma's decision to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and looked forward to its early formal ratification by the Russian Federation. India and Pakistan, however, had exploded nuclear devices and, along with North Korea, had still not signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). That was extremely disappointing and he urged all three States to sign and ratify that Treaty without further delay. Similarly, the United States Senate's vote not to ratify the CTBT against the President's advice was a disappointment. His country would continue to press for ratification by the United States as soon as possible, together with that of China, Israel and all other States that had signed the Treaty, but whose ratification was still necessary for its entry into force. Efforts must also continue to establish the verification system to ensure that the CTBT was fully operational in time.

85. The United Kingdom had pressed constantly for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty and was deeply frustrated that the position of other States had thwarted the achievement of that objective. Nuclear disarmament would simply not be possible without the verification arrangements on reprocessing and enrichment facilities under such a treaty. Accordingly, he urged all States that were members of the Conference on Disarmament to set aside their differences and begin negotiations at once.

86. The United Kingdom had been making systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally. The United States of America and the Russian Federation had been making very significant reductions under the START I Treaty, had made considerable progress on issues relating to fissile material, and had successfully pursued the negotiations leading to the conclusion of a START II Protocol and various ABM Treaty-related agreements. His country was delighted that the Russian Duma and Federation Council had approved the START II Treaty and hoped that that would open the way for negotiations on a START III treaty for further cuts in nuclear arsenals.

87. Consideration of a national missile defence system by the United States had been prompted by growing concerns about the acquisition of long-range ballistic missile capabilities by some countries that did not form part of established deterrence relationships. Those concerns needed to be addressed. Nevertheless, active missile defence raised complex and difficult issues. His delegation welcomed the fact that the United States had made it clear that in taking decisions on such a system, it would take into account a number of important considerations, including the need to preserve strategic stability. Those matters should be addressed bilaterally with the Russian Federation through calm, measured dialogue. For that reason, the United Kingdom had welcomed the announcement in June 1999 that those two countries would begin discussions on a third Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III) and on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT). Despite the obvious differences, it was hoped that agreement could be reached.

88. The United Kingdom had been very active in working to achieve the global elimination of nuclear weapons. It had signed and ratified the CTBT and had worked hard to establish the Treaty's verification system. His country had pressed hard for negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and had ensured that its enrichment and reprocessing operations were under EURATOM safeguards and subject to IAEA inspection.

The United Kingdom had also explicitly stated that, when it was satisfied with progress towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons, it would ensure that British nuclear weapons were included in negotiations.

89. His country had also been reducing its nuclear forces by dismantling all its air-delivered nuclear weapons, relying on a submarine-based delivery system only. Work had also begun to develop expertise in verifying the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, and a paper on those issues was being circulated. The United Kingdom had published an initial report on past production of fissile material for defence purposes and was circulating a summary paper on its main conclusions and the role of such work in nuclear disarmament. His Government had been transparent about the size of its nuclear material stocks and had declared nuclear material excess to its defence requirements.

90. In spite of the progress made in disarmament since the end of the cold war, in some ways the planet had become even more dangerous. States such as Iraq had acquired or were seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. India and Pakistan continued to develop their nuclear capabilities. Israel's potential nuclear capabilities were seen by non-nuclear States in the region as a factor in the Middle East peace process. There was almost universal agreement on the need for a united and vigorous response to tackle the problems of global insecurity and prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty must remain the cornerstone of collective efforts to bring that about.

91. **Mr. Wibisono** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that the Movement's position was based on the decisions taken at the 1995 Review Conference. He introduced a working paper submitted by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that were parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which addressed the issues set forth in the preamble and articles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and made specific proposals. The paper expressed the belief that the Treaty was a key instrument for halting proliferation and seeking a fair balance between the obligations and responsibilities of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States and proposed the establishment of an open-ended inter-sessional standing committee to follow up on recommendations for implementing the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

92. The working paper called for strict observance of the Treaty to stem further proliferation and reaffirmed the commitment of the non-aligned countries to its full implementation, expressing concern about the availability of nuclear technology to States that were not parties to the Treaty. The Movement called upon the parties concerned to refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements. The paper confirmed the role of IAEA as the competent authority to verify compliance with obligations under the Treaty and urged States to place their nuclear facilities under the Agency's safeguards.

93. The Movement reaffirmed the inalienable right of States parties to engage in research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and called for the removal of unilaterally enforced restrictive measures beyond safeguards which prevented peaceful nuclear development. The paper emphasized the need to take into account all the provisions of the CTBT and refrain from conducting all types of tests. Citing the dangers posed by nuclear armaments to mankind, the Movement called for a reversal of the nuclear arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals. The Movement was also concerned over the negative implications of the development of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the weaponization of outer space and called for compliance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty. The paper expressed support for the efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and emphasized the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's universality.

94. On the question of security assurances, the Movement urged States to negotiate a legal instrument to protect non-nuclear States against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons and expressed the view that the 1995 "Resolution on the Middle East" was an integral part of the package that had been adopted. The Movement was committed to its full implementation, including the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Lastly, he called upon the other States parties to consider carefully those proposals and demonstrate the same flexibility that the Non-Aligned Movement had shown in its preparations for the review conference.

Organization of work

95. **The President** said he took it that the Conference wished to adopt the proposed programme of work set out in document NPT/CONF.2000/INF.2.

96. *It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.

Summary record of the 3rd meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 25 April 2000, at 10 a.m.

President:	Mr. **Baali**	(Algeria)
later:	Mr. **Alemán** (Vice-President)	(Ecuador)
later:	Mr. **Baali** (President)	(Algeria)

Contents

General debate *(continued)*

Programme of work *(continued)*

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

General debate *(continued)*

1. Mr. **De Ruyt** (Belgium) said that his delegation shared the deep concern expressed by Portugal on behalf of the European Union and by many other States parties. When the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had been concluded some 30 years earlier, the ultimate goal had been total nuclear disarmament. At the time of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty there had been legitimate reasons to hope that that goal could be achieved. The end of the cold war, permitting bilateral arms reductions, and the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones had convinced the parties to the Treaty to extend it indefinitely.

2. After the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, there had been further promising developments. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) had been concluded; the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) had been ratified by the United States Senate; additional States had acceded to the NPT; and a nuclear-weapon-free zone had been established in Africa.

3. Unfortunately, hopes had recently been dashed by the emergence of some serious threats. The decision of India and Pakistan to pursue their nuclear programmes challenged the very spirit of the non-proliferation regime. While the declared intentions of India and Pakistan concerning the CTBT were good, it was time that the two countries put their words into action by acceding to it and by declaring a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and participating in the negotiation of a treaty on the matter. Also of concern was the development in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of nuclear programmes prohibited by the NPT.

4. The unexpectedly slow rate of ratification of the CTBT was disappointing. His delegation hoped that the other nuclear-weapon States would shortly follow the example of the United Kingdom, France and the Russian Federation and that the Japanese efforts in informal consultations would be successful. A further cause for concern was the inability of the international community to open negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Insistence on linking the negotiations to other matters, however understandable, was counterproductive.

5. A further worrisome development was the threat to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) posed by the declared intention of the United States to deploy a national missile defence system. It was essential that the programme should not compromise existing strategic balances or prevent the reduction of the strategic arsenals of the nuclear Powers.

6. Despite the grim picture, there had been some positive developments in the previous five years, including: the establishment of an international surveillance system in Vienna; a substantial reduction in deployed nuclear arms; an initiative by the United States and the Russian Federation to put designated fissile materials no longer required for defence purposes under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); initiatives by the United Kingdom and France regarding reductions, increased transparency and a unilateral moratorium with respect to the production of fissile materials for military purposes; the adoption of a Model Additional Protocol designed to strengthen IAEA safeguards agreements; important efforts by the NPT Exporters' Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group to enhance the transparency of export control regimes on nuclear items; and the recent ratification of START II by the Russian Parliament. His delegation hoped that the United States and the Russian Federation would shortly begin to negotiate START III.

7. It was important that the four States that remained outside the NPT should be present at meetings held to discuss the non-proliferation regime. The Malaysian suggestion was appreciated, but the proposed consultation mechanism might be too cumbersome. Perhaps the President could be given a mandate to engage in informal consultations with those countries and to report at least once annually on his efforts.

8. His delegation believed in the gradual evolution of nuclear disarmament and advocated the creation of an information exchange mechanism to allow nuclear-weapon States to keep the international community informed about efforts and progress in disarmament. The Government of Belgium had confidence in the existing structures and recognized the usefulness of the Conference on Disarmament, of which it would be assuming the Presidency. As President, its chief

priority would be to resume the activities of the Conference, which had been paralysed by a lack of consensus on the programme of work. Reasonable objectives for the next session of the Conference on Disarmament were to start negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for military purposes, revive the working group on negative security assurances and elaborate mandates enabling the Conference on Disarmament to deal adequately with the problems of nuclear disarmament and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

9. **Mr. Downer** (Australia) said that the value of the NPT had been demonstrated by the growth of its membership. Ten years earlier some 60 States, including two nuclear-weapon States, had been outside the Treaty. That number had dropped to four: Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan. Moreover, a number of States had turned away from possession of nuclear weapons and had acceded to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty enabled States to participate in nuclear trade and cooperation for peaceful purposes without fear of compromising non-proliferation objectives. It was a measure of the Treaty's success that the spread of nuclear weapons to 25 States, as projected in the 1960s, had not come to pass.

10. In honour of ANZAC Day, on which Australians remembered those who had lost their lives fighting for a better world, he wished to announce his Government's Six-Point Plan to promote progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament: the immediate entry into force and full implementation of START II and the early commencement and completion of negotiations on START III; the early entry into force of the CTBT; immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; universal adoption of the IAEA additional protocol and early establishment of an integrated safeguards regime; effective export controls on nuclear trade; and universal accession to the non-proliferation treaty regime.

11. Nuclear disarmament was a central obligation of the Treaty and remained a key Australian policy objective. Good progress had undoubtedly been made towards nuclear disarmament, even if not entirely uniform or consistent. The primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament lay with the two largest nuclear-weapon States. His Government looked to the United States and the Russian Federation to deliver the deep cuts in nuclear arsenals promised by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process and encouraged them to continue their preliminary discussions on START III. The smaller nuclear-weapon States had also contributed through withdrawal from deployment and reduction of forces. All five nuclear-weapon States had supported negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and four of them had announced a moratorium on the production of such material. His Government was committed to working towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, but it was well aware that reductions must be made incrementally, by means of a realistic, balanced approach that took into account strategic realities.

12. It was worth recalling that article VI obligations were directed to all parties to the Treaty. It was important for non-nuclear-weapons States to reinforce non-proliferation and disarmament goals, for example, by encouraging the entry into force of the CTBT and the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Australia had been a strong supporter of both those objectives. All States gained a vital security benefit from the assurance that others in their region were not pursuing nuclear weapons programmes. Universal accession to the Treaty remained an urgent priority. From both non-proliferation and disarmament standpoints, parties to the Treaty must adhere fully to the IAEA safeguards obligations. Australia had been an active proponent of the IAEA strengthened safeguards system and had been the first country to ratify the Additional Protocol to improve and extend IAEA inspection and access rights. His delegation urged the Conference to support the Additional Protocol strongly and pave the way for it to be regarded as a necessary part of non-nuclear-weapons States' safeguards obligations under the Treaty.

13. Although the CTBT had not entered into force, it had been firmly established as a powerful international norm against further nuclear testing. With 155 signatories, it was approaching the status of a universal treaty. The recent decision of the Russian Federation to ratify the CTBT was welcome. All five nuclear-weapons States had signed the CTBT and therefore had an obligation under international law not to frustrate its purpose. His Government welcomed the nuclear-weapons States' moratorium on testing and would continue to encourage the United States Administration

to mobilize popular support for the CTBT in order to convince the Senate of its worth.

14. His delegation looked to the Conference on Disarmament for the immediate commencement and speedy conclusion of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, one of the most urgent non-proliferation steps the international community could take. Pending negotiation, it hoped that China would join in the moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and that India, Israel and Pakistan would do likewise.

15. His delegation welcomed the opening for signature of treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in South-East Asia and Africa similar to those in the South Pacific and in Latin America and the Caribbean. It looked forward to further progress on establishing such a zone in Central Asia.

16. The provisions of article IV of the NPT, which dealt with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, were essential to the balance of rights and obligations of States parties. Implementation had been large-scale and effective through IAEA and regional cooperation arrangements. But such cooperation required a climate of certainty about non-proliferation. Nuclear-export controls were an essential means of ensuring that non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty were met. For the vast majority of States parties, export controls were a help rather than a hindrance. His Government had long held to the principle that significant nuclear supply to non-nuclear-weapons States should be dependent on their acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards, a principle that was endorsed in the "Principles and Objectives" adopted at the 1995 Conference. It believed that accession to the IAEA Additional Protocol should also be made a condition of supply.

17. While the nuclear tests in South Asia in 1998 were a challenge to the non-proliferation regime, actions by non-parties could not be seen as a failure of the Treaty itself. His delegation urged India and Pakistan to take prompt action and to reduce tension in the region by signing the CTBT, participating in negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, maintaining their moratoriums on nuclear tests and applying stringent export controls. Its hope was that India and Pakistan would ultimately sign the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States.

18. In examining progress on implementation of the Treaty, it would be necessary to address issues of compliance. IAEA was still unable to resume its verification and monitoring activities in Iraq. Despite recent improvements in relations with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was not fulfilling all its obligations under the safeguards agreement; it must preserve the information necessary for IAEA to verify its initial inventory declaration in order to be able to benefit fully from the peaceful nuclear cooperation offered through the light-water reactor project.

19. Despite challenges, the Treaty remained the world's best defence against the spread of nuclear weapons. It was the only global treaty dedicated to the containment of nuclear weapons and their eventual elimination, and it delivered major security benefits to all States.

20. **Mr. Amorim** (Brazil) said that Brazil was participating for the first time in a review conference of parties to the Treaty. Like many others Brazil had been critical of the asymmetrical obligations deriving from the Treaty, all the more so as the essential bargain it contained had not been respected during the cold war era, when the nuclear-weapon States had increased their killing capacity. In the 1990s, however, a turning point had been reached and reductions in nuclear arsenals had become a real possibility. Brazil had also been encouraged by the decisions adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which ensured that the nuclear-weapon States would be more accountable for achieving total elimination of nuclear weapons.

21. Meanwhile, important developments had been taking place in Brazil and Latin America. Brazil's 1988 Constitution had stipulated that nuclear energy would be used in the territory for peaceful purposes only. A full-scope safeguards agreement with Argentina had been concluded, providing for control by a bilateral agency and IAEA. The Treaty of Tlatelolco had gone into force in Brazil and the other countries of the region. In view of the auspicious international trends, Brazil had decided to accede to the NPT on the understanding that effective measures would be taken towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

22. Unfortunately, the current international environment was less favourable than in the post-cold-war era, despite the recent encouraging decision of the Russian Federation to ratify START II and the CTBT.

The geopolitical situation appeared less stable, regional tensions had added to the complexities of global balance, and the deployment of new weapons systems and modernization of existing ones seemed to indicate that the illusion of absolute security was once again being pursued. The irreversibility of nuclear arms control measures could not be taken for granted.

23. His delegation was disturbed that thousands of nuclear weapons continued to be kept on hair-trigger alert. Rationales for the possession and use of nuclear weapons had been reinforced. Deterrence doctrines had been expanded to deal with threats of all kinds, rather than purely the survival of the State, and the threshold for use of nuclear weapons had been lowered. Continued reliance on nuclear deterrence and the assumption that nuclear weapons would be maintained indefinitely was unacceptable. The nuclear-weapon States insisted that their weapons provided security benefits but reserved to themselves alone the right to own them, a position that was discriminatory and unsustainable. The possession of nuclear weapons by any State was a constant stimulus to other States to acquire them. The nuclear tests in South Asia should have alerted the international community to the risks posed by nuclear proliferation and delayed action on nuclear disarmament. There were also worrisome signs of the gradual acceptance of the de facto nuclear status of States not yet parties to the Treaty which had failed to renounce the nuclear weapons option. Such an attitude ran counter to the spirit of the Treaty. The Conference therefore had a twofold task: to urge non-States parties to accede to the Treaty without conditions and without delay, and to call on States parties to refrain from any action that might frustrate fulfilment of the objectives of the Treaty.

24. The Conference faced daunting challenges and its deliberations would be closely followed by decision makers around the world. Its outcome would have a strong bearing on the future of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The Conference must build on the numerous contributions which Governments, experts, individuals and non-governmental organizations had put forward over the years, particularly on interim measures and subsequent steps to be taken in the area of nuclear disarmament.

25. The New Agenda Coalition, of which his country was a founding member, had been a catalyst for those ideas. It proposed a programme of action that did not exempt any country from its responsibilities towards others. The measures listed would be incumbent on the entire international community, including the five nuclear weapon States and the three States not yet parties to the Treaty. The ideas of the New Agenda Coalition were not in themselves novel. What set the New Agenda apart was its composition, timing and comprehensive, balanced and achievable programme of action.

26. In his view, the main guiding principle of the Conference should be to preserve and consolidate what had been achieved in 1995. He hoped that, given the enormous challenges facing the Conference, States would demonstrate greater flexibility and a deeper sense of responsibility in order to uphold the integrity of the Treaty and confirm its vitality by agreeing to concrete measures in the field of nuclear disarmament.

27. **Mr. Saudargas** (Lithuania) said that the Preparatory Committee's work had been less productive than had been hoped; however, a new instrument such as the strengthened review process needed time to develop and could be modified at the end of the first cycle if necessary. Despite problems of implementation and enforcement, the Treaty's fundamental purposes remained credible. His Government therefore supported those who had called for a revitalization of the review process aimed at preserving the integrity of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament", developing a mechanism to transform principles and objectives into action and extending the review process from three to four sessions.

28. While welcoming the accession of nine additional States to the Treaty since 1995, he urged four States which were not parties to accede thereto. He was pleased that the Russian Federation had ratified START II and hoped that that agreement would be implemented in a timely manner and that negotiations on START III would soon begin. He also commended the Governments of France and the United Kingdom for having taken unilateral measures to downsize their nuclear arsenals and the measures taken by some nuclear weapon States to increase transparency in the field of nuclear disarmament.

29. The momentum resulting from the 1999 Vienna Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty must not be lost. He therefore welcomed the recent ratification of that Treaty by the Russian Parliament and urged other

States whose ratification was required for its entry into force, especially India, Pakistan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to sign and ratify it without delay. He also hoped that the Review Conference would promote the initiation of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the near future.

30. It was disturbing that, rather than working towards disarmament, States parties were increasingly required to devote their efforts to stemming proliferation. The Review Conference should therefore evaluate the dangerous course of events in the South Asian sub-continent and consider ways of preventing further deterioration in that situation. His Government was in favour of a progressive reduction of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and of enhanced efforts to close some nuclear weapon facilities, dismantle and destroy weapon-related materials, place excess nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards and pursue transparency and openness. The Conference on Disarmament should set up an appropriate mechanism to consider nuclear disarmament issues.

31. He welcomed efforts to expand nuclear-weapon-free zones through, *inter alia*, the Treaties of Rarotonga, Tlatelolco, Pelindaba and Bangkok and hoped that similar zones would be established in Central Asia and the Middle East. In that regard, he welcomed the Disarmament Commission's adoption of guidelines on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

32. While IAEA played a crucial role in the non-proliferation regime, its safeguards could not be effective unless all States parties honoured their commitments. His Government had acceded to virtually all IAEA conventions in the field of nuclear energy and was working to bring its legislation on export controls into line with that of the Nuclear Supplier Group States.

33. Despite some difficulties, the Treaty had proved effective; he was certain that a compromise could be reached and new forward-looking initiatives developed and endorsed for implementation during the next review cycle.

34. **Mr. Axworthy** (Canada) said that, in the fifty years since Canada had given up its own nuclear-weapon capacity, it had spent time and resources to build a strong international nuclear non-proliferation regime. With the NPT at its centre, the regime painstakingly constructed over decades had proved its worth, yet past achievement was no guarantee of future security. The cold-war truths of the twentieth century were giving way to the shifting uncertainties of the new one.

35. The challenges facing the Conference were varied. One concern was the tendency of some to justify retaining nuclear arsenals as a defence against other weapons of mass destruction or as political status symbols. No less disturbing were the ambitions of others to acquire nuclear capacity. Nuclear testing by India and Pakistan had added a frightening dimension to the insecurity in that region and had flagrantly violated international norms against nuclear proliferation. With the dismantling of warheads came heightened concern about the possibility of illicit transfers of weapons-grade material and technology. The drift towards unilateral options was also troubling. In the United States, the rejection of the CTBT was a significant step backward, while the proposed unilateral national missile defence system would have serious implications for the NPT regime. In the meantime, the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament had precluded any movement relating to nuclear disarmament, security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space. At least 50 States parties to the NPT had not yet concluded nuclear safeguards agreements.

36. To be sure, there had also been promising developments since the NPT had been extended indefinitely five years earlier. The number of States remaining outside the Treaty had been reduced from 10 to 4, and the CTBT had been signed by the vast majority of States. Nuclear weapon-free zones had been established. IAEA had adopted measures that significantly strengthened the nuclear safeguards regime. Significant reductions in nuclear weapons and the elimination of entire weapons systems by the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and France, as well as deep cuts in the nuclear forces assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), had contributed to a more stable security environment. In addition, the Russian Federation had decided to ratify START II and the CTBT.

37. While the record of the past five years might be mixed, it was clear that the end of the cold war had not removed the threat of nuclear weapons. Before the global nuclear non-proliferation regime could wither

by active design or malign neglect, it was essential to reaffirm international commitment and refocus global energy on strengthening the regime, as the best guarantee of common security.

38. Canada's goal was to give new meaning to the foundation of the NPT: a promise by those without nuclear weapons not to acquire them, in exchange for a commitment by those possessing such weapons to give them up eventually. The pledge made when the NPT had been extended indefinitely had been to ensure permanence with accountability. Canada's approach to that goal was threefold. First, it was committed to promoting and protecting the universality of the Treaty. Second, it would work to secure agreement on an updated five-year disarmament and non-proliferation action plan containing concrete objectives and goals. The action programme should be designed to find a way to bring the CTBT into force as soon as possible, end the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament and begin negotiations on a ban on fissile material production, continue START reductions in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, stress the need for the integrity of the ABM Treaty to be maintained, call on all nuclear-weapon States to enter into disarmament negotiations once the United States and the Russian Federation had reduced their strategic warheads to the 1000-2000 range, extend the application of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and encourage new ones, promote the universalization of IAEA safeguards, and further improve verification and inspection capacity and effectiveness. Another matter to be addressed was the growing number of countries which were developing or acquiring missiles capable of delivering nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Yet no treaty, code of conduct or set of guidelines existed to define responsible behaviour in those areas. The Missile Technology Control Regime could be made more effective by adopting stricter export controls on relevant technology and widening participation.

39. Third, Canada would work towards a more robust NPT review and assessment process through more frequent tracking, discussion and documentation of the progress made in translating commitment into action. Real accountability also required real transparency, and the active contribution of representatives of non-governmental organizations could do a great deal to enhance the openness of the Conference's work and mobilize public support and participation in its efforts.

40. The first resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly had been one recommending that atomic weapons should be eliminated from national arsenals. Ever since then, the international community had grappled with how best to contain the nuclear genie. Imperfect as it might be, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime provided the answer. A strong and effective NPT remained indispensable. The NPT remained the most widely adhered-to security accord in history because, despite the frustrations, it offered the best hope for minimizing the threat of nuclear annihilation, and the best vehicle for advancing common security.

41. **Mr. Ivanov** (Russian Federation), after conveying the greetings of President Putin and his best wishes for the success of the Conference, said it was symbolic that the review of the NPT was being held at the turn of the new century, when the foundations for a new system of international relations were being laid. His delegation had come to the Conference with the strong conviction that the preservation and strengthening of the Treaty would serve the interests of the entire world community.

42. New threats to international security and stability had emerged in the form of local conflicts, international terrorism and militant separatism. A tendency to undermine the existing system of strategic stability, attempts to build national stability at the expense of the interests of other States and the use of force in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law were equally dangerous and in fact were a direct invitation to a new arms race. In short, the world had come to a crossroads: either it would preserve through joint efforts the positive achievements in non-proliferation and limitation of nuclear weapons, or it would face the real prospect of chaos and uncontrollable military power. It was extremely important, therefore, that efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime should be made an integral part of a fair and democratic world order based on mutual trust and equal security for all States and regions.

43. The Russian Federation was fully committed to its obligations under article VI of the NPT. It was resolved to encourage steady progress by all five nuclear Powers towards nuclear disarmament. A few days earlier, it had ratified START II and the 1997 package of anti-ballistic missile agreements. The implementation of those instruments would constitute a

major step towards nuclear disarmament by reducing the overall level of strategic offensive weapons in Russia and the United States by approximately two thirds as compared to 1990 levels. It had also decided to ratify the CTBT.

44. The Russian Federation continued to implement earlier agreements on the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals. Pursuant to START I, it had already eliminated more than 2,000 ballistic missiles and over 950 land- and sea-based launchers, some 30 nuclear submarines and more than 80 heavy bombers. Total reductions under START I, when completed, would amount to some 40 per cent of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the United States.

45. Furthermore, all Russian ballistic missiles had been de-targeted. His Government continued to implement unilateral initiatives related to tactical nuclear weapons, removing them from surface ships, multi-purpose submarines, and land-based naval aircraft. Destruction of nuclear warheads from tactical missiles, artillery shells and mines was about to be completed, and half the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and for nuclear-gravity bombs had been destroyed. The Russian Federation was prepared to go further by considering steps to reduce the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia to the level of 1,500 warheads each. That historic opportunity could be missed, however, if the United States plan to deploy a national ABM system, in violation of the ABM Treaty of 1972, was translated into action.

46. Further reductions in strategic offensive weapons could be considered only in the context of preservation of the ABM Treaty. That instrument had opened the way for deep reductions in strategic offensive weapons on a stable and transparent basis. The prevailing system of arms control agreements was a complex and fragile structure, and, once one of its key elements had been weakened, the entire system would be destabilized. The collapse of the ABM Treaty would undermine all the disarmament agreements concluded over the past 30 years, and the threat of erosion of the non-proliferation regime would grow.

47. Compliance with the ABM Treaty in its current form, without any modifications, was a prerequisite for further negotiations on nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the NPT. The national security interests of every State and of the international community as a whole were affected. His Government was convinced that missile threats and proliferation could and should be dealt with without violating the ABM Treaty, and it was prepared to engage in the broadest possible consultations on the subject, both with the United States and multilaterally. It had proposed the establishment of a global missile and missile technologies non-proliferation control system as a real alternative to the vitiation of the ABM Treaty. The choice of that option was crucial not only to the fate of the non-proliferation regime, but also to the favourable unfolding of international affairs.

48. The task of strengthening the NPT was beyond the scope of the nuclear Powers alone. The universality of the Treaty remained an urgent concern, and those States which had not yet signed it should be actively encouraged to do so. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones made a meaningful contribution to the development and consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Russia was a party to the majority of international agreements on such zones, and the fact that it had no nuclear weapons beyond its national territory also illustrated its contribution to the consolidation of that regime. It urged other nuclear Powers to follow its example.

49. A ban on the production of fissile materials was another urgent issue. Russia was decommissioning its last remaining facilities for the production of weapons-grade plutonium and had ceased such production several years earlier. His delegation would work actively towards negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on that issue.

50. The future of the Conference on Disarmament was in grave doubt because of an erosion in the atmosphere of compromise which had prevailed earlier in that forum and the desire of some States to establish linkages between issues. For the second year in a row, the Conference was simply marking time, and a choice must be made to renounce immediate advantage in the interests of the common cause.

51. The NPT created a favourable climate for growing international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The IAEA safeguards were an effective instrument for strengthening the non-proliferation regime and a powerful confidence-building measure. Thirty years earlier, by concluding the Treaty, the international community had rejected the nuclear arms race. Confirmation of its indefinite extension by the Conference would vividly

demonstrate the commitment to make non-proliferation one of the inviolable principles of international security in the twenty-first century.

52. **Mr. Chalyi** (Ukraine) said that his Government had long supported the ideas embodied in General Assembly resolution 54/54 G, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda". The voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons by Ukraine and other newly independent States after the collapse of the Soviet Union was an act of great moral significance and political courage that should be properly reflected in the final document of the Conference.

53. Although Ukraine had possessed the world's third greatest nuclear potential, it had acceded to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State in 1994. It had eliminated 77 per cent of its strategic offensive weapons under START I and planned to complete that process by the end of 2001. He therefore welcomed the Russian Federation's ratification of START II and hoped that talks on START III would soon be resumed.

54. In affirming the importance of the ABM Treaty, his Government considered that no action taken by a State party with a view to lessening the possibility of a missile attack should constitute a violation of its obligations under that instrument. It also hoped that other nuclear-weapon States would join the Russian Federation in ratifying the CTBT.

55. The fundamental principle of non-proliferation had been undermined by developments in South Asia and challenged by States not parties to the NPT. It was imperative that those States should accede thereto as non-nuclear States without delay. It was also important to begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

56. Nuclear-weapon-free zones could play a valuable role in maintaining regional and global security and should be established in the regions of Central Asia and the Middle East.

57. IAEA efforts to strengthen the safeguards regime were commendable. Since 1995, Ukraine had greatly improved its non-proliferation record; it had concluded with IAEA an agreement for the application of comprehensive safeguards in 1997 and planned to sign the additional protocol to that agreement in 2001.

58. In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, a legally binding instrument, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, France and China had provided his Government with security guarantees that had been among the key factors in its decision to accede to the Treaty. His country's experience could be of value to the development of a universal, legally binding document on assurances. In that regard, he considered that the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, established in 1998 by the Conference on Disarmament, should be re-established. He also welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and hoped that the Council would pursue further expansion of the application of security assurances as part of the non-proliferation review process.

59. *Mr. Alemán (Ecuador), Vice-President, took the chair.*

60. **Mr. La Fortelle** (France) said that the success of the Review Conference would require a comprehensive, balanced approach to the three key areas covered by the Treaty – non-proliferation, the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and disarmament – and that his Government was convinced that the documents adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference were of fundamental importance to the review process.

61. France had committed itself unequivocally to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the provisions of article VI of the Treaty and of decision 2 of the 1995 Conference. It had completely phased out its land-based nuclear component, reduced its airborne and sea-based components, ratified the CTBT, closed its Mururoa test site, ceased production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, reduced the alert status of its nuclear forces on two occasions, provided the security assurances mentioned in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and ratified the relevant protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

62. His Government was committed to enhanced transparency as a voluntary confidence-building measure in support of disarmament efforts and, to that end, had opened its test site in the Pacific to international visits and published a document entitled "Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation:

French policy". He commended the success of the bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, recently illustrated by the Russian Federation's ratification of START II, and urged States which had not yet ratified the CTBT and, in particular, those whose ratification was necessary to its entry into force, to sign and ratify it in the near future. It was particularly unfortunate that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, the next step in the multilateral disarmament process, had not yet begun.

63. In a time of change and instability, it was essential to preserve and implement decision 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Nothing would be more dangerous than attempting to redraft the fundamental principles and objectives contained in that key document every five years. Securing the early entry into force of the CTBT and launching negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty were principles that had been recognized in a consensual manner as the only approach that would make it possible to secure the adherence by all States, whether or not they were parties to the Treaty, to universal, non-discriminatory, verifiable and hence credible standards. It would also enable States that had chosen not to accede to that instrument to demonstrate their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, thereby strengthening the Treaty itself and helping to ease regional tensions, especially in South Asia and the Middle East.

64. At a time when the risk that the arms race would be revived and the strategic balance broken was not negligible, it was indispensable for the United States of America and the Russian Federation to pursue the global reduction of their nuclear arsenals, which remained incommensurate with those of other nuclear-weapon States. His delegation therefore attached great importance to maintaining strategic stability, of which the ABM Treaty was an essential element, and was prepared to discuss new proposals for countering the slowness of the disarmament process both during the Review Conference and in the Conference on Disarmament, subject to a mandate adopted by consensus.

65. His Government was concerned at the fact that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had repeatedly hindered IAEA efforts to secure implementation of that country's safeguards agreement by verifying that all nuclear material subject to guarantees had been declared. Iraq was also a cause for concern. Thanks to the verification programme carried out since 1991, IAEA had been able to form a coherent picture of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear programme. He therefore regretted that IAEA had been unable to fulfil its mandate in that regard since 16 December 1998 and welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) and the inauguration of a process leading to the resumption of controls. France, for its part, had signed a strengthened safeguards agreement with IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Community on 22 September 1998 and would do its utmost to ratify it as quickly as possible.

66. His Government was cooperating with numerous countries and institutions in an effort to promote the widest possible access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a climate of confidence that was contingent on security, safety and transparency. The international community required an assurance that cooperation and exchange could not give rise to diversion of materials; hence the need for effective, objective and transparent export controls and adherence to the IAEA safeguards system. He called on all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Lastly, nuclear development must be accompanied by transparency in order to make governments and populations aware of what was at stake and to convince public opinion that nuclear power was an environmentally friendly and safe source of energy.

67. **Mr. Abusseitov** (Kazakhstan) said that the problems that had come up during the review process could lead to inconsistencies between the interpretation of Treaty obligations and the interests of States parties thereto, especially between nuclear-weapon States and others. It was therefore incumbent upon the international community to make the Treaty an effective tool for nuclear disarmament and for strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

68. It was essential for the United States of America and the Russian Federation to intensify their arms reduction talks and for them to be joined in that process by the three other nuclear-weapon States. In that regard, the recent ratification by the Russian Federation of START II paved the way for negotiations on further reductions of strategic arms as well as a package of 1997 ABM arrangements, in particular a memorandum

of understanding on the participation of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the implementation of the ABM Treaty. At the same time, it had become clear that despite the multilateral treaties in force, the international arms control regime was very vulnerable, since even a slight change in global balance and stability could endanger the effectiveness of the international arms control regime as a whole. In that regard, his delegation was concerned over the situation with respect to the ABM Treaty, the preservation of which was an indispensable condition for the process of disarmament.

69. Recognizing the need for overall strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, his delegation supported the entry into force of the CTBT at an early date. By closing the Semipalatinsk test site, his country had made a significant contribution to the nuclear-test ban. He welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify the CTBT and was encouraged by the efforts of the United States Administration to resubmit the issue of ratification to the Senate. There was also a need, in the context of globalization, to strengthen efforts to combat the illegal trade in nuclear material and missile technologies. His country had nearly concluded its internal procedures for joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group and was also preparing to join the Missile Technology Control Regime.

70. It was extremely important to establish a new climate of openness and transparency in the nuclear field, especially in view of the hundreds of tons of fissile material that would be released as a result of radical reductions in the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals. Such openness would be helpful in enhancing confidence between States and ensuring that the fissile material would not be misused. His Government favoured the early commencement of negotiations on ending the production of fissile material for military purposes. It was also actively involved in the elaboration of the Treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

71. The problem of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States could be solved by adopting a security assurances protocol as an integral part of the NPTO. The provisions of such a protocol should be simple and unambiguous. Greater openness and unrestricted exchange of nuclear material and technologies and of scientific information should facilitate the development of programmes on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He drew attention to the question of the rehabilitation of the former nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk. Nearly two years had passed since the adoption by the General Assembly of a resolution urging the international community to assist his Government to rehabilitate that region. A report on the subject would be submitted at the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

72. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) resumed the Chair.*

73. **Ms. Lindh** (Sweden), endorsing the statement of the European Union and the views expressed by Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said that 30 years after the entry into force of the NPT, international negotiations on nuclear disarmament were nearly at a standstill. Since 1995, there had been more setbacks than progress in nuclear disarmament. Such setbacks included the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan, the violation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its NPT obligations and the plans being made by the United States of America to build a national missile defence system, which might spark off a new nuclear missile race. Out of concern for that situation, Sweden, together with several other non-nuclear-weapon States, had launched an initiative in 1998 calling for progress towards the treaty-bound objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

74. Some positive steps had been taken by nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear weapons globally. They included the systematic implementation of START I ahead of schedule by the United States, and the Russian Federation, the unilateral reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons by France, the United Kingdom and the United States, and efforts by some nuclear-weapon States to increase transparency in the disarmament process and to place fissile material under appropriate international safeguards.

75. However, those efforts were not enough. There were four areas of particular concern: reducing nuclear arsenals; bringing into force the CTBT; halting the development of new weapons and systems; and keeping nuclear weapons out of regional conflicts. While her delegation welcomed the ratification by the Russian Federation of START II, it remained deeply concerned that the Treaty had still not entered into force seven years after its signature. The Russian Federation and the United States of America must now exercise their special responsibility by bringing START II and its protocol into force and immediately

beginning negotiations on START III. The unilateral reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons carried out by some nuclear-weapon States should be followed by further cutbacks. There should be transparency in the stocks of non-strategic nuclear weapons, which had no place in the twenty-first century. She welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify the CTBT and urged China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America to follow suit.

76. No State had the right to hold the common security environment hostage to domestic policies. Nor was it acceptable that differences between the nuclear-weapon States on unrelated issues should interfere with the responsibility for making progress on the nuclear arms control agenda. The development of nuclear weapons should cease once and for all. Her Government remained committed to negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty which would effectively prevent the further development of nuclear weapons, and it could not accept attempts by China or any other State to block progress on that crucial treaty.

77. Her Government was deeply concerned about the plans by the United States for a national missile defence system. Such action might jeopardize the international balance and have negative consequences for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. States parties should refrain from any deployment that could create uncertainties. In that regard, the Russian Federation and the United States of America shared the responsibility for negotiating a solution that would have a positive impact on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

78. There was a need to halt regional nuclear threats. The nuclear-weapon testing conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 had the potential to set off an arms race that would threaten peace and security in South Asia. It was imperative that India and Pakistan should renounce their nuclear ambitions in accordance with Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) and sign the CTBT. In the Middle East, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continued to be a cause for concern. Iraq should cooperate with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), and the countries of the Middle East region should take decisive steps towards a comprehensive solution to the security situation, including the setting up of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Her delegation hoped for a solution to the nuclear situation on the Korean peninsula and urged all the States concerned to refrain from developing weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must abide by its safeguard commitments in accordance with article III of the NPT.

79. Her delegation welcomed the approval in 1997 of a system which would strengthen the ability of IAEA to detect secret nuclear-weapons programmes. However, the additional protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreements must be ratified more expeditiously. Illicit trafficking was a threat to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and she therefore urged States to accede to the Physical Protection Convention as soon as possible. Moreover, thought should be given to cooperative measures, including verification, which would strengthen worldwide physical protection. Her Government remained committed to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and welcomed the efforts of IAEA to align its activities in that field more closely with those of developing countries. Any activities related to nuclear applications must be based on internationally agreed safety standards, and all countries must accede to all relevant conventions and fully implement their commitments.

80. The Conference offered an opportunity for the States parties to add more substance to the strengthened review process and to renew international commitment to the full implementation of the NPT. To that end, they should undertake unequivocally to eliminate nuclear arsenals and to engage without delay in an accelerated process of negotiations, thus achieving nuclear disarmament in accordance with the NPT; to do their utmost to achieve the entry into force of the CTBT unconditionally and without delay; to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; to increase transparency in respect of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenals and stocks of fissile material; and to let the principle of irreversibility guide all measures undertaken in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

81. **Mr. Niehaus** (Costa Rica) condemned the use of or threat to use and the development of nuclear weapons. No situation justified the existence of nuclear arsenals, given the dangers that lay in the inevitable escalation of military conflict. Once the nuclear fuse was lit, there was no way of avoiding global

conflagration. The nuclear-weapon States must make a genuine commitment to disarmament, deactivate their offensive nuclear systems and dismantle their arsenals. Moreover, they should halt the transfer of nuclear technology to States that were not parties to the NPT.

82. His delegation was seriously concerned about the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan and strongly urged all countries that were not yet parties to the NPT to renounce the development of nuclear weapons and become parties to that international instrument as soon as possible, without stipulating conditions. The universality of the NPT should be one of the primary goals of the international community with a view to guaranteeing global security. In that regard, he congratulated the seven States that had ratified the Treaty since 1995. He also appealed to all the States that had not ratified or signed the CTBT to do so shortly. That Treaty's entry into force was an indispensable and urgent step to ensure the security of all humanity. Its prompt ratification was essential to prevent a new arms race. In that regard, he welcomed the recent ratification of the CTBT and START II in the Russian Federation and expressed serious concern at the difficulties that the ratification process had encountered in other States. He was also concerned at the obstacles put in the way of IAEA by Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

83. He hoped that all those participating in the Conference would undertake to adopt concrete measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war and revive nuclear disarmament talks. The Review Conference should establish a nuclear disarmament agenda for the next five years that included: the establishment of concrete measures such as the early entry into force of the CTBT; the negotiation of a universal and legally binding instrument to prohibit the production of fissile material; the strengthening of IAEA and its verification activities; the adoption of additional protocols pursuant to article III of the NPT; and the establishment of a system to guarantee the physical protection of nuclear material.

84. The five nuclear-weapon States had prime responsibility for ensuring that the negotiations referred to in article VI of the NPT were pursued. Lastly, he wished to stress that the financial resources currently devoted to weapons should be used instead to promote socioeconomic development.

Programme of work *(continued)*

85. **The President**, after drawing attention to rule 34 of the rules of procedure, said that Mr. Christopher Weston (Canada) had been nominated Chairman of subsidiary body 2 of Main Committee II.

86. *Mr. Weston (Canada) was elected Chairman of subsidiary body 2 of Main Committee II.*

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

Summary record of the 4th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 25 April 2000, at 3 p.m.

President:	Mr. Baali	(Algeria)
later:	Mr. Balboni Acqua	(Italy)
later:	Mr. Minty	(South Africa)

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Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee

Election of Vice-Presidents

General debate (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee

1. **The President** said that, in accordance with rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Conference would elect two Vice-Chairmen for each of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee. The following nominations had been received: Mr. Lint (Belgium) for the post of Vice-Chairman of Main Committee I; Mr. Suh Dae-won (Republic of Korea) for that of Vice-Chairman of Main Committee II; Mr. Dzundev (The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) for the post of Vice-Chairman of Main Committee III; Ms. Aboulnaga (Egypt) for that of Vice-Chairman of the Drafting Committee; and Mr. Botnaru (Moldova) for the post of Vice-Chairman of the Credentials Committee.

2. *Mr. Lint (Belgium) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee I; Mr. Suh Dae-won (Republic of Korea) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee II; Mr. Dzundev (The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee III; Ms. Aboulnaga (Egypt) was elected Vice-Chairman of the Drafting Committee; and Mr. Botnaru (Moldova) was elected Vice-Chairman of the Credentials Committee.*

3. **The President** said that consultations on the outstanding nominations for the posts of Vice-Chairmen of the Committees were still continuing and that he would inform the Conference of those nominations at an appropriate time.

Election of Vice-Presidents

4. **The President** said that it was his understanding that the Conference wished to designate the delegation of Myanmar to provide one of the Vice-Presidents of the Conference.

5. *It was so decided.*

General debate (*continued*)

6. **Mr. Samhan** (United Arab Emirates) said that global political events had proved that the stability and security of States could not be achieved through the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons not only posed a serious threat to humanity, but also had a very negative impact on economic and social development, and the environment. Despite the limited attempts by some nuclear-weapon States to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons, the international community was still burdened by an arms race, particularly in prohibited weapons, including nuclear weapons. That situation had encouraged some countries in regions where tensions prevailed to conduct nuclear tests, stockpile fissile and nuclear materials, and acquire other non-conventional weapons as a means of deterrence.

7. As a result, there had been an escalation of tension and conflicts between those States, which constituted a direct threat to regional and international peace and security. His Government therefore called upon States to respect their obligations under the treaties prohibiting such weapons and urged States which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in order to achieve universality. It supported the proposals to establish subregional, regional and international arrangements to safeguard non-proliferation, including the establishment of an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament, so as to achieve the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons in accordance with article VI of the Treaty and also to conclude an unconditional instrument that would provide security safeguards for non-nuclear-weapon States.

8. Since 1995, there had been some positive developments, such as the accession of nine States to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the United Arab Emirates. His Government had taken that step on the basis of the 1995 "Resolution on the Middle East" and relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions which provided a legal basis for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region. Israel was the only country in the region which had not yet acceded to the Treaty and still possessed nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. That situation caused a clear military imbalance in the region and posed a continuous threat to regional peace and security, undermining the credibility of the Treaty. His Government urged the Conference to call upon the Israeli Government to give up its nuclear arsenal and implement the "Resolution on the Middle East" and to submit all its nuclear facilities to the inspection regime of the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It also called for an end to the provision of all forms of technological and scientific assistance in support of Israeli nuclear facilities.

9. Achieving a comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East and putting an end to occupation and tension in that region, particularly in the Arab gulf region, depended mainly on countries having the necessary political will to implement their obligations to eliminate prohibited weapons, including nuclear weapons, and to work to settle conflicts and end occupation in a peaceful manner, on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of international law, especially the principles of mutual respect for the sovereignty of regional States, peaceful coexistence, confidence-building measures, and renunciation of the use of force.

10. **Mr. Kharrazi** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that despite the ever-growing call for nuclear disarmament, the qualitative development of nuclear weapons continued unabated and the nuclear-weapon States showed no sign of relenting. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, however, had never sought to perpetuate a permanent classification of some States as nuclear-weapon States. Since nuclear disarmament remained the ultimate goal of the Treaty, nuclear-weapon States had an international obligation to cease the manufacture of such weapons and eliminate all existing stockpiles and their means of delivery.

11. That obligation had been underlined by the International Court of Justice. The maintenance of nuclear arsenals increased the dangers of vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation and the risks of accidental or deliberate nuclear attack. Since the international community had banned the use, development and stockpiling of two categories of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons should not be exempted. Work should begin on an additional protocol to the Treaty to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. The time had come to start negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention; the nuclear threat was global and its removal was a legitimate international concern.

12. There was enormous potential for the further diversification and development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The systematic refusal to transfer nuclear technology to developing non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty and the restrictive export control policies exercised by the nuclear suppliers were therefore highly regrettable. Ad hoc regimes, acting under the pretext of non-proliferation, continued to pursue discriminatory policies with the main objective of exclusive possession of nuclear technology by developed countries. That situation must be rectified. The existence of those regimes undermined the credibility of the Treaty and of IAEA, and rendered the IAEA safeguards irrelevant. The problem was compounded by certain States, with an imperfect record on non-proliferation, which had arrogated the right to determine compliance by others and to take measures to prevent access to peaceful nuclear technology by States parties to the Treaty, even though the 1995 Conference had established the requirement that States parties which had concerns regarding non-compliance with the Safeguards Agreements must direct such concerns to IAEA.

13. The Treaty constituted an integrated whole, whose effectiveness lay in full compliance with all its provisions by all States parties. Continued failure by nuclear-weapon States to live up to their side of the bargain would render the regime unstable and untenable. The current Conference must take effective measures to guarantee the implementation of article IV in all its aspects, especially with regard to the transfer of technology, equipment and nuclear materials to developing States. It should make every effort to develop common approaches and generally agreed arrangements for international peaceful nuclear trade.

14. The horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons had made security assurances all the more essential. Old bloc rivalries must be put aside. The preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the relevant Security Council resolutions and unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States were inadequate. Meanwhile, some nuclear-weapon States had tried to confine security assurances to nuclear-weapon-free zones or to place conditions on their obligations towards non-nuclear-weapon States. The Conference should strive to obtain more stringent and specific nuclear security assurances in the form of a legally binding international instrument. The Treaty could not be effective unless it achieved universality. Genuine and concerted efforts were required to attain that objective. The review process should provide for deliberations on ways to promote the universality of the Treaty, in particular, through the accession of States operating unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

15. The threat posed to regional and international peace and security by Israel's clandestine nuclear-weapon programmes was a major impediment to achieving the goals of the Treaty. Despite its intransigence, Israel benefited from unrestricted transfer of nuclear technology, equipment and material, and was fully catered to by the self-appointed guardians of non-proliferation. It was imperative to build on the 1995 "Resolution on the Middle East" and explore ways to implement it. Israel should be forced to renounce nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty and bring all its facilities and programmes under IAEA safeguards. Those who had helped Israel to develop such weapons had a special responsibility in that regard. Since the 1995 "Resolution on the Middle East" had been part of the package solution which had secured the indefinite extension of the Treaty, it was imperative to honour that collective commitment.

16. The 2000 Review Conference should also consider the implementation of the decision on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty". In addition to the inherent institutional shortcomings of the review mechanism, lack of political will and accommodation, as well as a selective approach towards provisions of the Treaty by some nuclear-weapon States had contributed to the failure of the review process. In order to guarantee compliance by States parties and full implementation of the decisions of the Review Conference, a standing body should be established. The Conference could set up a study group to consider establishing such a mechanism and report to the next session of the Preparatory Commission.

17. Nuclear non-proliferation was at stake; it was not a time for complacency. Apathy towards the Treaty, half-hearted commitment to its objectives and selective compliance with its provisions would undermine its relevance and validity. The Treaty must be viewed and implemented in its totality; all its provisions were interrelated and mutually reinforcing. The Islamic Republic of Iran had forgone the nuclear weapon option and would remain committed to nuclear non-proliferation.

18. **Mr. Aboul Gheit** (Egypt) said that his delegation wished to associate itself with the statements made at the second meeting by the representative of Indonesia introducing the working paper of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the representative of Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition. The 2000 Review Conference was the first opportunity to review the progress made towards implementation of the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty since its indefinite extension in 1995 and towards implementation of the comprehensive package of commitments entered into by the States parties to the Treaty at the 1995 Conference. A review of those objectives would reflect more failure than success.

19. With respect to the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty had not been attained; the international community had failed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia; efforts to achieve the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) had been hindered by the refusal of the United States Senate to ratify it; and negotiations had yet to be initiated in the Conference on Disarmament on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

20. The decision on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty" had set ambitious goals for review conferences and preparatory committee meetings. However, the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference had failed to adopt any substantive recommendations. As to the "Resolution on the Middle East", Israel had yet to accede to the Treaty or place its nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The 1995 Conference had reaffirmed the importance of the strict implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to nuclear disarmament, and emphasized the need to set specific objectives to achieve that ultimate goal. His delegation welcomed the steps taken by some nuclear-weapon States to reduce their arsenals over the past five years and noted with satisfaction the recent approval for ratification by the Russian State Duma of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II).

21. However, those steps fell short of meeting the hopes and aspirations of States that had renounced the nuclear option. In order to promote efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament, the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had called for the convening of an international conference and the eight States of the New Agenda Coalition had issued a joint declaration urging the nuclear-weapon States to accelerate the disarmament process. In that connection his Government fully supported the proposal by the Secretary-General in his report "We the peoples: the

role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century" (A/54/2000) for the convening of a major international conference that would help to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

22. The absence of effective legally binding international security assurances to protect the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was a source of disappointment. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) had failed to respond to the legitimate demands of those States. His delegation believed that it was high time to initiate negotiations on an international legally binding instrument. The decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" had reaffirmed the right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and had emphasized that, in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty.

23. The decision also called for increased transparency in nuclear-related export controls. Yet the non-nuclear-weapon States continued to face obstacles in their efforts to gain access to nuclear technology and know-how. His delegation urged the elimination of all constraints that prevented the full realization by States parties of their rights under article IV of the Treaty. In that connection, it considered that States parties should be legally obliged to apply IAEA safeguards as a precondition for the transfer to them of nuclear technology or materials. Also, decisive measures must be taken to protect peaceful nations from the threat of nuclear leaks from reactors not subject to international supervision.

24. With regard to the situation in the Middle East, Egypt had put forward many proposals with a view to overcoming the current impasse, including the initiation of regional negotiations on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the declaration by the States of the region of their commitment to adhere within a specified time-frame to the international instruments on nuclear non-proliferation and the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, and the implementation of confidence-building measures in the nuclear field. Regrettably, Israel had failed to respond to those proposals. That state of affairs could not be allowed to continue. The non-proliferation Treaty would have no credibility in the region as long as one State was exempt from its provisions.

25. The 2000 Review Conference must demand that Israel should accede to the Treaty without further delay and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. It must adopt clear recommendations for achieving the full implementation of the "Resolution on the Middle East". There was a need to consider the establishment of a mechanism to monitor progress in that area. His delegation believed that the nuclear-weapon States and, in particular, the States depositaries of the Treaty, as sponsors of the resolution, had a special responsibility concerning the realization of its objectives. The "Resolution on the Middle East" was an integral part of the package of commitments entered into at the 1995 Conference. Those commitments were not open to negotiation. If the situation in the Middle East was not given due regard on the pretext that to do so would burden the Conference, the credibility of the Treaty and the whole non-proliferation regime would be undermined.

26. With respect to the outcome of the Conference, he said that it was necessary to build on what had been achieved in 1995, to set new goals for the period leading up to the 2005 Conference, and to adopt recommendations for their attainment. There should be a particular focus on achieving the Treaty's universality and the strict implementation of its provisions. The participants must also consider how to improve the Preparatory Committee's working methods and how to make use of the subsidiary bodies established. Regarding the final document, the proposal to deal separately with those questions on which there was broad agreement and those issues on which consensus would be harder to obtain was unacceptable.

27. It was incumbent on the States parties to the Treaty to take advantage of the current favourable international climate in order to build a more stable and secure international order. The danger of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction threatened the whole of mankind. Therefore, all members of the international community must participate on an equal footing in the establishment of mechanisms and frameworks to eliminate that danger.

28. *Mr. Balboni Acqua (Italy), Vice President, took the Chair.*

29. **Mr. Reyes** (Colombia) said that Colombia had been a party to the Treaty from the outset and, along

with most of the Latin American countries, had agreed, through the Treaty of Tlatelolco, to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America. Colombia was convinced of the need to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to achieve universality. His Government also attached great importance to the package of decisions adopted in 1995, including the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", some of which remained unfulfilled, and the decision on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty", which was essential to the continued validity of the Treaty.

30. The non-proliferation regime must be strengthened and made more efficient. There should be no fear of new constructive proposals to that end, and no efforts should be spared in considering possible actions which could dissipate a dangerous feeling of frustration among some States parties. There was a need to take up substantive issues from a broad viewpoint, as well as the procedural reforms that were necessary to avoid the failures of the past. Since the 1995 Conference, various States had acceded to the Treaty, including Brazil and Chile; elsewhere, the results had been less encouraging; the nuclear explosions carried out in South East Asia posed a major challenge. Although the States parties to the Treaty could not accept the existence of new self-declared nuclear Powers, they could not ignore that situation, and the Conference should consider ways of dealing with it.

31. With regard to the situation in the Middle East, the international community should maintain pressure on the only State in the region which was not a party to the Treaty to agree to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards as a contribution to confidence-building and the non-proliferation regime, and to regional and world peace. His Government welcomed the recent ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian Federation. Much remained to be done in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, however, and the danger of nuclear war still existed, as well as the possibility of total destruction.

32. Although a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons was a step in the right direction, more decisive action was needed on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to establish a programme that would lead to their total elimination. In that respect, his delegation fully supported the proposals made on the previous day by Mexico. It also urged the States with the greatest nuclear capacity to begin negotiations straightaway on START III, a process in which the other nuclear-weapon States should be involved at some stage.

33. Colombia commended the States which had ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, particularly the three nuclear-weapon States. It had signed that Treaty and was completing the ratification process. His country believed that it was urgent for negotiations to begin on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and on a legally binding international agreement on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

34. Colombia, which had never had aspirations in the sphere of nuclear weapons, attached great importance to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The cooperation promised in that sphere had been very deficient, and concrete measures must be taken to correct that situation. Consideration should be given to the possibility of holding a special conference of the parties devoted exclusively to the promotion of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

35. The debate on the Treaty and the nuclear disarmament process had underscored the gap between the rhetoric on international security and the rest of the multilateral agenda. Just as in other areas of that agenda, the promotion of human rights, respect for international humanitarian law and also the new concept of human security must be incorporated into international security. In 1995, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT had accepted the indefinite extension of the Treaty, but not the indefinite continuation of a situation in which some States could have nuclear weapons and others could not. It was a matter of priority for the Conference to produce a plan of action with specific measures for nuclear disarmament, which should be implemented over the next five years.

36. **Mr. Shobokshi** (Saudi Arabia) said that the maintenance of international peace and security was one of the foremost objectives of the United Nations. In accordance with the Charter, Member States undertook to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain in international relations

from the threat or use of force. The conclusion of the Treaty had been an international effort to reduce that threat by limiting nuclear proliferation and, ultimately, eliminating nuclear weapons. The 2000 Review Conference was an opportunity to conduct an objective evaluation of the progress made towards those goals and to identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future.

37. Despite some positive developments, particularly the indefinite extension of the Treaty, the world was further than ever from achieving its principles and objectives. The States parties to the Treaty had been unable to halt the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons or to establish a fair balance of commitments and responsibilities between the nuclear-weapon States on the one hand and the non-nuclear-weapon States on the other. The retention by the nuclear Powers of large arsenals had served as a pretext for other States to conduct their own nuclear tests. The nuclear-weapon States must be reminded of their responsibility to avoid actions that encouraged non-nuclear-weapon States to acquire, manufacture or stockpile nuclear weapons.

38. The Security Council Summit Meeting on 31 January 1992 had declared that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security. While Council resolution 984 (1995) and the statements made at that time by each of the nuclear-weapon States could be considered as initial steps in that direction, an internationally negotiated, unconditional and legally binding document was needed to guarantee that non-nuclear States would not be subjected to nuclear attacks.

39. The international community must summon the political will to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, reduce the political and strategic importance of nuclear weapons in international relations and implement existing treaties that provided for disarmament and the reduction of nuclear stockpiles. The agreement to extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely would not have been possible without the adoption by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of a number of Resolutions, including the "Resolution on the Middle East". Since then, however, serious efforts had been made to weaken and prevent the implementation of the Resolution. In order to be successful therefore, the 2000 Conference should review all of the issues that had been agreed upon in 1995.

40. Saudi Arabia supported all efforts being made to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons in the Middle East. The Arab League's efforts to prepare a draft treaty aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East were evidence of the serious commitment of the Arab States, all of which had ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Those actions, however, did not guarantee the safety of the Arab States, given the continuing Israeli nuclear threat and that State's defiance of international law, including resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and IAEA. In order to achieve stable and balanced peace in the Middle East, Israel must eliminate its arsenal of nuclear weapons, accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and subject its nuclear facilities to international safeguards.

41. Israel continued to disregard the appeals of the United Nations, IAEA, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to desist from producing, experimenting with or stockpiling nuclear weapons. It was the only State in the Middle East which refused to subject its nuclear and chemical weapons to IAEA inspections safeguards. Israel's position and all its justifications for that position clearly contradicted its calls for peace; which must be based on trust and good will. Double standards towards Israel would not persuade it to do what was necessary in order to advance the Middle East peace process.

42. Saudi Arabia's commitment to nuclear disarmament was reflected in its refusal to produce, deploy or stockpile such weapons; its active involvement in the 1995 Conference; its participation in the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; and its accession to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. He commended the constructive and crucial role of IAEA and its safety system in the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; his delegation would support all efforts to enhance their effectiveness.

43. The current Conference must take an integral approach to international security. The final document should put forward a vision of the future based on lessons learned from the past, stress the need to achieve

international consensus, urge all States to become parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and call for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The final document should also include a reaffirmation of the Treaty obligation to avoid nuclear war and of the nuclear-weapon States' commitment to make every effort to stop the nuclear arms race and reduce their arsenals as a first step towards complete and total nuclear disarmament. Such action required transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapon States.

44. **Mr. Bellina** (Peru), speaking on behalf of the States members of the Andean Community, said that the problem of nuclear proliferation could either be viewed as the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons or defined in terms of both vertical and horizontal proliferation. The former was seen mainly in the developing world and its solution lay in the adoption of technical measures, such as restrictions on the transfer of equipment and technology. The latter involved not only a larger number of nuclear-weapon States but also an increase in their arsenals. The solution to that problem was essentially political.

45. The 2000 Review Conference must clearly establish that there was no reason to believe that the indefinite maintenance of nuclear weapons could be justified. What had been extended indefinitely in 1995 had been the Treaty and not the right to keep nuclear arsenals forever. It should not be forgotten that the Treaty itself imposed a contractual obligation on all its parties to progress towards general and complete disarmament. For the non-proliferation regime to be truly effective, those States that had not yet signed it, in particular, those with some nuclear capacity, should do so as speedily as possible. In that connection, the Andean Community welcomed the accession of Brazil and Chile to the Treaty.

46. The non-proliferation regime also provided for the right of States to receive the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Innovative approaches must therefore be adopted to permit both those groups that opposed the transfer of nuclear technologies to developing countries and those that rejected the arguments put forward by the technologically advanced countries to participate in decision-making. IAEA had an important role to play in that area and the 2000 Conference must take steps to reinforce the Agency's capacity to do so.

47. The region of Latin America and the Caribbean, which was the first populated region of the globe to have been declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone, firmly believed in the importance of such zones as a means of strengthening international peace and security. The entire southern hemisphere should be made into a nuclear-weapon-free zone by linking the existing zones that had been created by the Antarctic, Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok Treaties. Protecting non-nuclear-weapon States from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against them was another of the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Reaffirmation of that commitment by the nuclear-weapon States in the form of both positive and negative security assurances would facilitate the acceptance of the Treaty by States that were not yet parties. The early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was also important in that regard.

48. The Non-Proliferation Treaty could not be seen as the establishment of an international order based on the entitlement of a small group of States to possess nuclear weapons in perpetuity while the large majority of States lacked that right. In that connection, the member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) had recently issued the Lima Appeal calling for the creation of greater international public awareness in order to advance in every field of action towards a complete prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The members of the Andean Community hoped that the results of the 2000 Review Conference would include practical measures that must be taken by all parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty during the next five years, particularly with regard to article VI.

49. *Mr. Minty (South Africa), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

50. **Mr. Hasmy** (Malaysia) recalled that when the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had agreed at the 1995 Conference to extend the Treaty indefinitely, the nuclear-weapon States parties had reaffirmed their commitment to pursue in good faith negotiations aimed at reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control. A number of delegations, however, had had reservations about the wisdom of extending the Treaty indefinitely. Given the dismal record of nuclear disarmament during the period under

review, Malaysia continued to believe that by indefinitely extending the Treaty the international community had lost the only leverage that it had had with the nuclear-weapon States parties, which had no further incentive to make serious efforts towards the goal of reducing and eliminating their nuclear arsenals. The self-serving national interests of the nuclear-weapon States parties had taken control of the process at the expense of the larger interests of the international community.

51. Pursuant to the decision of the 1995 Conference to strengthen the review process for the Treaty, the 2000 Conference should undertake an objective and candid analysis of the achievements and failures of the previous five years and prepare a road map for the following five years. An analysis of the performance of States parties would reveal more negative than positive developments. On the positive side, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty represented a major achievement, even though a number of ratifications were still required for its entry into force. The recent decision by the Russian Federation to ratify the Treaty had made a positive contribution towards that goal. The earlier decision by the United States Senate not to ratify the Treaty, however, had been a disappointment, especially since the international community had looked to the United States for leadership on that important matter.

52. His delegation also welcomed the progress made in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process and, in particular, the ratification of START II by the Russian Federation. However, the linkage that was being established between the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the beginning of the START III process gave cause for concern, in view of the destabilizing effect which the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defence system would have. Malaysia therefore urged the United States of America to reconsider its intention to develop and deploy such a system. The other nuclear-weapon States should also join in that process.

53. His delegation also welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and South-East Asia, which, together with similar zones in the South Pacific and South America, would form contiguous nuclear-weapon-free zones spanning the southern hemisphere. There had also been encouraging progress towards the creation of a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone and acceptance of the innovative concept of a single-State nuclear-weapon-free zone, which had been advanced by Mongolia. The equally innovative proposal by Belarus for a nuclear-weapon-free corridor also merited serious consideration as part of a concerted global effort towards nuclear disarmament. Malaysia looked forward to the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions, including the Middle East and South Asia.

54. The period under review, however, had also witnessed a number of negative and disturbing developments. The nuclear-weapon States had failed to fulfil with determination the undertakings in the field of nuclear disarmament set out in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Indeed, no serious efforts had been made on the multilateral disarmament track and only half-hearted efforts had been made on the bilateral track. No serious effort had been made either to secure at the earliest possible date the accession of non-States parties to the Treaty. Instead, the period had seen the emergence of two more or less declared nuclear-weapon Powers in South Asia. While nine new States had acceded to the Treaty, four others, three of which had nuclear-weapon options and operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, remained outside of the Treaty regime. Malaysia reiterated its call for the establishment of a high-level consultation mechanism to promote the universality of the Treaty.

55. Far from preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, the period under review had witnessed the explosion of nuclear devices by the above-mentioned non-States parties, which had conducted a series of tests in order to attain the status of nuclear Powers, with serious implications for regional and international security. Also, contrary to the stated objective of decision 2 of the 1995 Conference, there had been no immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The current Review Conference should therefore make an unambiguous pronouncement on the matter.

56. The agreements entered into at the 1995 Conference had not been fully honoured. While some small progress had been achieved during the previous decade towards reducing the total number of nuclear weapons deployed by the nuclear-weapon States, the latter had reasserted their full commitment to the dangerous and outmoded doctrine of nuclear deterrence

as a cornerstone of their defence and security policies. In the mistaken belief that the possession of nuclear weapons increased their security, they continued to ignore the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice to pursue in good faith and conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control. The Conference on Disarmament continued to be in a state of limbo as demonstrated by its inability to constitute a working group on nuclear disarmament and commence negotiations on a fissile material cut-off convention. In addition, new players had emerged in the deadly game of nuclear armaments, with all its ramifications for regional and global security.

57. It was worthwhile recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that the use of nuclear weapons seemed scarcely reconcilable with the provisions of humanitarian law protecting civilians and combatants from unnecessary and indiscriminate effects of warfare. Indeed, the President of the Court had stated that with nuclear weapons humanity was living on a kind of suspended sentence, subjecting itself to a perverse and unremitting nuclear blackmail. Each year since 1996, Malaysia had sponsored a resolution in the First Committee and the General Assembly that drew attention to the unanimous opinion of the Court.

58. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was at a crossroads and the goodwill and patience of the non-nuclear-weapon States were being put under severe strain by the lack of political will on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their part of the bargain. Without a serious change of attitude on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and the Treaty itself risked serious erosion. Many of the ideas on how to propel the disarmament process forward deserved serious consideration.

59. What was really required, however, was for the international community to work towards a comprehensive and legally binding international instrument that would prohibit the development, testing, deployment, stockpiling, threat or use of nuclear weapons and ensure their destruction under effective international control. In that connection, the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, which had been in circulation since 1997, deserved serious consideration. Notwithstanding its disappointment at the lack of tangible progress in the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty following its indefinite extension, in concert with other States parties, Malaysia would continue to work towards the full realization of its provisions.

60. **Mr. Dorda** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) supported the Secretary-General's appeal in his millennium report (A/54/2000, para. 252) for a reaffirmation of political commitment to reducing the dangers from existing nuclear weapons and from further proliferation, and noted from the report (ibid., para. 248) that, despite the passing of the balance of nuclear terror into history, some 35,000 nuclear weapons remained in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers, with thousands still deployed on hair-trigger alert. Clearly, no tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament had been achieved. The non-proliferation regime could not continue unless the nuclear-weapon States gave evidence that they were fully committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons.

61. He welcomed some positive developments since the holding of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. They included the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of July 1996 on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (see General Assembly resolution 54/54 Q); the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by General Assembly resolution 50/245; and the recent ratification by the Russian Federation of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1991 (START II) and the CTBT.

62. There had been some negative developments, however. They included the United States Senate's rejection of ratification of the CTBT; that country's consideration of the feasibility of developing a nuclear-missile-defence system ("Star Wars"); and the adoption by NATO of the strategic concept that nuclear weapons were the only means of keeping the peace, which had been countered by the Russian Federation's declaration that nuclear weapons were an important element of national security.

63. By assisting Israel in developing weapons of mass destruction, Washington employed double standards, since it imposed punitive sanctions on some States even though they had opened their nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and blackmailed another State, trying to prevent its acquisition of nuclear technology

for peaceful purposes even though that State was a party to the NPT.

64. Israel's development of nuclear weapons threatened an entire region, ranging from the Western Mediterranean to India. While all the Arab States were parties to the Treaty, Tel Aviv refused to accede to it and ignored the international community's call to transform the Middle East into a nuclear-free zone. Encouraged by a super-Power, Israel, by pursuing its nuclear programme and rejecting the NPT, constituted a serious threat to international peace and security and undermined the credibility of the Treaty regime.

65. Some other recent developments were a further cause for concern. One European State had provided Israel with three submarines capable of deploying nuclear weapons, while another had negotiated with Israel secretly to sell it nuclear reactors despite Israel's refusal to put its nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision. Furthermore, the United States had lifted its restriction on Israeli scientists conducting nuclear research in its laboratories. Such developments cast doubt on the seriousness of some States parties to the Treaty in their call for universal accession. Furthermore, one super-Power resisted all efforts to induce Israel to accede to the Treaty, while Israel opposed all United Nations resolutions calling for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

66. With the exception of Israel, all States in the Middle East were parties to the Treaty. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya therefore called upon the Conference to stress that Israel must accede to the Treaty, without conditions or delay, and must place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision; to ensure that the nuclear-weapon States undertook, under article I of the Treaty, not to transfer nuclear weapons or devices or means of control, directly or indirectly, to Israel, and not to encourage it to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; to stress the commitment to prohibit the transfer of all nuclear equipment and expertise to Israel until it placed its nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision; to call for the speedy transformation of the Middle East into a nuclear-weapons-free zone; and to establish a subsidiary body of the Second Committee of the Conference to review the "Resolution on the Middle East" adopted by the 1995 Conference and to put forward recommendations for its implementation.

67. Since the universality of the Treaty was vital to its continued viability, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya welcomed the recent accessions to the Treaty and called upon all States which had not yet acceded to it to do so without delay. The Conference should adopt a number of measures for the non-proliferation and reduction of nuclear weapons. It should stress the importance of the undertakings laid down in the ninth to the twelfth preambular paragraphs and in articles I and VI of the Treaty; draw the attention of the nuclear-weapon States parties to their obligation to implement the Treaty fully, and to refrain from any form of nuclear partnership among themselves or with non-nuclear-weapon States in the framework of any regional security arrangements; institute a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons, equipment and know-how and stress the need for the provision of assistance in the peaceful [illegible] of nuclear energy to all parties to the Treaty; reaffirm the importance of reversing the nuclear-arms race and eliminating all nuclear weapons within a specified time-frame; and reaffirm that priority in disarmament negotiations should be given to nuclear disarmament.

68. In addition, the Conference should invite the nuclear-weapon States to negotiate on urgent measures to halt the nuclear-arms race; implement the unanimous advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict international control; call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee for nuclear disarmament, taking into account all proposals of the Group of 21 submitted to that Conference; and to start negotiations on a programme of nuclear disarmament with a view to their elimination within a specified time, including an agreement on prohibition of the development, acquisition, storage and use of or threat to use such weapons.

69. The Review Conference should also call upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate, within the ad hoc committee, the early adoption of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; and stress the importance of setting up a body subsidiary to the First Committee of the 2000 Conference to review practical steps to eliminate nuclear weapons. On the question of security safeguards, he called on the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the body on negative security safeguards, and stressed the need for a treaty

among nuclear-weapon States to guarantee that they would not resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. All States, including States not party to the Treaty, should subject all their nuclear facilities to IAEA supervision.

70. There was a need to emphasize the commitment to the full implementation of article IV of the Treaty, concerning cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as an important contribution to development. To that end, the Review Conference should emphasize the right of States to continue the application of nuclear technology, with a guarantee of its transfer without discrimination; eliminate the prohibition imposed by certain countries on the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes on the pretext that it could be used for chemical weapons; and reaffirm the responsibility of the nuclear States parties to support the legitimate need of other States parties for nuclear energy, especially developing countries, and also reaffirm that any threat against peaceful nuclear facilities posed a serious danger and must be prohibited.

71. In conclusion, he called upon the Conference to adopt recommendations for an end to the nuclear-missile state of alert, the withdrawal of nuclear missiles deployed in foreign countries, the commencement of negotiations on a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and an end to double standards with regard to nuclear weapons, and the allocation of funds resulting from nuclear disarmament for improving the living standards of the poorer countries.

72. **Mr. Staehelin** (Switzerland) noted an imbalance between the active implementation of articles II and III of the Treaty and the relative lack of progress under article VI. The 1995 extension must not be construed as an indefinite extension of the status quo, particularly with regard to the prerogatives of the nuclear-weapon States and their obligations under article VI. The imbalance jeopardized the very bases for concluding, and later extending, the Non-Proliferation Treaty: the reciprocal commitment to non-proliferation by the vast majority of States parties and to disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States, the adoption of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and the resolution on the Middle East and the establishment of a strengthened review process.

73. The lack of progress indicated that the strengthened review process had not been fully effective and that the Preparatory Committee had been unable to achieve its main objective of formulating recommendations on the application and universality of the Treaties. Perhaps the functioning of the strengthened review process and the role of the Preparatory Committee should be reconsidered in order to bring about effective implementation of the Treaty. Conference documents should include a review of the application of the Treaty and the Principles and Objectives since the 1995 Conference and a new package of reaffirmed principles and updated objectives to supplement the 1995 documents, which should be adopted by consensus.

74. Reaffirmation of the fundamental compromise — the link between disarmament and non-proliferation and the link between the Treaty's extension and the adoption of the Principles and Objectives in 1995 — should be the starting point for revitalizing the review process. The new objectives should include measures to redress the negative developments of recent years, possibly in the form of a new plan of action with a view to measuring the progress achieved at the sessions of the Preparatory Committee and at review conferences. His delegation would be submitting a working paper on such a plan, which should include confidence-building measures and information that would increase the transparency of efforts undertaken to implement the Principles and Objectives, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States.

75. The plan of action should provide for further systematic reductions in nuclear weapons, including unilateral reductions, on the basis of article VI. In that regard, the United States and the Russian Federation had a special responsibility; and reductions by those States would set an example for nuclear-weapon States which were not parties to the Treaty. The plan should also provide for the elimination of warheads and the application of IAEA safeguards to fissile materials; the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons in formal disarmament processes; and a moratorium on nuclear testing pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

76. Laboratory tests conducted for the purpose of developing new weapons should be considered incompatible with the preamble of the Test-Ban Treaty. In addition, pending the start of negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes, all States should adopt transparency

measures and declare a moratorium in that field. The Conference on Disarmament must intensify its efforts in the area of security assurances. Lastly, referring to the tests conducted by India and Pakistan and the situation in the Middle East and other regions, he urged parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be more aware of the regional aspects of non-proliferation.

77. **Mr. Hoffmann** (Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) said that only the signature and ratification of the Treaty by as many countries as possible and a worldwide verification system would guarantee the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Thus far, 28 of the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty had ratified it, including two nuclear-weapon States — France and the United Kingdom. Two other States Signatories, Chile and the Russian Federation, were completing parliamentary procedures for ratification.

78. Membership and ratification had been the focus of the first Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in Vienna in October 1999. The Conference had reaffirmed the importance of the Treaty and had stressed that unilateral moratoriums on testing were no substitute for a binding international legal instrument such as the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. It had also considered measures to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the Treaty's early entry into force.

79. The Treaty's global verification regime included an International Monitoring System; consultation and clarification; on-site inspections; and confidence-building measures. Since the global verification regime was to be capable of functioning upon the Treaty's entry into force, one of the Preparatory Commission's main tasks was to enhance the International Monitoring System's worldwide network of seismological, infrasound, hydroacoustic and radionuclide stations. The System would be capable of registering vibrations under ground, in the sea and in the air, and of detecting traces of radionuclides released into the atmosphere by nuclear explosions.

80. The data gathered by the stations would be relayed via satellite to the International Data Centre in Vienna and would then be available to States signatories. The budgetary appropriation of US$ 92.1 million for capital investment from 1997 to 2000 represented approximately 43 per cent of the total amount required to complete the network. The International Data Centre, the nerve centre of the verification system, was capable of transmitting bulletins, data from the International Monitoring System and additional information to States signatories seven days a week.

81. The Preparatory Commission was also laying the groundwork for on-site inspections by developing an operational manual and specifications for equipment to be used at the International Monitoring System stations; a passive seismic system for aftershock detection would be received shortly for testing and training. At the invitation of the Government of Kazakhstan, a field experiment simulating aspects of an on-site inspection following a chemical explosion had been conducted in that country in October 1999.

82. The Preparatory Commission had already organized two international cooperation workshops in Vienna and Cairo; and two more were scheduled to be held in Beijing and Lima. The Commission enjoyed the active support and participation of the Treaty's States signatories. In conclusion, he called on all States participating in the current Review Conference to support and contribute to the preparations for the Test-Ban Treaty's entry into force.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.

Summary record of the 5th meeting

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 26 April 2000, at 10 a.m.

President:	Mr. Baali	(Algeria)
later:	Mr. Gorita (Vice-President)	(Romania)
later:	Mr. Baali (President)	(Algeria)

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General debate (*continued*)

Credentials of representatives to the Conference (*continued*)

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Goerens** (Luxembourg) said the fact that 187 States, including the five nuclear Powers, had become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) demonstrated the vital importance of that instrument and its impact on the maintenance of world peace and security. Unfortunately, however, four countries, including India and Pakistan, which had recently conducted nuclear tests, thus endangering security in their region, remained outside the Treaty. He urged those countries to renounce nuclear weapons and accede to the Treaty as soon as possible. He was also alarmed at efforts by some States parties to the Treaty to develop nuclear weapons, in clear violation of their Treaty obligations.

2. Although Luxembourg had decided not to have nuclear power plants on its territory, it benefited from a number of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, particularly for medical and research purposes. His country had always pursued a strict nuclear non-proliferation policy and had established machinery to combat trafficking in sensitive nuclear material and equipment.

3. The nuclear Powers had not made as much progress towards nuclear disarmament as had been hoped. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation's ratification of the second of the strategic arms reduction treaties, START II, was an encouraging development. However, that historic breakthrough had to be consolidated through the ratification of the related protocol and the implementation of the Treaty on schedule. It was equally encouraging that the Russian Federation and the United States of America had stated their willingness to begin negotiations on START III. A substantial reduction in non-strategic nuclear weapons was also necessary in the near future.

4. In the area of non-proliferation, the 13 non-nuclear-weapon States members of the European Union together with France and the United Kingdom had concluded three additional protocols with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Some of the States members of the Union had already ratified their additional protocol, while others, including Luxembourg, would do so in the near future. All those States that had not yet concluded additional protocols with the Agency, should do so without delay.

5. His delegation welcomed the improvement in the political situation in the Middle East and the efforts being undertaken by all the parties concerned to work to bring lasting peace to that region. He hoped that such efforts would have a positive impact on the universal implementation of the Treaty as well as on efforts to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region.

6. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was of utmost importance to nuclear disarmament. He therefore urged those States among the 44 whose accession was required for its entry into force, to assume their responsibilities without further delay. In that regard, the decision by the Russian Federation to ratify the CTBT was a significant breakthrough. He trusted that that bold step would encourage the two other nuclear-weapon States that had still not acceded to the Treaty, as well as India and Pakistan, to ratify it in the near future.

7. It was regrettable that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty had not yet started within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. He hoped that one of the positive outcomes of the current work of the Conference would be the start of those negotiations.

8. **Mr. Sun Joun-yung** (Republic of Korea) said that, in order to make the NPT a strong and effective regime, the Review Conference must address the major issues of nuclear disarmament and the immediate programme of action, universality, non-compliance, safeguards and negative security assurances. The main responsibility for nuclear disarmament rested with the nuclear-weapon States. In that regard, he welcomed the Russian Federation's ratification of START II and looked forward to the commencement of the START III negotiations. He hoped that nuclear-weapon States would reduce their nuclear arsenals and enhance the transparency of the process by submitting the relevant documents as well as their future plans in that regard during periodic NPT review conferences. Moreover, nuclear-weapon States should try to lessen their dependence on nuclear weapons in their military strategies. It was time to enhance a multilateral exchange of information and views on nuclear disarmament. His delegation would support the establishment of an ad hoc working group in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament for that purpose.

9. He called upon all States that had not yet signed or and ratified the CTBT, especially those States among the 44 whose accession was required for its entry into force, to do so without further delay. The nuclear-weapon States must provide leadership in that regard. His delegation therefore welcomed the recent decision of the Russian Federation to ratify the CTBT and urged China and the United States of America to expedite their ratification processes. Moreover, negotiations on the fissile material cut-off treaty should begin immediately and, pending the conclusion of an agreement, a moratorium should be placed on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

10. Universality and strict observance of the NPT were central to preserving its role in the maintenance of international peace and security. He therefore urged the international community to redouble its efforts to reverse the nuclear arms race in South Asia, in the wake of the nuclear tests conducted there, and to call upon the States concerned to implement Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) as soon as possible. Moreover, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan should accede to the Treaty. No States other than the current five nuclear-weapon States should be recognized as such, nor should any new category of States be created under the NPT.

11. He expressed concern over the non-compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the IAEA safeguards agreement and called upon that country to implement that agreement fully and faithfully. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement and hoped that the Agency would establish an integrated safeguards system as soon as practical. His delegation upheld the principle that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT that fully complied with their obligations had a legitimate right to receive assurances from nuclear-weapon States that the latter would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

12. *Mr. Gorita (Romania), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

13. **Mr. Mra** (Myanmar) said that Myanmar was strongly in favour of nuclear disarmament and was fully committed to its realization. Apart from the conclusion of the CTBT, there had been no tangible achievement in the implementation of the NPT since its indefinite extension in 1995. Two of the threshold States had established their de facto nuclear-weapon status by conducting nuclear tests, which had seriously set back the non-proliferation regime. Moreover, two nuclear-weapon States had yet to ratify the CTBT. It was necessary to build a stronger international consensus to discourage any new development of nuclear weapons and to dismantle the existing weapons. The nuclear Powers should set an example in that area. His delegation welcomed the decision by the Russian Federation to ratify START II and the CTBT. The ratification of START II paved the way for the commencement of negotiations on START III.

14. At the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties, his delegation had submitted some proposals for incorporation into the document on Principles and Objectives, and a programme of action on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. His delegation believed that universal adherence to the NPT remained an urgent priority. The best defence against a nuclear catastrophe remained the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only genuine guarantee for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones through the adoption of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba had gone a long way in limiting the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons and enhancing global and regional peace and security. He urged all States parties to call for an early entry into force of the protocols, which had still to be ratified by the nuclear-weapon States, through the swift resolution of the remaining issues in a spirit of amity and cooperation.

15. **Mr. Wehbe** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his country had been one of the first in the Middle East to sign the NPT and noted that all Arab States of the Middle East had since then become parties to the Treaty. Israel, however, had so far shown no intention of doing so or of placing its nuclear installations under the comprehensive safeguards regime of the IAEA. The Syrian Arab Republic had been the first to call for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Yet Israel had failed to respond to any call from the United Nations or the international community as a whole to achieve that goal.

16. The Treaty had been in force for some 30 years, but universality of adherence to it had not been achieved, the world was not a more secure place after the end of the cold war, and nuclear weapons continued

to proliferate. The non-nuclear-weapon States might well wonder to what extent the nuclear-weapon States parties had fulfilled their commitments to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons, prevent proliferation and help non-nuclear-weapon States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

17. Although the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes was a legitimate right of all parties to the Treaty, double standards prevailed: the nuclear-weapon States which exported nuclear material hindered the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties, even though the latter were committed to subjecting their nuclear installations to international inspection. Yet at the same time those exporting States covertly and overtly transferred advanced nuclear technology to Israel. Indeed, one nuclear-weapon State had agreed to give Israeli scientists access to its nuclear establishments, enabling Israel to improve its nuclear technology and develop nuclear weapons. Such actions violated the Treaty in letter and spirit. The security guarantees which the nuclear-weapon States had given to the non-nuclear-weapon States did not satisfy the requirements of the latter and did nothing to dispel their fears, since those guarantees were non-binding and had not been negotiated in an international forum.

18. It was therefore important to begin negotiations on the drafting of a binding document providing comprehensive security guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The IAEA comprehensive safeguards system was a major factor in preserving nuclear peace in the world, and it was incumbent on all States parties under article III to conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency.

19. His delegation wondered how long the nuclear-weapon States would continue to defend Israel, which used its nuclear power for aggression and expansion, pursued an ambiguous policy in respect of its nuclear facilities and ignored all appeals of the international community. Pressure must be brought to bear on Israel to induce it to accede to the Treaty and subject its nuclear facilities to Agency supervision. Its continued military occupation of Arab territories and its continued defiance of international commitments and agreements threatened to destabilize peace and security in the region.

20. At the 1995 Conference, the nuclear-weapon States had achieved their goal — the indefinite extension of the Treaty — but had not yet fulfilled their part of the compact, which was to address the grievances of the non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the deficiencies of the Treaty. His delegation appealed to States to make the Treaty universal and called upon the nuclear-weapon States to abide by article VI. Furthermore, profoundly concerned over Israel's behaviour and its rejection of the Treaty, it urgently advocated a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. That could be achieved only if Israel acceded to the Treaty and placed its nuclear facilities under international control.

21. His Government endorsed the resolution recently adopted by the League of Arab States, which had called for: a comprehensive review of compliance by States parties with the commitments undertaken at the 1995 Conference; renewed emphasis on the fact that Israel's continuation of its nuclear programme outside the purview of the Treaty and its refusal to accede to the Treaty and to subject its nuclear facilities to IAEA supervision constituted a direct threat to international peace and security and undermined the credibility of the non-proliferation regime; renewed efforts by all States parties, and particularly the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, as sponsors of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference, to induce Israel to accede to the Treaty and to subject its nuclear installations to the safeguards regime; reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their commitment under article I of the Treaty not to assist Israel in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; the creation of a subsidiary body of Main Committee II to review the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; and renewed efforts to transform the Middle East into a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

22. In conclusion, his delegation called on the States parties, and particularly the Depositary Governments, to put pressure on Israel to heed the appeals of the international community so as to banish the nuclear nightmare and bring about stability and peace in the Middle East.

23. **Mr. Shihab** (Maldives) said that, although the optimism generated by the end of the cold war had not produced the hoped-for results, the past 50 years had seen major progress towards nuclear disarmament and arms control at the bilateral and multilateral levels. The CTBT had become a reality, several nuclear-weapon-

free zones had been declared, the number of nuclear weapons had been almost halved, the world's military expenditure had declined by about 30 per cent during the past two decades alone, and START II had finally been ratified, paving the way for negotiations on START III. Nevertheless, hundreds of nuclear warheads remained; weapons research, production and testing continued unabated; there had been no progress towards the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty and the threat of nuclear terrorism loomed.

24. No State party to the Treaty should ignore its obligations under that instrument or interpret the Treaty in any way contrary to the intended objectives. The indefinite extension and near-universality of the Treaty had reaffirmed its validity as the basis for the non-proliferation regime. However, developments since the 1995 Conference had shown the importance of achieving universal ratification of the Treaty and improving implementation of its provisions.

25. The nuclear-weapon States had an obligation to provide unconditional, legally binding security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States and to refrain from sharing nuclear material, equipment or technology with non-nuclear-weapon States or States not parties to the Treaty. Moreover, all States parties should have an equal right, without discrimination, to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

26. His Government supported all efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and called for urgent measures that would make it possible to establish such a zone in the Middle East. It was firmly opposed to nuclear testing and called on those who had not yet become parties to the CTBT to do so as soon as possible and without conditions.

27. The relationship between disarmament and development could not be overemphasized; there could be no rationale for spending billions of dollars on weapons of mass destruction when millions of people were plagued by poverty, hunger, malnutrition and disease. Funds spent on military build-up should be diverted to the eradication of poverty and disease throughout the world, and an increased portion of the resources made available through the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements should be made available for economic and social development with a view to reducing the ever-widening gap between the developed and developing countries.

28. **Mr. Grudziński** (Poland) said that his Government was convinced that the Treaty remained the mainstay of the global non-proliferation regime and a principal element of international peace and security. Since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, Poland had ratified the CTBT and was actively involved in the proceedings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in Vienna. Its safeguards agreement with the IAEA had been in force since 1972; it had recently ratified the additional protocol to that agreement and urged other States parties to do the same; and its National Atomic Energy Agency was working to bring national legislation into line with the international instruments to which Poland was a party.

29. He was concerned at the fact that three of the four States not parties to the Treaty were believed to possess nuclear-weapon capability and that two of them, India and Pakistan, had carried out nuclear-weapon tests, thereby placing in jeopardy both the Treaty and international peace and security. It was also disturbing that some nuclear-weapon States had not yet ratified the CTBT. He therefore welcomed the Russian Federation's recent decision to ratify that instrument and was encouraged by the continued efforts of the Administration of the United States of America to induce Congress to follow suit. He hoped that China would also pursue ratification and that the United States of America and the Russian Federation would soon begin START III negotiations. He was pleased that two nuclear-weapon States, France and the United Kingdom, had unilaterally reduced their nuclear arsenals and made them more transparent, thereby contributing to the development of a climate of confidence among countries, but it was disappointing that the Conference on Disarmament had been unable to undertake productive negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

30. A new nuclear arms race would threaten the existing international security balance. He therefore urged the Governments of certain Asian and Middle Eastern States to comply fully with their safeguards obligations. He also welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), which had established a new United Nations monitoring, verification and inspection commission for Iraq, and called for its full and early implementation.

31. The past five years had shown that, while the strengthened review process developed in 1995 did not require any major change, it needed a more effective implementation mechanism. Substantial progress having been made during the past five years, the 2000 Review Conference should focus on a positive, realistic programme of action that would reinforce the Treaty and thereby consolidate international peace and security.

32. **Mr. Arcaya** (Venezuela) said that while he was encouraged by the fact that various States had become parties to the Treaty since 1995 and by the entry into force of the CTBT, a number of negative developments had cast doubt on the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and created a climate of uncertainty and confusion in the area of disarmament. The lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament, the nuclear tests carried out in South Asia, the increased emphasis on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence by nuclear-weapon States and the possible deployment of a national anti-missile defence system had hindered the development of genuine cooperation for arms control. He hoped that the 2000 Review Conference would help to restore the confidence necessary to that process and called on States parties to display flexibility in order to overcome difficulties and ensure implementation of the decisions taken at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

33. Given its commitment to nuclear disarmament, as reflected in its accession to the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, his Government was discouraged by the delays in implementation of START II and by the fact that START III negotiations had not yet begun. When the Treaty had been extended indefinitely in 1995, it had hoped that both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States would assume their obligations under that instrument in a balanced manner. However, to date, the nuclear-weapon States had failed to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty. While the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT was gratifying, it was more important than ever for all nuclear-weapon States to further decrease their nuclear arsenals.

34. He endorsed the proposals made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and by the representative of Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition. In particular, he supported those who had called for nuclear weapons to be progressively taken off alert status, for nuclear warheads to be separated from their systems of delivery and for the non-deployment of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. His Government attached great importance to the development of a binding legal instrument establishing standards and principles to provide security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

35. Negotiations on a multilateral fissile material cut-off treaty should be initiated as quickly as possible; in the interim, nuclear-weapon States should agree to a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. The decision recently taken by the Government of the United Kingdom was an encouraging step in that direction.

36. He hoped that the Russian Federation's recent decision to ratify the CTBT would lead other nuclear-weapon States not yet parties to that instrument to follow suit. It was also important to increase the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including scientific research, electrical power, agriculture, medicine and industry, through international cooperation with developing countries.

37. He welcomed the nuclear-weapon-free zones established under the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok and supported the establishment of such zones in other regions such as the Middle East and Central Asia. In that regard, he welcomed the Mongolian Government's decision to declare its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

38. **Mr. Abulhasan** (Kuwait) noted that adequate progress had still not been made towards eliminating nuclear stockpiles and freeing the world of nuclear weapons. The spectre of a nuclear war was ever-present, and nuclear arsenals continued to proliferate outside the purview of IAEA. However, the opportunity remained for the nuclear-weapon States to show serious intentions of abandoning their nuclear weapons and stockpiles. In that regard, he welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT.

39. As the Secretary-General had noted, there were in the world more than 35,000 nuclear missiles, a small fraction of which would be sufficient to reduce the world to ashes. His Government hoped that the nuclear-weapon States would heed the appeals of the peoples and Governments of the world to renounce

their nuclear weapons and stockpiles, for which no justification remained. It reminded the nuclear-weapon States of their obligation to refrain from encouraging or assisting other States in the manufacture or acquisition of such weapons, and drew attention to the unanimous advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 1996 on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. A spirit of pessimism and grave concern prevailed among the peoples of the world regarding the failure to realize nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, peace being sacrificed in favour of selfish national interests.

40. Iraq had still failed to comply with Security Council resolutions on renouncing weapons of mass destruction. That failure had been borne out by the Director General of IAEA, who had indicated earlier in the Conference that the Agency had not been in a position during the past two years to implement its mandate from the Security Council, namely, to guarantee that Iraq had complied with its commitments. Ever since Iraq had ceased its cooperation, the Security Council had spared no effort to induce it to resume cooperation but had been compelled to conclude that Iraq had not fully complied with its resolutions and had not cooperated with United Nations inspectors. There were many steps which Iraq must still take. His Government therefore renewed its appeal to Iraq to renounce its weapons of mass destruction. He welcomed the establishment in December 1999 by the Security Council of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and hoped that Iraq would be prompted to cooperate with it.

41. The fact that all the Arab States had become parties to the NPT had not provided the minimum security requirements to ward off the Israeli nuclear threat. Israel, the only State in the region not a party to the Treaty, continued to defy the appeals of the international community and refused to allow IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities. Its actions destabilized the balance of power in the Middle East and threatened international peace and security. The international community should put pressure on Israel to eliminate its nuclear arsenal and to implement the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Conference and to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards regime. It should call on all States to cease providing any assistance that might contribute to Israel's nuclear programme. Israel's actions clearly contradicted its claim that it desired peace.

42. His delegation welcomed the accession by nine States, including three Arab States, to the Treaty. They were currently undertaking procedures to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA. The world looked forward to a twenty-first century of peace and stability, and a way must be found to eliminate nuclear weapons and to cease all nuclear tests. His delegation welcomed the expression of good intentions by the nuclear-weapon States in their statements at the Conference. It earnestly called on those nuclear-weapon States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty to do so or suffer the censure of future generations.

43. *Mr. Baali resumed the Chair.*

Credentials of representatives to the Conference (*continued*)

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee (*continued*)

44. **The President** said that rule 3 of the rules of procedure provided that, in addition to the election of the Chairman and the two Vice-Chairmen, the Conference should appoint six members of the Credentials Committee on the proposal of the President of the Conference. He therefore proposed the appointment of Austria, Chile, Morocco, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Switzerland. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt that proposal.

45. *It was so decided.*

46. *Austria, Chile, Morocco, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Switzerland were appointed members of the Credentials Committee.*

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.

Summary record of the 6th meeting

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 26 April 2000, at 3 p.m.

President:	Mr. Baali	(Algeria)
later:	Mr. Niehaus (Vice-President)	(Costa Rica)
later:	Mr. Baali (President)	(Algeria)

Contents

General debate (*continued*)

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee (*continued*)

Organization of work

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Jagland** (Norway) stressed that disarmament by nuclear-weapon States was as important as nuclear non-proliferation and reiterated his Government s full support for the goals established at the 1995 Review Conference. The tests carried out by India and Pakistan; the delay in initiating the START II process; the impasse in the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty; and the delay in the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) called for fresh impetus and new and concrete non-proliferation and disarmament measures. The growing importance of nuclear weapons in international politics was a trend that must be reversed.

2. The general objectives of the current Conference should be to maintain and build on the results of the 1995 Conference, revitalize and improve working procedures with a view to strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty process, and improve the substantive work of the process through initiatives and measures acceptable to both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Of key importance were the development of a programme of action for the coming five-year period, an increased focus on regional issues, and the elaboration of a comprehensive strategy for dealing with fissile material

3. In view of the deficiencies in the strengthened review process and the fact that the Principles and Objectives adopted in 1995 remained largely unfulfilled, Norway would be submitting a proposal for a programme of action to the current Conference. The proposed programme of action would call on States parties to follow up the decisions taken by review conferences and, to that end, recommend an increase in the number of annual meetings in the review process from three to four, with a narrower focus on a few specific issues. The programme of action would also contain proposals on developing a comprehensive strategy for dealing with fissile material, including negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes; promoting the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; reviewing information on strategic nuclear arms reductions, including the START process; promoting transparency with regard to tactical nuclear weapons and the destruction of such weapons; urging States to sign and ratify the International Atomic Energy Agency's new additional protocol on full-scope safeguards; and increasing transparency in nuclear-related export controls.

4 The nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan in 1998 had highlighted the importance of analysing the underlying causes of regional conflict and tension, and of taking into account arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in addressing regional issues. Since the only regional issue before the Conference was the situation in the Middle East, a more ambitious and balanced package of regional issues, including the situation in South Asia, should be dealt with at the annual review meetings. It was also vital to address regional situations where parties to the Treaty failed to comply with their obligations.

5. His delegation would be submitting a proposal for an international framework to deal with fissile material that included a ban on the future production of fissile material for weapons, verification that surplus military stocks of fissile material would not be diverted to weapons programmes, measures for the safety and control of highly enriched uranium produced for non-explosive purposes, and voluntary transparency measures with respect to military inventories of fissile material. Those issues should be addressed either parallel to or independently of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a fissile material cut-off treaty, which, regrettably, had not even begun.

6. The nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility to reduce their arsenals and to increase transparency with regard to existing stocks of weapons, intended reductions and nuclear policies. His delegation welcomed the recent decisions of the Russian State Duma on START II and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and encouraged the Russian Federation and the United States of America to implement further measures for strategic arms control, in particular, by increasing the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories as agreed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at the 1997 Helsinki Summit. It would be regrettable if current doubts about the viability of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were to aggravate an already difficult situation.

7. Greater attention should be focused on the risks of tactical nuclear weapons, which could be rapidly deployed and play a destabilizing role in conflict areas.

The situation called for increased transparency, a programme of warhead destruction and verification procedures. The 1999 unilateral decisions by the United States and the Russian Federation to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons should be reconfirmed and a time-frame should be established for their implementation. A large number of obsolete and decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines from the former Soviet Union had, over the years, produced huge quantities of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel that were a threat to the environment. Norway had offered to cooperate with the Russian Federation in order to accelerate the construction of an infrastructure for removing and storing those materials. The task, however, was so complicated and costly that nothing short of a broad-based international effort would be required. To that end, Norway had initiated negotiations with the Russian Federation and a number of potential donor countries.

8. *Mr. Niehaus (Costa Rica), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

9. **Mr. Enkhsaikhan** (Mongolia) said that, despite the threat of horizontal proliferation and the emergence of new nuclear deterrence, doctrines and strategies that allowed for the use of nuclear weapons, his delegation fully agreed with the President that the international community should avoid yielding to pessimism. It welcomed other, more positive trends, including the reduction of non-strategic nuclear arsenals by the two major nuclear-weapon States, their conclusion of bilateral nuclear arms limitation and reduction agreements and their agreement in principle to further reductions; the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons; the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by an overwhelming majority and its ratification by 55 States, including Mongolia; and the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

10. Mongolia also welcomed the recent decision by the Russian State Duma to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and START II and the recent accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by nine countries. His delegation attached great importance to the historic 1995 Conference and believed that its decisions should be further strengthened by the current Conference. Generally speaking, his delegation's position on the outcome of the 1995 Conference was reflected in the documents of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, including the Final Document of the recent Thirteenth Ministerial Meeting held in Cartagena, Colombia. It believed, in particular, that the two goals of non-proliferation and disarmament must be strictly fulfilled by States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in full compliance with its articles I, II and VI.

11. In response to the Russian Federation's decision to ratify the CTBT and START II, the United States should ratify the Test-Ban Treaty. Mongolia called on those two countries to consider fully implementing START II and embark on START III negotiations, which should ultimately include the other three nuclear-weapon States as well. The earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and the revitalization of the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty were of paramount importance. His delegation also urged the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts to elaborate a legally binding international instrument that would provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Stressing the importance of the Treaty's universality, he appealed to India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba to become parties as soon as possible.

12. Mongolia strongly advocated the strengthened safeguards systems of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and supported the additional protocol designed to improve and strengthen IAEA inspections. It was working with IAEA to conclude an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement; and a group of Mongolian experts would soon visit IAEA headquarters in that connection. Mongolia was also in the process of formalizing its participation in the International Monitoring System of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty Organization. His Government attached great importance to the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones and therefore welcomed the adoption by the United Nations Disarmament Commission of principles and guidelines on their establishment.

13. Mongolia had declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 1992, and General Assembly resolution 53/77 D, entitled "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status" had been adopted in 1998 with the support of the international community, including the nuclear-weapon States. That demonstrated that non-proliferation could be strengthened if a State's unilateral action was supported by its immediate neighbours and the

international community. As a further step, in February, the Mongolian Parliament had adopted special legislation on the country's nuclear-weapon-free status, which had been supported by the Secretary-General and by the Non-Aligned Movement at its recent Ministerial Meeting. Together with United Nations bodies, Mongolia was exploring ways and means of addressing some of the issues relating to its broader security concerns in order to reinforce its nuclear-weapon-free status.

14. **Mr. Orhun** (Turkey) said that his delegation subscribed to the statement made on behalf of the European Union. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remained the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential basis for nuclear disarmament. However, unless and until the Treaty enjoyed universal adherence, States parties would continue to be exposed to risks. Turkey, therefore, urged all States which were not yet parties to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible time. The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had made a positive contribution to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting the process of nuclear disarmament and strengthening international peace and security. Turkey had signed that Treaty on the day on which it had been opened for signature and had completed the ratification process in February 2000.

15. The inability of the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons was a source of disappointment; his country hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would soon commence negotiations without any pre-conditions. The re-establishment of an ad hoc committee to negotiate on effective arrangements for security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States would also be an important step. Turkey attached great importance to the commitment by all States parties to fulfil all the obligations undertaken in 1995 and welcomed the unilateral and bilateral efforts of the nuclear-weapon States to comply with the relevant articles of the Treaty. It also welcomed the recent decision to ratify START II and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the Russian State Duma and hoped that that step would be conducive to the commencement of START III negotiations and have a positive impact on other arms control processes.

16. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements concluded freely between States in their respective regions, would strengthen global as well as regional peace and security. Turkey welcomed the steps taken by States to establish new zones, and fully supported the initiative launched by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in 1998 to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. His country had repeatedly voiced concerns about the nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests conducted in South-East Asia in recent years, which had serious repercussions for regional and global security and stability.

17. In the Middle East, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction posed a tangible threat. Turkey had deep-rooted historical ties with the Middle East and maintained cordial relations with all the countries and peoples of the region. It was taking part in collective efforts aimed at devising measures to reverse the nuclear threat. The 2000 Conference should include further substantive steps for the next five years and address the objectives that had not been attained since 1995. The "resolution on the Middle East" must be implemented within that context.

18. Turkey firmly believed that the strengthening of safeguards was an important element of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation and was deeply concerned that there were still 54 parties to the Treaty which had not yet brought into force a Safeguards Agreement with IAEA. The events following the Gulf War had proved the need for additional safeguards in order to prevent diversion of nuclear materials or equipment, purchased for peaceful purposes, to activities prohibited by the Treaty. His country was preparing to conclude in the near future the additional protocol with IAEA for the application of safeguards.

19. The best means of preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear materials was to apply measures of physical protection. Turkey hoped that the IAEA international physical protection service would be further strengthened and extended. The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee had done valuable work to enhance transparency and foster dialogue and cooperation among all parties; Turkey had joined the Zangger Committee and was in the process of becoming a member of the nuclear suppliers group.

20. **Mr. Calovski** (The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) said that his delegation's views coincided

with those expressed by the representative of Portugal, speaking on behalf of the European Union. In 1995, his country had supported the indefinite extension of the Treaty. Decision No. 3 of the 1995 Conference was of crucial importance for strengthening the non-proliferation regime. In many regions, the security situation had been threatened more by other negative developments and destructive forces than by non-observance of the non-proliferation regime.

21. The 2000 Conference could be successful if it fully recognized that the international security situation had completely changed since 1990 and was still changing rapidly. The world was entering a period of cooperation and integration, and the forces of globalization would dominate in the years to come. Those forces favoured strict compliance with the non-proliferation regime and arms control; and those who did not grasp that reality would be marginalized. The observance of the Treaty was therefore an important contribution to the overall strengthening of international relations, the enhancement of international cooperation, and the strengthening of multilateralism, in particular the United Nations.

22. His Government's main priority was integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures and membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The observance of the Treaty by his country and the other States of the region was essential in that respect. It was also important that the General Assembly resolutions initiated by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, most recently resolution 54/62, should be fully implemented. The General Assembly had emphasized the importance of regional efforts in South-Eastern Europe on arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures. One of the most important vehicles for achieving those objectives was the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.

23. Although the danger of the use of nuclear weapons was diminishing, the threat of their use was not. On the other hand, interest in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was increasing and should be supported. That factor, together with a greater capability in the field of nuclear technology, would increase the number of countries capable of producing nuclear weapons. The non-proliferation regime must address that danger and the parties to the Treaty must endeavour to prevent such an occurrence, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, the Charter of the United Nations and international law. For non-nuclear-weapon States like the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the main interest was to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime and agree on measures that would positively affect the security situation and economic and social development. His delegation stressed the beneficial influence of nuclear disarmament on the mobilization of resources for development in that regard.

24. He emphasized the importance of the accession of nine States to the Treaty since 1995. The Conference should address the necessity that four other States accede to the Treaty. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia maintained excellent relations with all those countries, which, traditionally, had been in favour of full observance of the Charter of the United Nations, a main base for the Treaty. His country had ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in March 2000. It was encouraging that so many States had signed and ratified it. The recent ratification by the Russian Federation represented an important incentive for other States, including the United States of America, whose leadership in the adoption of that Treaty had been highly praised.

25. It was regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament had not started negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. One reason was the Conference's outdated working methods, which were the same as during the cold war. His delegation hoped that the current difficulties would be overcome. In the area of nuclear disarmament, the long-awaited ratification of START II by the Russian Federation was a welcome development which should lead to the commencement of START III negotiations and progress on other issues, including the current state of relations among nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly in the Conference on Disarmament. So far, the nuclear-weapon States had refused to negotiate with the non-nuclear-weapon States, and it was not realistic to expect that they would change their position. However, that did not mean that the non-nuclear-weapon States should abandon the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. They should strive to achieve that goal, shared also by the nuclear-weapon States, sooner rather than later.

26. The 2000 Conference should reaffirm the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It was regrettable that there had been no progress in that regard in the Middle East, as called for

in the 1995 "Resolution on the Middle East". The Conference also needed to pay particular attention to safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, an area of utmost importance to the majority of States parties. It should insist on full-scope safeguards and greater transparency in nuclear-related export controls and should encourage all parties to the Treaty to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The efforts to develop new and renewable energy sources should not be an obstacle in that respect. However, the dangers of old nuclear plants should be addressed, on the basis of international cooperation.

27. **Mr. Wisnumurti** (Indonesia) said that the Conference's task of reviewing the progress made in implementing the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 Conference had been rendered more difficult by the failure of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Conference to agree on substantive issues because of the differences between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Nevertheless, there had been progress in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament. His delegation was encouraged by the increase in the number of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the approval for ratification by the Russian State Duma of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), the consolidation of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the formulation by the Commission on Disarmament of guidelines on the establishment of new such zones.

28. On the other hand, the credibility of the non-proliferation regime had been gravely undermined by such developments as the conducting of nuclear tests in South Asia. In addition, the CTBT had yet to enter into force, negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices had not begun, and efforts to modernize nuclear arsenals, including through research, development and testing, continued. Plans for the deployment of a missile defence system and the prospect of the stationing of nuclear weapons in outer space were further causes for concern. Failure to acknowledge that dismal state of affairs would only deepen frustration.

29. It was critically important to reverse the growing perception that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was of dubious value and had become an instrument for the promotion of the interests of a handful of States. The Conference must adopt decisions on such issues as security assurances and measures to promote the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and agree on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament. The final document should set out a series of goals to be accomplished by 2005, including ratification of the CTBT by all 44 States identified therein, cessation of sub-critical testing, and conclusion of a non-discriminatory and universally applicable fissile material cut-off convention.

30. The Conference must also reaffirm the integrity and importance of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). In order to reduce nuclear danger, nuclear weapons must be de-alerted and nuclear warheads decoupled from their delivery vehicles, tactical nuclear weapons must be eliminated, plans to deploy weapons in outer space must be withdrawn, measures must be adopted to achieve greater transparency in nuclear-related issues, and negotiations must begin on a third strategic arms reduction treaty with a view to achieving significantly deeper reductions. The Conference must ensure that States that had renounced nuclear weapons were not excluded from decision making on nuclear disarmament.

31. The Conference on Disarmament had a unique role to play in that regard. Those were modest, realistic and achievable steps that would preserve the Non-Proliferation Treaty and stop the dangerous arms race that loomed on the horizon. With respect to security assurances, the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States could be addressed only by the conclusion of international legally binding instrument. Another means of promoting a stable security environment was the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. His delegation called on the international community to support the establishment of such zones in north and central Asia and in the Middle East.

32. The decision on "Principles and objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted by the 1995 Conference had reaffirmed the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as well as making the acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards a necessary precondition for the transfer of nuclear materials and technology. Broader participation in the elaboration of nuclear-related export controls would help to dispel the belief that the purpose of such controls went beyond non-

proliferation and that they impinged on the decision-making prerogatives of the recipient countries.

33. He noted with satisfaction that an increasing number of countries were concluding additional protocols to their Safeguards Agreements with IAEA, but was concerned that the Agency lacked funding for its technical cooperation programme. The depositary States, as sponsors of the "Resolution on the Middle East", had a special responsibility for ensuring its implementation. Regrettably, one State in the region had yet to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. His delegation welcomed the establishment of a subsidiary body at the Conference to identify the steps required for the adherence of all States in the Middle East to the Treaty.

34. The Treaty's objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were inseparable. It was not feasible to promote the non-proliferation regime without giving due regard to disarmament. In order to preserve the integrity of the Treaty, there must be significant and irreversible steps towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. In that connection, his delegation strongly supported the proposal by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to establish an open-ended inter-sessional standing committee to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Indonesia stood ready to contribute to that process.

35. **Mr. Al-Nasser** (Qatar) said that the 2000 Conference had inspired great hopes and aspirations that would be fulfilled only through serious and transparent work by the participants in the Conference and total adherence by the States parties to the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the package of commitments entered into at the 1995 Conference. Regrettably, the international community was far from having realized the goals of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament set out in the Treaty. As to the decisions and the resolution adopted at the 1995 Conference, the objective of universal adherence to the Treaty had not been achieved, negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material had yet to begin, the Preparatory Committee for the Conference had failed to produce any serious recommendations, and, although the Arab States of the Middle East had all acceded to the Treaty, Israel had yet to do so or to place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

36. The entire international community knew that Israel possessed nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, posing a grave threat to security in the Middle East. Furthermore, there was a real risk of radiological contamination from its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Yet the States parties to the Treaty, particularly some nuclear-weapon States, turned a blind eye to those problems. Israel's intransigence had dealt a severe blow to the efforts to bring peace to the Middle East. Qatar therefore called on all countries to bring pressure to bear on Israel to accede to the Treaty, place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction in order to establish in the Middle East a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

37. The nuclear-weapon States had a moral duty to provide the non-nuclear-weapon States with assurances against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons, pursue negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement on the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a specified time-frame, and allow the transfer to developing countries of nuclear technology to assist them in their efforts to achieve prosperity for their peoples. Lastly, his delegation hoped that the Conference would become a milestone on the path to the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons, in which humanity could enjoy peace, security and stability.

38. **Mr. Guliyev** (Azerbaijan) said that, with the end of global confrontation and the collapse of totalitarian ideologies, the international community had a unique opportunity to carry forward the process of disarmament and curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There had been remarkable achievements in those areas over the past decade, particularly the conclusion of CTBT and the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

39. The convening of the 2000 Conference demonstrated the continuing commitment of the States parties to the Preamble and provisions of the Treaty. Preserving the integrity of the Treaty was essential for international peace and security; and the attainment of the Treaty's universality was therefore a priority. His delegation called on all States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date and without conditions, particularly those States that operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Conference should stress that every effort had to be made to curb

the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The cohesive application of a strict export control regime by both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would make a substantial contribution in that area.

40. A commitment to the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons was essential to regional and international security and stability and to achieving the fundamental goals of the Treaty. Azerbaijan therefore welcomed the decision to ratify START II by the State Duma of the Russian Federation and the measures that had been taken by other nuclear-weapon States to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear armaments. It commended Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine on their contribution to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and, in particular, their decision to voluntarily withdraw all tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from their territories.

41. His country also supported the steps that had been taken since 1995 to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. He recalled in that connection the initiative which the President of Azerbaijan had launched in 1997 to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the southern Caucasus. Given the geostrategic location of that region and the conflicts which it was currently experiencing, the establishment of such a zone would mark an important milestone in the enhancement of security at both the regional and international levels and should therefore be supported by the international community.

42. The total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only genuine guarantee for non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, every effort should be made to put in place a legally binding regime of negative security assurances. Azerbaijan welcomed the establishment in March 1998 by the Conference on Disarmament of an Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances. The Conference should vigorously seek to increase its membership in order to better reflect the changes that had taken place in international relations. IAEA played a crucial role in verifying compliance with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and States that had not yet done so should conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency. He emphasized in that connection that nuclear safety was an essential prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

43. Azerbaijan, which regarded combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a priority of its foreign policy, had signed and ratified major international and legally binding instruments and had contributed to the efforts of the international community in that field. Even though it had no nuclear sites or nuclear material under its jurisdiction, his country had applied for IAEA membership in order to enhance its cooperation with the Agency. Situated as it was at the crossroads of potentially turbulent regions, Azerbaijan took all necessary precautions, including legislative measures, to prevent the transfer through its territory of any components, materials and technology related to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

44. **Mr. Al-Sindi** (Yemen) said that, as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime over the previous 30 years, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had benefited all States. At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, at which States parties had agreed to the indefinite extension of the Treaty and had adopted a number of Decisions and Resolutions, including the "Resolution on the Middle East", the United States of America and the Russian Federation had committed themselves to reducing their nuclear arsenals. More recently, the State Duma of the Russian Federation had decided to ratify both START II and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. For its part, the United Arab Emirates had acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thereby bringing the goal of universality one step closer to reality.

45. Notwithstanding those favourable developments, doubts still persisted about the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, since a number of States remained outside its ambit. All the States in the Middle East had acceded to the Treaty, with the exception of Israel, which had given no indication that it intended to do so. The Conference should urge Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place all of its nuclear installations under the full-scope IAEA safeguards regime. The sponsors of the "Resolution on the Middle East" should also called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty without delay and to place all of its nuclear installations under the international safeguards regime as an important first step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

46. The Conference should also request the States parties to the Treaty to refrain from the transfer or transport of nuclear equipment, know-how, resources or material. Lastly, his delegation supported the Egyptian proposal for the establishment of a

monitoring system in the Middle East and hoped that, as the new century unfolded, the international community would fully recognize the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as an instrument for the elimination of nuclear weapons based on a specific timetable.

47. **Mr. Cappagli** (Argentina) said that, since the restoration of its democracy, Argentina had taken a series of steps to strengthen its integration with neighbouring countries, intensify the dialogue between the countries of the southern hemisphere, ban weapons of mass destruction and place restrictions on certain types of conventional weapons. It had also participated in efforts to promote international security and stability based on democratic values, the rule of law, human rights and free markets. The nation had been particularly active at the regional level, where, together with its neighbours, it had developed a framework for coexistence based on cooperation, transparency and integration.

48. Argentina reaffirmed its unwavering commitment to the international community's objectives of non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It had contributed to those objectives by the transparency, mutual trust and coordination that had characterized its relations with Brazil in the nuclear field. The two States had established a system of mutual safeguards for their nuclear installations and materials, which was reinforced by their acceptance of IAEA safeguards and their accession to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

49. Argentina had also signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. It welcomed the subsequent accession of Brazil and Chile and urged all States that were not yet parties to accede to the Treaty as early as possible. Given the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty not only to the maintenance of international peace and security but also to the very survival of mankind, States had a moral obligation to comply with its provisions. The balance of obligations between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, however, in no way legitimized the permanent possession of such weapons nor did it release nuclear-weapon States from their obligations in the area of disarmament. Those States should speed up the reduction of their nuclear arsenals with a view to the total elimination of such weapons in the near future.

50. The obligation of the nuclear-weapon States was all the greater as they were also permanent members of the Security Council. The 2000 Review Conference should seek to strengthen certain aspects of the Treaty, such as its provisions concerning Safeguards Agreements, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear export controls. The Conference should also undertake an in-depth review of the Treaty's implementation, identify future steps to be taken and commit the international community to action.

51. The maintenance of international peace and security was becoming increasingly complex and no effort should be spared to avert the danger of a nuclear war and its inescapable consequences. The international strategic situation had deteriorated in recent years with the nuclear tests that had been carried out in South Asia in 1998 and the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States towards disarmament. Delegations to the 2000 Conference should therefore show the greatest flexibility so that the Conference could effectively address those concerns.

52. A more positive trend had been noted, however, in the bilateral and/or unilateral reduction by some nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and the recent ratification by the Russian Federation of START II. The indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty facilitated the process of eliminating nuclear weapons already begun by the nuclear-weapon States and the international community should be kept informed of the interim measures adopted pending the total elimination of those arsenals.

53. In order to advance towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, the international community had elaborated a series of instruments and taken a number of initiatives that together constituted the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The success of that regime was dependent on the support of all States. The signature, ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and a start to negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons would therefore go a long way towards demonstrating the international community's commitment to the goal of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in all their aspects.

54. IAEA safeguards were crucial to ensuring that nuclear materials for peaceful uses were not diverted to other uses. In addition, bilateral and regional safeguards promoted greater transparency and mutual

trust between neighbouring States. The regime of bilateral safeguards developed by Argentina and Brazil, for example, was highly effective and could serve as a model for other regions of the world. Acceptance of IAEA safeguards and a commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy as a condition for the supply of nuclear materials and technology were becoming the norm. Nuclear export control regimes had an important role to play in promoting cooperation in the nuclear field and should be viewed not as restrictions on legitimate access to nuclear technology but as guidelines for responsible nuclear export policies.

55. The Treaty placed no restrictions on the legitimate and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Indeed, it guaranteed the economic and technological development of the parties through international cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including the international exchange of equipment and material for the processing, use and production of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. Such activities must be carried out in a transparent manner and in compliance with internationally accepted norms for the safety and physical protection of nuclear materials. In that connection, cooperation in the pertinent forums was essential in order to strengthen the norms that regulated the transport by sea of radioactive wastes.

56. Nuclear-weapon-free zones made a significant contribution to international peace and security as areas that were free from the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons. Argentina hoped that other regions, especially those that were hotbeds of tension, would follow the example of Latin America and the Caribbean and establish similar zones, which significantly promoted development.

57. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) resumed the Chair.*

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee *(continued)*

58. **The President** said that Mr. Koeffler of Austria had been nominated as the second Vice-Chairman of the Credentials Committee and that, in addition, Greece had been nominated as the sixth member of that Committee.

59. *Mr. Koeffler (Austria) was elected as a Vice-Chairman and Greece was elected as a member of the Credentials Committee.*

Organization of work

60. **The President** said that the General Committee had considered requests from the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the League of Arab States and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) to make statements in the plenary meeting of the Conference. Since there had been no objection to those requests, he took it that the Conference wished to extend an invitation to OPANAL, the League of Arab States and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials to make statements in a plenary meeting of the Conference.

61. *It was so decided.*

62. **The President** said that, at the same meeting, the General Committee had considered the query by Cuba, an observer to the Conference, as to whether it could circulate its documents as official documents of the Conference. Since the rules of procedure were not clear in that respect and since, at the 1990 Review Conference, several States non-parties to the Treaty had been allowed to circulate their documents as official documents, the General Committee had had no objection to continuing that practice. He therefore took it that the Conference wished to continue to issue documents submitted by observer States as official documents.

63. *It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.

Summary record of the 7th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 27 April 2000, at 10 a.m.

President:	Mr. Balboni Acqua (Vice-President)	(Italy)
later:	Mr. Martynov (Vice-President)	(Belarus)

Contents

General debate (*continued*)

In the absence of the President, Mr. Balboni Acqua (Italy), Vice-President, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Köffler** (Austria) said that the task before the Conference was first and foremost to reaffirm the commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Austria had been among the first countries to sign and ratify the Treaty, in 1968, and ever since, it had demonstrated its firm support to that landmark Treaty and advocated its ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons. His delegation joined in the calls for universal adherence to the Treaty.

2. With regard to vertical non-proliferation, important disarmament measures had been undertaken and real cuts achieved since 1995. His delegation especially welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify the second of the strategic arms reduction treaties, START II, and its Protocol and hoped that negotiations on a START III agreement could soon commence. It also applauded the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the establishment of the provisional technical secretariat of the Preparatory Commission in Vienna. Thus far, 155 States had signed that Treaty and 55 States had ratified it. The signatories must now provide the necessary funding to continue to build up the comprehensive verification system so that it would be fully operational once the Treaty entered into force.

3. The challenge of banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other devices as foreseen in the "Principles and Objectives" of the 1995 review had not been met. During its presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, Austria had made every effort to translate the existing consensus into concrete negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty, and although it had not succeeded, it would continue its efforts.

4. As host country of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Austria attached particular importance to the implementation of NPT-related safeguards agreements. The measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol would also strengthen the safeguards system and the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities.

5. In focusing on the way ahead, it was important that the "Principles and Objectives" adopted at the 1995 Conference should remain intact and be put into action. His delegation favoured the idea of a plan of action for the coming five-year period in order to achieve a more systematic review of implementation, which would contain both unresolved issues from past reviews and new initiatives. The interests of both non-nuclear-weapon States and States possessing nuclear weapons must be taken into account as well. Such a programme would include a number of elements, including the early entry into force of the CTBT and negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. A comprehensive strategy had been presented at the previous meeting by the representative of Norway, which could provide an interesting basis for those negotiations. Irreversible reduction and destruction of strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals, universal implementation of the additional protocols to the IAEA safeguards, negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, promotion of existing and new nuclear-weapon-free zones, and guidelines for missiles capable of carrying nuclear, chemical and biological weapons were other elements of such a programme. Transparency and information-sharing, both on a global and on a regional level, needed careful consideration, as public awareness of nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation was growing.

6. **Archbishop Tauran** (Observer for the Holy See) said that the Holy See had become a Party to the Treaty with a view to promoting peace. The Treaty had been one of the most significant efforts towards disarmament ever undertaken, and its 187 ratifications were the most of any international instrument on disarmament. The Review Conference provided an opportunity to take stock of the implementation of the Treaty's objectives. The preparatory work for the current Conference had shown, unfortunately, how uncertain the situation with regard to non-proliferation remained, despite the indefinite extension of the Treaty agreed in 1995. The Conference also had symbolic significance: at the beginning of a new millennium, humanity was seeking reassurance about its future.

7. Progress in the implementation of article VI of the Treaty had been very slow. The current stage of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament indicated that many still believed in the use of force and counted on nuclear weapons instead of giving priority to the rule of law, mutual trust and the will to engage in

dialogue. There had certainly been progress between 1968 and 2000, but goals for the future must be more ambitious. What the world lacked was an authentic culture of peace founded on the primacy of law and respect for human life. The time had come to discard the inherited mindset of the cold war. Only universal and verifiable disarmament would guarantee the necessary climate of trust, collaboration and respect for peace to flourish.

8. **Mr. Kukan** (Slovakia) said that his delegation aligned itself with the statement given by Portugal on behalf of the European Union and associated countries.

9. In Slovakia, nuclear energy was used solely for peaceful purposes, a principle enshrined in the national legislation. The first nuclear power plant in Slovakia had begun operating in 1972. Since that time, his Government had always attached great importance to nuclear safety and had sought international cooperation. It felt that IAEA played a crucial role in the non-proliferation regime by applying the safeguards system to prevent the conversion of fissile materials from peaceful to military purposes. As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Slovakia vigorously supported the Agency's programme for strengthening safeguards to enhance its ability to detect clandestine nuclear materials and activities. In 1999, Slovakia had signed a new agreement with IAEA on the application of safeguards and an additional protocol to that agreement, which was about to be submitted to the National Council for approval.

10. The IAEA safeguards system could be greatly strengthened by universal application. It was encouraging that the Board of Governors had recently agreed on an additional protocol with the Russian Federation. His delegation urged all States to apply the strengthened safeguards system and to adopt additional protocols, which should follow as closely as possible the wording of the Model Additional Protocol approved by the Board of Governors, to their safeguards agreements concluded under article III of the NPT.

11. His Government had consistently stressed the importance of the CTBT and hoped that the necessary ratifications for its entry into force would soon be obtained. It welcomed the decision of the Russian Federation to ratify the CTBT and START II. Both ratifications should give a positive impulse to global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. By opening the way for negotiations on START III, ratification of START II demonstrated the usefulness of a step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament.

12. Slovakia considered the NPT an exceptionally important mechanism for dealing with issues vital to humanity. The number of States parties to the Treaty was evidence of its paramount significance to the international community. It was essential, therefore, to preserve the momentum created at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference in order to minimize the risk of nuclear conflict and further the development of cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of mankind.

13. **Mr. Martynov** (Belarus) said that the international community could not ignore the external factors affecting the implementation of the non-proliferation regime. His delegation was deeply concerned about the recent nuclear tests in South Asia, the failure to ratify the CTBT, especially by the United States, and the fact that four States remained outside the NPT system. There was reason for hope, however, in the fact that nine new Parties had joined the NPT since the 1995 review, there had been a de facto moratorium on nuclear testing by the five nuclear Powers, and real progress had been made towards disarmament.

14. His Government regarded the NPT as the cornerstone of international security. Its erosion would also erode the systems that kept the world safe. The new challenges to the NPT regime required a new level of commitment and responsibility on the part of its members. Just a few days earlier, the parliament in Belarus had ratified the CTBT, showing a firm commitment to international peace and security. Further progress was needed in universalizing the non-proliferation regime and in bringing all States under IAEA safeguards. Equal and fair access must also be provided to scientific developments in the field of nuclear energy.

15. Belarus had been the first former Soviet republic to renounce nuclear weapons and to remove them from its territory, in 1997. Thus, it was very important to his Government to have a legal framework of guarantees and assurances in place for non-nuclear-weapon States. In that connection, the slow progress towards an agreement on fissile material was disappointing.

16. A realistic and consistent approach was needed to make nuclear disarmament a reality. His Government

was deeply concerned at the possibility that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) could be vitiated by the development of a missile-based defence system by one State. That could undermine the entire NPT regime and the system of strategic stability built up over decades. Belarus was actively involved in defending the ABM Treaty.

17. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in several regions of the world was a very important development, and Belarus welcomed the progress made towards establishing a similar zone in Central Asia, as well as the announcement by Mongolia that it had renounced nuclear weapons. The initiative towards such a zone in Central and Eastern Europe also should continue, and he called on other States to strengthen the de facto non-nuclear status of Eastern Europe. His Government also supported efforts in the Middle East to make that region a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and called on all Middle Eastern countries to become parties to the NPT and to put their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Full implementation of article VI of the Treaty was of paramount importance.

18. Belarus, Ukraine and the Russian Federation had borne the brunt of the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster 14 years earlier. The experience had taught them that the human factor was the weak link in the chain of nuclear security. In closing, he expressed the hope that participants in the Conference could find the right balance between their own interests and the future of the world.

19. **Mr. Jayanama** (Thailand) said that at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference his delegation had initially supported a fixed-period extension of the NPT but had been persuaded to join the consensus for an indefinite extension of the Treaty on the basis of the "package" approach set forth in the decision on the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", which included the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to meet their nuclear disarmament obligations.

20. Since the 1995 Conference, however, little progress had been made. There had been some achievements, including the adoption of the CTBT, the establishment of two additional nuclear-weapon-free zones and the recent decisions by the Russian Federation to ratify START II and CTBT. But the past five years had seen a number of negative trends, including the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, the announced intention of the United States to develop a new national missile defence system, a delay in the entry into force of the CTBT and the announcement by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of its new nuclear doctrine and nuclear-sharing policy.

21. Given that sombre picture, it was not surprising that the three Preparatory Committee sessions had not been able to arrive at substantive recommendations for the 2000 Review Conference. It was now up to the Conference itself to decide what could be done on the three main issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, nuclear-weapon-free zones and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

22. In the past five years, there had been insufficient progress in nuclear disarmament and an increase in nuclear proliferation. Unless the nuclear-weapon States made an unequivocal commitment to engage without delay in negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament, the credibility and viability of the Treaty would be threatened. The conclusion of an internationally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be a good starting point. The nuclear-weapon States could then take several other practical steps recommended by the New Agenda coalition, namely: reducing tactical nuclear weapons with a view to their elimination; de-alerting or de-activating and removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles; demonstrating transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals and fissile material inventories; and placing all fissile material for nuclear weapons declared to be in excess of military requirements under IAEA safeguards. His delegation strongly supported those measures, which would reduce the risk of accidental nuclear first strike and serve as confidence-building measures among all States parties to the Treaty.

23. Another important issue was the universality of the Treaty. Until States with nuclear technology became, in one form or another, members of the Treaty regime, complete non-proliferation could not be achieved. Indeed, after the nuclear tests conducted in South Asia in 1998, the goal had became even more elusive.

24. One of the achievements since 1995 had been the increase in nuclear-weapon-free zones. To the treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga had been added the

treaties of Bangkok and Pelindaba. In addition, Mongolia had declared its nuclear-weapon-free status and the States of Central Asia were in the process of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region.

25. Under Thailand's chairmanship, the States parties to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok) had been proceeding on two tracks, pursuing the implementation of the treaty provisions while at the same time intensifying consultations with the five nuclear-weapon States to secure their accession to the Protocol to the Treaty. On the first track, the various treaty organs had been set up and had met to consider rules of procedure and future work plans, and consultations had been undertaken with IAEA concerning safeguards, safety issues and assistance. With regard to the Protocol, China had reiterated its readiness to be the first nuclear-weapon State to sign the Protocol. The States parties hoped that the other nuclear-weapon States would show greater flexibility in negotiations on the Protocol.

26. Under article IV of the NPT, States parties had an inalienable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. His delegation therefore believed that the transfer of nuclear technology and the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes should be fully supported. In that regard it commended IAEA for its significant role in promoting nuclear technical cooperation. His delegation felt that the Technical Cooperation Fund, although voluntary in nature, should be treated as a political commitment consistent with treaty obligations. Resources for the Fund should be predictable, adequate and assured. Despite economic difficulties, Thailand had pledged in full its share of the Fund target.

27. Export controls on nuclear technology, although necessary in order to comply with non-proliferation obligations, should be applied in a transparent, realistic and non-discriminatory manner and should in no way hamper the flow of technical cooperation. His delegation believed that nuclear-related export control regimes needed to be reviewed once the new strengthened system of safeguards was fully implemented. A balance should be struck between the promotional and regulatory activities of IAEA.

28. His delegation fully supported the Secretary-General's proposal to convene an international conference, in order to maintain the momentum of the overall nuclear disarmament process. It also welcomed the decision taken by the Conference of States Parties to establish two subsidiary bodies, one under Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons and another under Main Committee II to consider proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East.

29. **Mr. Ben Mustapha** (Tunisia) said that the near-universal ratification of the Treaty gave it credibility and demonstrated the international community's will to address the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, nuclear arsenals had been reduced and the CTBT had been opened for signature and acceded to by 155 States, including his own. However, it had not yet entered into force, nor had negotiations on a treaty banning the use of fissile material for military purposes been initiated. Moreover, the Conference on Disarmament, the only body responsible for the multilateral negotiation of disarmament treaties, had not even been able to reach agreement on its programme of work. He welcomed the Russian Federation's ratification of START II and said he hoped that negotiations on START III would soon begin.

30. It was disturbing that the CTBT had not yet been ratified by certain nuclear States whose accession was required for its entry into force. He therefore welcomed the holding of the Vienna Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in October 1999.

31. Decision 2 of the 1995 Conference ("Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament") had called for the early conclusion of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Those negotiations should be initiated as soon as possible. Pending nuclear disarmament, effective security assurances should be put in place to protect countries which had voluntarily renounced the use of nuclear weapons — the majority of United Nations Member States — from their use or the threat thereof. Nuclear-weapon States had special obligations in that regard under article VI of the Treaty, and events had shown that there could be no true solution to the problem unless nuclear weapons were totally eliminated and the doctrine of nuclear deterrence was renounced.

32. As a State party to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), Tunisia attached great importance to the creation of such zones and of zones free of all weapons of mass destruction. In that regard, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East remained blocked by Israel's continued refusal to accede to the Treaty despite numerous General Assembly resolutions and the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference. Lastly, he endorsed the appeal of the Non-Aligned Movement for the holding of a conference with a view to the rapid conclusion of an agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons.

33. **Mr. Nguyen Thanh Chau** (Viet Nam), after recalling that the 1995 decision to extend the Treaty had been reached as part of a politically binding package set forth in the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", including the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate aim of eliminating them, said that he welcomed the recent decision of the Russian Federation to ratify START II and the CTBT. In other respects, however, the events of the past five years with regard to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation had been disappointing. The expansion of NATO, its actions in the former Yugoslavia, and the prospective deployment of national missile defence systems undermining the integrity of the ABM Treaty were contentious issues which could have damaging global repercussions on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

34. Since 1995 the nuclear-weapon States had made commendable efforts towards reducing their arsenals, but much remained to be done if the NPT was not to lose its credibility. At the 2000 Review Conference it was important that all States parties to the Treaty should reaffirm their unequivocal commitment to the goal of a speedy and total elimination of nuclear weapons. He urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue in good faith and bring to conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in fulfilment of their obligation under article VI of the Treaty, an obligation confirmed by the advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice.

35. In the interim, steps should be taken to complement and reinforce the bilateral reductions currently under way. Those interim measures might include the de-alerting of nuclear weapons, removal of nuclear warheads from their delivery systems, agreement not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and greater transparency with regard to stocks of fissile materials. In that regard his delegation fully supported the New Agenda for nuclear disarmament.

36. Since nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were complementary, his delegation joined others in calling for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Nuclear-weapon States should put excess military stocks of fissile materials under IAEA safeguards. IAEA should be endowed with the financial and human resources necessary to meet its responsibilities for technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. Control arrangements should not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. Viet Nam was grateful for the technical cooperation and support it had received from IAEA and various countries.

37. One of the few significant achievements of the past five years had been the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996. His country was in the process of ratifying the CTBT and urged the other signatories, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to do likewise.

38. With regard to security assurances, his delegation would like to reiterate that the only genuine guarantee for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending achievement of that goal, all the nuclear-weapon States must commit themselves, without any conditions, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and to conclude international legally binding instruments to that effect. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, by voluntarily renouncing their nuclear option, were entitled to receive such assurances.

39. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones had made a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament, confidence-building and security. For such zones to be effective, commitments by the nuclear-weapon States were indispensable. For example, his delegation felt that the accession of all nuclear-weapon States to the Protocol to the Treaty on

the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was essential for confidence-building.

40. The NPT had played a vital role in preventing nuclear proliferation, but its continued success depended on the cooperation of States parties in adhering to the Treaty, and much of the responsibility lay in the hands of the nuclear-weapon States. The 2000 Review Conference should arrive at a balanced assessment of progress since 1995 and take a forward-looking approach that identified areas and means for further progress in implementing the Treaty. The participants must provide the review process with clearer terms of reference to ensure that the NPT remained a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime.

41. *Mr. Martynov (Belarus), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

42. **Mr. Herman** (Hungary) said that his delegation aligned itself with the statement made by the Presidency of the European Union. While his delegation shared many of the concerns expressed about the prospects of nuclear non-proliferation, it believed that the current situation was not all that bleak. Welcome developments since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference included the development of the IAEA Additional Protocol and the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT. Moreover, steps had been taken by some nuclear-weapon States to increase transparency and reduce nuclear armaments.

43. The decisions and the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference provided a solid basis for the further promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and the achievement of the ultimate goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons. A consistent effort by the current Conference to build a consensus in identifying the areas where progress could be achieved coupled with a focus on practical measures would result in a strengthened nuclear non-proliferation regime. He reaffirmed his delegation's support for Security Council resolution 1172 (1998), in particular paragraph 13 thereof. Hungary, one of the 44 countries that had to ratify the CTBT for it to enter into force, had already adopted the relevant legislation.

44. Nuclear-weapon-free zones played an important role in enhancing regional peace and security and promoting nuclear non-proliferation. His delegation endorsed the guidelines adopted at the most recent session of the Disarmament Commission to the effect that such zones must be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. In that regard, positive developments in the Middle East peace process would undoubtedly be instrumental in promoting the idea of making the Middle East a region free from nuclear weapons.

45. Hungary steadfastly supported the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while also stressing the need for proper implementation of relevant safeguards. It was among the countries that had concluded an additional protocol with IAEA. It urged all States that had not yet done so, to do likewise.

46. **Mr. Ogunbanwo** (Nigeria) said that the NPT had undoubtedly contributed immensely to an international environment conducive to peace and stability. As a result of its firm belief in the Treaty, his Government had concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA. Its signing of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) was further proof of its commitment to building a nuclear-weapon-free world. Universality of the NPT was within reach. The challenge facing the international community was how to engage the States still outside the NPT regime through some sort of consultative mechanism. The fact that 182 out of 187 States parties to the NPT were non-nuclear-weapon States demonstrated that security was possible without nuclear weapons. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones by those same non-nuclear-weapon States in their various regions further reinforced the fact that nuclear weapons did not guarantee security but rather distracted from it.

47. When the NPT had been indefinitely extended in 1995, the possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States had not been extended indefinitely. Regrettably, the 1995 programme of action for nuclear disarmament was still unimplemented. There had been no new treaty on the reduction of nuclear weapons, nor had there been any negotiations on the reduction and destruction of all tactical nuclear weapons. Although the ratification of START II by both parties was a welcome step forward, which he hoped would lead to an accelerated process of negotiations under START III, regrettably there were no negotiations covering the weapons possessed by the other three nuclear-weapon States. After welcoming the Russian Federation's recent decision to ratify the CTBT, he noted that the CTBT had not yet entered into force owing to delays in securing the required number

of ratifications. Furthermore, the Conference on Disarmament had failed to engage in negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Another cause for concern was the possible deployment of national anti-missile defence systems, a development which could adversely affect efforts to reduce nuclear weapons.

48. While the nuclear-weapon States bore primary responsibility for taking tangible steps towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, the international community also had a role to play. In that connection, his delegation endorsed the proposal by the New Agenda Coalition that nuclear disarmament efforts could be pursued in a sort of constructive parallelism at the bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral levels. The international community must capitalize on the positive trends of the new initiatives and proposals and use them to advance nuclear disarmament. The time had come for serious dialogue between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. The review process must also be upgraded so that it could accomplish more than just the adoption of decisions and procedures.

49. The issue of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States deserved serious attention. In that regard, he hoped that all States parties would lend their support to the draft protocols to the NPT submitted in 1997 by Nigeria, Myanmar, Kenya and the Sudan and in 1999 by South Africa. Management questions had too often been at the core of the problems of the NPT review processes. During the long intervening periods between review conferences, States parties did not have treaty-based mechanisms to which to turn. His delegation therefore proposed that the Conference should consider the desirability of establishing an NPT management board to deal with the management challenges facing the Treaty. It further proposed that the issue of security assurances should be dealt with by a working group established under Main Committee I.

50. Commending the crucial role played by IAEA in the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, he noted that, in order for the Agency to continue to function effectively and efficiently, there should be some real growth in its regular budget. The current review conference should focus attention on strengthening the Treaty, not weakening it. The best way forward, in that regard, was to look beyond national priorities and focus on collective interests.

51. **Mr. Snoussi** (Morocco) said that, while the NPT had had a positive impact on international peace and security, its overall record was rather mixed, since the Principles and Objectives agreed upon at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had been only partially achieved. The situation with regard to nuclear non-proliferation was much more complicated than it had been a few decades ago. Indeed, his delegation was concerned about the ease with which nuclear weapons technology was acquired. The situation had been further complicated in recent years by the accessibility of nuclear technology as well as the proliferation of the number of suppliers of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Indeed, many non-nuclear-weapon States were sceptical about the willingness of nuclear-weapon States to conduct negotiations on nuclear arms reduction in good faith. His delegation welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT and wished to inform the Conference that Morocco had deposited its instrument of ratification of the CTBT with the United Nations Secretariat.

52. In his delegation's view, a fissile material cut-off treaty would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and also constitute a major step towards nuclear disarmament. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament could not be achieved without an international legally binding instrument that provided negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

53. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in regions of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia, was an essential measure at the regional level. In that regard, Morocco had always been concerned about the universality of the NPT and the need to place all nuclear installations in the Middle East under the IAEA monitoring regime. The resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Conference served as the basis for further negotiations to restore peace and security in that region. He therefore hoped that the leaders of Israel would issue a clear and unambiguous statement announcing their intention of acceding to the NPT and placing their nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards. Such an initiative on the part of Israel would give a clear signal of its determination to rebuild confidence in the wake of a number of procrastinations and acts of provocation. Flexibility was also needed to implement the resolution on the Middle East, and his Government

would spare no efforts to achieve consensus on that issue.

54. The IAEA safeguards regime needed to be reviewed in order to make the Agency's monitoring mechanisms more effective. Clearly, the Agency's role was fundamental in ensuring that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes would contribute to economic and technological development.

55. Despite its purely modest achievements, the Preparatory Committee had nevertheless developed essential recommendations on procedural matters. The Conference now had the important task of dealing with a long list of uncompleted measures. Given the complexity of many of the issues, some concentrated work was required in order to strengthen the Treaty, which still remained the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

56. **Mr. de Saram** (Sri Lanka) said that States parties' obligations under the Treaty fell into three principal categories: first, that of nuclear-weapon States not to transfer such weapons and of non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire them; second, that of the IAEA to monitor compliance with those obligations and to ensure that the restrictions on transfer and acquisition did not prejudice non-nuclear-weapon States in their use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; and, third, that of achieving a fundamental balance between the commitment by the vast majority of States parties never to acquire nuclear weapons and the fact that the nuclear-weapon States parties were permitted to retain their nuclear weapons indefinitely under article VI of the Treaty.

57. Article VI did not ban nuclear weapons or their use. Rather, it imposed on nuclear-weapon States the lesser obligation of nuclear disarmament in exchange for a guarantee that the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States would never acquire them. In an advisory opinion of 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice had stressed that article VI of the Treaty imposed not a mere obligation of conduct, but an obligation to achieve a precise result — nuclear disarmament in all its aspects — by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith. It had also stressed that any realistic search for general and complete disarmament necessitated the cooperation of all States.

58. While he welcomed the unilateral and bilateral disarmament measures adopted by nuclear-weapon States, it was disappointing that the provisions of decision 2 of the 1995 Conference concerning the proposed convention banning the production of fissile materials and the expectation of a determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating them had not been fulfilled. He therefore welcomed the fact that the 2000 Conference had decided that the subsidiary body established under Main Committee I would discuss and consider the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty and the provisions of the section on nuclear disarmament contained in decision 2 of 1995.

59. **Mr. Tupou** (Tonga), speaking on behalf of the South Pacific Forum, called on States that had not yet acceded to the NPT to do so in the near future. Although the South Pacific States were geographically distant from contemporary centres of international tension, they, like all nations, derived security benefits from the Treaty. Without that instrument, disturbing predictions that the world would include 25 or more nuclear-weapon States by the 1980s could well have come to pass. Although the commitment of such States to pursue nuclear disarmament was a central element of the bargain at the heart of the Treaty, article VI thereof had not been fully implemented. He welcomed the Russian Federation's recent ratification of START II and hoped that START III negotiations would soon begin, and he encouraged all nuclear-weapon States to move towards the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons and to display maximum transparency regarding that process.

60. A strong non-proliferation regime was essential to nuclear disarmament. The CTBT had been of direct, practical benefit to the South Pacific countries; since the French Government's ratification of that Treaty, it had finished dismantling its testing sites on the Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls. He welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify the CTBT and urged nuclear-weapon States that were not yet parties to that instrument to ratify it without delay. In the meantime, the South Pacific Forum countries were proceeding with the establishment of the international monitoring system network of stations in that region.

61. The 1995 Conference had stressed the importance of negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty as a means to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. It was therefore disappointing that the Conference on Disarmament had yet to begin negotiations on the subject, and he hoped that the 2000 Conference would give new impetus to that process. He called on States parties that had not yet concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA to do so with a view to achieving the universal application of the safeguards regime.

62. Nuclear-weapon-free zones were another essential complement to the Treaty. The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, established in 1986 by the Treaty of Rarotonga, was the region's contribution to non-proliferation and global security. He welcomed the ratification of the related protocols by certain nuclear-weapon States and said he hoped that the only such State that had yet to ratify them would commit itself to doing so during the Conference.

63. Shipments of radioactive materials and mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel through the South Pacific was a source of continuing concern. Such shipments should be made only if the cargo was of demonstrably minimal risk, on ships of the highest standard and by States that agreed to promote the safety of the material and, in the event of an accident, to provide compensation for any industries harmed as a result of changes in the market value of the region's fisheries and tourism products. He noted the constructive dialogue with nuclear industry representatives from France, Japan and the United Kingdom on the current liability and compensation regime for shipments of radioactive materials and MOX fuel through the region and stressed the importance of International Maritime Organization and IAEA efforts to develop a strong regime of prior notification of, and consultation with, coastal States and of the development of a regime for the preparation of environmental impact statements and emergency response plans.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

Summary record of the 8th meeting
Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 27 April 2000, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. **Mra** (Vice-President) .... (Myanmar)
later: Mr. **Baali** (President) .... (Algeria)

Contents

General debate (*continued*)

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee (*continued*)

In the absence of Mr. Baali (Algeria), Mr. Mra (Myanmar), Vice-President, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Nhleko** (Swaziland) said that, since its entry into force, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had made steady progress towards universality and a significant number of nuclear-weapon States had dismantled their nuclear stockpiles, while others had entered into bilateral arrangements to promote transparency and cooperation. He hoped that those States that had not yet done so would accede to the Treaty without delay. The early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was also a high priority for the international community. The strength of that Treaty lay in its ability to create a moral and political norm against the testing of nuclear arsenals and to promote compliance with its verification regime. Swaziland had already set in motion the internal process for ratifying the Treaty.

2. His delegation looked forward to the resumption and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a binding universal legal instrument banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Those negotiations would reflect the international community's resolve to ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons under strict and effective international controls. An enhanced role for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was at the core of a strengthened non-proliferation regime. The adoption in May 1997 of a Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements had ushered in a new era in the history of non-proliferation verification and would have a positive impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's safeguards regime. His delegation welcomed the progress that had been made towards the conclusion of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones and reiterated the call made in the 1995 "Resolution on the Middle East" for cooperation to ensure the early establishment by regional parties of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

3. **Mr. Tadmoury** (Lebanon) said that, although the world was now closer to a system for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Treaty was still not universal, because four States in regions threatened by political tension and the spectre of armed conflicts had not acceded to it. An overview of achievements during the past five years gave grounds for hope of coming closer to the aims of the Treaty, although the Treaty lacked a mechanism to monitor the implementation of its provisions. Among the positive factors, he noted the cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation in the reduction of nuclear weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which, he hoped, would be fully implemented. In addition, a more propitious climate had been created for the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

4. In that connection, he drew attention to the unanimous advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice affirming the obligation to pursue and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. Under the Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon States should be provided with effective safeguards formulated within a treaty framework designed to preserve international peace and security and to ensure the necessary protection against any nuclear accident. Regrettably, there had been no response to the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions concerning such safeguards.

5. On the other hand, there was scope within the framework of the Treaty for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, particularly in the developing countries, where resources were being depleted by demographic growth and increasing impoverishment and disease. Such peaceful uses were vital in many fields, primarily medicine and the transfer of technology, and in that regard, he emphasized the capacities of IAEA and the possible creation of subsidiary bodies under its auspices for the purpose of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear power in the service of economic, social and human development, with full IAEA monitoring and under a careful system of environmental protection.

6. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference had adopted the "Resolution on the Middle East", which the United States, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation had all supported. At the time, the Arab States and the non-aligned States had linked their agreement to the indefinite extension of the Treaty to the adoption of the Resolution, and it was a cause of concern that Israel still refused to accede to the Treaty and to place its nuclear installations under IAEA

Conference could not reach fruition unless Israel espoused the principle of transparency by acceding to the Treaty and placing its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards, so as to give credibility to the Treaty and remove the direct threat to security and stability at the regional and international levels. Israel's compliance with the "Resolution on the Middle East" would constitute a step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as urged by the General Assembly for many years.

7. The fact that one State in the Middle East was not a party to the Treaty constituted a precedent liable to create an atmosphere for nuclear competition marked by tension and lack of confidence. His delegation called upon the States parties to the Treaty, especially those States that had adopted the "Resolution on the Middle East", to exert their utmost efforts to ensure Israel's accession to the Treaty and persuade it to place its nuclear installations under the safeguards system, inasmuch as that was in the true interest of all States in the Middle East without exception.

8. The statements made at the current Conference had dealt seriously with the aims of the review, but the phase of assessment should lead to the phase of adopting creative decisions promoting the universality of the Treaty and making it an effective instrument for comprehensive nuclear disarmament. In view of the meagre results achieved by the multilateral negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, new policies should perhaps be envisaged that would put an end to the current frustrations and create a fresh stimulus. In that connection, he welcomed the Secretary-General's proposal in his report on the Millennium Assembly calling for an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear weapons and their dangers. Such a conference would undoubtedly initiate a promising new phase that took into account the peace, security and prosperity of future generations and their right to a better future.

9. **Mr. Vohidov** (Uzbekistan) said that his Government's foreign policy was based on the principle of non-nuclear development. The initiative of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and his own country to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia enjoyed broad political support in the region and had been reflected in the documents of the past three sessions of the General Assembly and included in the final documents of the Preparatory Committee for the Conference. The International Conference on Central Asia as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, held at Tashkent in 1997, had demonstrated the unanimity of the aspirations of the Central Asian States to ensure a safe and stable world and had set in motion the regional process aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

10. In order to establish that zone, Uzbekistan regularly conducted consultations with its neighbours and the five nuclear-weapon States. Over the past four years, with the assistance of the United Nations, IAEA and independent experts, the expert group on the formulation of a treaty to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia had conducted several working meetings. The countries concerned were now very close to finalizing and signing the treaty. Uzbekistan was convinced that Central Asia could become the fifth nuclear-weapon-free zone. He, therefore, appealed to the Conference for support and believed that the draft Central Asian treaty should be endorsed in the final document of the Conference.

11. The situation in the world demonstrated the need to undertake the most stringent measures to strengthen the global system of strategic stability and the entire disarmament process. The trends which had emerged had had an adverse effect on the durability of the non-proliferation regime. It was obvious that nuclear weapons would remain one of the major elements of global policy for a long time. The entry into force of the START II Treaty emphasized the possibilities of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The establishment and strengthening of a nuclear non-proliferation regime was the only way of securing a ban on all nuclear tests.

12. Uzbekistan was a party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and had signed an Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with IAEA. In that context, the accession of Bangladesh to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and the decision to ratify that Treaty by the State Duma of the Russian Federation, were encouraging signs. It was to be hoped that the United States of America would soon follow suit. His Government supported the Secretary-General's proposal to convene an international conference to consider ways of eliminating the nuclear threat and also his assessments of the current state of the non-proliferation regime contained in the report entitled

"We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the 21st century" (A/54/2000). Lastly, Uzbekistan believed that the final document of the Conference should define in a more precise manner the role of the Treaty in promoting the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament and in strengthening international peace and security and that concrete measures to encourage the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be identified.

13. **Mr. Takev** (Bulgaria) said that the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had created the necessary conditions for putting an end to the dangerous nuclear arms race and that the current Conference would make a valuable contribution to the improvement of existing mechanisms to control and reduce nuclear arsenals. Implementation of the Treaty and other nuclear non-proliferation regimes had demonstrated the need for an effective control system over the whole spectrum of activities related to nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and the components and materials for their production. States that were not yet parties to the Treaty should therefore accede to it without delay in order to strengthen the credibility and effectiveness of the principles and goals laid down in the Treaty, which was a stabilizing factor in international relations.

14. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had a crucial role to play in improving the current nuclear non-proliferation regime and promoting nuclear disarmament. Bulgaria hoped that the Treaty would be ratified by a sufficient number of States to permit its early entry into force and, in that connection, welcomed the recent decision to ratify the Treaty by the State Duma of the Russian Federation. Bulgaria also agreed on the need for effective international arrangements to provide assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, in conformity with the spirit of Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

15. The promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was one of the prime objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Bulgaria's nuclear facilities operated under full-scope IAEA safeguards, and the country cooperated closely with the Agency and with the European Union on nuclear safety and nuclear non-proliferation issues. His Government would shortly take up consideration of an Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement with a view to its ratification He regretted the Conference on Disarmament's lack of progress towards the adoption of its programme of work. The proposal for the establishment within the Conference on Disarmament of ad hoc working groups on nuclear disarmament and on the prevention of an arms race in outer space deserved special consideration and might constitute a possible basis for compromise.

16. Negotiations on banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices would also be an important step towards the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Those negotiations should commence at an early date in the Conference on Disarmament. Adequate export control measures were an important part of international cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and an essential tool for achieving nuclear non-proliferation. Bulgaria adhered strictly to the Nuclear Suppliers' Group guidelines in its export control policy on dual-use goods and technologies. Its efforts were aimed at further improving its national export control system and bringing it into line with the relevant regulatory mechanisms of the European Union so that the competent Bulgarian authorities could successfully combat illegal trafficking in nuclear materials.

17. **Mr. Andjaba** (Namibia) expressed his delegation's support for the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Namibia welcomed the recent decisions of the Russian State Duma to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and START II and the announcement that the United States of America and the Russian Federation would resume negotiations on START III. Despite those and other positive developments, it was a matter of concern that nuclear arsenals remained at levels far in excess of any reasonable military requirement and that nuclear weapons continued to be developed. There was even some question as to whether the reduction taking place amounted merely to the replacement of obsolete weapons with newer ones.

18. The delay in the entry into force of START II and its Protocol and the recent failure of the United States Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty were equally regrettable. Overall, the non-nuclear-weapon States had faithfully fulfilled their obligations under article II but the nuclear-weapon States had failed to honour their commitments undertaken at the 1995 Conference. Nor had there been any serious effort to draw the four States non-parties into the Non-

Proliferation Treaty regime. Claims that nuclear weapons were needed indefinitely for national security or deterrence not only encouraged other States to acquire them but were also contrary to the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament (General Assembly resolution 53/77 W, para. 1).

19. Namibia was committed to the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it had signed in 1990 soon after gaining independence. It had signed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, and one of the seismological stations under the International Monitoring System would be based in Namibia. His country had concluded a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and was currently negotiating an Additional Protocol. Namibia was grateful to IAEA for its assistance in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the fields of human health, animal health, agriculture and water resources management and hoped that that assistance would continue.

20. The steps that should be taken in order to attain the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty included accelerating nuclear disarmament negotiations, promoting universal accession to the Treaty, ratification of the CTBT, establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, imposing a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, adherence by States parties to all obligations under the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and establishing a nuclear weapons register to promote transparency and accountability.

21. **Mr. Daka** (Zambia) said that the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil the commitments entered into at the 1995 Conference represented a betrayal of confidence and undermined the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which played a crucial role in non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The 2000 Review Conference should therefore address the issue of the reluctance of the nuclear-weapon States to honour their commitment to fully implement the package that had been endorsed by the 1995 Conference. The current Conference should set an agenda for non-proliferation in the new millennium, including practical steps for the systematic and progressive elimination of all nuclear weapons and recommendations for the implementation of the "Resolution on the Middle East".

22. Zambia was concerned at the continuing restrictions on exports to developing countries of materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. The concerns expressed by nuclear-weapon States about perceived nuclear proliferation should not be used to justify any restrictions on exports to non-nuclear-weapon States of material, equipment and technologies to facilitate the exploitation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Those concerns should be addressed in the appropriate multilateral forums. Moreover, in order to be effective, all non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States. His Government was therefore troubled by the attempts of some parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to use the IAEA technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes. Lastly, in order to further strengthen the existing Safeguards Agreement, the Conference should reaffirm the legitimate vote of the Conference on Disarmament to pursue nuclear disarmament on the basis of the Model Additional Protocol.

23. **Mr. Mwakawago** (United Republic of Tanzania) said that his delegation supported the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. His delegation viewed the current Conference as an opportunity to redress inequities in the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and the failure of nuclear-weapon States to honour their Treaty obligations. It reaffirmed its strong support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, such as the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok. Tanzania had demonstrated its commitment by its early ratification of the Treaty of Pelindaba. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) played a crucial role in enhancing nuclear safety and should accord the highest priority to achieving full integration of its safeguards system.

24. His delegation reaffirmed its support for the 1995 "Resolution on the Middle East", calling for its full implementation, and urged Israel to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to transform the region into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. He welcomed the progress achieved by the United States and the Russian Federation towards nuclear arms reduction, particularly the ratification of START II by the Russian Federation, and urged the two countries to initiate START III negotiations. His Government also commended the

unilateral limited disarmament measures taken by France and the United Kingdom. Noting the risks and the gravity of the situation resulting from the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan, he said that it was not too late for the two countries to renounce the use of nuclear weapons and return to their pre-May 1998 situation.

25. His delegation, too, was concerned at the possible deployment of a national missile defence system by the United States, in gross violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. That Treaty must remain a cornerstone of strategic arms reduction; its violation could trigger a new round in the nuclear arms race. The nuclear-weapon States should focus on consolidating existing disarmament and arms control treaties. Their insistence on maintaining nuclear deterrence, while arguing that the chances of a nuclear war were slim, was terrifying.

26. As long as nuclear weapons existed, there was the ever-present danger of a nuclear war, triggered either by accident or through faulty judgement. The call by non-nuclear-weapon States for negative security assurances was a legitimate concern that had long been ignored by the nuclear-weapon States. It was morally incumbent on the latter to make credible and effective efforts in that regard. The resistance of the nuclear-weapon States, with the exception of China, to renouncing the no-first-use option also gave cause for grave concern. Those States must urgently commit themselves to a no-first-use policy, coupled with a de-alerting of their nuclear arsenals in all their forms.

27. **Mr. Salamanca** (Bolivia) expressed his country's full support for the statements made by the representative of Peru on behalf of the Andean Community and the representative of Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition. It was deeply concerned by the nuclear tests carried out in India and Pakistan; the slow pace of arms limitation negotiations; the continuing non-accession of four States to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, three of which possessed nuclear weapons; the undermining of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by the United States missile defence system; and the United States Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The Non-Proliferation Treaty represented the hopes of countries like Bolivia that resources once used to produce nuclear weapons would be rechannelled into development. The underlying key ideas that had led to the drafting of the Non-Proliferation Treaty thirty years earlier should remain central to the deliberations of the current Conference on its implementation.

28. His delegation welcomed the decision by the State Duma of the Russian Federation to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and START II. It was concerned, however, at the recent statement by the Russian Prime Minister according priority to strengthening the country's military potential. In conclusion, his delegation urged the four countries whose accession would ensure the universality of the Treaty to become parties to it and agreed wholeheartedly with the representative of Brazil that a single nuclear weapon was one too many.

29. **Mr. Osei** (Ghana) said that his delegation supported the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. As a non-nuclear-weapon State and a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Ghana reaffirmed its commitment to it and other disarmament processes. However, it shared the disappointment and pessimism of many non-nuclear-weapon States about the lack of progress, largely because of the unwillingness of the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the necessary flexibility and political will to move forward. The nuclear-weapon States could not expect the non-nuclear-weapon States to remain committed indefinitely to the NPT and other disarmament treaties when they themselves evinced different attitudes. Yet, for the sake of mankind, everyone must remain hopeful. His delegation believed that the pursuit of a new, rather than a renewed, agenda, engendered such hope, and therefore wholeheartedly supported the New Agenda Coalition.

30. It should be recalled that the negotiations for the Treaty involved a bargain between the five nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States; since the developing countries had kept their part of the bargain, they had a right to access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to facilitate socio-economic development. His delegation welcomed the responsiveness of IAEA to the most pressing global challenges — poverty and disease, natural resources management and environmental degradation — through applied nuclear science and technology, working in partnership with other development agencies. In Ghana, primary health care was being enhanced through a project funded by IAEA. His delegation believed that the Conference should identify opportunities for the Agency's continued work at the

multilateral, regional and bilateral levels to provide financial and institutional support for the application of nuclear technology to benefit human and economic development. The technical cooperation efforts of IAEA would need to be fully complemented by the provision of adequate budgetary resources.

31. The demonstration of commitment, political will and flexibility at the Conference by the nuclear-weapon States would be critical to establishing the necessary trust and goodwill among States parties, thus promoting transparency and unrestricted exchange of nuclear materials, as well as scientific information to facilitate the development of programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Everyone had a stake in the outcome of the review process. Flexibility on the part of the key nuclear actors would boost the disarmament process. The choice was to focus on the wider goal of promoting the survival of mankind, or to remain fixed in a narrow, parochial and short-sighted vision of national goals and be doomed.

32. **Mr. Alvim** (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)) recalled that, in July 1991, the Governments of Argentina and Brazil had signed an agreement at Guadalajara, Mexico, on the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy. That agreement had been the outcome of a lengthy process of building trust and easing possible tension that had culminated in the establishment of the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR). In signing the Guadalajaran Agreement, Argentina and Brazil had sought to ensure conditions for the application of full-scope international safeguards in the two countries. At the same time, Argentina, Brazil and Chile had proposed modifications to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and had started negotiations on a full-scope Safeguards Agreement with IAEA, with ABACC as one of the parties, which was known as the Quadripartite Agreement.

33. The Guadalajara Agreement was more stringent than the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which Argentina and Brazil had subsequently acceded. Therefore, no transition stage had been needed for the application of safeguards when the NPT had come into effect in the two countries. The new international situation at the end of the century highlighted the need to strengthen not only traditional safeguards but also the regional approach. Regional nuclear safeguards organizations had the advantage of proximity to and familiarity with the countries in question, and, representing the unwavering political will of the member countries, promoted non-proliferation in their regions and were committed to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy.

34. Regional safeguards also made sense from the technical and economic standpoint, when integrated with IAEA safeguards. The integration of safeguards efforts was therefore of the utmost importance, especially for the application of the Additional Protocol, in respect of which Brazil, Argentina and ABACC had stated their intention of starting negotiations. ABACC was fully empowered to play a leading role in the application of the new safeguards. Technical cooperation between Argentina and Brazil was a way of establishing trust between them, and with the international community. Argentina, Brazil and ABACC had increased cooperation in the safeguards area, and in other fields, while ensuring the transparency required for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

35. Over nearly eight years, ABACC had carried out 944 inspections; during those inspections and joint inspections with IAEA, it had made considerable progress in reducing the inspection effort, with no loss in effectiveness. In particular, the two agencies had made significant progress in the use of inspectors and equipment. Complying with its obligations under the Guadalajara and Quadripartite Agreements and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, ABACC had forwarded 3,200 accounting reports to IAEA, as well as 770 inspection reports to both countries and 30 to IAEA, and 19 declarations to Brazil and Argentina, of which 11 had been related to compliance with the Treaty of Tlatelolco and had been forwarded to the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The ABACC secretariat felt that the efforts undertaken by Argentina and Brazil to eliminate the risks of nuclear weapons in the region had made an appreciable contribution to world peace.

36. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) took the Chair.*

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee (*continued*)

37. **The President** said that the following nominations had been received: Mr. Reznikov (Belarus) for the post of Vice-Chairman of Main Committee I; and Mr. Villagra-Delgado (Argentina) for the post of Vice-Chairman of the Drafting Committee.

38. *Mr. Reznikov (Belarus) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee I; and Mr. Villagra-Delgado (Argentina) was elected Vice-Chairman of the Drafting Committee.*

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.

Summary record of the 9th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 1 May 2000, at 10 a.m.

President:	Mr. Baali	(Algeria)
later:	Mr. Kuindwa (Vice-President)	(Kenya)
later:	Mr. Baali	(Algeria)

Contents

Election of Vice-Presidents (*continued*)

General debate (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Election of Vice-Presidents (*continued*)

1. **The President** said that the Group of Non-Aligned Countries had proposed the candidacies of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria for three of the four remaining vacancies for Vice-President of the Conference.

2. Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria were elected Vice-Presidents of the Conference.

General debate (*continued*)

3. **Mr. Oskanian** (Armenia), after emphasizing the crucial role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in eliminating both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy, commended the decision of the Russian Federation to ratify the second of the strategic arms reductions treaties, START II, and hoped that it would open the way to negotiations on START III. His country had joined 155 States in signing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), whose entry into force was a priority element in the implementation of article VI of the NPT. His Government supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and welcomed the zones established in South-East Asia and Africa since 1995.

4. The five-year period under review had been marked by both achievements and setbacks for the global non-proliferation regime. Universality of the Treaty remained a high priority for all States parties. Yet regional security problems stood in the way of universality, and the security concerns of the four States which were not parties must be addressed on the regional level. The non-parties would have a reason to join and parties would be more inclined to comply fully with their obligations if effective security assurances could be achieved to de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons as a guarantee of security. Some nuclear-weapon States had announced that they had ceased production of fissile material for use in weapons, and it urged all States capable of producing fissile material for weapons purposes to declare a moratorium on production pending the conclusion of a legally binding fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament should make full use of its capability as the sole multilateral forum for such negotiations and find a compromise solution leading to the adoption of a treaty.

5. Just three days after Armenia had declared its independence in 1991, the Armenian parliament had adopted a decision to abide by the NPT. After formally acceding to the Treaty in 1993 as a non-nuclear-weapon State, Armenia had concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It had then reactivated its nuclear energy programme with the assistance of IAEA, which had helped to solve a serious energy crisis. The right of States parties to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy under international safeguards was of critical importance and should be maintained

6. *Mr. Kuindwa (Kenya), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

7. **Ms. Rodrigues** (Mozambique) said that, despite the positive developments in the past five years, there had been setbacks in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, including the nuclear tests carried out in South Asia, the failure of some countries to ratify the CTBT and ongoing nuclear modernization programmes in nuclear-weapon States. In order to create a world free of nuclear weapons, comprehensive and practical strategies must be devised to meet the specific situations of individual countries. Such strategies would be based on comprehensive national surveys, effective coordination, information management and advocacy for non-proliferation. Inspections conducted by IAEA were one of the most important ways to prevent the acquisition, development and spread of new nuclear weapons technology. The NPT had provided the international community with a framework for action and grounds for optimism. It had also established an international standard: no longer would States parties to the Treaty be allowed to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons with impunity.

8. Her delegation attached particular importance to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and it was concerned at the delay in the ratification and implementation of the Treaty of Pelindaba. It invited all States concerned to take appropriate action for its effective implementation and the resulting denuclearization of Africa. It also called on States with special responsibility in international security to help to remove the obstacles impeding the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones.

9. During the cold war, the developing countries had suffered the effects of the nuclear arms race both directly and indirectly. They had lived under the threat of a nuclear strike, and they had witnessed the devotion of precious resources to the vertical development of nuclear weapons. With the end of the cold war, they had hoped to see an end to that threat. A freeze on the development of new weapons would allow resources to be redirected to development needs. The developing countries could benefit greatly from the availability of nuclear energy, and they would like to see IAEA set up a non-selective programme to circulate relevant information so that countries like her own could benefit from Agency projects. Indeed, as a developing State struggling to eradicate absolute poverty, Mozambique strongly supported the idea of linking disarmament to sustainable development initiatives. Through the effective implementation of the NPT, States could enhance their mutual assurances and, through nuclear disarmament, free huge amounts of resources for development.

10. **Mr. Hasan** (Iraq) said it was clear that, while the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had abided by their commitments, some of the nuclear-weapon States parties had failed to do so. There was still no clear prospect of the elimination of nuclear weapons; universality had not been achieved; Israel, backed by nuclear weapons, continued its arrogant behaviour; no tangible steps had been taken to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons; and no clear progress had been achieved to ensure the exercise by all the parties to the Treaty of their right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Failure to implement the Treaty and the resolutions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference reflected an international atmosphere in which hegemony, increased reliance on nuclear deterrence, military alliances, the unilateral use of force and the constant marginalization of United Nations mechanisms, were used to achieve the political interests of the dominating great Power, as in the case of the sanctions imposed on Iraq and the use of inspection activities in Iraq for United States intelligence purposes.

11. Owing to the non-implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference, the Arab countries faced constant danger and blackmail from Israel, which continued to build up its nuclear capability and to practise a policy of hegemony. Israel's nuclear arsenal included sophisticated weapons built with United States assistance. Indeed, the United States had recently agreed to give Israeli experts access to its nuclear facilities with a view to developing Israel's nuclear technology. Israel, in turn, transferred American nuclear technology to other countries. Yet the Treaty provided the Arab countries with no guarantee against the Israeli threat.

12. Under the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and various United Nations resolutions, the international community was legally bound to require Israel to accede to the Treaty and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision. The recent Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, for its part, had expressed great concern over Israel's nuclear capability and had condemned Israel for continuing to develop its nuclear arsenal. The working paper submitted by the Group of Arab States to Main Committee II of the Conference contained recommendations with a view to removing the Israeli threat.

13. The United States continued its own violation of the Treaty by supplying nuclear technology to Israel, deploying nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States parties, refusing to ratify the CTBT and indicating its intention to develop a national missile defence system.

14. Iraq, for its part, fully complied with its obligations under the Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system. In March 2000, the Agency had reported that Iraq had fully cooperated with the inspection team and that all nuclear materials had been found in agreement with the IAEA inventory. Prior to that, in October 1998, the Agency had stated in its report to the Security Council (S/1998/927) that there were no indications that there remained in Iraq any physical capability for the production of weapon-usable nuclear material of any practical significance (para. 17).

15. However, the activities of IAEA and the defunct United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) had been used as a cover for prolonging the embargo imposed on Iraq and achieving certain political aims of the United States, thereby constituting a serious deviation from their mandates from the Security Council. Agents of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had transmitted to Washington all the information which IAEA had

obtained from inspection activities in Iraq, their aim being to conspire against Iraq and its leadership. They had also installed eavesdropping devices to monitor the movements and communications of Iraqi officials. Thus, the inspection and monitoring regime in Iraq had been a tool in the hands of the United States Administration, seriously damaging the credibility of IAEA and the United Nations by continuing the genocidal embargo in the name of the United Nations. Iraq demanded compensation for the damage it had suffered as a result of those acts of aggression; it also demanded that those responsible should be punished, and that the Conference should adopt recommendations that condemned activities undermining the impartiality of the work of IAEA.

16. The United States and the United Kingdom had used depleted uranium in their aggression against Iraq in 1991 and against Yugoslavia in 1999, despite the disastrous effects of such a radiological weapon on human beings and the environment — effects which would continue for centuries unless action was taken to decontaminate Iraq's environment. His delegation invited the Conference to call for the prohibition of the use of such weapons and also invited IAEA to help Iraq reduce the negative effects of that disaster, and affirmed Iraq's right to demand compensation.

17. In December 1998, immediately following the withdrawal of IAEA inspectors from Iraq, upon instructions from the United States Administration, the United States and the United Kingdom had launched a full-scale aggression against Iraq, including destruction of the nuclear-monitoring instruments, thereby dealing a fatal blow to the IAEA monitoring regime. The Conference should condemn that aggression and provide for compensation to Iraq. A previous blow directed at the IAEA safeguards regime had been Israel's aggression in 1981 against the Iraqi nuclear reactor. The Security Council had condemned that aggression and called upon Israel urgently to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards (resolution 487 (1981), para. 5), but its resolution continued to be mere ink on paper. Iraq hoped that the Conference would explicitly prohibit military attacks against nuclear facilities placed under IAEA supervision. He noted, however, that the background papers submitted by IAEA and the United Nations Secretariat had failed to mention those facts; indeed, the papers submitted by the Secretariat had presented a distorted picture of the Iraqi situation that bespoke a total surrender to the American master.

18. His delegation urged all States parties to intensify their efforts to increase awareness of the threats to humankind posed by nuclear weapons. It welcomed the various international and regional proposals on nuclear disarmament, including the working paper in document NPT/CONF.2000/WP.3. It welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify the CTBT and START II and stressed the legal and moral responsibility of those States possessing nuclear weapons to eliminate them at the earliest date. The nuclear-weapon States which preached democracy and human rights must learn that the first principles of democracy and human rights were the equality of all human beings with regard to their need for security and safety. The goal of the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction must be adopted as the standard by which to measure the extent to which States had abided by their commitments.

19. **Mr. Erwa** (Sudan) said that his country supported the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the paper submitted by the Movement to the Conference. As one of the first States to sign and ratify the NPT, the Sudan reaffirmed its full commitment to the Treaty in the interests of promoting international peace and security.

20. The nuclear threat was as grave as ever: nuclear weapons continued to proliferate outside the IAEA safeguards system. As the Secretary-General had noted at the outset of the Conference, there was a lack of political will to activate the international mechanisms for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and those mechanisms had been left to rust. Consequently, the Conference had a historic responsibility to redress the current nuclear imbalance and to pursue efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.

21. Some limited progress had been made towards the prevention of proliferation, the latest being the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT. The Sudan hoped that that action would prompt other nuclear-weapon States to take serious steps towards banishing the nuclear threat and reaffirming their commitments under the Treaty.

22. The Sudan shared the international community's concern at the refusal of the nuclear-weapon States to enter into serious negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. He endorsed the call of the Non-Aligned Movement in the Conference on Disarmament for the

setting up of an ad hoc committee to commence negotiations for a phased programme of nuclear disarmament within a specific time-frame, including the conclusion of a multilateral convention on nuclear disarmament, in keeping with the spirit of article VI of the Treaty and the unanimous advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, in which the Court had reaffirmed the obligation to pursue negotiations for nuclear disarmament.

23. Even though all the other States in the Middle East had become party to the Treaty, Israel still refused to do so. Whereas some major Powers had brought pressure to bear on certain disadvantaged States to become parties to certain treaties, they at the same time gave Israel full access to nuclear technology and assistance in developing its nuclear programme, in clear violation of the Treaty. His Government's call for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East was based on the importance of achieving a just and comprehensive peace in that region. Peace would be unattainable unless all such weapons owned by Israel were eliminated. It was the clear responsibility of the Conference to take action, in the light of Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty and to submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards. That responsibility included efforts to implement the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference, which had called for Israel's accession to the Treaty without delay, as a step towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

24. The nuclear-weapon States were committed under article I of the Treaty to withhold nuclear assistance from Israel as long as it refused to accede to the Treaty and to submit its facilities to IAEA safeguards. The States parties to the Treaty, and particularly the United States, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom were, as sponsors of the resolution on the Middle East, called upon to exert the utmost effort to induce Israel to accede to the Treaty.

25. In conclusion, he stressed the importance of the unwavering commitment of all States parties to all provisions of the Treaty. They must refrain from selectively implementing only certain provisions, and they must be firmly committed to the implementation of the resolutions adopted at the 1995 Conference. It might be the last opportunity for States to eliminate the nuclear option, achieve the universality of the Treaty and avert its collapse.

26. **Mr. Minoves-Triquell** (Andorra) said that Andorra, a country without a Ministry of Defence, an army or missiles, had lived in peace and neutrality for 700 years, yet it had become clear that, in the twenty-first century, neither isolation nor neutrality was a guarantee of peace. Since it had joined the United Nations in 1993, Andorra had been actively involved in the cause of disarmament and had provided whatever assistance it could in that area. Although Andorra had no military structures or nuclear installations, it had wished to join the moral stand against nuclear proliferation, and had signed the NPT and the CTBT in 1996. It welcomed the fact that eight other States had joined the NPT since the 1995 review.

27. It was a common responsibility of humanity to preserve the planet from destruction and, if possible, to turn back the clock to a time when the means of global annihilation had not existed. To that end, existing disarmament agreements must be fully implemented and new ones developed to foster safe and progressive disarmament.

28. *Mr. Baali (Algeria), President, resumed the Chair.*

29. **Mr. Kuindwa** (Kenya) said that his country had excellent credentials in the area of disarmament: it had been one of the first to sign the NPT in 1968 and one of the original 21 members of the Conference on Disarmament, and it was on that basis that his Government had lent its unswerving support to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Thus, the lack of progress in many areas was of great concern to his delegation. The easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which had resulted from the end of the cold war had been expected to facilitate nuclear disarmament, but it had had a contrary effect in some cases. Nuclear-weapon States had reneged on their commitments under the NPT, the United States had failed to ratify the CTBT, nuclear tests had taken place in South Asia, and effective international arrangements on negative security assurances were lacking, showing an absence of political will to fulfil obligations.

30. All those factors were contributing to an erosion of the non-proliferation regime and threatening collective security. The insecurity created by a lack of commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to move towards disarmament had provided others with an excuse to test. Deplorable though the actions by

India and Pakistan might be, a wake-up call had been sounded that must be clearly heard.

31. It was also disappointing that posturing by some at the Conference on Disarmament had rendered it moribund. Discussions must start sooner rather than later on a fissile material cut-off treaty, which would help to salvage the non-proliferation regime. The recent decisions taken in the Russian Federation on the CTBT and START II were to be commended and brought the entry into force of the CTBT closer.

32. Among issues of particular importance to Kenya, the failure to achieve universality of the NPT was especially disappointing. It was imperative for States which possessed nuclear weapons capability to be Parties to the Treaty so that they could be subject to IAEA safeguards. Conversely, States which had opted not to join should not benefit from the transfer of technology for peaceful uses. The question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy was of great significance to countries like his which continued to grapple with economically crippling energy deficiencies. Therefore, access to nuclear technology by all States parties should be provided on an assured and predictable basis, and technical assistance should be extended without any constraints.

33. The success of the Conference would depend entirely on whether participants believed that the NPT was still relevant in its current form, or whether the changes which had taken place since its extension and the lack of progress on commitments called for a new approach. For instance, the need for security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States was apparent and had the support of most members of the international community, yet still such assurances had not been provided. They would best take the form of an international convention of a legally binding character and would encourage those outside the NPT process to consider joining it.

34. The dumping of radioactive waste in the developing world, particularly in Africa, was once again becoming a problem. He appealed to all States generating such waste to act responsibly in dealing with it, especially as countries which were without the benefits of nuclear technology did not possess the know-how to handle its waste.

35. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that, in addition to taking new decisions, the Conference would ensure that the decisions made earlier were implemented.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

Summary record of the 10th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 1 May 2000, at 3 p.m.

President:	Mr. Baali	(Algeria)
later:	Mr. Vohidov (Vice-President)	(Uzbekistan)
later:	Mr. Baali (President)	(Algeria)

Contents

General debate *(continued)*

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Kasiev** (Kyrgyzstan) said that the 2000 Review Conference, which was taking place against a background of mounting challenges to the non-proliferation regime, was an opportunity to revive and strengthen the spirit of cooperation that had prevailed at the 1995 Conference, when the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had been indefinitely extended. While the Conference must build on the decisions and the resolution adopted in 1995, it must look forward as well as back, identifying practical steps to strengthen the implementation of all aspects of the Treaty and achieve its universality.

2. The events in South Asia in 1998 had underlined the importance of regional efforts in the fields of disarmament and non-proliferation as a means of strengthening the global regime. His delegation welcomed in that connection the significant progress made towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, which would enhance both global and regional peace and security. It commended the efforts of the expert group established to prepare the form and elements of an agreement for such a zone. The group had held a series of meetings with the participation of representatives of the five Central Asian States, the five nuclear Powers, the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and was close to completing its work.

3. His delegation supported previous speakers who had emphasized the importance of progress towards implementing the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) and the early commencement of negotiations on a third such treaty, as well as achieving significant reductions in the number of nuclear weapons deployed and expediting the negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. He regretted the impasse reached in the Conference on Disarmament on that issue and called on it to seek alternative ways forward.

4. His Government strongly supported the IAEA safeguards system. It had concluded a safeguards agreement with the Agency in March 1998 and would begin negotiations on an Additional Protocol in the near future. The disarmament process required strict procedures for the safe transport, storage and use of sensitive nuclear materials. The 2000 Conference should consider new steps to strengthen nuclear-related export controls, enhance physical protection, prevent the unlawful transfer of nuclear materials and counter the threat of nuclear terrorism.

5. It was important to give due regard to the serious environmental consequences that had resulted, in some exceptional cases, from uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel-cycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons. His Government called on all States and international organizations with expertise in the field of cleanup and disposal of radioactive contaminants to provide appropriate assistance for remedial purposes in Kyrgyzstan and other affected countries.

6. At the dawn of the new millennium, the non-proliferation regime was facing new problems and challenges. There was thus no reason for complacency. Indeed, if it was to remain viable, the Treaty would require constant care and attention. His delegation looked forward to working at the Conference to find new approaches with a view to ensuring the integrity and effectiveness of the Treaty in the long term.

7. *Mr. Vohidov (Uzbekistan), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

8. **Mr. Botnaru** (Moldova) said that the end of the cold war had brought with it the promise of the eventual elimination of weapons of mass destruction. In order to achieve that goal, there must be continuing progress in the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. The Non-Proliferation Treaty's indefinite extension in 1995 had demonstrated the importance that the States parties attached to it in that context. In accordance with the provisions of the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted by the 1995 Conference, there must be systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament. His delegation welcomed in that regard the conclusion in 1995 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which represented an effective obstacle to the qualitative development of nuclear weapons, and, at the regional level, the voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

9. Since nuclear-weapon-free zones were an important complement to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the commitment by the Central Asian States to establish such a zone and the adoption by the

Commission on Disarmament of guidelines for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones were also to be welcomed. There had, in addition, been significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation, while the Russian State Duma had decided to ratify START II and the CTBT, and France and the United Kingdom had taken unilateral measures to downsize their nuclear arsenals.

10. However, the nuclear tests conducted in 1998 in South Asia represented a serious challenge to the non-proliferation regime, and the lack of progress towards the entry into force of the CTBT and the differences over the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) threatened to impede the process of nuclear disarmament. His delegation urged those countries whose ratification was essential for the entry into force of the CTBT to accede to that instrument without delay. It hoped that a more constructive atmosphere in the Conference on Disarmament would lead to the adoption of verifiable nuclear disarmament measures.

11. His Government strongly supported the activities of IAEA as the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States with the Safeguards Agreements concluded with the Agency and welcomed the adoption in May 1997 of a Model Protocol Additional to the existent Safeguards Agreements. Although Moldova had no nuclear materials in its territory, his Government intended to conclude an additional protocol with IAEA for the purpose of promoting universal compliance with the Treaty. The Conference must consider other means of strengthening the safeguards system.

12. Conscious of Moldova's location at an important commercial crossroads, his Government was taking all necessary measures to prevent the transit through the country of components, materials and technology intended for use in weapons of mass destruction. It appreciated the assistance provided in that area by the Government of the United States and the European Union. Although the Preparatory Committee for the Conference had failed to produce any substantive recommendations, it had made all the necessary procedural preparations, thus clearing the ground for a result-oriented Conference and providing a good opportunity to produce a realistic programme of action to enhance the Treaty and ensure the full implementation of its provisions by all States parties. His delegation stood ready to contribute to that process.

13. **Mr. Estevez-Lopez** (Guatemala) said that, with the development of nuclear weapons, mankind had been confronted with the previously unimaginable spectre of an armed conflict that could result in its complete annihilation. Recognizing the need to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples the international community had concluded the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That instrument was certainly not perfect. Indeed, it had maintained the inequality between the five States that possessed nuclear weapons prior to 1967 and the other States parties, which were required under the Treaty to renounce the nuclear option forever. The Treaty, however, constituted no more than an intermediate step towards the goal of nuclear disarmament and, ultimately, general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

14. His delegation had welcomed the Treaty's indefinite extension and the measures taken at the 1995 Conference to strengthen and refine the review process. It noted with satisfaction the positive developments in the areas of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation since 1995, including the accession of a further nine States to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the decision by the Russian State Duma to ratify START II and the CTBT, the reaffirmation by the five nuclear Powers of their commitment to nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the progress made towards establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in Central Asia and Mongolia. His delegation urged all States not yet party to that Treaty to accede to it and called on those States whose ratification of the CTBT was necessary for its entry into force to accede to that instrument. Lastly, he hoped that the States of South Asia and the Middle East would continue their efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions.

15. **Mr. Neewoor** (Mauritius) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty's objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament were inextricably linked. It was the promise of disarmament that provided the rationale for the permanent renunciation of the nuclear option by the non-nuclear-weapon States. The failure of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty was the most important issue before the Conference. The continued deployment in the world of 36,000 nuclear warheads

showed how little the nuclear Powers had done to advance the cause of nuclear disarmament. At the same time, efforts were being made to achieve the qualitative enhancement of existing nuclear capabilities and there were plans to deploy weapons in outer space. The very credibility of the non-proliferation regime was at stake.

16. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence had resulted in greater proliferation of nuclear weapons and upgrading of nuclear capability by one nation inevitably led to a new nuclear arms race. There was therefore no alternative to total nuclear disarmament, which must be achieved within an established time-frame. The end of the cold war had presented opportunities for serious dialogue among the nuclear Powers. Small steps had been taken by the United States and the Russian Federation in 1997 to reduce their nuclear arsenals, and other nuclear Powers had made unilateral pledges to reduce their nuclear arsenals. He welcomed the recent ratification of START II by the Russian Federation and its decision to ratify the CTBT and hoped that the United States and the Russian Federation, along with other nuclear States, would act boldly to implement START III and agree on a time-frame for total denuclearization. It was regrettable that a time-frame for the total elimination of nuclear weapons had not been included in the CTBT, which was the major reason why Mauritius had not yet become a signatory.

17. The 1995 Conference had envisioned not only the conclusion of the CTBT by 1996, but also a fissile material cut-off treaty, the establishment of new nuclear-free zones and determined efforts by the nuclear Powers to reduce nuclear weapons globally with a view to their eventual elimination. Unfortunately, there had been no movement towards a fissile material cut-off treaty and nuclear disarmament remained stalled. On the other hand, non-nuclear-weapon States had concluded the treaties of Pelindaba and Bangkok creating two major nuclear-free zones. Mauritius had been among the first States to ratify the former and called upon States which had not done so to ratify that Treaty as soon as possible. The countries of the Middle East, Israel in particular, should also take the steps necessary for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in that region.

18. He deplored the reluctance of the nuclear Powers to fulfil their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty concerning the transfer of nuclear materials and technology for peaceful uses to developing countries under the IAEA full-scope safeguards, which was the only tangible benefit that the developing countries expected from the NPT. The transport of nuclear waste across the seas and the risks that that entailed were also a source of concern to developing countries. That situation was further aggravated by the absence of a proper compensation regime, which must be addressed by the Review Conference.

19. A registry should be created under the auspices of IAEA where records could be kept of all nuclear weapons wherever they might be stationed, since they represented a serious danger for adjacent populations. That registry should be accessible under strict conditions to sovereign Governments, which were responsible for the safety and security of their peoples. The fact that there were nuclear-weapon States which had not acceded to the NPT or the CTBT should be recognized. Accordingly, he called for the early convening of an international conference on nuclear disarmament which would broaden the scope of the discussion of nuclear issues in a new, global, perspective and also address the issue of the growing threat of nuclear terrorism.

20. **Ms. Raholinirina** (Madagascar) said that the Review Conference was taking place at a time when the international situation was complex and unstable. Hopes for peace and prosperity raised by the end of the cold war had been dashed by the growing level of violence in the world. Since the 1995 Conference, there had been both progress and setbacks in the areas of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The nuclear tests in South Asia in 1998 had contributed to regional and international insecurity and undermined the objectives of the NPT. In that regard, she reaffirmed her delegation's commitment to the principles contained in the 1971 Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and welcomed the recent decisions by four States of that region, the Comoros, Djibouti, Oman and the United Arab Emirates to accede to the NPT. She hoped that India and Pakistan would soon add their names to that list in order to promote a culture of peace in the region.

21. She regretted that the NPT was not yet universal and that the nuclear Powers still had some 35,000 nuclear weapons, thousands of which were ready for immediate launching. The total elimination of nuclear weapons must be the international community's ultimate objective in order to remove that threat to mankind. The impasse in negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials and the

differences of opinion concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which could lead to a renewed arms race, were also sources of concern. In addition, recent statements by nuclear Powers reaffirming their strategic doctrines based on nuclear deterrence could compromise the NPT itself.

22. There had, nevertheless, been some positive developments. The nuclear Powers had taken steps to substantially reduce their nuclear arsenals and the Disarmament Commission at its 1999 session had adopted without a vote principles and guidelines for the established of new nuclear-weapon-free zones. The establishment of such zones was a powerful and irreversible trend which would certainly lead to a nuclear-weapon-free world. Zones free of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, should be set up in areas of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia. It was also encouraging that the Russian Parliament had approved START II and the CTBT for ratification, which should prepare the way for negotiations on START III.

23. Since the NPT was the key to preventing a nuclear holocaust, its provisions and the 1995 Principles and Objectives must be fully implemented. The indefinite extension of the Treaty should not be taken to mean that nuclear weapons would also continue to exist indefinitely. There was no justification for the possession of nuclear weapons, the use of which was considered a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity.

24. Nuclear energy could, however, contribute to the well-being of mankind and there should be a wide-ranging exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technical knowledge in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Special attention must be given to the developing countries in accordance with the Principles and Objectives of the 1995 Conference. Her delegation supported the convening of a special conference of the States parties on the promotion of cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and stressed the excellent relationship which her Government enjoyed with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Review Conference provided an ideal opportunity to renew commitments under the NPT and work towards a new era of peace and harmony. A world free of the spectre of nuclear war was possible if delegations joined in putting the interests of mankind above all other considerations.

25. **Mr. LaFortelle** (France) introduced on behalf of his own delegation as well as those of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America a common statement of their positions on issues relating to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses. He drew attention to paragraph 10 of the statement, which declared in particular that none of their nuclear weapons were targeted at any State. They also reaffirmed their willingness to continue efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in general, in accordance with decision 2 (1995). The text of that statement would be circulated as an official Conference document.

26. **Mr. Roman-Morey** (Secretary-General, Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL)) noted that the Tlatelolco Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean continued to be an example for the international community. Nearly 40 years before, at the height of the cold war, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, a group of Latin American intellectuals had laid out the principles of the first treaty on nuclear disarmament. As a result, in February 1967 the Treaty of Tlatelolco had been opened for signature and had since been ratified by 18 States, thus establishing the first nuclear-arms-free zone, covering a large and densely populated region of the planet.

27. The NPT, although a close contemporary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, had been concluded and entered into force after the Latin American regional instrument. In addition, unlike the latter, which categorically prohibited nuclear weapons and was valid indefinitely, the NPT simply sought to put an end to the proliferation of nuclear arms in the international community and had not been extended indefinitely until a quarter century after its creation. The Treaty of Tlatelolco and other regional disarmament agreements were therefore essential elements in the international regime of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Despite the near universality of the NPT at the international level and the Treaty of Tlatelolco at the regional level, and more than 30 years after their entry into force, the issue of nuclear weapons continued to concern the international community.

28. Since 1995, additional States had associated themselves with the cause of non-proliferation and disarmament. Chile and Brazil had acceded to the NPT in 1995 and 2000 respectively. However, of the four

States still not signatories, India and Pakistan had acquired de facto nuclear status while Israel continued to be an undeclared nuclear State. The fourth State, Cuba, was a special case since it did not have any real nuclear military capability, had signed the nuclear safeguards of IAEA and had signed but not ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its amendments.

29. In the area of nuclear disarmament, article VI of the NPT was very clear, and the Principles and Objectives had in addition committed the nuclear Powers to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. In that context, the CTBT had been concluded and opened for signature yet the major nuclear Powers were delaying its entry into force. He applauded the decision by the Russian Duma to ratify the CTBT and hoped that the United States and the other States whose participation was necessary for its entry into force would follow suit. In Latin America, the Treaty had been ratified by nine States and signed by 14 others.

30. The Conference on Disarmament had made little progress in finalizing the Convention banning the production of fissile material for military uses. He recognized the efforts, albeit slow, of the nuclear Powers to dismantle their arsenals and thereby achieve effective nuclear disarmament and welcomed the declaration made by the representative of France. Nevertheless, as the Secretary-General had stated at the beginning of the Conference, there were still more than 35,000 active nuclear warheads in the world, barely 3,000 fewer than in 1970 at the height of the cold war. Although there were not 25 or 30 nuclear Powers as predicted by President Kennedy when he launched his Atoms for Peace programme, the five nuclear Powers, plus two, plus one more, were keeping the 182 States which had decided never to possess nuclear weapons in a situation of permanent insecurity by virtue of the very existence of such weapons. Nuclear weapons must be completely eliminated since they posed a continued threat to the very existence of the human race.

31. With regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba had been concluded, and negotiations on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia were well under way. Mongolia had also unilaterally declared itself a nuclear-weapon-free country. However, in the Middle East, the only region mentioned specifically in the Resolution annexed to the Principles and Objectives, there had been no real progress.

32. The issue of nuclear-free zones was important for his agency because OPANAL had created the first and most universal nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world. The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean had decided to reject nuclear weapons in 1967; at least two States in that region had been capable of developing nuclear weapons but had freely decided to choose the path of peace, security and development offered by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. That example had been followed by other regions of the world. In that regard, he pointed out that the Treaty of Pelindaba had become possible only when one of the States parties had freely decided to give up not only its nuclear capability but also its nuclear status in the interests of universal security. In addition, 110 States, representing more than 60 per cent of the international community of nations, were now included in nuclear-weapon-free zones, proving that, where a clear and definite political will existed, nuclear disarmament was possible.

33. The peoples of the world and future generations should not have to wait any longer after having lived through more than 40 years of nuclear anxiety. There was no room for complacency since it had been proven that the end of the cold war had in no way put an end to the nuclear threat and the peoples of the world would not forgive delegates if the Conference failed to reach agreement. They must ensure that the nuclear arms race would not resume and that there would be no new incentives for nuclear proliferation. The Treaty of Tlatelolco had succeeded in achieving those objectives and would continue to inspire the world community in the areas of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

34. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) resumed the Chair.*

35. **Mr. Naciri** (Observer for the League of Arab States) said that it was a source of concern for the non-nuclear-weapon States that the Treaty had not laid down a timetable for nuclear disarmament, bearing in mind that those States lacked sufficient guarantees in the event of nuclear aggression. Universality of the Treaty had still not been achieved, since four States, including Israel, India and Pakistan, the "undeclared nuclear States", had not acceded to it. Furthermore, the non-proliferation regime had suffered two setbacks, namely, the nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan and India in 1998, and the failure of the United States Senate to ratify the CTBT, which might discourage the

ratifications and accessions needed for its entry into force.

36. The Arab States, considering a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East to be an irrevocable strategic goal, were concerned that Israel possessed nuclear weapons and categorically refused to accede to the Treaty. Furthermore, it kept its nuclear activities shrouded in mystery, pursuing deterrence based on uncertainty and insistence on the nuclear option to put pressure on Arab States to accept its conditions in the peace process. The Israeli stance disrupted the balance of power in the region, and could even lead to a new arms race, exposing the whole world to incalculable risks. Despite Israeli intransigence, the Arab States had spared no efforts to transform the Middle East into a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. The idea behind the resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, adopted by the General Assembly over 25 years earlier and re-emphasized at every session since then, enjoyed broad acceptance among Member States.

37. At the 1995 Conference, the nuclear-weapon States had achieved the indefinite extension of the Treaty as part of a package that had included the resolution on the Middle East, However, the failure by the three depositary nuclear States, which had sponsored that resolution, to exert the utmost efforts for its implementation might further harden the position of Israel without providing the non-nuclear-weapon States parties with significant guarantees.

38. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the League of Arab States, meeting in Beirut in March 2000, had adopted a resolution which called on the 2000 Review Conference to evaluate the extent of fulfilment by States parties of their commitments under the Treaty; emphasized that continuation by Israel of its nuclear programme outside the context of the non-proliferation regime threatened security and stability; called on the States parties, and especially the depositary States as sponsors of the resolution on the Middle East, to spare no effort to secure Israel's accession without further delay and placement of its facilities under the IAEA safeguards regime as a step towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone; called on the nuclear-weapon States to pledge, under article I of the Treaty, not to transfer to Israel any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to assist or encourage it in their production or acquisition; called on the States parties to cease the transfer of any nuclear technology to Israel, so long as it failed to accede and to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards regime; and supported the call by the Non-Aligned Movement for the establishment of a subsidiary body under Main Committee II of the Conference to consider means of implementing the resolution on the Middle East.

39. The international community was seriously seeking universality and was proceeding with the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Well over 100 States had signed treaties establishing such zones, which now covered more than half the land surface of the globe. In that context, and in the face of the challenge posed by Israel's ambiguous nuclear policy, the League of Arab States had established a committee to prepare a draft treaty on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The League had also established a committee to monitor Israeli nuclear activities and assess the risks which they posed to international peace and security.

40. The position taken by the League consisted in continued efforts to achieve universality of the Treaty and the greatest degree of transparency, including Israel's accession and its submission to the safeguards regime; mobilization of support for the Arab position at the Conference, including support for the "Resolution on the Middle East" and renunciation of the nuclear option; and encouragement of the Arab States to acquire peaceful nuclear technology, with support from the advanced nuclear States, with a view to harnessing such technology for development.

The meeting rose at 5.05 p.m.

Summary record of the 11th meeting

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 2 May 2000 at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Abelian (Vice-President) .... (Armenia)
Later: Mr. Baali (President) .... (Algeria)

Contents

General debate (*continued*)

Election of Vice-Chairmen (*continued*)

In the absence of Mr. Baali (Algeria), Mr. Abelian (Armenia), Vice-President, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Alemán** (Ecuador) said that despite the important advances of the past 55 years, nuclear disarmament had stalled. Those States which had decided not to develop nuclear weapons and had ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) were justly concerned by the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear arms, by the development of more sophisticated weaponry for reasons of national security, by military doctrines that did not exclude the first use of nuclear force, by the slow pace of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and by obstacles to international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

2. Ecuador itself was a party to the NPT and to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and had been active in the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL). The Latin American countries had been the first, in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, to declare a nuclear-weapon-free zone and advocated extending the zone to include the entire southern hemisphere by linking it to similar zones in other regions.

3. The NPT must become universal. It was inconceivable that countries with proven nuclear capabilities should not be covered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, and the fact that four States had not ratified the Treaty was undermining peace and stability in their regions. On the other hand, the recent ratification of the CTBT and the second of the strategic arms reduction treaties, START II, by the Russian Federation was an encouraging development. In view of the huge arsenal still in the possession of the nuclear Powers, the risk of an inadvertent war had not diminished even though increasing political, moral and legal limitations had been placed on the effective use of such weapons. The periodic reviews of the NPT should not simply go over the same ground but should make headway in extending its implementation and the observance of its principles and objectives. All nuclear-weapon States, a number of which continued to deploy nuclear weapons on alert status for supposed security reasons, had to negotiate in good faith to eventually achieve total disarmament under effective international control. Accordingly, his delegation supported the working paper submitted in document NPT/CONF.2000/WP.3 as a significant contribution to further progress.

4. **Mr. Pérez-Otermin** (Uruguay) observed that the instruments of war and destruction had to give way to development projects that would advance human well-being, and a safe method of disposing of the nuclear wastes from power plants had to be found. The Latin American region had taken the leadership in renouncing the possession of nuclear weapons and declaring a zone of peace, and all States parties to the NPT must strive towards the same overriding goal. The entry into force of the CTBT was becoming more urgent as an unequivocal expression of support for the aims of the NPT. The Lima Appeal by the OPANAL member States had shown the way.

5. Looking to the future, the Conference must propose ways of ensuring verification and peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and the nuclear States must think in terms of humanity as a whole by cooperating in the transfer of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to non-nuclear States. The Conference must also give a clear message that would satisfy the concern of coastal States with regard to the regulation of transit shipments of plutonium and radioactive wastes on the high seas, a hazardous activity completely incompatible with article IV of the NPT. The likelihood of an accident was high, and such a disaster would have an incalculable impact on coastal countries. Such catastrophes were completely avoidable if proper action was taken now to suspend all such transport. Many other challenges, such as the proliferation of anti-ballistic missiles, nuclear proliferation, illicit traffic in nuclear materials and the dangers of an arms race in space would also have to be dealt with in the spirit of the NPT.

6. **Ms. Durrant** (Jamaica), speaking on behalf of the 14 States parties which were members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) observed that many approached the Review Conference with a strong sense of foreboding and feelings of frustration at the disappointing lack of progress on the multilateral disarmament agenda. The meeting nevertheless presented an important opportunity to redirect action and adopt an aggressive strategy aimed at strengthening the NPT regime.

7. In the five years since the indefinite extension of the NPT, the number of ratifications had risen to 187. With the accession of Chile and Brazil, the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean had been expanded, and nuclear-weapon-free zones had been created in Africa and South-East Asia with the Treaties of Pelindaba and Bangkok. The CARICOM countries welcomed the adoption in 1997 of the Model Additional Protocol, which provided IAEA with a more effective verification mechanism. Since the adoption of the CTBT in 1996, 54 States had ratified it, among them 28 of the 44 whose ratification was essential for the Treaty's entry into force. The Russian Federation's recent decision to ratify START II and to begin discussions with the United States on START III was another positive development. Even so, the anticipated progress had not been realized. The continued arrogation of superior nuclear power by a few had served only to incite others to challenge that superiority, thereby undermining the goals of non-proliferation and disarmament. In that, the nuclear-weapon States must bear the weight of responsibility, for they had failed to pursue negotiations in good faith on the various measures essential for the achievement of the NPT goals and had shown a glaring lack of commitment to the NPT preamble and provisions. The stalemate had served as the dismal background for the nuclear tests undertaken in India and Pakistan in 1998. Universality of the NPT had still not been achieved. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia and the Middle East remained a distant objective. All those were issues that demanded urgent attention at the Review Conference.

8. Expressing support for the working paper presented by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NPT/CONF.2000/18, annex), the CARICOM States also reaffirmed the right of all States parties to develop and produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and urged the removal of all obstacles to the transfer of the relevant technology. The CARICOM States remained concerned over the risks to which coastal States were exposed by the practice of shipping nuclear wastes through the Caribbean Sea. The Review Conference was the appropriate forum for addressing the matter squarely. The International Maritime Organization Code of Practice, while binding, did not protect en-route coastal States, and they consequently had no legal recourse to compensation for accidents, which became more likely as shipments of radioactive nuclear wastes increased dramatically. The CARICOM States consequently intended to introduce for consideration in Main Committee III a working paper under article IV, which would call for consultations leading to the establishment of a comprehensive international regime for the protection of the population and marine environment of en-route coastal States from shipments of nuclear material.

9. **Mr. Kittikhoun** (Lao People's Democratic Republic) said that, despite the indefinite extension of the NPT, existing nuclear arsenals continued to pose the greatest danger to the survival of civilization. Nuclear weapons had been modernized, States had found new rationales for their use, and the CTBT had not yet entered into force. All States, but particularly the nuclear-weapon States which bore the greatest legal responsibility, must in good faith pursue negotiations leading to total nuclear disarmament.

10. The performance of the NPT over the past years had not yielded the expected results. The negotiations on banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices had yet to begin. His delegation regretted the lack of progress on that issue, and hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would soon conclude the negotiations for a non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production of fissile materials. It was important to address nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament measures in parallel.

11. Learning from its past experiences about the danger of nuclear weapons, the international community should make every effort, on entering the new twenty-first century, to ensure that mankind could live without the threat of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the Conference, at its current session, should lay the groundwork for States parties to the Treaty to agree to negotiate and conclude a legal instrument to provide assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States concerning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In that context, the issue of concluding a legal binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States deserved the utmost attention of the world community and should be strongly pursued.

12. His Government welcomed the increase in the number of States parties to the NPT since its entry into force in 1970. The fact that 187 States were now parties to the Treaty, testified to its global appeal in terms of both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear

disarmament. His Government supported the strong aspirations of the peoples in many parts of the world in their efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in their respective regions, including South-East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and the South Pacific. The creation of those zones would help to free the peoples concerned from the nuclear threat. In that context, he welcomed the adoption of the principles and guidelines by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in the previous year on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones based on arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned as well as the adoption by the Mongolian parliament of the legislation on Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status.

13. In view of the significant contribution made by nuclear material, equipment and technology to scientific research, and hence to economic growth, it was a cause of concern that developing countries had only restricted access to them. That practice was inconsistent with the prevailing international atmosphere of cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

14. The present Conference provided an excellent opportunity for all States parties to evaluate and consider adopting new measures to ensure that the provisions of the NPT and the decisions adopted in 1995 were fully implemented. For its part, the Lao People's Democratic Republic would continue to cooperate fully with other States parties towards the achievement of the ultimate goal of the Treaty: the building of a world free from nuclear weapons.

15. **Mr. Lelong** (Haiti) commended commitment to the cause of nuclear disarmament manifested by Japan, a country which, because of its own painful experience, was all too aware of the dreadful consequences of nuclear proliferation. Recalling the positive developments that had taken place in the disarmament process, he said that, as a sign of good faith, France and the United Kingdom had adopted transparency measures: they had taken courageous initiatives relating to arms reductions, had immediately ratified the CTBT and were observing a unilateral moratorium on the production of fissile material for military purposes. The United States and the Russian Federation, for their part, had taken bilateral action to advance the disarmament process within the framework of the START treaties. His delegation welcomed the Russian Federation's recent ratification of START II and trusted that negotiations on START III would begin in the near future. The decision of the Russian parliament to ratify the CTBT following the presidential elections was also an encouraging event.

16. There had been positive progress in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. His delegation welcomed the entry into force in March 1997 of the Treaty of Bangkok for South-East Asia and hoped that the African countries would not delay in taking action to ratify the Treaty of Pelindaba, signed in April 1996. As had been true in the case of the adoption of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967 and the Treaty of Rarotonga in 1985, the establishment of the two new zones could only serve to strengthen international peace and security. He looked forward to the outcome of the negotiations to establish a fifth zone in central Asia.

17. He welcomed the decision of the nine countries which had joined the NPT in 1995, thus helping to make it the most universal disarmament instrument in existence, and the fact that the role of the IAEA as a competent and responsible authority for verifying and ensuring the respect of the commitments of the States parties had been strengthened with the adoption in May 1997 of the Model Additional Protocol.

18. At the same time, the agreements between States parties on the question of nuclear disarmament seemed to be merely agreements of principle, as the actions of certain Powers did not always reflect the obligations they had undertaken in accordance with article VI of the NPT. Also, the mistrust or belligerence which had lasted for decades was not about to disappear. It was only by creating attitudes appropriate to the new era and to a culture of cooperation and mutual assistance that the world could finally free itself of the baggage of the cold war.

19. His Government had always taken great care to emphasize the inequality inherent in the international regime. Accession to the NPT was a move towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the area of horizontal and also vertical proliferation. The doctrines of "sufficiency", "nuclear deterrence" and "self-defence" advocated or maintained by the nuclear-weapon States had not increased the confidence of the non-nuclear-weapon States. If it was a question of self-defence, then why deprive others with a similar aim? Moral authority was paramount: preaching should be by example, and preferential treatment should be

avoided. Otherwise, it would seem that the nuclear Powers were more devoted to the cause of hegemony than to the possibility of complete disarmament for the benefit of the whole planet. The Canberra Commission had described the situation as highly discriminatory and thus unstable, a situation which could not be sustained, since the possession of nuclear weapons by any State was a constant stimulus to other States to acquire them.

20. Efforts should be strengthened to ensure the universality of the NPT. The nuclear tests carried out in May 1998 by India and Pakistan were sufficient to show that a state of emergency should be declared. Thirty years after the entry into force of the NPT, and despite the positive impact noted, the global situation, although unipolar, was no less threatening. Clandestine nuclear programmes had been discovered, transparency and non-respect of safeguards agreements were prevalent, and there was the stubbornness of the nuclear Powers. A negotiation mechanism for a treaty to ban fissile material had still not been established. Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were still in disagreement with the IAEA on inspection issues. China had not yet ratified the CTBT, although it had been open for signature since 24 September 1996, in suggesting an amendment to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), the United States was planning to develop a national missile defence system, thus reviving the concerns of the international community, particularly the Russian Federation. As for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its security argument was not convincing. Indeed, it was hardly conceivable that the alliance that already had the most sophisticated conventional weapons should wish to cling to its nuclear weapons and its divisive policy, on the pretext of deterring potential aggressors.

21. Haiti, like many other States in the Caribbean region, was extremely concerned about the risks of accidents that could occur during the maritime transport of radioactive material. Given its experience of the illegal dumping of toxic waste on the Haitian coast, waste that had stayed there for more than ten years, his Government was very sensitive to the potential for ecological disaster and reiterated its support for General Assembly resolution 54/225. Paragraph 5 of that resolution called for an improvement in emergency response capabilities with a view to a timely, effective and coordinated response for the containment of environmental damage in the Caribbean Sea area in the event of an accident or incident relating to maritime transport.

22. His delegation rejected the argument that the security of nations was dependent on any form of nuclear weapon. It deplored the growth of military expenditure and the extravagant allocations for defence budgets. Used for other purposes, such funds would certainly help to reduce the widening gap between rich and poor countries. It was surely high time for politicians to understand that genuine security was based on the socio-economic development of nations and the development of a culture of peace between peoples for them to act accordingly.

23. **Mr. Thapa** (Nepal) said that the NPT stood at a crossroads. Thirty years after the Treaty had entered into force, there was little to be proud of in terms of the realization of the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty. Despite the positive results that had emanated from the operation of the NPT, serious challenges lay ahead to silence its critics, although the disregard of its provisions by some States, both parties and non-parties, should not be viewed as failure of the Treaty.

24. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT had been a milestone event in view of its success in reaching three important decisions and adopting a resolution on the Middle East. It would be recalled that those historic decisions formed a package deal and that a bargain had been struck between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in order to give permanency to the NPT. Whereas the non-nuclear-weapon States had kept their promise to forgo the nuclear option, there was hardly any evidence to indicate that the nuclear-weapon States had fulfilled their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, which required them "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

25. The present situation looked gloomy because of the following factors: the Treaty still lacked credible universality as three of the States remaining outside the non-proliferation regime possessed nuclear capabilities; the South Asian nuclear tests in May 1998 had posed a serious threat to the entire non-proliferation regime; START II was still not

operational pending completion of the ratification procedure; until the required number of instruments of ratification was obtained, the CTBT could not enter into force; some States were reaffirming nuclear doctrines in order to justify the retention of and reliance on nuclear weapons for security purposes; and the leading nuclear-weapon State was intent on pursuing a national missile defence programme which would adversely affect the integrity of the ABM Treaty.

26. The encouraging progress made in the field of nuclear disarmament should be acknowledged, however limited it might be. The recent decision of the Russian Federation to ratify START II and the CTBT, the unilateral decision by some nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear stockpiles, the observance of moratoriums on nuclear tests after the 1996 signing of the CTBT, the growing number of nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world and the 1997 Model Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements were indeed positive steps towards achieving long-cherished goals of nuclear disarmament.

27. The Conference was taking place at a critical juncture. There was much at stake not only for States and Governments, but for civil society and responsible individuals as well. The entire world community was closely watching the outcome of the Conference. It was therefore vital for all to demonstrate what could be done to make the world a safer and better place to live in.

28. **Mr. Maquieira** (Chile) said that his country had acceded to the NPT in 1995, immediately after the Review and Extension Conference and prior to the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which clearly established the obligation to negotiate in good faith for nuclear disarmament, the ultimate and fundamental aim of the system established by the Treaty. The extension of the Treaty was legitimate only to the extent that it was accompanied by a serious commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

29. Some progress had been made since 1995, including the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones, the conclusion of a strengthened safeguards systems, the real reductions of nuclear stockpiles in some of the five recognized nuclear Powers, and, most recently, the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT.

30. Progress had been less than expected, however, and the many unfinished tasks needed to be dealt with urgently and in a spirit of compromise, given the tendency emerging among some of the international actors. It seemed that the security of some was to be increased at the cost of the security of others. Henry Kissinger had once said that the absolute security of one State would imply the absolute insecurity of all the others. It was imperative to reverse that dangerous trend, and in that context his country fully supported the New Agenda Coalition, which represented a moderate and constructive approach to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

31. Chile was a party to all the regional treaties which contributed to disarmament and international security, including the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Also, his Government had recently finalized the internal process for ratification of the CTBT, another of the hoped-for outcomes of the system created in 1968. It regarded the negotiation of a convention banning the production of fissile material as an urgent task awaiting the international political community as another means of promoting international peace and security. Chile was playing an active role in MERCOSUR, an economic and political entity in the southern cone of the continent which had declared a peace zone and was encouraging confidence-building measures. Lastly, he supported the statement made on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and the working paper which had been submitted in document NPT/CONF.2000/18.

32. Another cornerstone of the efforts being made to strengthen the review process for the Treaty was the set of principles and objectives decided upon in 1995. The States parties should update those principles and objectives, recognizing the ones which had been met thus far and outlining those which should be met in the next five years. Together with the launching of negotiations on fissile material, universal and binding guarantees should be obtained on the non-use of nuclear weapons. To meet the Treaty's important objective of ensuring equitable access to technologies and materials for developing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the States parties should ensure that the control of exports was transparent and that it was made progressively multilateral in structure and scope. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be duly protected through a strengthened system of safeguards, such as the one developed by IAEA, which Chile strongly supported.

33. Of particular relevance in the light of the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, at a time when all but one of the States of the region had acceded to the Treaty. In the broader context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, Chile attached special importance to the regulation of the international maritime transport of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel according to the highest international safety standards. Such transit should be regulated by means of friendly negotiations in which the views of riparian and transit States, in particular, were taken into account.

34. With 187 States parties, the Treaty had the potential to offer the international community the chance to create truly universal conditions for an existence free of the nuclear threat. Chile had deplored the conduct of nuclear tests by India, Pakistan, China and France. It welcomed Brazil's recent accession to the Treaty and urged those countries which had not yet done so to follow suit. The regime established by the Treaty was characterized by a balance between the responsibilities and obligations of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. That fact must be borne in mind in efforts to strengthen the review process for the Treaty, with a view to both non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the measures agreed upon to strengthen the review process for the Treaty formed a whole, together with the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely, and were therefore inseparable. The decision on extension had solemnly proclaimed the political will to end nuclear proliferation; the decision to strengthen the review process had strengthened the obligation of all States parties to comply with the Treaty; and the decision on principles and objectives was the point of departure for the gradual but complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

35. **Mr. Mabilangan** (Philippines) said that the lack of progress in the preparatory process for the Review Conference, together with recent developments in the areas of nuclear proliferation and disarmament, painted a bleak picture for those who longed for a world free of nuclear weapons. The Treaty was the outcome of compromises built on compromises and of the uneasy union between the desire of the nuclear-weapon States to maintain their nuclear advantage and the desire of the rest of the world for the fulfilment of the legal commitments enshrined in article VI of the Treaty. The best solution to nuclear proliferation was nuclear disarmament.

36. Failure was not an option, in view of the renewed arms race; the weakening of the anti-ballistic missile regime; the heightened possibility of regional nuclear war; the proliferation of fissile material and the possible use of nuclear weapons by terrorists; the militarization of outer space and the continued improvement of nuclear arsenals and capabilities; and the nuclear-weapon States' immutable adherence to nuclear doctrines. The stakes were even higher in the Asia-Pacific region, where nuclear weapons had first drawn blood and the final nuclear tests of the last millennium had been conducted. All the most volatile flashpoints were in the Asia-Pacific region, and all of them had a decidedly nuclear dimension. Region-wide efforts continued with a view to addressing the causes of conflict and the potential for war, *inter alia* through the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, while the individual States of the region continued to engage other States on regional security matters.

37. He reiterated his support for the conduct, at the earliest possible date, of an international conference aimed at reaching agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, which should prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use and should provide for their destruction. He welcomed the Secretary-General's call for a major international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers (A/54/2000, para. 253), as well as the decision to establish a subsidiary body under Main Committee I to consider practical steps for the systematic elimination of nuclear weapons. He supported the statement made and the working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/18, annex) introduced by the Indonesian delegation on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

38. Although the lack of progress in relation to the regime established by the Treaty was disheartening, the fact that so many States had condemned that situation, that all States not parties to the ABM Treaty had been called upon to accede to it and that all the nuclear-weapon States had reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear disarmament showed that there was hope that those abominable weapons would be eliminated. While he welcomed the statement made the preceding day by

the French delegation on behalf of the nuclear-weapon States, he recalled the need to translate words into deeds. He also appreciated the statement made by the Secretary of State of the United States of America and sympathized with the concerns which had prompted the United States to propose a national missile defence system. However, those perceived threats must be weighed against the already delicate balance in the non-proliferation and disarmament equations. The United States should consider carefully all the ramifications of its intended course of action and should not be bound by artificial constraints.

39. In view of the need for creative approaches to nuclear disarmament, he welcomed the initiative taken by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden in issuing a communiqué entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda" (A/54/423), which provided fresh perspectives that broadened the choices available to the international community. Nuclear-weapon-free zones contributed not only to nuclear non-proliferation, but also to nuclear disarmament. The inaugural meeting of the Executive Committee for the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, held in October 1999, had been an important step towards the implementation of that Treaty. Negotiations were under way to address the concerns of the nuclear-weapon States with a view to encouraging them to sign the Protocol to that Treaty. He welcomed Mongolia's initiative to establish itself as a single-nation nuclear-weapon-free zone (NPT/CONF.2000/16), and recalled that the Philippines had done likewise in 1987.

40. Recently, owing to competing partisan interests and the propensity for misunderstanding, established legal norms had been disregarded or misapplied. The Review Conference provided States parties with a crucial opportunity to strengthen the rule of law by ensuring that all of them fulfilled their legal commitments. To that end, the States parties must consider all proposals that sought to ensure the sanctity of those commitments, such as the proposal to establish an institutional framework for the Treaty, which had been put forward in various forums. That idea deserved further study, as did the larger question of the evolving institutional relationships among the various international disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. It must be borne in mind that, while the Treaty did not legitimize the possession of nuclear weapons, its extension had not been unconditional but had been part of a package of agreements. Insinuations to the contrary were not helpful.

41. While all the States parties were responsible for the successful outcome of the Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States had a special role to play in that regard. They had not fully complied with the provisions of article VI of the Treaty or with the principles and objectives agreed upon at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In that connection, he welcomed the recent developments in the Russian Federation with respect to START II and the CTBT. The slow pace of nuclear disarmament owing to political realities should not stop the international community from doing more. He trusted that the Conference would help ensure that article VI of the Treaty, which currently seemed to be suspended in a time warp, would be put into practice so that the common aspiration for a world free of nuclear weapons would be one step closer to fulfilment.

42. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) took the Chair.*

43. **Mr. Jokonya** (Zimbabwe) said that, while the Treaty was the cornerstone of the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the new world order did not seem to provide a framework for strengthening the review process as a means of promoting the full implementation of the Treaty, as reflected by paragraphs 249 and 250 of the Secretary-General's report to the Millennium Assembly (A/54/2000). Zimbabwe, as a party to the Treaty, was committed to the goal of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Treaty required both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to make progress towards general and complete disarmament. Some nuclear-weapon States recognized that fact, as shown, *inter alia*, by the statement made by the Chinese delegation in the First Committee on 14 October 1998 (A/C.1/53/PV.5), which had called upon the nuclear-weapon States to intensify their efforts to fulfil their obligations under article VI of the Treaty.

44. As long as there was an exclusive club whose members were reluctant to give up their nuclear option, threshold nuclear Powers would always be tempted to try to gain entry into that club. He hoped that the current adverse trend in disarmament would not trigger a new nuclear arms race. Recent negative developments had included the failure of the United States Senate to ratify the CTBT, despite the assurances given by the United States delegation in the First

Committee on 14 October 1998 (A/C.1/53/PV.5); the maintenance of nuclear weapons as an essential part of NATO and United States security policy; the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament; the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan; and the challenges to the ABM Treaty.

45. On the positive side, Zimbabwe welcomed the Russian Federation's recent ratification of START II and the CTBT, which demonstrated the Russian Federation's full commitment to its obligations under article VI of the NPT. Due consideration should be given to the Russian Federation's concerns about the challenges to the ABM Treaty, since further reductions in strategic offensive weapons could only be considered in the context of the preservation of that Treaty. As the representative of the Russian Federation had stated on 25 April 2000, if one component of the system of arms control agreements was weakened, the entire system would be destabilized. That observation echoed the Secretary-General's assertion, in paragraph 251 of document A/54/2000, that unless plans to deploy missile defences were devised with the agreement of all concerned parties, the progress achieved thus far in reducing the number of nuclear weapons might be jeopardized.

46. At the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the Review Conference, his delegation had stated that its experience in the Conference on Disarmament had demonstrated the futility of engaging in negotiations without political will. The Secretary-General had made a similar observation in his address to the Review Conference, and had proposed a results-based Treaty review process that focused on specific benchmarks, such as the entry into force of the CTBT. The latter not only set up political and technical obstacles for any country designing nuclear weapons for the first time but also represented a cornerstone of efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. It was disheartening to note that some nuclear-weapon States had chosen not to ratify that instrument, even though it would enable them to meet their obligations under article VI of the NPT.

47. Another benchmark would be an irreversible reduction in stocks of nuclear weapons. The New Agenda Coalition had put forward proposals to that end. The current Review Conference should not only consolidate existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, but also negotiate the establishment of new ones. A third benchmark would be the provision of binding security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States should formally recognize the legally binding nature of assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty and to regional nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. The determination of whether a State was in good standing under those treaties and protected by such assurances should be made by IAEA or another authoritative international body. Lastly, he urged the nuclear-weapon States to continue negotiations aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons, pursuant to article VI of the Treaty and in line with the advisory opinion rendered in 1996 by the International Court of Justice.

48. **The President** said that the representative of Bangladesh would be unable to deliver his statement as scheduled, his arrival in New York having been unexpectedly delayed. Copies of the text were being distributed and, if there was no objection, a summary of the statement would be included in the official records of the meeting.

49. *It was so decided.*

Summary of the statement by Mr. Shafi Sami (Bangladesh)

50. The vision of the twentieth century that would emerge from the Millennium Summit must be shaped by the realization that nuclear weapons were the most dangerous threat to civilization; nuclear non-proliferation was a goal that could be achieved through political will. The delegation of Bangladesh endorsed the five benchmarks established by the Secretary-General in his opening statement and was prepared to cooperate with him in the achievement of those goals.

51. Non-compliance with the safeguards provisions of the Treaty and differences of opinion regarding the full implementation of that instrument and the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons posed a clear and present danger. His Government was particularly concerned at the "nuclearization" of South Asia and urged India and Pakistan to become parties to the Treaty and to sign the CTBT. He congratulated the States parties that had concluded agreements establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in South-East Asia and Africa since 1995 and supported the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East and other parts of the world. His delegation also welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT and to reduce its nuclear stockpiles.

52. Full disarmament was mandated in the Constitution of Bangladesh. His Government had been the first in South Asia to accede to the CTBT and was contributing a seismic station to the International Monitoring System of the CTBT verification regime. It had concluded a safeguards agreement with IAEA and was considering the conclusion of an additional protocol thereto. He called upon States parties that had not yet signed safeguards agreements to do so.

53. His delegation welcomed the forward-looking decisions of the 1995 Review Conference, which had laid the foundation for a strengthened review process, and thought that it might be time to consider establishing an elected executive council to deal with questions of non-compliance and implementation.

54. As President of the Conference on Disarmament at its 2000 session, it was Bangladesh's goal to play a moderating and facilitating role in enhancing appreciation of differences, bridging gaps and creating consensus. It would continue to contribute to the process of consensus-building with a view to the adoption of a declaration of principles and objectives to be achieved by 2005. The current impasse in the Conference, which was the only consensual universal multilateral body on disarmament issues, was undesirable. The 2000 Review Conference should seek common ground on the basis of the 1995 programme of action and in particular with regard to negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and working groups on nuclear disarmament, security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

55. He was encouraged by the fact that the Treaty was only four accessions short of universality and noted that Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) had urged India and Pakistan, and all other States that had not yet done so, to become parties to the NPT and the CTBT without delay and without conditions.

56. His Government attached great importance to implementation of article IV of the NPT. It was disappointing that, 32 years after the entry into force of the Treaty, the developing States had yet to gain access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. He called for a closer study of the matter and hoped that the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which had been established for that purpose, would be transparent in its operations and that States parties would adhere to the provisions of the Treaty in both letter and spirit.

57. Lastly, he urged States parties to overcome their disagreements and to remember that nuclear proliferation had serious implications not only for international peace and security, but also for development, which constituted the agenda of over two thirds of the world's inhabitants.

Election of Vice-Chairmen (*continued*)

58. **The President** recalled that the Vice-Chairmen of Main Committee II and Main Committee III had not yet been elected. He had been informed that the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries had endorsed the candidacies of Mr. Yaw Odei Osei (Ghana) and Mr. Hamid Baeidi Nejad (Islamic Republic of Iran) for the posts of Vice-Chairmen of Main Committees II and III, respectively.

59. *Mr. Osei (Ghana) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee II and Mr. Baeidi Nejad (Islamic Republic of Iran) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee III.*

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

Summary record of the 12th meeting

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 5 May 2000, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Baali .... (Algeria)

Contents

Preliminary reports by the Chairmen of the three Main Committees and the Credentials Committee

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Preliminary reports by the Chairmen of the three Main Committees and the Credentials Committee

1. **The President** informed the meeting that the General Committee, having considered at its 4th meeting, the question of overlap of issues between the Committees, particularly with regard to the work of Main Committees I and II, proposed that Main Committees I and II should address the issue of compliance/non-compliance in relation to the articles of the Treaty allocated to them, with Main Committee I addressing issues relating to articles I and II, and Main Committee II addressing issues relating to article III.

2. He took it that the Conference wished to adopt that proposal.

3. *It was so decided.*

4. **Mr. Reyes Rodriguez** (Colombia), speaking as Chairman of Main Committee I, said that the Committee had held four meetings, during which it had heard the views of various delegations, including 16 general statements. Following consultations, he had submitted a Chairman's paper to the Committee the previous day and was awaiting reactions and proposals. The subsidiary body of Main Committee I had held two meetings and proposals had been made on the working paper submitted by the Chairman of that body. In his view, the Committee's debate and discussions had begun to focus on substantive issues.

5. **Mr. Kobieracki** (Poland), speaking as Chairman of Main Committee II, said that the Committee had held three plenary meetings during which 15 working papers and 6 conference room papers had been submitted. The Committee had completed its general debate and was now addressing various individual issues, including safeguards, export controls, physical protection and illicit trafficking, and the question of nuclear-weapon States and other States with unsafeguarded nuclear activities. The Committee would take up the final item, nuclear-weapon-free zones, at its next meeting. Given the wealth of material provided so far, the Committee was in a good position to proceed to the drafting stage. In that regard, he would submit to all delegations an initial draft report of Main Committee II in the course of the current day during informal open-ended consultations. He hoped that delegations would be in a position to discuss that draft report as early as the plenary meeting of the coming Monday.

6. Referring to subsidiary body 2, he said that, in accordance with its mandate, it had held two out of four meetings. The Middle East, South Asia and other regional issues had been discussed. A number of working papers and proposals of direct relevance to the work of that body had been discussed. The Chairman of the subsidiary body intended to submit a draft report in the coming week.

7. **Mr. Reimaa** (Finland), speaking as Chairman of Main Committee III, said that the Committee had held a total of three meetings devoted to a general exchange of views, during which 28 delegations had made general statements. The major issue addressed had been the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including maritime transport of such energy, radioactive materials, nuclear safety and technical cooperation and the liability and role of nuclear energy in sustainable development. At the Committee's second meeting, a presentation had been made by a representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the Agency's technology transfer activities and its technical cooperation programme. Two closed meetings had also been allocated for the presentation of proposals by delegations. In that regard, a total of 10 working papers and four conference room papers had been introduced. To date, 17 Main Committee III documents had been issued. He would submit an informal initial draft report to the first meeting of the open-ended drafting group of Main Committee III. He believed that the Committee would be able to complete its work within the allotted time-frame.

8. **Mr. Widodo** (Indonesia), speaking as Chairman of the Credentials Committee, introduced the interim report of the Credentials Committee (NPT/CONF.2000/CC/L.1). The Committee had met twice to examine the credentials of representatives participating in the Conference. On the basis of the information received from the Secretary-General of the Conference, the Committee had decided to accept the credentials of 139 States parties participating in the Conference, including those of Liechtenstein, on the understanding that those delegations which had not presented their credentials in the form required by rule 2 of the rules of procedure, would do so as soon as possible. The Committee would keep the receipt of credentials under review and meet again, as necessary.

The meeting rose at 10.35 a.m.

Summary record of the 14th meeting*

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 10 May 2000, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Baali .... (Algeria)

Contents

Statement by the President

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* No summary record was issued for the 13th meeting.

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

Statement by the President

The President said that there had been broad agreement at the informal plenary meeting held to discuss the strengthened review process that the process needed to be improved, on the basis of decision 1 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In informal consultations with delegations, he had been encouraged by the favourable reactions to his perception of the elements common to the working papers submitted and the statements made during the meeting, and he would shortly be submitting to the Conference a working paper taking into account all the constructive ideas put forward that reflected the mainstream thinking on the subject.

The meeting rose at 10.25 a.m.

Summary record of the 15th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 12 May 2000, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Baali .... (Algeria)

Contents

Reports of the Main Committees

Organization of work

The meeting was called to order at 4 p.m.

Reports of the Main Committees
(NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/1, NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.17, NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/1)

1. **The President** invited the Chairman of Main Committee I to present his report.

2. **Mr. Reyes Rodríguez** (Colombia), Chairman of Main Committee I, said that the report (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/1) had been adopted by the Committee at its seventh meeting, on 11 May 2000. The Committee had also taken note of the working paper of the Chairman and agreed to forward it to the Conference for further consideration. Main Committee I had had before it, in addition, a working paper submitted by the Chairman of Subsidiary Body 1 and it had agreed that the working paper provided a framework for further work at the Conference.

3. **The President** said he took it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of Main Committee I.

4. *It was so decided.*

5. **The President** invited the Chairman of Main Committee II to introduce his report.

6. **Mr. Kobieracki** (Poland), Chairman of Main Committee II, said that an advance copy of the report in English had been made available to delegations as document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.17. The report had been adopted by the Committee at its seventh meeting on 12 May 2000. The Committee had also taken note of the working paper of the Chairman. Despite all the Committee's work, some elements of its report remained contested. The formulations on which the Committee had agreed for the Final Document of the Conference were contained in paragraph 7. The text indicated in bold would require further work since it had not enjoyed consensus at the time of the adoption of the report. Main Committee II had had before it, in addition, the report of the Chairman of Subsidiary Body 2. While consensus had not been reached on some elements of that document either, the Committee had agreed that it provided a good framework for further work at the Conference.

7. **The President** said he took it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of Main Committee II.

8. *It was so decided.*

9. **The President** invited the Chairman of Main Committee III to introduce his report.

10. **Mr. Reimaa** (Finland), Chairman of Main Committee III, said that an advance copy of the report in English had been made available to delegations in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/1. The Committee had worked intensively and constructively in order to arrive at generally acceptable formulations for the Final Declaration on article IV regarding peaceful uses of nuclear energy, article V on peaceful nuclear explosions and article IX concerning wider adherence to the Treaty. Consensus had been reached on all but eight paragraphs, the role of nuclear power in achieving sustainable development, transport of radioactive materials by sea, nuclear liability, funding of the technical cooperation programme of the International Atomic Energy Agency and conversion of nuclear materials to peaceful uses. He was confident that, given the opportunity for further consultations, the Committee would be able to reach agreement on those issues.

11. **The President** said that he took it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of Main Committee III.

12. *It was so decided.*

Organization of work

13. **The President**, noting that Main Committees I and II had agreed that the working paper and the report of the Chairmen of Subsidiary Bodies 1 and 2 respectively provided a good framework for further work at the Conference, said that he would ask them to continue with their consultations with a view to achieving a consensus on those areas that required further efforts and to report to him in that regard by the morning of Tuesday, 16 May.

14. Referring to the work of the Main Committees on agenda item 16 "Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference" and agenda item 17 "Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality", he suggested that the reports of Main Committees II and III should be

forwarded to the Drafting Committee for the purpose of finalizing the formulations for the Final Document of the Conference.

15. *It was so decided.*

16. **The President** urged delegations as the Conference entered its final week to move forward from discussion of well-known positions and to focus on developing a convergence of views on the outstanding issues. It was his intention, once having been informed of the outcome of the consultations undertaken by the Chairmen of Subsidiary Bodies 1 and 2, to convene a small but representative informal consultation group, which would seek to further narrow the differences between delegations with a view to reaching a consensus, including on the forward-looking section of the outcome of the Conference and on the issues identified by Main Committee I. He would also continue his consultations on strengthening the review process for the Treaty with a view to finalizing a paper on that question.

17. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico), speaking on behalf of the States of the New Agenda Coalition, said that it was crucial that the consultations should proceed with the utmost transparency.

18. **Mr. Zahrar** (Egypt) asked whether the informal consultation group would be open to all delegations.

19. **The President** said that he intended to work with a small but representative group of delegations.

20. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico), speaking on behalf of the States of the New Agenda Coalition, said that the informal consultation group should be open to any delegation that wished to take part, since it was far from clear what would constitute a representative group of delegations.

21. **The President** said that that would not be possible for practical reasons. However, he would ensure that the consultations were as transparent as possible and that all regions and groups of States were represented, including the New Agenda Coalition. In addition, he would meet regularly with the Bureau and keep it informed of the progress made.

22. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico) said that the States of the New Agenda Coalition wished to participate, rather than be represented, in informal consultations.

23. **Mr. Monteiro** (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union, pledged his support for the President's efforts to reach a consensus on the outstanding issues and expressed his readiness to work to that end in whatever manner the President deemed appropriate.

24. **The President** said that he took it that the Conference wished to proceed as he had suggested.

25. *It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 4.25 p.m.

Summary record of the 16th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Saturday, 20 May 2000, at 11 a.m.

President: Mr. Baali .... (Algeria)

Contents

Review of the operation of the treaty as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (*continued*)

(c) Implementation of the provisions of the treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones (*continued*)

(iii) Article VII (*continued)*

Reports of the main committees (*continued*)

Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference

Report of the Credentials Committee (*continued*)

Draft report of the Drafting Committee

Consideration and adoption of the final document(s)

The meeting was called to order at 11.45 a.m.

Review of the operation of the treaty as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (*continued*)

(c) Implementation of the provisions of the treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones (*continued*)

(iii) Article VII (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Westdal** (Canada), reporting on his consultations with key parties with a view to coming up with a consensus on the text of the regional issues paper, said that significant progress had been made. The key parties were actively engaged in good faith negotiations concerning the last few phrases and words of key texts with an eye to a larger goal that everyone shared. Participants would betray their responsibilities if they did not make one final effort to complete that vital work.

2. **Mr. Widodo** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, called on all the countries most directly concerned to reach an agreement in order to achieve a historic and successful outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, an objective that was cherished by the entire international community.

3. **Mr. Soutar** (United Kingdom), speaking on behalf of the Western Group, said that the tremendous progress achieved over the course of the Conference had led to the development of agreed language covering all aspects of the Treaty and the strengthened review process. If agreement could be reached on that basis, it would not only demonstrate that the Conference had responded positively to the aspirations of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, but it would also send a clear message to the international community that the nuclear non-proliferation regime remained vibrant and relevant. For that reason, the Western Group would like to call on the parties most intimately concerned to intensify their consultations with a view to reaching consensus within the next few hours. The international community would not readily understand if the Conference stumbled at that last fence.

4. **Mr. Bingre do Amaral** (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that the international community must not let the current historic opportunity slip from its grasp. In that regard, the European Union would back any efforts aimed at ensuring smooth negotiations between the key parties concerned. The final step must be taken in order to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion.

5. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said the agreed language that the Conference had endeavoured to forge over the previous four weeks had brought together nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States on many fundamental issues. Those agreements could be built upon in the near future. Unfortunately, all those efforts could come to naught should the Conference fail to resolve the one pending issue. That would be unacceptable. He therefore appealed to the two States concerned in the matter to be more flexible and bear in mind the real priorities of the Conference.

6. **Mr. Noburo** (Japan) read out a message from his country's Minister for Foreign Affairs stressing the critical importance of the Conference's discussions to international peace and security, as well as to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and expressing the hope that the negotiations between the parties concerned would bear fruit as soon as possible.

7. **Mr. Chomicki** (Poland), speaking on behalf of the countries associated with the European Union, endorsed the statement of the European Union and expressed the hope that the parties concerned could achieve a compromise that was satisfactory to all States parties to the Treaty.

8. **Mr. Sanders** (Netherlands) said that his delegation fully supported the ongoing efforts to reach agreement on the one remaining paragraph and called on the parties directly concerned to bridge the remaining gap.

9. **Mr. Kapralov** (Russian Federation) said that his delegation, too, was deeply concerned about the situation which had developed in the Conference and welcomed the appeals to the parties most intimately involved in the discussion of the remaining unresolved issue to come to an agreement and thus ensure the success of the Conference.

10. **The President** said that he would suspend the meeting for an hour in order to allow the representative

of Canada to hold consultations with the parties concerned.

The meeting was suspended at 12.05 p.m. and resumed at 3.05 p.m.

11. **Mr. Westdal** (Canada), reporting on the outcome of the consultations, announced that a key paragraph of the regional issues paper had been agreed. Should the Conference endorse the paragraph, the last obstacle to the conclusion of the Conference would be surmounted.

12. **The President** thanked the representative of Canada on behalf of all the States parties for a job well done under extremely difficult circumstances.

Reports of the main committees (*continued*)

Report of Main Committee I

13. **The President** said that agreement had been reached on section A, paragraph 12, of the report of Main Committee I. The new version would read: "The Conference reiterates the call on those States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and that have not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear-weapon development or deployment and to refrain from any action which could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation."

14. He took it that the Conference wished to adopt the paragraph.

15. *It was so decided.*

Report of Main Committee II

16. **The President** said that former paragraph 59 had been deleted and replaced by the following: "The Conference, taking note of all initiatives by States Parties, believes that the international community should continue to promote the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with the relevant United Nations Disarmament Commission guidelines and in that spirit welcomes the efforts and proposals that have been advanced by the States Parties since 1995 in various regions of the world."

17. He took it that the Conference wished to adopt the new paragraph.

18. *It was so decided.*

19. **Mr. Suganuma** (Japan), reporting on the results of informal consultations held on the portions in boldface of the current revised version of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.13, dated 17 May, said that paragraph 24 should be deleted. In paragraph 31, the words "including in particular nuclear-weapon States" should be replaced by "noting their common but differentiated responsibilities". Paragraph 35 had been amended to read: "The States Parties, recalling the obligations of all States Parties under articles I, II and III of the Treaty, call upon all States Parties not to cooperate with or give assistance in the nuclear or nuclear-related field to States not party to the NPT in a manner that assists them or for the manufacturing of nuclear explosive devices."

20. Paragraphs 40, 41, 42, 62, 72 and the part of paragraph 73 in bold should be deleted.

21. **Mr. Awaad** (Egypt) said that paragraph 56 would now read: "The Conference welcomes the consensus reached in the General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security. The Conference urges all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards."

22. **The President** said that he would suspend the meeting in order to allow the Drafting Committee to consider the small amendments.

The meeting was suspended at 3.25 p.m. and resumed at 4.45 p.m.

Adoption of arrangements for meeting the costs of the Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/26)

23. **The President** drew attention to document NPT/CONF.2000/26 containing the schedule of division of costs based on the actual participation of

States parties in the Conference. The document must be seen in conjunction with rule 12 of, and the appendix to, the rules of procedure adopted by the Conference on 24 April 2000.

24. He took it that the Conference wished to adopt document NPT/CONF.2000/26.

25. *It was so decided.*

Report of the Credentials Committee (*continued*)
(NPT/CONF.2000/CC/1)

26. **Mr. Widodo** (Indonesia), speaking as Chairman of the Credentials Committee, introduced the final report of the Credentials Committee (NPT/CONF.2000/CC/1). The Committee had met thrice to examine the credentials of representatives participating in the Conference. On the basis of the information received from the Secretary-General of the Conference, the Committee had decided at its third and last meeting on 16 May to accept the credentials of 155 States parties participating in the Conference, on the understanding that those delegations which had not presented their credentials in the form required by rule 2 of the rules of procedure would do so as soon as possible. The Committee had then adopted its report to the Conference.

27. **The President** said he took it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of the Credentials Committee.

28. *It was so decided.*

Draft report of the Drafting Committee
(NPT/CONF.2000/DC/CRP.2)

29. **Mr. Erdös** (Hungary), speaking as Chairman of the Drafting Committee, introduced the draft report of the Drafting Committee. The Committee had held five meetings, had considered the reports of the Main Committees as well as various proposals put forward by delegations with a view to achieving a consensus final document. The Committee had also considered the draft Final Document of the Conference and agreed to recommend it to the Conference for adoption.

30. **The President** said he took it that the Conference wished to take note of the report of the Drafting Committee.

31. *It was so decided.*

Consideration and adoption of the final document(s)
(NPT/CONF.2000/DC/WP.1 and NPT/CONF.2000/CRP.1/Rev.1)

32. **The President** said that because of time constraints it had not been possible to have the documents reissued with the changes agreed by the Drafting Committee. He would nevertheless take it that the Conference wished to adopt its final document, as contained in documents NPT/CONF.2000/DC/WP.1 and NPT/CONF.2000/CRP.1/Rev.1 and as orally revised, by consensus.

33. *It was so decided.*

34. **Mr. Hasan** (Iraq) welcomed the spirit of solidarity and courage demonstrated by the Conference in thwarting the attempt of the United States of America to sabotage the Conference. Since his country was a party to the NPT and complied fully with the full scope safeguards regime, there was no reason to include a reference to Iraq in the final document. Unfortunately, the United States had somehow managed to impose such a reference, the wording of which had nothing to do with the NPT, the mandate of the Conference or the safeguards regime. While his delegation had not opposed the consensus adoption of the document, it nevertheless wished to express its reservations concerning the paragraph containing that reference.

35. **Mr. Olbrich** (Germany) welcomed the adoption of the final document without a vote. Referring to the section of document NPT/CONF.2000/DC/CRP.1/Rev.1 entitled "Article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7", he said that, because of the overriding importance that Germany attached to a successful non-proliferation policy, it would accept the inclusion of paragraph 8. However, in his delegation's view, the peaceful use of nuclear energy did not contribute to sustainable development.

36. **Ms. Schneebauer** (Austria), said that her delegation could accept the wording of the paragraph in question, which was the same as the wording of the report of Main Committee III of 1995. At the same time, she wished to reiterate her delegation's statement to Main Committee III that only non-power applications of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy could contribute to sustainable development. In her Government's view, nuclear power could not play a role in the context of sustainable development. However, Austria was willing to continue to meet its

obligations under article IV of the NPT in those areas in which it was able to contribute, in particular the humanitarian aspects of development and prosperity in the world.

37. **Mr. Toftlund** (Denmark) said that his delegation fully shared the views expressed by the representative of Austria with regard to the relationship between sustainable development and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

38. **Mr. Mungra** (Suriname), speaking on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), said that CARICOM remained firmly committed to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. It believed that there was no justification for the retention of weapons of mass destruction, which should be dismantled in the shortest possible time. Concerning the issue of maritime transport of radioactive materials, although CARICOM had put forward proposals calling, inter alia, for prior notification and consultation, environmental impact assessment and the establishment of an effective liability regime in respect of accidental or deliberate damage, it was deeply concerned that a comprehensive liability or compensation regime still did not exist. Until a moratorium on the transport of radioactive materials was achieved, CARICOM would continue to press for prior notification of and consultation on such transport and for a comprehensive liability regime that incorporated the Community's just demand for compensation in the event of damage. In that context, the Caribbean Community applauded the relevant regulations of the Treaties of Bangkok and Pelindaba.

39. Although the CARICOM States had joined in the consensus on the adoption of the final document, they still remained opposed to the persistent use of the Caribbean sea for the transhipment of highly toxic nuclear materials, which were a threat to the fragile ecosystems and marine and coastal environment of the Caribbean, and hence to the very survival of the communities living in that region. Support of the CARICOM position demonstrated the importance that a vast majority of countries in the international community attached to that issue.

40. **Mr. Noboru** (Japan) said that his Government would redouble its efforts in order to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament on the basis of the very valuable document adopted by the Conference. In that regard, it was his delegation's understanding that future work would be pursued on the basis of the reaffirmation of the Principles and Objectives of 1995, as well as of the document adopted at the current Review Conference.

41. **Mr. Alborzy** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation had a reservation with respect to the paragraph relating to the peace process in the section dealing with the Middle East and to any other references which might be construed as recognition of Israel.

42. **Mr. Pradhan** (Bhutan) said that, even though his delegation had difficulties with paragraphs 9 and 11 of the section dealing with articles I and II, it had gone along with the wording of those paragraphs in order not to prevent the achievement of a consensus.

43. **Mr. Webbe** (Syrian Arab Republic) expressed his delegation's disappointment that, notwithstanding the establishment of Subsidiary Body 2 on regional issues, including the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Conference had been unable to come up with language clearly calling on Israel to accede to the NPT and to submit all its nuclear installations to the IAEA safeguards regime in order to implement Security Council resolution 487 (1981). That was all the more regrettable since it meant that the Conference had failed to meet the basic conditions for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

44. Moreover, the credibility of the Treaty could not be revived unless those States that persisted in applying a double standard mended their ways. Indeed, he did not see how States which were not parties to the Treaty, such as India and Pakistan, could be urged to accede to it, while there was a clear unwillingness to demand that Israel should also accede to the Treaty and submit its nuclear installations to the safeguards regime.

45. As long as Israel remained outside the Treaty and refused to comply with United Nations resolutions, despite repeated appeals by the General Assembly, the situation would remain a cause for concern for many Arab countries. If that situation persisted, it would threaten peace and security, not only in the region but also in the rest of the world. Instead of paragraph 9 under the section concerning the Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the Conference should have set up a specific mechanism to address the subject of Israel. His

delegation therefore wished to register its reservation with respect to that paragraph. Previous conferences as well as the current one had provided ample opportunities for Israel to accede to the Treaty and to submit its installations to IAEA safeguards. It had availed itself of none of them.

46. He wished to emphasize, once again, his country's commitment to stability and peace throughout the region. The Syrian Arab Republic, which had complied with the provisions of the Treaty over the previous 30 years, believed that the mere reference in paragraph 3 of the document on the Middle East to the importance of Israel's acceding to the Treaty and placing its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards was not commensurate with the Conference's objectives. That was regrettable, because it sent the wrong message to Israel and encouraged it to continue its occupation of the Arab territories. Moreover, it felt no pressure to commit itself to the establishment of peace in the region. The foregoing notwithstanding, and in view of the efforts made by all delegations to achieve positive results, his delegation would go along with the consensus.

47. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), said that the Coalition resolutions of 1998 and 1999, which had attracted 35 and 60 sponsors, respectively, as well as the support of the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, had clearly demonstrated the international community's desire for a new and unequivocal commitment by nuclear-weapon States to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, coupled with a commitment to an accelerated process of negotiations concerning nuclear disarmament to which all States were committed under article VI. The results of the Conference had made explicit what had always been implicit, thus reinforcing and revitalizing the Treaty as the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The NAC countries acknowledged and welcomed the important political step that the nuclear-weapon States had undertaken and now had greater faith in the prospects for nuclear disarmament. While the Conference had not achieved all that would have been wished, its results constituted an important stage in the endeavour to build a nuclear-weapon-free world. The NAC countries would, for their part, persevere in the efforts to translate into reality the solemn commitments entered into at the Conference.

48. **Mr. Hu** Xiaodi (China) said that, while his delegation had not objected to the adoption of the Final Document, it believed that the document had a number of shortcomings. It had failed to call for the removal of fundamental obstacles to nuclear disarmament, such as plans on the part of one country to establish a national missile defence system, a move that could sabotage global strategic stability by undermining the ABM Treaty and sparking an arms race in outer space. Moreover, not enough emphasis had been put on some necessary principles and measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, such as calling upon nuclear-weapon States with the largest stockpiles to take the lead in nuclear disarmament by reducing their nuclear arsenals and delivery systems and pledging unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

49. Since his delegation believed that a fissile-material cut-off treaty should be conducive to nuclear weapons non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, it supported negotiations on and the conclusion of a cut-off treaty. In view of the very real likelihood of a nuclear weapons race in outer space as a result of the planned missile defence system, China believed that the prevention of an arms race in outer space was more urgent than the negation of a cut-off treaty. Accordingly, the Conference on Disarmament should deal with at least three issues, namely, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, nuclear disarmament and a fissile material cut-off treaty in a balanced and comprehensive manner. His delegation supported the early conclusion of the fissile material cut-off treaty in accordance with an agreed programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament. However, in view of the many uncertainties in that regard, setting an artificial timeframe would be not only unreasonable but also impracticable.

50. In his delegation's view, in order to reduce the danger of nuclear warfare, nuclear-weapon States must guarantee unconditional no first-use of weapons and provide unconditional negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons deployed outside the borders of nuclear-weapon States and the elimination of the nuclear umbrella must also be guaranteed. Without such assurances, transparency and confidence-building measures would not be feasible. Furthermore,

the implementation of the relevant measures would require an environment of strategic stability.

51. His Government believed that all countries had the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. When exporting nuclear material to non-States parties, all States parties to the NPT should strictly abide by the provisions of the Treaty, in particular article III, in order to ensure that the exported items were under IAEA safeguards and were used only for peaceful purposes. China, for its part, would faithfully fulfil its obligations under the NPT and would continue to work towards the realization of the three main objectives of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

52. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America) welcomed the fact that over 150 States parties to the NPT had clearly reaffirmed the vital importance of the Treaty to the promotion of international peace and security and had agreed to continue to work together in order to achieve its universality. The Conference had expressed profound concern about cases of non-compliance and had reaffirmed that strict observance of the Treaty remained central to achieving its objectives.

53. It had been agreed that any addition to the five nuclear-weapon States was unacceptable and would serve only to heighten instability and security concerns among States, making the world a more dangerous, uncertain place. Moreover, the five nuclear-weapon States had agreed on the need for further efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals and to work towards a world free from nuclear weapons.

54. Full agreement had been reached in many other areas. Thus, the critical importance of nuclear safety in realizing the many peaceful benefits of nuclear technology had been recognized, and strong support had been expressed for the work of IAEA, including its technical cooperation programme. The need for strong, effective international safeguards had been underscored and agreement had been reached to work towards further strengthening the review process for the Treaty. Finally, he wished to stress the importance of cooperation, compromise and consensus among States parties in the continued implementation of the Treaty and called upon the international community to rededicate itself to the fundamental goals of the NPT, to use nuclear techniques to build prosperity in a world made ever more secure with each step achieved under the Treaty towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

55. **Mr. Widodo** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said the deliberations of the Review Conference had shown that States parties to the NPT had reached a critical stage in their concerted efforts to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime. In that regard, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries fervently hoped that, as a result of the decisions taken by the Conference, all the substantive issues contained in the working paper that had been submitted by the Movement would be addressed, so that the international community as a whole could lay a more solid foundation for non-proliferation that would serve the interests of all States parties to the Treaty. The highlight of the Review Conference had undoubtedly been the adoption of practical steps designed to bring about a systematic and progressive implementation of article VI of the NPT, as well as paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

56. In the context of the strengthened review process, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries had noted the introduction of new principles and approaches in the context of nuclear and related issues. However, the Movement was at the same time conscious of various conditionalities that were often attached to action on disarmament matters. The challenge was how to further strengthen the consensus that already existed in order to achieve the goals enshrined in the Treaty. While the Conference might not have lived up to all expectations, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries was optimistic about the future viability of the Treaty. It hoped that the Conference would give a fresh impetus to efforts to build a world without nuclear weapons, where security and equality were guaranteed to all nations.

57. **Mr. Alborzy** (Islamic Republic of Iran) welcomed the Final Document adopted by the Conference, which provided the basis and framework for future work on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Indeed, the document reaffirmed, inter alia, that no new nuclear-weapon State should be recognized; that States not parties to the Treaty should accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States; and that nuclear-weapon States should refrain from assisting States not parties to the Treaty to acquire nuclear weapons. Agreement had also been reached on strengthened safeguards, while Israel had been called upon to accede to the NPT and to place all its nuclear

facilities under IAEA safeguards. Indeed, IAEA was the only competent authority responsible for verifying and ensuring the compliance of all States parties with their safeguards agreements. It was also the body to which all concerns regarding non-compliance with those safeguards agreements should be addressed.

58. Moreover, the document emphasized that unhindered nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes should be promoted. No allegations of proliferation could deprive a State party to the Treaty of its inalienable right to develop, conduct research on, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It had also been decided that a transparent and open framework was needed for nuclear export controls. In that regard, his delegation expected the current Italian and future French presidencies of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to take practical steps to give effect to that desire of the Conference, which had also emphasized that the ABM Treaty should continue to be preserved as the cornerstone of global strategic stability. Finally, nuclear-weapon States had committed themselves to a further reduction of their nuclear arsenals through bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the conclusion of START III as soon as possible. His delegation was confident that the agreed framework for strengthening the review process would provide a mechanism for facilitating the implementation of the Review Conference's decisions.

59. Mr. **Reguieg** (Algeria) said that Algeria was committed not only to strengthening the NPT, but also to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. He hoped that the historic final consensus document would help to achieve the universality of the Treaty and hence strengthen the non-proliferation regime. That would ultimately promote the noble cause of disarmament and a world free from nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction. His delegation welcomed the atmosphere of flexibility, responsibility and cooperation which had reigned throughout the Conference.

60. **Mr. Albuquerque** (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union and the associated countries Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Turkey, welcomed the successful outcome of the Conference. The flexibility shown by all States parties had confirmed the shared commitment to the Treaty as a cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament based on the decisions and resolution of the 1995 Review Conference.

61. The European Union strongly supported the Conference's renewed urgent call to those States that had not yet adhered to the Treaty, to do so without delay. It remained committed to the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and to its implementation. It therefore welcomed the progress towards that end and the agreement by the Conference on a balanced outcome concerning various elements of that issue.

62. The Conference had reviewed the situation regarding compliance, an issue to which the European Union also attached particular importance. Moreover the Conference had agreed on practical steps designed to lead to the progressive implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on Principles and Objectives. The European Union was encouraged by the agreements reached on those measures and hoped that the momentum generated by the Conference would be sustained.

63. **Mr. Aboulgheit** (Egypt) expressed the hope that the success achieved by the Conference would help to promote the non-proliferation regime as a whole, speed up nuclear disarmament and achieve universality of the Treaty. By achieving consensus on all matters before them, the 187 States parties to the NPT had reaffirmed the importance of Israel's adherence to the Treaty and the placement by that country of all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. That was an important and essential step towards achieving the universality of the Treaty in the Middle East. The States parties to the Treaty had reaffirmed the continued validity of the Resolution on the Middle East and had stressed the need to follow up progress made in its implementation and in achieving its objectives. Moreover, they had underscored the need to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

64. **Mr. Haniff** (Malaysia) said that the outcome of the Review Conference had not matched his delegation's earlier expectations of stronger commitments to nuclear disarmament, especially from the nuclear-weapon States. The lack of political will on the part of nuclear-weapon States had been reflected by their failure to even acknowledge the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, which had a direct impact on the activities, policies and obligations

of Member States in the area of nuclear disarmament, particularly with regard to article VI. Instead of making a strong pronouncement on the Court's advisory opinion, the Conference had been prevailed upon to merely recall that opinion in the "forward-looking" document and to note it in the "review document". Regrettably, the nuclear-weapon States did not view the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals as a matter of urgency. Some of them continued to oppose the proposal to begin negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or a framework convention.

65. The Resolution on the Middle East was an integral part of the package of decisions and resolutions adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, yet the region was far from being a zone free from nuclear weapons as called for in that Resolution. In that regard, his delegation was concerned that Israel was the only State in the Middle East that had not acceded to the Treaty or placed its nuclear facilities and material under full-scope IAEA safeguards. It was also concerned about the new concept of "strategic" stability, which was definitely incompatible with nuclear disarmament, since it appeared to imply the retention of nuclear weapons.

66. Referring to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, he said that a group of over 30 countries could not and should not dictate terms to the other 150 States parties to the NPT. The activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group were undemocratic and contrary to existing international norms. The Group's activities did not adequately distinguish between non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the NPT which had full-scope safeguards arrangements with IAEA and States not parties to the Treaty. He therefore hoped that any further strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation safeguards system, particularly in the context of dual-use items, would be pursued with greater transparency. It was also regrettable that the Secretary-General's proposal to convene a major conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers had not been widely supported, since the issue of nuclear disarmament was of paramount importance to the survival of humanity.

67. **Mr. Tucknott** (United Kingdom), speaking on behalf of the Western Group, said that the States parties to the NPT had demonstrated their collective desire to reach an outcome which confirmed the relevance of the Treaty 30 years after its entry into force. The final report of the Conference contained a balanced review and set a realistic and achievable agenda to take forward the work to which the entire international community was committed, namely, the achievement of a world free from nuclear weapons.

68. **Mr. Kvok** (Russian Federation) said there was no doubt that the Conference had demonstrated once again the need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and strategic stability, the cornerstone of which was the ABM Treaty of 1972 and all its revisions. Without that Treaty, it was impossible to make any progress towards nuclear disarmament. In his delegation's view, strategic stability was primarily meant to strengthen international security, which would make it possible to achieve more substantial reductions in nuclear and conventional weapons in the future. While the final document of the Conference was not ideal, it was a product of common sense and good will. The Russian Federation would continue to conduct a consistent policy to strengthen the NPT and try to make it universal.

69. **Mr. Brunet** (France) said that the results of the Conference showed the continuing commitment of the international community to non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. His delegation would continue to work towards that end on the basis of the review of the 1995 decisions and forward-looking results of the Conference.

70. **Mr. Hoang Chi Trung** (Viet Nam) welcomed the success achieved by the Review Conference and hoped that it would provide the impetus for efforts aimed at achieving the common goal of total nuclear disarmament. The NPT was the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and a tool which would enable the States parties to work towards achieving a world free from nuclear weapons. In that regard, nuclear-weapon States should make an unequivocal commitment to eliminating all nuclear weapons within a specified time-frame. Although the measures laid out in the final outcome document were not as complete and comprehensive as most of the non-nuclear-weapon States would have wished, they nevertheless represented considerable progress in the work towards that noble objective. His delegation sincerely hoped that those measures would be observed by all States parties to the Treaty in general, and by the nuclear-weapon States in particular.

71. **The President** welcomed the positive outcome of the Conference. While the results might not appear to be commensurate with the magnitude of the tasks and challenges facing the international community or the expectations of that community, they must be seen against the background of the prevailing political circumstances.

72. In accordance with Decision 1 on the strengthening of the review process for the Treaty adopted in 1995, the Conference had been successful in looking forward as well as backward. It had managed to evaluate the results of the period since 1995, including the implementation of the obligations of States parties under the Treaty, and to identify areas in which, and the means through which, further progress would be sought in the future, including the strengthening of the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and the achievement of its universality.

73. Among its major achievements, the Conference had again reaffirmed its conviction that the preservation of the integrity of the Treaty and its strict implementation were essential to international peace and security, and it had recognized the crucial role of the Treaty in nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Thus, agreements had been reached on the review of the operation of the Treaty, and the progress achieved in the implementation of the obligations of all States parties to the Treaty had been duly recognized. At the same time, nuclear-weapon States had been urged to show more resolve in carrying out their undertakings under article VI of the Treaty.

74. The paramount importance of achieving the goal of universality of the Treaty had once again been stressed. In that regard, States not yet parties to the Treaty, namely Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan had been urged to adhere to it promptly and without delay. The importance of the full compliance of all States parties with all provisions of the Treaty had also been emphasized, while the contribution of nuclear-weapon-free zones to the enhancement of global and regional peace and security and to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime had been further stressed. In addition, the importance of legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had been reaffirmed and further efforts in that regard had been urged. An in-depth consideration of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under IAEA safeguards had been conducted and agreement had been reached on appropriate recommendations in that respect.

75. More significantly, the Conference had agreed on some practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The implementation of that programme of action would undoubtedly accelerate prospects of achieving the shared objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

76. The Conference had also focused on regional issues. In particular, the situations in the Middle East and South-East Asia had been the subject of an in-depth consideration and appropriate recommendations. Finally, the Conference had emphasized the need to keep the issue of improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty under constant review and a decision aimed at further improving the effectiveness of the review process had been adopted.

77. In conclusion, he reiterated that the final outcome of the Review Conference, which was the product of a delicate and hard-won compromise between divergent and sometimes conflicting positions, was the best attainable under the prevailing conditions.

78. He declared the Conference closed.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.

B. Main Committee I

Summary records of the 1st to 7th meetings

Main Committee I

Summary record of the 1st meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 26 April 2000 at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Reyes Rodriguez .... (Colombia)

Contents

Programme of work

General exchange of views

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Programme of work

1. **The Chairman** said that two documents had been distributed to the participants: the draft timetable for the work of the Committee (NPT/CONF.2000/INF.2) and the summary of questions submitted to the Committee. Three meetings would be devoted to consideration of articles I and II, preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 and the review of the implementation of article VI, one meeting to article VII and security assurances and two meetings to consideration of the report of the Committee, which would be submitted to the President of the Conference and which would include the report prepared by the subsidiary organ.

2. He would take it that the Committee wished to adopt the programme of work.

3. *It was so decided.*

General exchange of views

4. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico), speaking on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, said that in 1995 the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had believed that nuclear disarmament would be substantially facilitated by the easing of international tensions and that confidence between States would be enhanced. That belief had been strengthened in 1996 by an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, which had affirmed that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

5. It must be admitted that events since then in the field of disarmament and international security had not been encouraging: the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was far from having attained the number of ratifications needed to enter into force and no possibility of accelerating the ratification process was in sight; the commencement of negotiations on a treaty on fissile material faced serious difficulties and negotiations on a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances were at a standstill. Moreover, some States did not show the necessary political will to fulfil their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the systematic and progressive efforts of the nuclear-weapon States Parties had fallen short of the requirements called for by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

6. It was also a matter of concern that three States were operating nuclear facilities which were not safeguarded in accordance with the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), were keeping their nuclear weapons options open and had still not acceded to the Treaty; that nuclear weapons continued to be central to security policies and strategic concepts; and that nuclear doctrines were being reaffirmed.

7. It was in that context that the Brazilian, Egyptian, Irish, Mexican, New Zealand, South African and Swedish delegations were submitting to the Committee document NPT/CONF.2000/WP.3 entitled "Nuclear disarmament", as the identification of areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future regarding the obligation under article VI of the Treaty to achieve nuclear disarmament. In that document, the authors stressed that it was important for the five nuclear-weapon States to make an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and, in the course of the forthcoming review period 2000-2005, to engage in an accelerated process of negotiations and to take steps leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States Parties were committed under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. They also stressed that the United States of America and the Russian Federation must undertake to fully implement the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and commence without further delay negotiations on START III with a view to its early conclusion.

8. They affirmed that the five nuclear-weapon States must undertake with determination the process of the elimination of their nuclear arsenals and, in that context, they should implement a set of interim measures, *inter alia*, to adapt their nuclear policies and postures so as to preclude the use of nuclear weapons; to proceed to the de-alerting and the removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles and to reduce tactical nuclear weapons and proceed to their elimination as an integral part of nuclear arms reduction; to demonstrate greater transparency with regard to their nuclear arsenals and fissile material inventories; to further develop the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the

International Atomic Energy Agency so as to include all five nuclear-weapon States in similar arrangements and to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from weapons programmes; and to apply the principle of irreversibility in all nuclear disarmament nuclear arms reduction and nuclear arms control measures.

9. They called upon States Parties that had not yet done so to sign and ratify, unconditionally and without delay, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and, pending the entry into force of the Treaty, to observe moratoria on nuclear tests.

10. They reiterated the urgency of commencing without delay negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into consideration both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives, and pending the entry into force of the Treaty, the observation of a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

11. They were convinced that nuclear disarmament must be subject to multilateral consideration and therefore called for the establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament.

12. They agreed that the extension and establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at, among States of the regions concerned, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, were significant contributions to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

13. They also agreed on the importance of the negotiation and conclusion at an early date of an internationally legally binding instrument to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

14. Finally, considering that, in order to be effective, the nuclear non-proliferation regime must be universal, they called upon those States that had not yet done so to adhere unconditionally and without delay to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to take all the necessary measures required by adherence to that instrument as non-nuclear-weapon States.

15. The current Review Conference might be the last best opportunity to advance nuclear disarmament. The practical measures to which he had referred would, if they were implemented, contribute to a more secure planet. He therefore urged States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to strengthen the non-proliferation regime on the basis of those proposals.

16. **Mr. Randal** (New Zealand) said that the current Review Conference was crucial in that it would be instrumental in determining, on the one hand, whether international confidence in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons could be sustained and whether its indefinite extension could be upheld, and, on the other, to what extent States Parties, if they arrived at a consensus that crossed traditional alignments, could meet the requirement placed on them by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference to exercise a greater degree of accountability for their efforts in fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty.

17. It was important, at the beginning of the Conference, to keep in mind the political and legal framework of the Treaty. The Treaty clearly indicated that non-nuclear-weapon States had both the right and the responsibility to participate in nuclear disarmament. In that connection, his delegation did not ask that the negotiations on the START agreements should be open to other States Parties to the Treaty, but it believed that the States Parties to the Treaty should not be excluded in some way from the process of nuclear disarmament.

18. Moreover, the Treaty clearly established that progress on nuclear disarmament was not contingent on progress with general and complete disarmament and that, insofar as it was based on mutual obligations, no one group of States should be able to determine independently the pace with which it should be implemented.

19. His delegation welcomed the recent ratification by the Russian Federation of the START II agreements. It believed that those agreements were extremely important and urged the United States and the Russian Federation to spare no effort towards the early conclusion of the START III agreements.

20. During the past five years, there had been significant challenges to the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, challenges posed both by States Parties and by other States. With regard to the nuclear tests carried out in South Asia almost two years earlier, they might not have weakened the Treaty, but they had challenged the non-proliferation norm and brought into sharp focus the reality that the Treaty had not yet been signed and ratified by all States. In that connection, the Committee should send the strongest possible signal that demonstrations of nuclear capability could not occur with impunity and that States Parties to the Treaty should reinforce the calls made, individually and collectively, to the two States which had carried out the aforementioned nuclear tests to renounce the nuclear-weapons option and to sign and ratify the Treaty unconditionally as non-nuclear-weapon States. They should also call upon those States to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay. It was also important that they should support the efforts for dialogue to urge States in the South Asia region to exercise restraint in the nuclear area and call upon another non-State Party which operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accede to the Treaty and to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

21. The Committee should focus immediately on the three objectives set down in the Principles and Objectives adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the full implementation of which was proceeding slowly. Work on the conclusion of a viable fissile material cut-off treaty, in particular, was being delayed by calls for work on other issues in the Conference on Disarmament.

22. The Conference should make work on negative security assurances, which was currently at a standstill, a priority. In that connection, as his delegation had noted previously, some new creative thinking might be required. The unilateral assurances provided for in Security Council resolutions were not regarded as constituting firm and legally binding agreements. They had not been negotiated and remained unverifiable and, in view of the continuing rationalization of the use of nuclear weapons, there were questions about the security benefits they provided. On that point, his delegation had always regarded security assurances as part of the nuclear-non-proliferation "bargain", whereby non-nuclear-weapon States which had renounced the nuclear-weapons option should have the assurance of not being subjected in any way to a nuclear threat. He hoped, in that connection, that the nuclear-weapon States would ratify the protocols to the various nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.

23. If its work was to be credible, the Committee could not confine its focus to what it had not been able to achieve. It must also endeavour to inject a new political determination into the process of the elimination of nuclear weapons and ensure further and faster progress in the implementation of the START agreements. In that connection, he hoped that China, France and the United Kingdom, as well as the Russian Federation and the United States of America, would undertake to eliminate their nuclear forces. The Committee should also endeavour to achieve greater transparency in the area of nuclear disarmament, to make the principle of the irreversibility of disarmament measures prevail and to ensure that States Parties acknowledged that other interim measures (the renunciation of nuclear doctrines, the de-alerting of nuclear weapons, the reduction of non-strategic weapons, and so on) could and should be adopted. In that context, he urged all delegations to support the working paper on nuclear disarmament submitted by the delegations of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden (NPT/CONF.2000/WP.3). Lastly, the Conference and the Committee should seek a new political undertaking from the States Parties for the total elimination of nuclear weapons and urge them to accelerate the negotiations to that end.

24. **Mr. Noboru** (Japan) said that the decision to extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons indefinitely had introduced a new chapter in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation which was marked by an effort to focus more sharply on the implementation of the letter and spirit of the Treaty. The opening of the new era had to be clearly recognized and embraced by all States Parties, both those that possessed nuclear weapons and those that did not, otherwise unnecessary divisions could be created which would weaken the non-proliferation regime from within.

25. The goal of nuclear disarmament was being pursued at several levels — the unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral levels. The first three levels involved only the nuclear-weapon States and no one would deny the great importance of the work they

had done. The fourth involved all the States Parties to the Treaty, which were parties to the most important multilateral legal instrument on disarmament, the Treaty itself. Nuclear disarmament was not an exclusive domain of the nuclear-weapon States: it involved and affected all the States Parties to the Treaty, as was confirmed by the important progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation achieved through such multilateral agreements as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. In that connection, it should be noted that, considering the enormous amount of work still to be done if all nuclear weapons were to be eliminated, it would be wrong to assume that the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty would exhaust all the possibilities for action at the multilateral level. It was therefore important to start at once discussions on possible future steps to be taken on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

26. The deliberations on nuclear disarmament which had been conducted in various forums clearly showed that the question of the pace of the work to be done was particularly contentious, with regard both to the assessment of the progress that had been made and to the formulation of the measures to be taken in the future. Since the international community was united in wishing to eliminate nuclear weapons, it was important to ensure that the differences of opinion on the question did not call that consensus in question. Moreover, since no concrete steps could be taken unless there was unanimity, it was evident that the only way to proceed was step by step.

27. The adoption by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament had been a major milestone in efforts to achieve the goal of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Five years had elapsed since that time and the Australian and Japanese delegations had considered it logical that the States Parties to the Treaty should not only reaffirm their commitment to the implementation of those principles and objectives, but that they should also take into account the results achieved so far and agree on further measures to promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. For that reason, they had submitted to the Committee a working paper entitled "Further measures to be taken for the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (NPT/CONF.2000/WP.1), the aim of which was to supplement the aforementioned principles and objectives with further measures. Most of those measures were already set forth in General Assembly resolution 54/54 D, entitled: "Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons". They were moderate measures which, if adopted, would increase the momentum that had been achieved in the past five years and would enable the participants in the Conference to leave with more confidence in the future.

28. With regard to the review work of the Committee, it should be noted that the previous year the Preparatory Committee, at its third session, had failed to express a view on the nuclear tests carried out in South Asia in 1998. Moreover, statements had been made in 1998 in international forums such as the United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency, but not in the Preparatory Committee for the Conference, where they were of direct concern. His delegation believed that there should be a reference to those nuclear tests in the final documents of the Conference since otherwise the world might believe that the States Parties to the Treaty had so resigned themselves to nuclear tests that they could not even take the trouble to express their disapproval.

29. While progress had undeniably been made towards nuclear disarmament during the past decade, the record of the past four years was not entirely reassuring. Everyone acknowledged that in the pursuit of disarmament the key words were patience and perseverance. However, if the non-nuclear-weapon States were to demonstrate that they possessed such qualities, the nuclear-weapon States must also demonstrate that they possessed the corresponding virtues of sincerity and commitment. That was all the more important in that the 180 non-nuclear-weapon States which were Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had the power to make or break the Treaty.

30. The goal of the Treaty was to ensure the survival of humanity in the face of the destructive force of nuclear weapons. Whatever the Treaty might have suffered, its relevance could not be questioned since it was possible to repair it by implementing the measures that the international community had adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and those that it would agree on at the current Conference.

31. **Mr. de Albuquerque** (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union, the associated countries Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey, and, in addition, Iceland and Liechtenstein, said that the States members of the European Union were strongly committed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference had been a milestone in efforts to prevent proliferation and ensure disarmament. The programme of action agreed upon in paragraph 4 of the decision on the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament provided a standard against which progress could be measured.

32. Reviewing the goals set in 1995, he said that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had indeed been concluded and had been signed by the five nuclear-weapon States, by all the European countries and by many other States. Since then the Treaty had been ratified by all the members of the European Union. The refusal of the United States Senate to ratify the Treaty had been a setback, but the European Union welcomed the commitment expressed by the United States Government to abide by the provisions of the Treaty and to support the verification regime and the work of the Preparatory Committee of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The European Union called upon all States, especially the 44 States whose ratification was necessary for the Treaty to enter into force, to sign and ratify it without delay and without conditions. It welcomed the decision of the Parliament of the Russian Federation to ratify the Treaty and urged all States with nuclear capabilities to abide by a moratorium. The Review Conference should moreover consider what more could be done by States Parties to accelerate ratifications, prevent a resumption of tests and facilitate the entry into force of the Treaty.

33. South Asia continued to be a subject of concern to the European Union. The tests carried out by India and Pakistan in 1998 ran contrary to efforts towards non-proliferation and disarmament. The European Union called upon both countries to meet the requirements set out in Security Council resolution 1172 (1998). It noted that those two countries had committed themselves to a moratorium on tests and had expressed their willingness to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

34. The second goal set in 1995 concerned fissile material. The European Union regretted that concrete negotiations on a treaty in that area had not yet started in the Conference on Disarmament, as a result of the annual haggling over the adoption of the Conference's work programme. It stood ready to commence the negotiations immediately and unconditionally on the basis of the Shannon report. It urged the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to reaffirm their commitment to the goal of banning the production of fissile material. It welcomed the moratorium declared by four of the five nuclear-weapon States and urged all States which had not yet done so to abide by a moratorium.

35. The third part of the programme of action adopted in 1995 concerned the reduction of nuclear weapons. The European Union welcomed the progress that had been made, unilaterally and bilaterally, in that area, especially the progress made by the United States and the Russian Federation to fulfil the START I Treaty and ratify the START II Treaty, and by France and the United Kingdom to reduce the number and type of nuclear forces in their arsenals. It was encouraged by the efforts being made by the United States and the Russian Federation concerning transparency and irreversibility with regard to fissile materials. It called upon the nuclear-weapon States to increase overall transparency and to dismantle nuclear-weapon facilities. It participated in cooperative programmes aimed at providing assistance for the safe and secure management and disposition of fissile material and related facilities. It commended the various initiatives aimed at making "excess" fissile material subject to IAEA safeguards, thereby removing it from the stock available for use in nuclear weapons. It supported the efforts based on the principles of transparency, accountability, confidence-building and irreversibility.

36. The past five years had also witnessed negative developments which had retarded progress towards nuclear disarmament. The European Union deeply regretted that important agreements necessary for the fulfilment of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had not yet entered into force. It welcomed the approval for ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian Parliament and hoped that that Treaty and its protocol would enter into

force promptly and would be implemented as soon as possible so that negotiations on START III could begin.

37. Efforts should address not only nuclear warhead inventories, but also non-strategic nuclear weapons. The Review Conference should focus on the latter and encourage the nuclear-weapon States which possessed such weapons, in particular the United States and the Russian Federation, to explore ways of including those weapons in future nuclear reduction and disarmament arrangements. While it commended the unilateral and reciprocal commitments made by the United States and the Russian Federation in 1991, the European Union hoped that non-strategic nuclear weapons would be taken into account in the START III negotiations with the objective of their reduction and eventual complete elimination. It reaffirmed the importance of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

38. The European Union shared the concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. It was important that in responding to those threats States did not take any action which might harm the integrity and validity of the treaties which underpinned non-proliferation and strategic stability.

39. While the primary responsibility for negotiating the reduction of their arsenals rested with the five nuclear-weapon States, all States Parties had an obligation to further the implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In that connection, the European Union supported the establishment of an ad hoc working group within the Conference on Disarmament under the agenda item on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. All States Parties to the Treaty also had an obligation to work for progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

40. The European Union welcomed the entry into force of the Convention on Chemical Weapons. It looked forward to the completion of the negotiations on a protocol designed to strengthen the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention and welcomed the agreements concluded in the field of conventional armaments. Its members took very seriously their obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the decisions and resolutions adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The implementation of the programme of action adopted by consensus at that Conference had not been completed. Every effort should be made not only to fulfil the obligations undertaken on that occasion, but also to identify the progressive and systematic steps to be taken during the next five years. The European Union had adopted a common position in order to contribute to a structured and balanced review of the operation of the Treaty at the 2000 Conference with a view to helping to build a consensus on the substantive issues that would be discussed.

41. **Mr. de la Fortelle** (France) said that the Committee's mandate was to review the implementation of the "nuclear disarmament" component. Five years earlier the Conference had decided to extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons indefinitely and had stressed the need for a dynamic and voluntary approach with a view to ensuring its full implementation. To that end it had strengthened the review process and it was in that context that the current Conference was being held. That approach had led to the adoption of decision 2, which set out an ambitious programme on the essential question of nuclear disarmament. It was legitimate that, five years later, the international community should pay particular attention to the record of the States Parties on that question and call for clear and credible goals for the next few years.

42. Reviewing the progress that had been made, he said that important results had been achieved. France could pride itself on its exemplary record and was unequivocally committed to nuclear disarmament. On the multilateral level it had proposed that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should be based on the "zero option", in other words the banning of any nuclear test or nuclear explosion, at whatever level, and that had given a decisive impetus to the negotiations. It had signed the Treaty on 24 September 1996 and had been the first nuclear State, with the United Kingdom, to ratify it, on 6 April 1998. Since then, its contribution to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, in particular of its expertise, had been considerable. It was also in favour of the universal banning of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and remained in the forefront of initiatives towards the immediate, effective and unconditional launching of the so-called "cut-off" negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

43. On the unilateral level, France had renounced the development of several programmes and was reducing substantially its nuclear arsenal, as well as its expenditure on the military nuclear sector. It had, *inter alia*, entirely abandoned the ground-to-ground nuclear component and reduced the format of the airborne and marine components; it had accordingly limited its means of deterrent to two components and reduced the overall number of means of delivery by more than half. It had adapted the operational characteristics of its nuclear capability. With the dismantling of the ground-to-ground missiles on the Plateau d'Albion, no French military deterrent force was now targeted. The alert levels of its forces had been decreased on two occasions.

44. With regard to nuclear tests and the production of fissile material, radical and unprecedented measures had been taken: the Pacific test site and the Pierrelatte enrichment plants and Marcoule processing plants had been shut down irreversibly. France had dismantled its nuclear test centre and had been the first country to have decided and undertaken to dismantle its facilities for the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. It had also met the legitimate security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which it had, together with the other nuclear-weapon States, given a comprehensive, collective and concrete reply through Security Council resolution 984 (1995). In addition, more than 100 States benefited from the negative security assurances given by France under the protocols annexed to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. France had renewed the commitments it had made in those protocols in legally binding instruments.

45. France welcomed the ratification by the Russian Federation of the START II Treaty, the implementation of which would pave the way for the achievement of substantial reductions in the two greatest nuclear arsenals; that measure would also make it possible for bilateral negotiations to commence on START III, thereby contributing to the reduction of all nuclear weapons. France attached the greatest importance to the maintenance of strategic stability, of which the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems was an essential element. It was concerned that the Treaty should not be called into question in any way since that might upset the strategic balances and result in a resumption of the arms race.

46. There were some who might regard the outcom of multilateral efforts disappointing, but it should b remembered that it had been possible to negotiate an conclude the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treat within the deadline, barely one year after the 199 Conference, even though it was far from entering int force. The commencement of negotiations on a "cu off" treaty was still blocked in Geneva. It was up to th 2000 Conference to give a decisive impetus to thos negotiations. Those who would impede them had no given sufficient consideration to the contribution tha such a treaty would make to nuclear disarmament an non-proliferation, or perhaps they were fundamentall opposed to what should be the common objective progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

47. Delegations did not have the same appreciation o the progress that had been achieved. What appeared to some to be a considerable achievement within the space of a few years could seem insufficient to others in view of the scale of the challenge posed by the total elimination of nuclear weapons. While his delegation respected that difference in approach, it believed that it was important to arrive at a common assessment of the key elements of the results, or at least to bring the points of view closer together. It was above all by the ability to ensure the continuity of the dynamic in favour of nuclear disarmament imparted by the decisions taken in 1995 and to identify realistic goals that the participants in the Conference would be judged.

48. Some who had been disappointed at the slow progress wondered about the sincerity of the commitment to the process made by the nuclear-weapon States while others advocated new approaches which, in their view, would accelerate it. The uncertainty and instability which the world was currently experiencing and the inability to interpret it and its implications for disarmament were no stranger to those reflections. The new international context should certainly encourage realism, but that should in no way signify immobility. For its part, France had, through its actions, demonstrated its willingness to fulfil in good faith the commitments it had undertaken.

49. The common willingness to move forward should, more than ever, result in more importance being given to the effectiveness and solidity of the disarmament process than to short-lived declarations. The best way to proceed in that direction continued to be the full implementation of decision 2 adopted in

1995. Since the programme set out in that basic text was far from being implemented, it was important to do everything possible to ensure the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the commencement without further delay of effective negotiations on a treaty on fissile material.

50. The joint implementation of those two instruments was an essential element before a new hurdle in nuclear disarmament was tackled. One of the major challenges to the credibility of the international non-proliferation regime and the goal of disarmament was to ensure the universality of its constituent components; it was less a question of tending towards absolute mathematical universality than of embracing the initiatives of the potential actors in nuclear disarmament. It was essential to bring together other countries which, like India, Pakistan and Israel, had chosen to remain outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Because of the regional context in which they were involved, those States had important responsibilities: they had to demonstrate their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Only a constructive approach, going beyond the rhetoric of condemnation, would make it possible to take up that challenge.

51. France attached importance to the continuation, and if possible the intensification, of negotiations between the two main protagonists in the process of the overall reduction of arsenals and general and complete disarmament, namely the United States and the Russian Federation. For its part, it had always refused to engage in a competition with the other nuclear Powers and intended to pursue in the future with determination the policy of strict sufficiency which had always guided its actions.

52. It was important to be aware of the evolution in the demands of the international community and public opinion for greater transparency, dialogue and confidence. If those demands were increasingly taken into account, it would undoubtedly contribute significantly to the process of nuclear disarmament properly speaking.

53. **Mr. Vacek** (Czech Republic) said that his country associated itself with the statement made on behalf of the European Union. Without wishing to repeat the statements made in the general debate in plenary meeting, he thought that a number of points were worth developing in the Committee. A relevant, realistic and balanced approach was the only way to achieve progress. After having listened to the statements made by other speakers, his delegation believed that the alarmist comments were not entirely justified; the situation with regard to nuclear disarmament was somewhat eased and that should be taken into account in the work and results of the Conference.

54. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had been concluded since the previous Review Conference and it was currently being implemented technically. It was admittedly regrettable that Treaty had not yet entered into force for various reasons, including the nuclear explosions in South Asia, but it must be noted that encouraging progress had recently been achieved, for example in the form of further ratifications. His delegation, which provided the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee, hoped that the progress would continue and result in the implementation of the principles and objectives adopted by the previous Review Conference. It urged States whose signature was necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty to do what was required without delay.

55. There should be no increase in the number of conferences necessary for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The Conference held the previous autumn should be sufficient and one more conference was to take place in 2001 in order to maximize the effects. The Treaty should enter into force fairly soon, in any event before the next review conference. The Preparatory Committee, which would begin its work in Geneva in the next few days, should make it possible to take stock of developments in the situation and of the technical progress achieved. The next stage was to conclude the treaty governing relations between the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the United Nations. His delegation hoped that the difficulties which still persisted would be quickly overcome so that the agreement could be adopted and submitted to the General Assembly.

56. Many obstacles continued to paralyse the work of the Conference on Disarmament. The fact that negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material had not yet begun was a great disappointment and a major setback in the general context of the implementation of the principles and objectives of the Conference. The negotiation of such a treaty should be regarded as a priority and the Review Conference should provide an impetus in that

connection. He welcomed the fact that four nuclear-weapon States had decided to abide by a moratorium on the production of fissile material but regretted that others had not done likewise.

57. Participation in the Conference on Disarmament should be open to all States which wished to take part; the exclusiveness currently practised was not justifiable. The Czech Republic, which had the status of an observer, had still not obtained the status of a member. The principle of universality should be applied in that area.

58. With regard to article VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation, it was true that the deliberations had not developed in a particularly dynamic way. There were, however, grounds for cautious optimism in that, since the previous Conference, the START II Treaty had been ratified and the outlook was good for the START III negotiations to commence in a constructive atmosphere. Like the European Union, his delegation hoped that the negotiations would result in concrete and verifiable measures and in the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons through an appropriate contractual instrument.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

Main Committee I

Summary record of the 2nd meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 27 April 2000, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Reyes Rodríguez .... (Colombia)

Contents

General debate

Observations on Articles I and II and the first to third preambular paragraphs of the Treaty and on item 17 of the agenda of the Conference

The meeting was called to order at 3.05 p.m.

General debate

1. **The Chairman** said that there would be a general debate before beginning consideration of articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 of the Treaty.

2. **Mr. Pearson** (Chairman of Subsidiary Body I) said that, while his ideas on the Committee's work methods were evolving as he consulted with delegations, he believed that the Committee should not deviate from its mandate and should work on the basis of consensus and seek to achieve future-oriented results. In the short time available, delegations should refrain from making general statements and should come prepared to reach agreed results. It would also be unreasonable for delegations to state that they were unprepared to attempt to achieve a tangible result regarding article VI. In principle, the chair did not propose to submit a text, but would work on the basis of the documents which had already been or were about to be submitted. Any substantial contributions on the mandate of the Subsidiary Body submitted before the meeting on 3 May would be welcome.

3. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its core provisions in articles I, II and VI, which had been allocated to Main Committee I, remained valid. Articles I and II reflected a desire to avert nuclear war and the belief that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase that danger. By creating a political and legal barrier against nuclear weapons proliferation, the NPT had promoted security and facilitated the peaceful uses of the atom. The Treaty's success was nearly universal; only Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan remained outside the Treaty. That success had also contributed to the dramatic progress in nuclear disarmament since the end of the cold war. The United States would continue to work towards the removal of obstacles to universal adherence and to achieve the goals of Security Council resolution 1172 (1998). The international community had rallied strongly behind the NPT in the wake of the nuclear tests in South Asia in 1998, and had strongly endorsed the continued importance of the Treaty, affirming that all remaining non-parties might join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. Relations between the United States and India and Pakistan could not realize their full potential until differences on non-proliferation were narrowed.

4. The United States believed that compliance with articles I and II was essential and had established laws, policies and procedures to ensure scrupulous compliance with article I. Complete custody and control of its nuclear weapons were maintained, and a rigorous security system to protect against theft had been implemented. The Government had also implemented a comprehensive nuclear export control system to ensure that entities under United States jurisdiction did not provide assistance to non-nuclear-weapon States in the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The United States was satisfied that nearly all States parties to the NPT honoured their article II obligations, but remained concerned that some States parties did not take those obligations seriously. During the past decade there had been two serious breaches of the NPT by non-nuclear-weapon States, which had undermined regional and global security. The international community had responded firmly to those breaches, and the nuclear programmes of Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been constrained. In both cases, questions about compliance remained. Parties to the NPT must continue to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations with all the political, technical and financial support necessary to enforce compliance with the NPT.

5. With reference to article VI, he said the United States did not believe, as others had argued, that article VI was the price the nuclear-weapon States had to pay to prevent other States from acquiring nuclear weapons. The States parties to the NPT should make article VI work not because of altruism or a desire to be perceived as virtuous, but because they, like the United States, believed that the NPT and effective nuclear arms control measures enhanced international security. The United States would continue to pursue nuclear disarmament measures on a daily basis, not just every five years.

6. Since the end of the cold war, the United States had taken many steps to reduce nuclear forces and to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in international relations. Through the strategic arms reduction process, it had destroyed more than 940 heavy bombers and ballistic missile launchers, and was already below the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I final limit in that category. The reduction in the number of

bombers and submarines, and the destruction of ICBM silos, measures that precluded the reuse of those delivery systems, had also put them ahead of schedule in the category of deployed strategic warheads.

7. He welcomed the fact that both parliamentary chambers of the Russian Federation had recently approved the ratification of the START II treaty, as had the United States Senate in 1996. That would give added momentum to discussions on both START II and the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM), which had begun in June 1999 at the summit meeting between President Clinton and President Yeltsin in Cologne. The implementation of START III would reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads in both countries by about 80 per cent of peak cold war levels. Moreover, as agreed in Helsinki in March 1997, it would be desirable to work towards a treaty that expanded the scope of nuclear arms treaties to include, for the first time, measures related to the transparency of strategic nuclear-warhead inventories and their destruction. In 1999, the United States and the Russian Federation had begun discussion on START III which were ongoing at senior levels at regular intervals.

8. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States had reduced its arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons by 80 per cent and had denuclearized its army and air and surface Navy. Types of non-strategic weapons systems had been reduced from 13 to 2, one of which was not deployed. In addition, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had reduced the number of its nuclear weapons in Europe by more than 85 per cent and the types available from 11 to 1. As part of those reductions all NATO ground-launched substrategic forces, including nuclear artillery and surface-to-surface missiles, had been withdrawn to the United States and many had been dismantled. The only remaining United States nuclear weapons in Europe, air-delivered gravity bombs, had been reduced by well over 50 per cent. The United States had removed nuclear warheads from systems that were to be eliminated under START I, taken all remaining heavy bombers off alert and detargeted all long-range ballistic missiles. Although the deadline for reductions under START II was December 2007, the United States and the Russian Federation had agreed to deactivate by the end of 2003 all strategic systems that would be eliminated under the Treaty once it entered into force. The strategic nuclear delivery vehicles would be deactivated by removing their nuclear warheads or other jointly agreed steps. United States NATO nuclear weapons were no longer routinely deployed on aircraft, and the readiness of the aircraft that would carry them was measured in weeks and months rather than minutes.

9. The United States was not just removing warheads from the field but was also taking thousands of them apart, not only to fulfil a legal obligation under START I, but also because it believed that it was in the country's interest to do so. It was a vivid demonstration of their commitment to article VI. Since the end of the cold war, the United States had dismantled more than 13,000 warheads, a process which included the physical separation of the warhead's conventional high explosive from its fissile material. Over 3,000 of those weapons had been dismantled since the 1995 NPT Conference. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States had terminated, truncated or retired without replacement almost 20 nuclear systems. That self-imposed restraint applied to warhead designs, the production of fissile material for new weapons, and the launchers for those weapons. The United States had stopped nuclear testing and producing fissile material for nuclear weapons more than seven years earlier. They had not produced any new nuclear warheads during that period and had no requirements for the production of new types of warheads. All United States fissile-material production reactors, plutonium-separation and uranium-enrichment facilities had been permanently shut down, deactivated or scheduled for deactivation in the near future, or converted to non-weapons production use.

10. The United States was no longer developing or producing new land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In 1998, the United States had stopped producing Trident submarines, and no new types of ballistic missile submarines or submarine-launched ballistic missiles were under development. Further, the United States had decided the previous year that it would unilaterally remove four Trident submarines from its ballistic missile submarine fleet over the next few years, regardless of the status of START II, that would constitute a reduction of almost 800 deployed warheads. Expenditures for strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear forces personnel had been reduced by nearly two thirds since the end of the cold war. Not only were they reducing and dismantling nuclear weapons, but were also taking steps to ensure

that fissile material withdrawn from the military stockpile was never used in nuclear weapons. Since 1993, the United States had unilaterally declared approximately 226 metric tons of fissile material as surplus to defence needs and had committed to make that surplus fissile material available for IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable. The irreversibility of the withdrawal of fissile material implied verification against reuse, and ultimately, disposition to a form unusable in nuclear weapons. As a result of intensive work on the "trilateral initiative", launched in September 1996, the United States, the Russian Federation and IAEA were close to completing negotiations on a model legal agreement that would irreversibly remove fissile material from nuclear weapon programmes under IAEA verification. In addition, the United States had decided to place 90 tonnes of excess fissile material under IAEA safeguards. Of that total, 12 tonnes had been placed under safeguards and another 13 tonnes of high-enriched uranium had been made available for safeguards during a 1995 to 1998 downblending operation which included a successful IAEA verification experiment.

11. In 1993, the United States had signed an agreement to purchase 500 tonnes of high-enriched uranium from the Russian Federation to be downblended to low-enriched uranium over 20 years. To date, the United States had taken delivery of low-enriched uranium that had been downblended from over 80 tonnes of high-enriched uranium. In 1998 the United States and the Russian Federation had agreed to cooperate on the disposition of plutonium for weapons purposes withdrawn in stages from each side's nuclear military programmes and designated as no longer required for defence purposes. After a year of intense negotiations, the United States had nearly completed an agreement that would include mutual commitments regarding the plutonium to be disposed from each side. Once the agreement was in place, the two sides would proceed in parallel with the disposition of 34 tonnes each. That task would take many years of sustained international involvement to implement. In 1996 the United States had announced that it would eliminate its excess high-enriched uranium by blending the material to low-enriched uranium, thereby rendering it unusable in nuclear weapons. Thirteen tonnes had been downblended and another 50 tonnes had been targeted. After downblending, the low-enriched uranium may be used as fuel for commercial nuclear-power reactors. In 1997, the United States had announced a disposition strategy for excess United States plutonium which would be either burned up in nuclear reactors or immobilized in glass or ceramic.

12. The United States had already provided over $5 billion for many of the costs associated with nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union. Since 1995, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme had continued and expanded. To date, this programme had provided assistance in the elimination of about 1,000 ballistic missile launchers, missiles and bombers in the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Other programmes had been directed at securing some 650 tonnes of weapon-grade fissile material and peacefully employing former weapon scientists. As part of its efforts to prevent a nuclear war through an accident or miscalculation due to false missile warning, the United States and Russian Presidents had agreed to an initiative in 1998 to continuously exchange information on launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles and to consider establishing a joint centre for that purpose and a multilateral pre-launch notification regime. Both countries were well on their way to establishing a bilateral centre for the exchange of early-warning information and were working together towards fulfilment of the other goals set by the Presidents to reduce nuclear dangers.

13. The United States had taken steps in the area of legally binding security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. Since the previous Review and Extension Conference, the United States had signed the relevant protocols relating to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone. When combined with the Latin American Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, that raised the number of non-nuclear-weapon States eligible for legally binding negative security assurances to almost 100. Moreover, the United States continued to place great importance on its national declaration on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the NPT, as stated by President Clinton in 1995, except in the event that such a State invaded or attacked the United States, its territories, armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it had a security commitment.

14. Since 1995, the United States had also taken steps to reflect the changed strategic situation in its nuclear

policy. In 1996, President Clinton had pledged to the international community that his country would work towards the ultimate elimination of the roles and risks of nuclear weapons. In 1997, the United States had issued a new presidential directive establishing a dramatic reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in its defence policy. In 1999, NATO had published a new Strategic Concept, making it clear that it had dramatically reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons. Moreover, in light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons, NATO had undertaken a process to consider options for confidence-building and security measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control and disarmament.

15. Those positive steps, many of which had been accomplished since the 1995 Conference, demonstrated a positive trend. Nevertheless, there had been two significant disappointments: the lack of Senate consent for the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the lack of progress on a fissile material cut-off treaty. There was no doubt that the United States would ratify the CTBT and General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had been enlisted to address senators and build bipartisan support for eventual reconsideration of that issue. It was regrettable that the negotiations on the fissile material cut-off treaty had been interrupted. The United States would continue to work relentlessly towards the expeditious negotiation of a cut-off treaty, which constituted the next logical multilateral step in the nuclear disarmament process. With regard to the question of missile defences, he reiterated the observations made by the Secretary of State that the United States was not bent on sabotaging the ABM Treaty. The Treaty had been amended before and there was no good reason why it could not be amended again to reflect new realities.

16. Perhaps the most important challenge to the Conference was to chart the way forward, and much remained to be completed. The negotiation and conclusion of the fissile material cut-off treaty were long overdue. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had been negotiated, but the next goal was achieving its entry into force. Bringing START II into force remained a priority, and all delegations supported an early conclusion of START III. The United States could support many of the suggestions made on the new agenda because it was committed to the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons. It was also anxious for the negotiation of the trilateral initiative to be completed and for even larger quantities of excess fissile materials to be placed under IAEA supervision — a practical implementation of the principle of irreversibility in arms control.

17. The future agenda should be realistic as unrealistic expectations would undermine the very regime that they sought to strengthen. The United States was therefore opposed to the establishment of timebound frameworks for nuclear disarmament; the tested and effective approach of incremental steps should not be abandoned. Arms control needed to be placed within a firm context, and external events would affect the pace of negotiations regardless of the will to accelerate the process. Furthermore, proposals calling for the negotiation of global negative security assurances were not well founded since the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties already provided the possibility for legally binding negative security assurances to over 100 countries. Demating of all nuclear weapons could lead to instability and therefore could not be supported. The United States was ready to work collectively and to listen to all proposals and would clearly articulate its own perspective. Within its limits, it would be flexible in resolving the differences relating to the practical steps to achieve the shared ideal.

18. **Mr. Luck** (Australia) said that a fundamental aspect of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was the commitment made by the nuclear-weapon States to continue to pursue the goal of nuclear disarmament. That was central to preserving the vitality of the Treaty and remained a key Australian policy objective. The Conference should therefore send a strong message to the nuclear weapon States that the other States parties to the Treaty expected them to fulfil that commitment. While not underestimating the progress already made, he stressed that nuclear disarmament was a complex and incremental process.

19. The Russian Federation and the United States had eliminated nuclear weapons on a significant scale through the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process. The Russian Duma had recently approved ratification of START II and both countries should soon initiate the START III process, which would lead to further reductions. The United Kingdom and France had also significantly reduced their nuclear arsenals, and in 1992 the latter had permanently closed its test

sites. While the main onus for nuclear disarmament still lay with the United States and the Russian Federation, all countries must contribute to such efforts and there should be a multilateral debate on that issue at the Conference on Disarmament. The Review Conference should support the non-proliferation regime in the strongest terms, as an essential component of the nuclear disarmament process.

20. Australia and Japan had submitted a document (NPT/CONF.2000/WP.1) containing measures to strengthen the Treaty, taking as their point of departure the implementation of the 1995 "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament". The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) reinforced the non-proliferation regime, and he welcomed the moratorium on tests being observed by the nuclear-weapon States. The objective of the Treaty's universal ratification would soon be reached. The Review Conference must nevertheless urge all States which had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible, so that it could enter into force.

21. It was a matter of profound disappointment and regret that negotiations had still not begun on a fissile material cut-off treaty, which was a key element for implementing article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and for progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The Review Conference must urge all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to begin those negotiations and to conclude them preferably by 2003 or 2005 at the latest. In the meantime, it was to be hoped that China would join the moratorium on the production of fissile material announced by the other nuclear-weapon States.

22. The Review Conference must also address the issue of South Asian nuclear testing. Although actions by non-parties could not be seen as a failing of the Treaty itself, they did strike at the international norm against proliferation. He welcomed the efforts by the Indian Government to build a domestic consensus in favour of signing the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, but was concerned that little progress seemed to have been made by India and Pakistan in meeting other benchmarks set out in Security Council resolution 1172 (1998). The four States still outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan) must join as non-nuclear-weapon States and conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

23. The Review Conference must consider further measures to provide assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Proposals must however be practical and capable of achieving consensus. In that context, the creation of a new nuclear-weapon-free zone was an important vehicle for providing negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. He reiterated Australia's willingness to offer its support to any initiative in that area, and said that the Conference should strive for the speedy establishment of such new zones. Touching on the issue of transparency, he thanked the United States for the information provided to the Conference on Disarmament regarding the current state of nuclear disarmament and encouraged other nuclear-weapon States to share information on steps that they had taken or were contemplating taking to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and obviate the risk of nuclear-related accidents.

24. The ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons would be achieved at the end of a gradual process. The approach adopted must take into account strategic realities and allow for the constructive participation of nuclear-weapon States. It should not be forgotten, however that another positive aspect of the non-proliferation regime was the security benefit whereby non-nuclear-weapon States made a commitment to each other not to establish programmes to acquire such weapons.

25. **Mr. Suh Dae-won** (Republic of Korea) welcomed the achievements made in terms of accessions to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the successful completion of Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty negotiations, strengthened safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones. Nevertheless, grave challenges to the non-proliferation regime remained, which must be addressed urgently and with determination. Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998 had dealt a serious blow to non-proliferation efforts. The failure by the United States Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty had made its rapid entry into force unlikely. The deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament had stalled negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

26. The Non-Proliferation Treaty had achieved near universality and had been recognized as the international norm against nuclear proliferation. In order to achieve universality, the Conference must urge the four countries which had not already done so to

accede to it as soon as possible, not to transfer nuclear-weapons-related material, equipment or technology to other States and to put their facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system. It must also make it clear that those countries would not be granted any special status, whether de jure or de facto. Nuclear disarmament was not just an essential element of the non-proliferation regime, but was also a binding obligation for States parties to the NPT. In that regard, he commended the Russian Federation for having ratified the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and START II and hoped that those initiatives would provide momentum for further nuclear-arms reduction negotiations. He also encouraged the trilateral initiative by the United States, the Russian Federation and IAEA to put excess weapons materials under the Agency's supervision. It was time for nuclear-weapon States to redouble their efforts for nuclear disarmament in response to the call of the international community. His delegation supported the establishment of an ad hoc working group at the Conference on Disarmament to discuss that important issue, which was a legitimate concern of the international community.

27. Although it was commendable that the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty had been adopted, the number of ratifications did not bode well for its rapid entry into force. In that respect, he strongly supported the Final Declaration adopted at the first Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The Conference should update its objectives with a view to facilitating the Treaty's early entry into force. He welcomed the recent approval of the CTBT by the Duma of the Russian Federation and recalled that the Government of the Republic of Korea had signed the Treaty in September 1996 and ratified it in September 1999. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, it was essential that the five nuclear-weapon States maintained their moratorium on nuclear tests and that the three nuclear-capable States refrain from further tests.

28. The fissile material cut-off treaty was another important step towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It was regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament had thus far been unable to move forward negotiations in that area, and more creative ways must be found to ensure continuity in those efforts. Pending the entry into force of that Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States which had declared a moratorium on the production of fissile material must respect that commitment, which should be adopted by all nuclear-capable States. In conclusion, he reaffirmed his support for the Principles and Objectives adopted in 1995 and his willingness to participate in the preparation of a forward-looking document which would contain a concrete plan of action. That document would incorporate the unfulfilled tasks from the Principles and Objectives as well as updated expectations for 2000 and beyond. It was essential that States parties achieve consensus on a new course of action for the next five years.

29. **Mr. Hu Xiaoti** (China) said that the end of the cold war and détente in international relations had created the necessary conditions for making progress in nuclear weapons control and disarmament. The expectation had been created that progress towards the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons would continue. However, certain disquieting developments at the international level such as the use of force, the violation of national sovereignty or nuclear tests carried out in South Asia had taken place in recent years. The purpose of such activities was to achieve superiority and security at the expense of other countries. Such measures could only provoke widespread opposition on the part of the international community, since they undermined international security and were a step backwards in the nuclear disarmament process.

30. The issue of nuclear disarmament was of great concern. In order to ensure disarmament, all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty must make a determined effort to create an international climate of stability, cooperation and trust and guarantee that all countries enjoyed the benefits of international security. To that end, it was essential that States respect territorial sovereignty, that the use or threat of the use of force amongst countries be prohibited, that a new concept of security based on mutual trust and advantage, equality and cooperation be established, that military arsenals be dismantled and that collective security rather than the imposition of hegemony by one country over another, be sought. The cold war mentality, power games and the search for hegemony must be abandoned, and the policy and practice of nuclear proliferation must be eliminated. The State possessing the largest nuclear arsenal bore the responsibility to continue to drastically and irreversibly reduce that arsenal. The State that had deployed

nuclear weapons abroad must withdraw them. All nuclear-weapon States must pledge unconditionally not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use force or the threat of force against non-nuclear-weapon States or in nuclear-weapon-free zones and an international agreement to that effect should be concluded.

31. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was the basis for achieving a worldwide strategic balance and the fundamental condition for achieving disarmament. The development and deployment of anti-missile defence systems and space defence systems could affect that balance and stability or lead to a new arms race. States parties must firmly commit themselves to giving impetus to the work of the Conference on Disarmament in order to draft a general and balanced plan of work aimed at promoting the holding of negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in space, nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. All States parties, in particular nuclear-weapon States, must unequivocally commit themselves to achieving the general prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons with a view to eliminating nuclear weapons throughout the world and undertake to negotiate a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. His delegation would submit to the Committee a working paper detailing its proposals, in the hope that it would be included in the Committee's report.

32. **Ms. Martinic** (Argentina) said that the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty had been a wise decision since the latter was the foundation for the international non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament system. Work must continue to build on that foundation because the maintenance of international peace and security was an increasingly complex task; that fact must not, however, lead to paralysis but must serve as a stimulus. The issue of nuclear non-proliferation was a source of great concern for Argentina, which believed that it was essential that there should be no backward movement in that regard. After careful review, it seemed obvious that the expectations of non-nuclear-weapon States concerning the elimination of such weapons had not been met by the measures adopted in that regard, which was a source of frustration. The drafters of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 30 years before had lamented the horrendous invention which mankind had created but fully realized that expressions of regret alone could not change reality. That situation had not changed: although it was necessary to study the past, it was also necessary to decide what measures would facilitate progress towards the future. It was important to recall the lasting validity of the provisions of the Treaty and the need to carry out in good faith the commitments made. The nuclear-weapon States must continue reducing their arsenals in accordance with their obligation assumed under article VI, as well as the 1995 resolution and decisions.

33. She hoped that the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty would soon be concluded and expressed support for the working paper on nuclear disarmament submitted to the Review Conference by the delegations of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden. She also reiterated her delegation's commitment to the Treaty, which was the foundation for the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and to the aim of making every effort to ensure its universality and full implementation with a view to achieving the ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

34. **Mr. Gorita** (Romania) stressed that his delegation fully endorsed and shared the ideas presented by the representative of Portugal on behalf of the European Union and associated countries. The Non-Proliferation Treaty continued to be the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation of the disarmament process. That was why one of the essential objectives of the Review Conference was to achieve truly universal adherence to the Treaty. He welcomed the progress made towards the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons as well as the recent ratification of START II and the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty by the Duma of the Russian Federation. Although the United States Congress had not ratified that Treaty, he welcomed the Administration's commitment to abide by and implement its provisions.

35. He fully supported all initiatives aimed at promoting nuclear non-proliferation, an issue which was more important than ever, taking into account developments since the last Review Conference. Implementation of the agreement reached at the previous Conference with regard to the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and the fissile material cut-off treaty should be one of the most important priorities in

current efforts. The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty had been an essential step not only for strengthening the non-proliferation regime but also for the process aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons. Once it had entered into force, its impact would inevitably go far beyond the prohibition on testing and have a more meaningful and far-reaching effect on the promotion of international security. Romania had signed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty in September 1996, and it had been ratified by both chambers of its Parliament on 4 October 1999. In 1999, his country had signed a Facility agreement with the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organization for modernizing the Muntele Rosu station, which was included in the international monitoring system established by the Treaty. That agreement had already been approved by the Government of Romania and would soon be ratified by Parliament.

36. A material cut-off treaty should be the next step in the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation under way in multilateral forums. Despite the failure of numerous attempts to open negotiations on that issue at the Conference on Disarmament, efforts in that direction should continue. The international community should bear in mind that the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty was more important for nuclear disarmament than a declaration renouncing a nuclear-arms race. It was also important to realize that such a treaty would contribute important new positive elements to the relations between nuclear-weapon States and to international security. As an interim measure, any initiative taken in the spirit of the future treaty would contribute to reducing tensions and making consensus possible. In that context, he welcomed the initiatives of France and the United Kingdom, which had contributed significantly to promoting transparency with regard to national production and stockpiling of fissile material, as well as the efforts made by the United States and the Russian Federation to provide an accounting of their military nuclear material. In the same spirit, Romania had begun the conversion of its Triga research reactor to ordinary nuclear fuel rather than enriched uranium. Following the example of those unilateral initiatives, he appealed to the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be more flexible and to make it possible to restore the 1995 consensus on those issues and successfully conclude the Review Conference.

37. **Mr. Abdhullah Faiz** (Malaysia) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty represented the hopes and aspirations of many countries for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Thirty years after its entry into force in March 1970, 187 States were parties to the Treaty, more than to any other arms control treaty in history, although, regrettably, four States had not acceded to it. The events of the preceding five years had not been encouraging; since the legacy of the cold war continued and implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was still pending. It was of utmost importance to make systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating them under strict and effective international control. While the world clamoured for a cleaner environment, civil liberties, human rights and good governance, future generations had been bequeathed the most awesome and destructive weapons created by man.

38. The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty had been one of the most long-awaited instruments on nuclear disarmament and arms control. Despite its flaws, Malaysia had joined the overwhelming majority in supporting the adoption of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty by the General Assembly in 1996. He was however concerned that five years later the Treaty had still not entered into force, which had necessitated the convening of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty held in Vienna in 1999. Every effort must be exerted to ensure early ratification and thereby take a step towards nuclear disarmament. Malaysia had signed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty on 23 July 1998 and was proceeding towards ratification. The Malaysia Institute of Nuclear Technology Research (MINT) had been designated the national authority for implementing the Treaty. It would also host one of the radio nuclide monitoring stations in the Treaty's international monitoring system. He underscored the ratification by France, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty but expressed disappointment at the recent decision by the United States Senate not to ratify that Treaty, which had undermined several years of efforts by the international community to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. He welcomed the ratification of START II and eagerly awaited new negotiations on strategic arms reduction (START III) with the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Against that background, requests by the United States

to revise the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty had caused concern, since that could trigger a new arms race and even an arms race in outer space. There was widespread international consternation about the possible unravelling of years of painstaking efforts on a host of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation treaties.

39. The nuclear tests undertaken in May 1998 in South Asia had dealt a serious blow to nuclear disarmament efforts. Those tests should not be considered simply from the point of view of regional dynamics but in the overall context of global nuclear disarmament. They had been a wake-up call to which the nuclear-weapon States must respond appropriately or face dire consequences. The South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty had been signed by the heads of Government of the 10 countries in the region on 15 December 1995, seven months after the 1995 Conference. That Treaty had expressed the desire of all Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) members to free the region from the scourges of nuclear conflict and the nuclear-arms race. The Treaty had also been a declaration by the 10 signatory States of their commitment to the ultimate goal of the universal banning of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States must view that Treaty in its proper perspective, support its provisions and sign its Protocol. His delegation therefore welcomed the announcement by China that it would accede to the Protocol and encouraged the other four nuclear-weapon States to do likewise. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions would create further building blocks for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

40. The Conference on Disarmament had been rendered impotent by its failure to adopt a programme of work for the preceding three years. It must strive to set up a working group on nuclear disarmament. In 1999, five new members had been admitted, including Malaysia, after seven agonizing years of waiting. The Conference must make a clean break with the mindset of the past and make membership universal in order to benefit from the wealth of ideas of the broadest possible membership. To that end, the appeal made by the Czech Republic should be heeded.

41. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was at a critical juncture; nuclear disarmament was still a pipe dream. Although that situation could not be changed overnight, actions taken to date had not been convincing. The fears and concerns which had been expressed were real. The will and patience of the non-nuclear-weapon States were being severely tested and, inevitably and understandably, resentment and frustration were brewing among them. If the nuclear-weapon States persisted in following the path of self-destruction, their own non-proliferation objectives could be undermined. The Review Conference would provide parties with an opportunity to reaffirm their firm commitment to the Treaty and make any necessary corrections. At the first Review Conference of the new millennium responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of the strengthened review process agreed upon in 1995, members should seize the opportunity to renew with vigour and determination the objective of achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. There should be an objective assessment of progress made in the implementation of the Treaty and its commitments during the preceding five years. It was also essential to make concrete but realistic recommendations for actions to be taken in the coming five years towards full implementation of the Treaty. The Review Conference must succeed in strengthening and extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty, since any failure would contribute to an erosion of confidence in the regime.

Observations on articles I and II and the first to third preambular paragraphs of the Treaty and on item 17 of the agenda of the Conference

42. **Mr. Thamrin** (Indonesia) said that the members of the Non-Aligned Movement which were parties to the Treaty had endeavoured to make a substantial contribution to the preparatory process for the Review Conference as well as to the Conference itself. The working paper submitted by the Non-Aligned Movement several days before had set out the hopes and expectations of the Movement with regard to the results of the Conference, expressed its views on the issues dealt with in the Treaty, recommended ways to strengthen the review process and identified areas where nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation could be promoted.

43. The members of the Non-Aligned Movement which were parties to the Treaty agreed that strict observance of article I remained central to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the advances made in peace and security since the Treaty's entry into force. They reaffirmed their commitment to

full implementation of the provisions of article I and to refrain from sharing with or transferring to non-nuclear-weapon States or States that were not parties to the Treaty any information or materials which might be used for military purposes, under any security arrangement. Concerned by the possibility that certain States that were not parties to the Treaty could obtain materials, technology and knowledge which would allow them to develop nuclear weapons, the States parties called for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and of the provision of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to such States, without exception.

44. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment to fully implement the provisions of article II and to refrain from sharing with nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States and States that were not parties to the Treaty any information or materials which might be used for military purposes, under any security arrangement.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.

Main Committee I

Summary record of the 3rd meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 2 May 2000, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Reyes Rodríguez .... (Colombia)
later: Mr. Lint (Vice-Chairman) .... (Belgium)
later: Mr. Reyes Rodríguez (Chairman) .... (Colombia)

Contents

Exchange of views (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

Exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Mr. De Icaza** (Mexico), speaking on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden and Mexico, said that the proponents of the New Agenda Initiative had taken note of the joint statement issued the day before by the nuclear-weapon States, which fell short of their expectations regarding nuclear disarmament. The States concerned appreciated the nuclear-weapon States' forward-looking approach to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and their acknowledgement of their special responsibility and a key role in that regard; however, the total elimination of nuclear weapons was an obligation and a priority, not an ultimate goal, and it was still less a goal linked to, subject to or conditioned on general and complete disarmament. The proponents of the New Agenda Initiative reiterated their appeal to the five nuclear-weapon States to make an unequivocal commitment to achieving the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and, in the course of the forthcoming period 2000-2005, to engage in an accelerated negotiation process and take steps to implement nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). They also reaffirmed the importance of the specific measures they had proposed as provisional steps to be taken by the five nuclear-weapon States.

2. **Mr. Wibisono** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the non-aligned countries that were parties to the NPT, took note of the joint statement issued on 1 May 2000 by the five nuclear-weapon States, particularly its paragraph 5. The non-aligned States parties were concerned at the conditionalities established by the five nuclear Powers. In that connection, he referred to the non-aligned States parties' long-standing and principled positions on nuclear disarmament and related issues of nuclear non-proliferation and testing, reaffirmed by the Twelfth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Durban, South Africa, in 1998 and by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the non-aligned countries at their recent ministerial meeting, held in Cartagena, Colombia. He also referred to the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there existed an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control, and to the conclusion of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that nuclear weapons should be accorded priority in disarmament negotiations. In that context, the total elimination of nuclear weapons was an obligation and a priority and not an ultimate goal, and even less a goal that was linked to, subject to or conditioned on general and complete disarmament.

3. The non-aligned States parties therefore urged the nuclear-weapon States to comply unconditionally with their commitments regarding nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty and to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures to halt the nuclear arms race at an early date and to achieve nuclear disarmament. They called for the early commencement of negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament, and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time-frame, including a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.

4. **Mr. Pham Binh Minh** (Viet Nam) said that the lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was alarming. Some 35,000 nuclear warheads still existed; the planned national missile defence and theatre missile defence systems in the United States threatened to undermine the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty); and nuclear weapons were becoming increasingly important in certain military doctrines. Despite the recent ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) by the Russian Federation, the START bilateral process was at an impasse, and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was being delayed by the nuclear-weapon States, which were supposed to be setting an example for all the others.

5. A number of steps could be taken to promote nuclear disarmament in the coming five-year period. First, further progress must be made towards universality of the NPT. Second, nuclear-weapon States must be requested to redouble their disarmament efforts and to take interim measures to reduce nuclear risks, such as the de-alerting of nuclear weapons, the removal of nuclear warheads from their delivery systems, the conclusion of joint agreements on the no-

first-use of nuclear weapons, greater transparency with regard to fissile material and the conclusion of legally binding internationally instruments to that effect. Third, nuclear-weapon-free zones must continue to be established and strengthened and, fourth, the Conference on Disarmament must commence without delay negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Fifth, the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty, particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes must be reaffirmed and the technical cooperation programme of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to that end should be strengthened. Particularly vital in that connection was the application of nuclear technology in the fields of agriculture, hydrology, medicine and the environment.

6. His delegation welcomed the bilateral process under way between the Russian Federation and the United States of America and the unilateral efforts of the United Kingdom and France but believed that multilateral action was also needed. It therefore supported proposals to establish an ad hoc working group in the Conference on Disarmament in order to exchange information and facilitate nuclear disarmament efforts. In that connection, Viet Nam supported the working paper on nuclear disarmament introduced by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NPT/CONF.2000/18) and the measures outlined in the New Agenda Initiative's working paper on nuclear disarmament (NPT/CONF.2000/WP.3).

7. **Mr. Westdal** (Canada) stressed that the 1995 extension of the NPT in no way guaranteed any State party's right to possess nuclear weapons indefinitely but rather reaffirmed the obligations to eliminate them. Fifty years earlier Canada had renounced the option of developing nuclear weapons, although it had had the capability to do so. Noting that the nuclear testing in India and Pakistan in May 1998 had seriously hampered disarmament efforts, he reaffirmed his delegation's support for Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) and urged all States parties to promote its implementation. His delegation also urged all States parties to call upon India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba to accede to the Treaty and to appeal to all States which had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) without further delay and without conditions. Referring to the working paper submitted by Canada to the Preparatory Committee in 1999 (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/10) he said that the pursuit of disarmament negotiations under article VI was not conditional on negotiating a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

8. Canada had fully supported the bilateral START process between the United States and the Russian Federation and welcomed the ratification of START II by the Russian State Duma. It encouraged the accelerated negotiation of START III and the integration of China, France and the United Kingdom into an expanded START process. It also called for full accountability and transparency in the nuclear-warhead inventories, including tactical weapons, of all five nuclear-weapon States. In the interim, appropriate safety measures must be implemented by reducing numerical and alert levels. The Conference on Disarmament should establish a practical mechanism for the exchange of information with a view to achieving further progress in nuclear disarmament through national, bilateral and multilateral initiatives. He stressed the importance of maintaining the 1972 ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability and of establishing a mechanism in the Conference on Disarmament to address outer space issues, particularly non-weaponization. Canada was also working hard with other countries to develop new confidence-and-norm-building measures to supplement the work of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Having signed the CTBT in 1996 and ratified it in 1998, Canada considered it to be provisionally in force and invited other States parties to that Treaty to do likewise.

9. His delegation, which had first proposed a prohibition on the further production of weapon-usable fissile material in 1979, called for the early conclusion within the Conference on Disarmament of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Parallel to those negotiations, appropriate non-proliferation and disarmament measures should be taken, including the identification of existing stocks of weapon-usable fissile materials and, within the framework of the current Review Conference, the declaration of a moratorium on their further production by all five nuclear-weapon States. His delegation

would be circulating proposals for a programme of action to strengthen and update the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

10. His delegation accorded high priority to the strengthened review process agreed in 1995, which should address what States parties were accountable for and how that accountability was to be exercised. The current Review Conference should consider those questions under agenda item 17. His delegation was circulating proposals for the further strengthening of the review process. For example, it believed that, at each session, the Preparatory Committee should consider and report publicly on key issues pertaining to the functioning and implementation of Treaty provisions, perhaps on an article-by-article basis, and summarize its deliberations for future sessions and review conferences. The Preparatory Committee and review conferences should also strive for greater transparency, including increased access and participation by non-governmental organizations, and enhanced media coverage.

11. **Mr. Al-Hariri** (Syrian Arab Republic) noted that the universality of the Treaty required the accession of the remaining States not parties to it, particularly those possessing nuclear facilities, and their conclusion of safeguards agreements with IAEA. It also required that the nuclear-weapon States should provide effective security assurances so that the interests of some States were not served at the expense of others. That called for a balance between the rights and obligations of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, there must be no nuclear cooperation with any State not a party to the Treaty, particularly a State which ignored international legitimacy and used such cooperation to develop its nuclear-weapon capability. Double standards must also be avoided in the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The fact that Israel possessed nuclear technology and nuclear weapons but was not a party to the Treaty cast doubt on the credibility of the Treaty and the future of non-proliferation. Consequently, it was the responsibility of the Conference to review the international control and transfer of nuclear technology and to ensure that it was non-discriminatory.

12. The progress made by the nuclear-weapon States so far was quite disappointing. Their recent joint statement gave the impression that they believed they had achieved all they wanted with the extension of the Treaty in 1995, and that their obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons carried no specific time limit.

13. Accordingly, the Conference should strongly urge all nuclear-weapon States to implement article VI of the Treaty by taking steps to rid themselves of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, under strict international control; create an effective mechanism to accelerate nuclear disarmament and thereby defuse tension in critical regions of the world; and call on the nuclear-weapon States to exercise complete transparency by declaring their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, with emphasis on their physical protection and the prevention of illegitimate transfers.

14. His delegation believed that the Treaty had not provided reliable security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties, since the assurances contained therein were conditional, discriminatory and non-binding. In the Middle East, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties had the legitimate right to effective security assurances against the Israeli nuclear threat. Furthermore, the nuclear-weapon States were required under the Treaty to pursue negotiations on a legally binding instrument that would provide comprehensive and unconditional guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States under effective international control.

15. Such an instrument should embody a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States; should set forth the right of the non-nuclear-weapon States to guarantees that would be negotiated within a specific committee; and should contain explicit pledges by the nuclear-weapon States to achieve complete nuclear disarmament within a specific time-frame.

16. **Ms. Aboulnaga** (Egypt) emphasized the need to respect articles I and II of the Treaty without exception. The majority of States parties had concluded the Treaty on the understanding that both regional and global measures would be taken to prevent the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet despite certain achievements in the past few years, such as the conclusion of the CTBT and the recent decision by the Russian Federation to ratify the CTBT and START II, the dangers of nuclear proliferation remained critical. The objectives of non-proliferation and universality of the Treaty had not been achieved; nuclear proliferation

had not been prevented in South Asia; and the refusal of the United States Senate to ratify the CTBT undermined that instrument.

17. There was a lack of political will among the five nuclear-weapon States to embark on multilateral negotiations leading to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. They must heed the millions of voices crying out for an end to the nuclear threat; and they must heed the 1996 unanimous advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice confirming the obligation to pursue negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament under international control. In the context of universality, she emphasized the difference between non-adherence, used in the sense of non-accession, and non-compliance with the Treaty. Non-compliance was the responsibility of Main Committee I in the context of articles I and II of the Treaty, and the monitoring of compliance had been placed under the mandate of IAEA.

18. Egypt, after having signed the Treaty in 1968, had done its utmost to spare Africa from the nuclear threat, and in 1974 had proposed the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Since then, it had put forward numerous proposals for ridding the region and the world of weapons of mass destruction, and had continued to play an active role in many international forums to that end.

19. In that context, Egypt called on the Conference to evaluate the fulfilment by States parties — especially the five nuclear-weapon States — of their commitments under the Treaty and also those undertaken at the 1995 Conference. Furthermore, Egypt called for multilateral negotiations among States — including the nuclear-weapon States — to be held in parallel with other bilateral and multilateral efforts to reduce nuclear weapons.

20. The statement made on behalf of the five nuclear-weapon States at the current Conference did not fully meet the expectations of the other States parties. While it reaffirmed their commitment to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, it was silent about the only State in the region which possessed nuclear weapons — Israel — but mentioned Pakistan and India. The statement also ignored the possibility of negotiations on a multilateral treaty with binding legal force that would provide security assurances that there would be no threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The assurances provided for in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) did not respond to concerns about the possibility of a nuclear threat, since they were not legally binding, were predicated upon certain conditions and could be modified in the future.

21. **Mr. Zabaluyev** (Russian Federation), noting that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was one of the cornerstones of the international non-proliferation regime, said that his Government was taking various measures under article VI of the Treaty. It believed that a gradual, systematic and well-financed approach was needed, involving all the nuclear Powers.

22. Russia's nuclear disarmament process comprised measures under its bilateral treaties with the United States and unilateral initiatives. In the bilateral sphere, under the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, two classes of land-based missiles had been eliminated and their production and testing halted. Under the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons (START I), Russia had, *inter alia*, eliminated some 950 missile launchers, 2,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and 80 heavy bombers. As a result the number of deployed nuclear warheads had been reduced to considerably below the level stipulated by START I. By the end of 2001, the United States and Russia's strategic nuclear forces would have been reduced by roughly 40 per cent.

23. His Government had ratified START II in April 2000. Under that Treaty, which provided, *inter alia*, for the elimination of ICBMs with multiple warheads, the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers would be reduced to between 3,000 and 3,500.

24. In that connection, his delegation emphasized that the 1972 ABM Treaty was crucial to both the START treaty process and to global strategic stability. Further reductions under the START process should be closely linked to the preservation of the ABM Treaty, the collapse of which would undermine the entire edifice of disarmament treaties built up over the years and, in particular, jeopardize the stability of the various non-proliferation regimes. His Government believed that the problem of missile threats could be solved without destroying the ABM Treaty. It had proposed the creation of a global system for monitoring the non-

proliferation of missiles and missile technology, and an international meeting of experts had recently been held in Moscow on that subject. The gradual establishment of such a system on a non-discriminatory basis would play a major role in strengthening global strategic stability.

25. With regard to tactical nuclear weapons, his country was implementing a number of unilateral initiatives, which included the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from ships, submarines and land-based naval aircraft, and their centralized storage; the elimination of a third of all nuclear ammunition for sea-based tactical missiles; the elimination of nuclear warheads for tactical weapons, and nuclear mines; and the elimination of half the country's nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and half its aircraft-carried nuclear bombs.

26. His Government had removed the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union from the territories of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, thereby enabling them to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. As a result, Russia no longer deployed nuclear weapons beyond its own borders, and it called on other nuclear Powers to follow its example.

27. His Government was downsizing Russia's nuclear sector as part of its nuclear disarmament efforts. Two of Russia's four defence-industry factories were being closed down and, under a joint United States-Russian programme, 10 of its 13 plutonium-producing reactors had been shut down and the production of uranium for nuclear weapons had been halted. The number of defence-industry workers had been drastically reduced and the International Scientific and Technological Centre set up to convert defence-related scientific know-how to peaceful uses was continuing its retraining activities and its support for civilian projects.

28. In October 1991, Russia had imposed a moratorium on nuclear testing. On 21 April 2000, the State Duma had ratified the CTBT. In order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, it was necessary to ensure the accession to the CTBT of all States with a nuclear potential and whose decision on ratification was important for the Treaty's entry into force.

29. Another significant non-proliferation measure would be the early convening of the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. It was important to ensure the safe disposition of weapon-origin fissile material and its conversion to spent fuel or other non-weapon-usable forms. In October 1997, his Government had informed the General Conference of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that it would be gradually withdrawing from its nuclear weapon programmes some 500 tonnes of high-enriched uranium and 50 tonnes of plutonium. A major programme for the conversion of high-enriched weapon-origin uranium to low-enriched reactor fuel was under way. The problem of the disposition of weapon-origin plutonium was being tackled in the context of Russia's national nuclear power development strategy, where its use as rapid reactor fuel was being considered.

30. Russia was involved in joint research initiatives with the United States, France and Germany on the use of uranium/plutonium fuel in Russian reactors, and Russian and United States scientists were working on the development of an experimental reactor fuel, produced from weapon-origin plutonium, for use in Canadian reactors. Lastly, under a trilateral initiative with the United States and IAEA, weapon-origin fissile material removed from weapons programmes was to be placed under international control.

31. *Mr. Lint (Belgium), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

32. **Mr. Mya Than** (Myanmar) said that the 2000 Review Conference was taking place at a time when prospects for arms control and disarmament were not encouraging, a situation reflected in the inability of the Preparatory Committee to put forward substantive recommendations to the Conference. Nevertheless, the recent decisions by the Russian Federation to ratify START II and CTBT could provide fresh impetus to the deliberations. His delegation believed that moderate tangible results were within reach, provided that all States parties showed flexibility and realism. The Conference had made a good start by establishing two subsidiary bodies to undertake substantive work.

33. Although it was too soon to predict the final outcome of the Conference, the minimum his delegation expected was a set of principles and objectives. Insofar as principles were concerned, the Conference could simply reaffirm those set forth in Decision 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The objectives adopted must be relevant to

the present situation and the new century. His delegation would like to suggest some elements that might be included in the final product.

34. In order to strengthen the review process, the practice of establishing subsidiary bodies to work on important issues should be carried forward. Interim measures to reduce nuclear danger should include reviewing and adapting nuclear policies, de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons, and de-alerting and de-activating nuclear weapons.

35. With respect to nuclear disarmament, the full implementation of article VI would require: the early entry into force of the CTBT and a continued moratorium on nuclear test explosions; the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a universal, non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein, and a moratorium on such production pending the entry into force of the convention; the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to carry out further deep reductions of nuclear weapons with a view to the total elimination of nuclear weapons; the commencement of multilateral negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States in that regard at an appropriate stage; and the establishment of an ad hoc committee by the Conference on Disarmament to address the issue of nuclear disarmament.

36. With regard to security assurances, the States parties should agree on the need to conclude an internationally legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. On the subject of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Conference should urge: expeditious completion of consultations on an amendment to the Protocol of the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), early accession by the nuclear-weapon States thereto and entry into force of the Protocol; formal recognition and observance of the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia; and early completion of negotiations on establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

37. In addition to principles and objectives, his delegation felt that the Conference should adopt decisions on such important subjects as nuclear disarmament and security assurances and a resolution on the Middle East.

38. **Mr. Friedrich** (Switzerland) said that the mandate of Main Committee I included a review of the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and the programme of action on nuclear disarmament reflected in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Nuclear disarmament was clearly far from complete, and progress in the last five years had been modest. The question before the Committee was how to revitalize the nuclear disarmament process.

39. His delegation welcomed the reaffirmation by the five nuclear-weapon States, in their common statement at the 10th plenary meeting of the Conference, of their commitment to the Principles and Objectives. It was reassuring to learn that none of their nuclear weapons were targeted at any State. It was also encouraging to learn that they were committed to preserving the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and a basis for further reductions and had reaffirmed the necessity of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and the adoption of a programme of work for the Conference on Disarmament. Those new undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States should be incorporated into an action plan setting forth supplementary practical measures for implementing the 1995 Principles and Objectives and article VI of the Treaty.

40. His delegation would like to submit for the Committee's consideration a working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.3) with suggested elements for such an action plan to be adopted by the Conference. Given the size of their nuclear forces, the United States of America and the Russian Federation had a special responsibility to step up their efforts to reduce their strategic offensive nuclear weapons under the START process. All States parties to the NPT should be systematically informed of the progress in nuclear disarmament and the changes in nuclear arsenals. Moreover, no reduction in nuclear weapons could be considered complete until all the fissile material in the warheads was irreversibly converted and placed under IAEA safeguards. His delegation deplored the lack of commitment and transparency displayed by some nuclear-weapon States. Tactical

(sub-strategic) weapons were another area of concern and should be included in formal disarmament processes.

41. With regard to other multilateral disarmament efforts, all parties with nuclear potential should observe a moratorium on nuclear testing pending the entry into force of the CTBT. Similarly, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for military purposes should be observed until a convention on the matter could be concluded. Efforts in the area of legally binding security assurances should be intensified and extended to non-nuclear-weapon States outside nuclear-weapon-free zones.

42. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America) said that his delegation wished to submit two working papers to be issued as Conference documents with suggestions for elements of the Committee's final report. One paper concerned the Committee's "backward look", or review of the implementation of article VI; the other concerned its "forward look" at means of implementing articles I and II in the areas of universality and non-proliferation. Many of the other working papers submitted had proposals his delegation could work with. In addition, the common statement introduced by France on behalf of the five nuclear-weapon States in the 10th plenary meeting contained elements that could be useful in drafting.

43. *Mr. Reyes Rodriguez (Colombia) resumed the Chair.*

44. **Ms. Mendes** (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that the European Union would be submitting a working paper, which it hoped would be useful for the work of the Committee.

45. **Mr. Shi Zhongjun** (China), introducing working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.2, said that his delegation had put forward proposals which it hoped would find a place in the Committee's report and the final document to emerge from the Conference. In that paper, it reaffirmed its belief in the need for the complete prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons and urged all the nuclear-weapon States parties to commit themselves to that goal and to negotiate and conclude a convention to that effect. It also urged the nuclear-weapon States to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons. Other key proposals concerned the CTBT, the ABM Treaty, prevention of an arms race in outer space, a programme of work for the Conference on Disarmament and negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

46. **Mr. Kim Myong-jin** (Republic of Korea) said that, despite some achievements in disarmament, the non-proliferation regime faced grave challenges from, among other things, the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan and the delayed entry into force of the CTBT. All States parties must fulfil their treaty obligations.

47. The nuclear-weapon States should remember that disarmament was not only a prerequisite for non-proliferation but a binding obligation under the Treaty, and it was high time that they stepped up their disarmament efforts. In that regard, his delegation commended the Russian Federation for its decision to ratify START II and the CTBT and hoped that the action would revive the momentum of nuclear weapons reduction talks. While his delegation supported the step-by-step approach to disarmament, it shared the view that the international community had legitimate concerns and should be kept informed and exchange views on the issue. To that end, his delegation supported proposals for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

48. His delegation wished to reaffirm its strong support for the Principles and Objectives adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The basic direction taken at that time was still valid. Part of the Committee's task would be to assess implementation of the Principles and Objectives.

49. **The Chairman** said that he would soon be introducing a Chairman's working paper and welcomed suggestions in that regard.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.

Main Committee I

Summary record of the 4th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 4 May 2000, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Reyes Rodriguez .... (Colombia)

Contents

Exchange of views (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 3.45 p.m.

Exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Acqua** (Italy), speaking also on behalf of Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Norway, drew attention to working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7, which was intended to complement the European common position in NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.5. The working paper contained, *inter alia*, an additional proposal on negative security assurances (para. 7) for inclusion in the forward-looking part of the Final Report.

2. **Mr. Soutar** (United Kingdom) said that the Conference should, indeed, focus on efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally and on progress made thus far. However, thought should also be given to the second part of paragraph 4, sub-paragraph (c) of the 1995 Principles and Objectives, namely on the elimination of those weapons, as well as general and complete disarmament under international control. His delegation had submitted working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.6 with a view to stimulating wider debate and helping to identify the necessary steps towards a common goal. It did not contain language for inclusion in the Final Document, nor did it seek to propose a timetable.

3. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) asked whether the Conference would be considering some of the more substantive proposals on security assurances, an issue deemed very important by many delegations. South Africa had submitted a working paper on a draft protocol to the Treaty (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/9), and Nigeria had proposed that a mechanism should be established under Main Committee II to deal with security assurances.

4. **Mr. Than** (Myanmar) said that the issue was of great importance to many delegations. The proposals contained in working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7, *inter alia*, were most interesting. His own delegation's proposals on security assurances had been submitted in document NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/18. Sufficient time must be allocated to ensure progress on the issue over the coming week.

5. **The Chairman** confirmed that the necessary time would be allocated to the issue and that the organization of the Committee's work would remain flexible. He suggested that the meeting should be suspended pending distribution of the Chairman's working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5).

6. *It was so decided.*

The meeting was suspended at 4 p.m. and resumed at 4.25 p.m.

7. **The Chairman** said that his working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5) took account of deliberations in Main Committee I and in the Preparatory Committee. It represented a "first effort" to approach issues within the Committee's mandate and was intended to be balanced and objective. He suggested that the meeting should be suspended to enable delegations to review its contents.

8. *It was so decided.*

The meeting was suspended at 4.30 p.m. and resumed at 5.05 p.m.

9. **The Chairman** invited delegations to comment on the working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5).

10. **Mr. Icaza** (Mexico) said that the working paper would greatly assist the Committee's work. While his delegation was not yet in a position to offer detailed comments, it felt that certain elements were lacking. The paper gave the impression that delegations were satisfied with the existing state of affairs and failed to reflect concerns raised both in the Committee and general debate. Nor did the working paper appear sufficiently impartial and objective.

11. As Mexico had pointed out, the nuclear-weapons States had failed to make systematic or progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons in the period under review, and no multilateral instruments had entered into force in the area of nuclear disarmament. Moreover, the international non-proliferation regime was at a delicate stage and the Treaty was "under pressure". The working paper failed to reflect those, as well as other, concerns and anxieties expressed by delegations, including the need for compliance with article 6 of the Treaty. The paper also omitted the concerns raised by the Secretary-General in his statement to the Conference. Mexico, therefore, reserved the right to propose amendments.

12. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that the working paper did appear to reflect the deliberations of the Committee. His delegation, therefore, wished to propose several amendments. The first part of the last sentence of paragraph 1 in section A should be

amended to read: "The Conference remains convinced that universal adherence to the Treaty and full compliance of all States with its provisions are the best way (...)". Paragraphs 3 and 4 related to articles I and II of the Treaty. In order to reflect both with the text and spirit of the Treaty, an additional paragraph should be added to the effect that: "The Conference calls upon nuclear-weapon States, within the framework of this Treaty and throughout the world, not to cooperate technically with any State not party to the Treaty". In the last sentence of paragraph 10, the word "yet" should be inserted before the words "taken place", in order to allow for the possibility that the signing might still take place. In paragraph 11, the word "clearly" should be replaced by the word "unambiguously". At the end of that paragraph, the following sentence should be added: "None of those States can claim, de facto or *de jure*, the status of nuclear-weapon States".

13. Section B related to the Principles and Objectives of the 1995 Conference. In paragraph 1, the word "explosions" should be replaced by the word "tests". The section should also include a reference to the importance of a declaration by the nuclear-weapon States that they would eliminate nuclear weapons in the world within a specific period of time. References to an "early date" or "long-term objective" might result in no progress for 30 years. Transparency and predictability were essential. Vague or ambiguous drafting would lead only to a confidence crisis of the kind experienced by the Conference on Disarmament.

14. He recalled that, in August 1996, 28 States had submitted a programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons in stages by 2020. If the nuclear-weapon States could not accept that programme, they could propose an alternative one as a basis for negotiations. In section B of the working paper, therefore, there should be a reference to the objective of nuclear disarmament, which was supported by the international community and had the backing of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.

15. It must be made clear that the Ad Hoc Committee which had been set up in 1998 could not be re-established to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile materials. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference had called for negotiations on such a treaty, but so far no negotiations had taken place. There was no doubt that all members of the Conference on Disarmament would consider that such a treaty should prohibit not only the production but also the stockpiling of fissile materials, so as to promote disarmament. Those elements must be reflected in the working paper.

16. On the question of security assurances, although the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament dealt with that issue, and referred to a possible internationally legally binding instrument, there was no reference to that in the working paper. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States were not enough. Efforts had been made to negotiate a treaty, but the work had come to a stop because the nuclear-weapon States had objected, even though they had agreed to the Principles and Objectives without a vote. Security assurances could only become a reality when nuclear weapons were eliminated; there would then be no need for a treaty. However, as long as States had nuclear weapons, there was a need for multilateral, binding security assurances. The declarations made in 1995 were unilateral and were not legally binding. Furthermore, as circumstances changed, they could change or be withdrawn. Lastly, his delegation felt that the proposed preambular paragraph was repetitive and stated the obvious.

17. **The Chairman** said that, as the Committee was aware, Subsidiary Body 1 would take up article VI of the Treaty. Some of the points made by the representative of Egypt concerning security assurances were covered in section C of the working paper.

18. **Mr. Thamrin** (Indonesia) said that his delegation would make substantive comments on the working paper at a later stage. It agreed that what was needed was a balanced document, reflecting the opinions and positions of the political groupings concerned.

19. **Mr. Soutar** (United Kingdom) said that his delegation felt that the Chairman had made a genuine effort to encapsulate the many, widely differing views which had been expressed in the debate and had produced a document which seemed likely to offer a basis for building consensus. At the same time, his delegation had difficulty with some parts of the working paper and reserved the right to make alternative suggestions.

20. **Mr. de La Fortelle** (France) said that the working paper had some positive points and others which posed problems for his delegation. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of section B took a positive view of past

developments, although there could be a more detailed list of the measures taken by France and other nuclear-weapon States. In paragraph 2 of section A, the words "in the context of" and "corresponding" did not reflect the balance achieved in the Treaty, in which every word counted. The content of paragraphs 9-11 should be dealt with elsewhere, probably within the ambit of Main Committee II. Referring to paragraph 4 of section B, he said that it was not clear whether a non-binding text like an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice should be mentioned in the working paper.

21. With regard to section C, paragraph 1 seemed to digress from the topic, since it consisted of a very general statement about the Charter of the United Nations, and probably was not needed. Referring to paragraph 2, he said that his delegation could not agree that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only genuine guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and could not accept the reference to a legally binding negative security assurances regime. His Government's position was that work on negative security assurances was being carried out mainly within the nuclear-weapon-free zones. Over 100 countries were covered by such zones, in which there would be negative security assurances that were fully legally binding. It was very important to continue that work. Lastly, his delegation could not agree to paragraph 4 of section C, which was contrary to its nuclear doctrine.

22. **Mr. Hu Xiaodi** (China) said that the comments by the representative of Mexico were relevant: the working paper failed to refer to an important issue, namely the problems and obstacles encountered over the past five years. For example, there was no mention of the need to preserve the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. His delegation would produce its own working paper, covering that issue and others.

23. On the whole, the Chairman's working paper was quite balanced, although there were some specific issues which needed to be raised. For example, in paragraph 5 of section B, the Conference would express regret that the Conference on Disarmament had not started negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, although, as everyone was aware, the General Assembly and the international community had also requested the Conference on Disarmament to carry out work on other important issues, such as nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms build-up in outer space, and it had not started negotiations on them either. His delegation would make comments about the specific wording of the working paper at a later stage. For example, paragraph 9 of section A should follow the wording of Security Council resolution 1172 (1998), which referred to the nuclear tests conducted by India and then Pakistan.

24. **Mr. Amorim** (Brazil) said that, although his first reaction to the Chairman's working paper had been similar to that of the representative of Mexico, he had then started to see more merit in the paper. Some points that were highlighted in a critical way were ones that his delegation regarded as positive; that applied especially to section C. Brazil supported the comments of the representative of Mexico on section B; its view of the situation was not as positive as the one presented there. He also felt that some of the facts that were welcomed should be noted, and vice versa: for example, the Committee should welcome the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.

25. Lastly, his delegation supported the appeal to India and Pakistan in the third sentence of paragraph 9 in section A, but felt that it was incomplete, since the Committee should call on all parties to the Treaty to act in such a way that did not undermine the fulfilment of the objectives of the Treaty and Security Council resolution 1172 (1998).

26. **Mr. Noboru** (Japan) said that his delegation would make comments on the working paper at a later stage. The paper was well-balanced and was a good basis for further consideration of the issue. It therefore urged all delegations to approach it with a constructive and flexible attitude.

27. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) said that the working paper was incomplete because of the work that was being done elsewhere, especially that by the New Zealand delegation on forward-looking elements, which would be an integral part of any outcome of the Committee's work. He agreed with the representative of Mexico that some elements were absent and should be included. Since the Committee was reviewing the entire period since the previous Conference, it needed to give a full historical perspective, covering all important developments. His delegation supported the observations made by the representative of Brazil; some of the negative comments made about certain

elements had reaffirmed his delegation's positive view of those elements. His delegation reserved its position on some aspects of the text.

28. **The Chairman** said that it was very important to bear in mind that the Committee had established Subsidiary Body 1 to consider practical steps for the implementation of article VI of the Treaty.

29. **Mr. Al-Berkdar** (Iraq) said that paragraph 8 of section A was vague and could easily be misunderstood. Clearer language must be used, since it was apparent that there had been cases of non-compliance with the Treaty during the period since 1995; otherwise, the paragraph should be deleted.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.

Main Committee I

Summary record of the 5th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 5 May 2000, at 10.50 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Reyes Rodriguez .... (Colombia)

Contents

Exchange of views (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

Exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Friedrich** (Switzerland) said that the long-standing demand by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) for legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was justified and legitimate. That view had been reaffirmed by both the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion of 8 July 1996, and the Security Council, in its resolution 984 (1995). While nuclear-weapon States had given several types of negative security assurances to non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty, efforts to reach agreement on comprehensive legally binding positive and negative security assurances should be intensified, because existing legally binding security assurances did not apply to all the States parties to the NPT. Moreover, his delegation had some doubts as to the effective scope of unilateral declarations. Indeed, it was well known that certain nuclear-weapon States felt that their security assurances were not unconditional. For example, the violation of the Treaty by a non-nuclear-weapon State or the possession of chemical or biological weapons capabilities had been cited as circumstances that warranted the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State. Such reservations were unacceptable. A universal agreement on legally binding security assurances was also urgent because no arrangements had been made for the implementation of positive security assurances. Indeed, positive assurances were a direct result of negative assurances and threatened the latter. By preparing concrete measures to achieve positive security assurances, the nuclear Powers would confirm just how sincere and committed they were in that regard. Positive guarantees should be implemented at the global level within the framework of an international agreement. Such an agreement would complement and strengthen existing negative assurances.

2. **Ms. Laohaphan** (Thailand) said that the true guarantee for all non-nuclear-weapon States against nuclear danger lay in the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of that goal, nuclear-weapon States must firmly guarantee not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Therefore, she fully subscribed to the proposal for an international negative-security-assurances regime which would be legally binding, would be honoured by all nuclear-weapon States and would cover all non-nuclear-weapon States as an interim measure. The conclusion of such a security arrangement was of vital importance as a confidence-building measure for the non-nuclear-weapon States. She also supported the proposal that the Review Conference should pave the way for negotiations aimed at concluding a binding international instrument in the form of an annexed protocol to the NPT. Such an international negative-security-assurances regime would offer protection from nuclear danger at the global level, and it should also be coupled with provisions of such assurances to the parties of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties in various regions of the world.

3. Nuclear-weapon-free zones would greatly enhance regional security and serve as a confidence-building measure in the areas concerned. However, in order for them to fulfil their principal objective, the nuclear-weapon States needed to support the aims of the related treaties and arrangements and the efforts to create new zones. In that regard, Thailand, as the depositary State of the Treaty of Bangkok and current Chairman of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), appealed to the nuclear-weapon States to exercise greater flexibility in the discussions on the Protocol to that Treaty. ASEAN welcomed China's readiness to be the first nuclear-weapon State to sign the Protocol. For nuclear-weapon-free zones to be a major contribution to overall nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and hence to global security, the parties to the zone treaties should enhance their cooperation and solidarity with a view to achieving the common goal of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

4. **Mr. Mya Than** (Myanmar) recalled that at the first session of the Preparatory Committee of Myanmar, Nigeria and the Sudan had submitted a draft protocol to the NPT on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States which was still open for discussion. He wished to propose an additional paragraph, to be inserted after paragraph 2 in section C of the Chairman's working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.1/CRP.5): "3. To this end, the Conference reaffirms decision 2 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference regarding further steps to assure non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, steps that could take the form of an internationally legally-

binding instrument". It was important to reiterate that position from the 1995 Conference because it had still not been implemented. As the wording was taken from the 1995 Principles and Objectives, it should be acceptable to the Committee.

5. Paragraph 1 of section C contained the same text as article 2 of the draft protocol he had referred to earlier, urging States to abide by Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, which was at the heart of security assurances. He suggested that the words "to carry out substantive work" should be added at the end of section C, paragraph 3.

6. **Mr. Baidinejad** (Iran) said that the Non-Aligned Movement had submitted a paper which contained some paragraphs similar to those in the Chairman's working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5). However, in paragraphs 2 and 3 of section C of the letter the forward-looking approach, which was a very important element, was lacking. Paragraph 2 of section C referred to the need for negative security assurances, and paragraph 3 of the same section referred to the Committee established in that connection by the Conference on Disarmament. However, the work carried out by that body had continued for some time without any success, and it might be more appropriate to consider it in the context of the NPT. The practical steps to be taken pursuant to the 1995 decision should be made clearer and could be based on the formulation provided by the representative of Myanmar.

7. **Mr. Thapa** (Nepal) said that the need for negative security assurances was being felt more than ever as the threat of horizontal nuclear proliferation increased. Although some arrangements seemed to have been made for positive security assurances, through unilateral declarations such as Security Council resolution 984 (1995), there was not yet any legally binding negative security assurances regime to cover all non-nuclear-weapon States. Such a regime should include those outside nuclear-weapon-free zones. The nuclear-weapon States were fond of stating that over one hundred non-nuclear-weapon States had received negative security assurances under protocols attached to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. That claim, however correct, did not meet the concerns of the many other nuclear-weapon-free States parties to the NPT, including Nepal, which were not covered by such a zone. The Conference should ensure that its final document highlighted the importance and urgency of providing negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT and creating a congenial atmosphere for achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament.

8. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) emphasized that the Conference was not addressing the question of security assurances in a vacuum. The Preparatory Committee had debated the issue at its second session, and South Africa had later submitted the draft of a possible instrument on security assurances in a working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/9). It had been agreed that the present Conference would consider the issue of security assurances, and his delegation had proposed that the Conference should give consideration to a treaty or a protocol to the NPT on the subject, with a view to its early adoption and signature.

9. He drew attention to paragraph 8 on security assurances of the 1995 Principles and Objectives and to paragraph 7 of the draft final document of the 1990 NPT Review Conference. He also recalled the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the use or threat of use by a State of nuclear weapons, according to which the threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons was contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations. He then referred to paragraph 40 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.6, which urged the States parties to the NPT to negotiate a legal instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as an annexed protocol to the NPT. Since that proposal was supported by a large number of the States participating in the Conference, it deserved serious consideration. The negotiation of legally binding nuclear security assurances within the NPT umbrella would provide a significant benefit to the States parties and would be an incentive to those States which remained outside the NPT to become parties.

10. The question of legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States was a highly complex issue. The key questions needing to be addressed were: the identification of the States providing the security assurances; the identification of the beneficiaries of such assurances; the nature and scope of the assurances provided; elements to be included in a legally binding instrument on security assurances; and the format in which such security assurances should be provided.

11. Security assurances comprised both negative and positive assurances. Negative security assurances consisted of undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use such weapons. Positive security assurances consisted of undertakings to provide assistance in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to a State victim of an act of aggression with nuclear weapons or the object of a threat of such aggression.

12. One complicating factor was that not all non-nuclear-weapon States were in the same position. Many of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT were members of security arrangements and alliances that relied on the nuclear capability of nuclear-weapon States as an integral part of their defence strategy. It was for that reason that the permanent members of the Security Council qualified the assurances they gave by excluding cases of attacks against a nuclear-weapon State's territory, its armed forces or other troops, its allies or a State towards which it had a security commitment. That was a very important issue that had to be recognized. A further qualification, included in the 1995 security assurance statements of the United Kingdom and the United States, emphasized that the assurances were not regarded as applicable if any beneficiary was in material breach of its own non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. It was assumed that such a material breach related to instances where a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT was acquiring or developing nuclear weapons in contravention of the Treaty.

13. The negotiation of an international legally binding instrument on security assurances would need to take those factors into account. The inclusion of such elements in the agreement would mean that, while all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT were beneficiaries of security assurances, those assurances would be qualified in certain circumstances, for example, if a non-nuclear-weapon State party in alliance with a nuclear-weapon State was attacking another nuclear-weapon State.

14. Security assurances should be provided in the form of an international legally binding instrument, which could be either a separate agreement reached in the context of the NPT or a protocol to the NPT. The argument that declarations made by nuclear-weapon States were sufficient or that those assurances should be granted only in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones was not valid. The primary undertaking not to aspire to nuclear weapons had been made under the NPT, and security assurances should therefore also be given in the context of or as a part of that Treaty.

15. In the drafting of the South African working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/9) careful consideration had been given to the statements made by the nuclear-weapon States. In the proposed draft protocol which that working paper contained, article I gave the general undertaking of security assurances, both positive and negative, article II included the qualification which the nuclear-weapon States had emphasized and provided for the case of a non-nuclear-weapon State attacking an alliance, and article III provided that the issue of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be addressed by the Security Council.

16. He continued to hope that the question of a security-assurances protocol or agreement could be dealt with at the present Conference. However, if that was not possible, the Chairman should include a statement in the final document to the effect that the Conference directed the Preparatory Committee to develop such an instrument for consideration at the 2005 Review Conference.

17. **Mr. Osei** (Ghana) supported the position expressed by the delegation of South Africa and said he hoped that the position of the Non-Aligned Movement would be reflected in the final document of the Conference. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, his country looked forward to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which could be the only authentic guarantee for all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the realization of that goal, it was imperative to seek refuge in a legally binding document relating to a negative security assurances regime.

18. **Ms. Crittenberger** (United States of America) said that her country had long recognized the importance that many non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT attached to the question of security assurances. In 1968, it had joined the other NPT depositary Governments in declaring that the United States would seek immediate assistance from the Security Council for any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT that was threatened with aggression involving nuclear weapons or that was the victim of aggression in which nuclear weapons were used. At the same time, the Security Council recognized that such a threat would create a situation in which the Council

would have to act immediately in accordance with its obligations under the United Nations Charter. In 1978, President Carter had issued a declaration providing negative security assurances for States parties in order to encourage support for nuclear non-proliferation and to enhance the prospects for more effective arms control and disarmament. In 1995, President Clinton had reaffirmed the policy first stated in 1978, and France, Russia and the United Kingdom had issued almost identical assurances. China had also made a statement on security assurances. The United States had affirmed its continued commitment to that assurance in its statement of 27 April to the Committee.

19. All five of the NPT nuclear-weapon States had supported Security Council resolution 984 (1995). That resolution had reinforced security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties by noting the national declarations and providing a description of how the Security Council could assist a non-nuclear-weapon State party threatened with nuclear weapons or the victim of such aggression. The resolution noted that the means available to the Council included measures to restore international peace and security. The statement by the nuclear-weapon States parties on 1 May 2000 had indicated their readiness to exchange views on the positive security assurances referred to in resolution 984 (1995).

20. Legally binding assurances against the use of nuclear weapons had long been a goal of many States Parties. There had been continued progress in that area. Since the 1995 Conference, the United States and other nuclear-weapon States parties had signed or ratified Protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, which had increased the number of non-nuclear-weapon States parties eligible to receive legally binding negative security assurances from all five nuclear-weapon States from 32 to around 100. Moreover, the nuclear-weapon States were continuing consultations with parties to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone with the goal of resolving issues on the Protocol. Her delegation was hopeful that the negotiations by Central Asian nations would lead to a treaty that all could support and that there would soon be formal consultations with the nuclear-weapon States on the draft treaty and protocol.

21. The United States joined with others in supporting the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on effective international arrangements against the use of nuclear weapons at the Conference on Disarmament in 1998. Her delegation regretted that there had been insufficient consensus over the past two years to proceed with the work of that Committee.

22. Some had dismissed as inadequate the foregoing record of progress on security assurances. Many continued to press for the negotiation of a global treaty to provide negative security assurances or to make Security Council assistance automatic. It would make more sense, however, given that there was no consensus to accept such ideas, not to expend efforts trying to achieve the unachievable. The high-level political assurances and legal undertakings to which she had referred represented a strong regime of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties. Her delegation was ready to consider other ideas that would advance their mutual goals in that area.

23. **Mr. Dahan** (France) observed that delegations from a number of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT had understandably argued for broader security assurances. Security Council resolution 984 (1995), with its provisions for both negative and positive assurances, and the various treaties creating nuclear-weapon-free zones covering 110 States had gone far towards addressing their legitimate concerns. As for the next steps to be taken, the calls for a legally binding treaty and an across-the-board approach raised problems, among which were the issue of the status and the assurances to be accorded to threshold States, and the questions of deterrence and no-first-use.

24. The proposal for negotiation of a protocol to the NPT were not appropriate because only the Conference on Disarmament had a mandate to negotiate international instruments, and any debate in the Main Committee would overlap with the discussions in that body. His Government believed that the best way was the regional approach, which offered still-unexplored possibilities for providing legal assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Problems that could be tackled in that context were the entry into force of the Treaty of Pelindaba, the dialogue of the five nuclear-weapon States with the parties to the Treaty of Bangkok, or the need to advance negotiations on a treaty creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. Above all, being realistic was an imperative.

25. **Ms. Aboulnaga** (Egypt) said that the Chairman's working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5) had to take into account the fact that negotiations on a legally binding negative-security-assurances regime were hopelessly deadlocked and also that the nuclear-weapon States were putting forward to non-nuclear-weapon States completely unacceptable conditional assurances within time-frames. For the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, it became all the more important to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in the Middle East. The Chairman's working paper should reflect the various positions taken in the paper submitted by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.6).

26. **Mr. Abdelbari** (Algeria) said that States parties which had renounced the nuclear option must receive negative assurances from nuclear-weapon States, but no formula had been reached that reconciled the widely divergent positions. The 1968 and 1995 Security Council resolutions were valuable but insufficient, because they dealt only with positive assurances. His delegation supported the Non-Aligned position regarding the need for a legally binding international instrument prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Negotiations on such an instrument should begin within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances.

27. **Mr. Hu Xiaodi** (China) expressed full support for section C, paragraph 4, of the Chairman's working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5) concerning the non-first-use of force, but was in favour of strengthening the wording at the beginning of the paragraph by having the Conference urge the nuclear-weapon States to undertake such a commitment. The international legal instruments referred to in paragraph 4 must be concluded immediately.

28. His delegation had just submitted a document (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.7) proposing amendments to the Chairman's working paper that would take greater account of the negative developments since 1995. He proposed that the first seven paragraphs of that document should be incorporated into section B of the Chairman's working paper, for they dealt with the difficulties encountered in achieving nuclear disarmament.

29. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) said that his delegation understood the justified security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. It agreed with the South African delegation that the important issue of negative security assurances should not be considered in a vacuum but in the context of the changing global political and strategic situation.

30. Nuclear-weapon States had done much to guarantee security. The United States and French delegations had, for instance, referred specifically to Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and to the joint activities that had led to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In that connection, the Russian Federation would work towards advancing negotiations on a treaty establishing such a zone in Central Asia. Useful work had also been done in the Conference on Disarmament in 1998, but the events in South Asia had altered the situation. It would be a complex matter to define what type of assurances were required and for whom the assurances should be intended. All must continue, however, to work constructively together. His Government favoured the negotiation, within the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament, of an international instrument on security assurances and a legal instrument specifically assuring against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which would of course be open to reservations by the Parties.

31. **Mr. Toftlund** (Denmark), referring to the working paper submitted by Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7), said that his delegation endorsed the positions reflected therein on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a fissile material cut-off treaty, and non-strategic nuclear weapons, and believed that they should be taken into account in the drafting process. It also looked forward to continued discussion of negative security assurances.

32. **Mr. Thapa** (Nepal), referring to section C, paragraph 5, of the Chairman's working paper, said that since security assurances were not given to States outside the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it would be more realistic to add the phrase "in the zones concerned" to the end of the sentence.

33. **Mr. Abdullah Faiz** (Malaysia), referring to section B, paragraph 4, of the Chairman's working paper, said that it did not do justice to the landmark 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, with its profound implications for international law, if the Conference simply took note of it. He proposed the replacement of the verb "notes" with the verb "affirms".

34. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation), referring to section B, paragraphs 5 to 7, of the Chairman's working paper and noting that the same ground was covered in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7, said that they dealt with controversial matters whose success was dependent on prior support for global strategic stability. He asked the Chairman to consider grouping paragraphs 5 to 7 under a separate section dealing with fissile materials and bilateral United States/Russian Federation agreements, so as to avoid repetition.

35. He supported the amendments to section A, paragraph 2, and section C, paragraph 2, proposed by France at the previous meeting. In section B, paragraph 1, he proposed the addition of the phrase "ultimate objective of the" before the phrase "complete elimination", which would restore the full wording used at the third session of the Preparatory Committee. His delegation would be unable to support paragraph 4 of section B, with its reference to the opinion of the International Court of Justice; and paragraph 4 of section C also created difficulties for his Government.

36. **The Chairman** observed that Main Committee I would be dealing with the backward-looking review of the implementation of article VI of the NPT, while the subsidiary body would be dealing with the forward-looking plan of action.

37. **Ms. Crittenberger** (United States of America) said that her delegation supported the comments of the representatives of France and the Russian Federation regarding section A, paragraph 2, of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7. It concurred with the concerns expressed by Iraq regarding section A, paragraph 8, and agreed that the paragraph should be more specific. Turning to section B, she noted that it did not contain a general acknowledgment of the steps taken in implementation of article VI of the Treaty, which might be a useful addition. With regard to paragraph 2, it was her understanding that 56 States had deposited instruments of ratification for the CTBT. Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 were intended to provide a backward look at progress made, and some mention should be included of the efforts of the States to make nuclear disarmament irreversible. Concerning section C, paragraph 1, her delegation would like to seek a legal opinion on whether there was a need to reaffirm the Charter of the United Nations. She enquired where the proposal to include a preambular paragraph in the paper would be discussed.

38. **The Chairman** said that the proposal would be discussed in the General Committee.

39. **Mr. Clark** (Samoa) said that his delegation supported the Malaysian suggestion regarding section B, paragraph 2.

40. **Mr. Mya Than** (Myanmar) said that in section C, paragraph 5, "important" should be added before "role" in the first line. His delegation endorsed the Malaysian suggestion regarding section B, paragraph 4. With regard to section A, paragraph 9, his delegation did not approve of test explosions at any time or any place, but it would prefer to replace "condemns" in the first line with "deplores", in keeping with the language of the relevant General Assembly resolutions and Ministerial statements of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

41. **Mr. Tsering** (Bhutan) said that subsidiary body 2 was also dealing with the nuclear tests in South Asia, as discussed in section A, paragraphs 9 to 11 of the Chairman's working paper. In the view of his delegation, the Committee's consideration of that topic represented a duplication of effort.

42. **The Chairman** said that it had been agreed in plenary meeting that some topics would be dealt with in more than one body of the Conference. The Drafting Committee would be responsible for harmonizing the input from those discussions in preparation of the final report.

43. **Mr. Ahmed** (Bangladesh) said that the issue in question needed to be discussed in greater detail in the Committee at a later stage. His delegation also agreed with the representative of Myanmar regarding the redrafting of section A, paragraph 9.

44. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) said that the paragraphs referred to dealt with non-proliferation, which was a topic within the ambit of the Committee.

45. **Mr. Luck** (Australia) said that his delegation wished to comment on the working paper on nuclear verification submitted by the United Kingdom (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.6) in the context of disarmament. That paper was a forthright statement anticipating the practical need, at a future stage, to develop verification systems relevant to the dismantling of warheads and the disposal of fissile material. It was clear that the verification of full nuclear disarmament with confidence was complex and should not be allowed to become an opportunity for proliferation. Some clarification and amplification of the paper were required, however. It was important for international confidence and transparency that the nuclear verification programme outcomes mentioned in paragraph 5 should be explained in more detail. With regard to paragraph 6, national technical means to detect undeclared facilities, while an important part of the verification regime, could not be left entirely to the nuclear-weapon States themselves. Development of such a regime would pose challenges to the protection of intellectual property and the fundamental obligations under articles I and II of the Treaty.

46. The irreversibility mentioned in paragraph 13 was not only desirable but essential. Excess weapon material must be converted to non-weapon forms at the earliest possible moment. Having many weapon parts in storage would be detrimental to confidence in the disarmament regime. With regard to the monitoring of the nuclear complex mentioned in paragraph 14, it was not yet clear how effective the methods would be. Plans to evaluate methods and develop new techniques should be emphasized. As the concepts matured, it would be important to know the verification regime involved, particularly regarding the association of sensitive components of warheads, and how the regime was implemented within nuclear-weapon States and extended to nuclear-capable States.

47. His delegation would be interested to learn how the United Kingdom envisaged that the authentication and dismantlement elements of the verification process would deal with the question of the potential sharing of weapon design information and the associated risks. Transparency of fissile material production in nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-capable States would be a vital component of international confidence that disarmament had taken place. He wondered what methods would be used to prove that fissile material production figures were accurate.

48. The United Kingdom paper dealt insignificantly with verification and transparency of nuclear arsenals and fissile material. It was also a timely reminder of the importance of verification in the context of disarmament and constraining fissile material production through a fissile material cut-off treaty, which his delegation viewed as a high priority to Australia.

49. **Mr. Al-Anbuge** (Iraq) reiterated the statement his delegation had made at the previous meeting concerning section A, paragraph 8, of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5. Either the cases referred to in the paragraph should be specified or the paragraph should be deleted.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.

Main Committee I

Summary record of the 6th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 10 May 2000, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:	Mr. Reyes Rodriguez	(Colombia)
	later: Mr. Lint (Vice-Chairman)	(Belgium)
	later: Mr. Reyes Rodríguez (Chairman)	(Colombia)

Contents

Exchange of views (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

Exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Reimaa** (Finland), speaking also on behalf of Sweden, said that the working paper on nuclear disarmament submitted by Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7) was an important contribution to the work of the Committee. It addressed key areas on which the Committee should seek agreement and made proposals that were both ambitious and achievable. The 2000 Review Conference, while reaffirming the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted by the 1995 Conference, should also record the progress achieved in the field of disarmament and identify the areas in which further progress should be sought. The outcome of the Conference should contain clear commitments regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons.

2. His delegation agreed that the Russian Federation and the United States should proceed with reductions of their non-strategic nuclear weapons, as previously announced, in a transparent and irreversible manner. It also supported the goal of achieving the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which should occur no later than the 2005 Conference, and the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Lastly, he agreed that States parties should consider options for dealing with fissile material and endorsed the proposals contained in the working paper regarding increased transparency and accountability and establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc working group for the exchange of information and views on endeavours towards nuclear disarmament.

3. **Ms. Menéndez** (Spain) said that her delegation also supported working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7, particularly the paragraphs on the CTBT, non-strategic nuclear weapons, transparency and accountability, and the Conference on Disarmament. However, it had some reservations concerning the paragraph on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

4. **Mr. Lint** (Belgium) introduced document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.15, which contained a proposal submitted by Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Switzerland regarding the wording of part II, paragraph 4, of the Chairman's working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5/Rev.1). It was important that the four States that were not yet party to the Treaty should attend the meetings of the States parties. He welcomed in that connection the presence of one of those States at the Conference as an observer. His delegation proposed that, in part II, paragraph 4, of the Chairman's working paper, the Conference should ask the President of the Conference and the chairmen of forthcoming sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference to hold informal consultations with the four States not yet party to the Treaty and to report thereon to the respective sessions of the Preparatory Committee and the 2005 Review Conference. During those informal consultations, the President of the Conference and the chairmen of the forthcoming sessions of the Preparatory Committee should submit to those States all documents adopted by the Conference or the Preparatory Committee. The purpose of such an initiative was to send a clear signal that the universality of the Treaty was in the interests of all States.

5. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America) said that those States had surely got the message and that there was no need for the proposed initiative.

6. **Ms. Ho May Yong** (Malaysia) recalled that, at the third session of the Preparatory Committee, her delegation had proposed the establishment of a high-level consultation mechanism with a view to achieving the universality of the Treaty. In the light of the concerns expressed by certain delegations with regard to the integrity of the Treaty, it had decided not to pursue the proposal. The initiative proposed by the representative of Belgium was an alternative approach that Malaysia was ready to support. She noted with satisfaction that her delegation's proposal that the Conference should acknowledge bilateral efforts to promote the universality of the Treaty was reflected in the wording suggested by the representative of Belgium.

7. **Mr. Tawfik** (Egypt) said that his delegation, which was committed to achieving the universality of the Treaty, welcomed the proposal made by the representative of Belgium and would give it due consideration.

8. **The Chairman** invited the Committee to resume its consideration of section B of the revised working paper submitted by him. In informal consultations held the previous day, various delegations had proposed amendments to the original paper. A number of those proposals had been incorporated in the revised working paper contained in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5/Rev.1.

9. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico) noted with satisfaction that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the revised working paper reflected the language proposed by him in informal consultations for inclusion at the beginning of section B, on the basis of the drafting suggestions submitted by the States of the New Agenda Coalition in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.8.

10. **Mr. Lodding** (Sweden) said that there was an inconsistency in paragraph 5, in which the Conference welcomed the ratification of the CTBT by France and the United Kingdom and the recent decision by the Duma of the Russian Federation to ratify the Treaty. As he understood it, the Duma's decision had completed the procedures required for ratification of the Treaty under Russian legislation. The language used should therefore be the same in respect of all three States.

11. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) welcomed the incorporation in section B as paragraph 7 of the language on testing proposed by him in informal consultations on behalf of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria and Peru. That language was among the drafting suggestions submitted by the States of the New Agenda Coalition in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.8. During the negotiations on the CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament, four nuclear Powers, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, had made statements that a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests would prevent the nuclear-weapon States from developing new nuclear weapons and modernizing their existing stocks. Those statements had been a key factor in convincing the non-nuclear-weapon States to accept the limits imposed on the scope of the CTBT and had formed an integral part of the Treaty's negotiation history. Taking those assurances as their basis, the sponsors of the language now incorporated in paragraph 7 had proposed that the Conference should call upon all States not to conduct tests for the further development and modernization of nuclear weapons.

12. **Ms. Cheunsomchit** (Thailand) said that her delegation supported the wording of paragraph 7.

13. **Mr. Soutar** (United Kingdom) said that his delegation was committed to the full implementation of the CTBT. The United Kingdom had both signed and ratified the Treaty. He called on those States that had sponsored the language contained in paragraph 7 of the revised working paper, but had yet to ratify the Treaty to do so at an early date, particularly those States whose ratifications were necessary for the Treaty's entry into force.

14. As stated in the preamble of the CTBT, the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constituted an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The United Kingdom was fully honouring its obligations under the Treaty not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or other nuclear explosion and would continue to do so. However, it would also continue to conduct experiments in order to ensure the continued safety and reliability of its limited nuclear stockpile.

15. The purpose of the Conference was to review the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If the sponsors of the proposal wished to raise concerns regarding the United Kingdom's fulfilment of its obligations under the CTBT, they should do so in the appropriate forums. If, on the other hand, those States were seeking to build on the provisions of the CTBT, they should have submitted a proposal to that effect to the Committee's Subsidiary Body when it began its work. To submit such a proposal at the current stage in the deliberations was neither constructive nor appropriate. His delegation was not prepared to consider constraints that went beyond the United Kingdom's obligations under the CTBT. The Conference should focus instead on bringing about the earliest possible entry into force of the Treaty.

16. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America) said that his delegation wished to associate itself with the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom. All stockpile stewardship activities in the United States were conducted in full compliance with the CTBT. The current Conference was not an appropriate forum in

which to reinterpret or expand on the provisions of that instrument.

17. **Mr. Naziri-Asl** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation welcomed the incorporation in the revised working paper of the language proposed by the representative of South Africa in informal consultations. Affirming that the issue of testing was relevant to the Committee's discussions on non-proliferation, he proposed that, in the second line of paragraph 7, the word "any" should be inserted between "conduct" and "tests".

18. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) said that South Africa, which was among the States whose ratifications were required for the entry into force of the CTBT had ratified the Treaty. He had not submitted his proposal with the intention of reinterpreting the provisions of the CTBT or extending its scope. The language that he had proposed reflected undertakings given by the nuclear-weapon States in the negotiations on the CTBT. In calling upon States not to conduct tests for the further development and modernization of nuclear weapons, the Conference would in no way be restricting the stockpile stewardship activities of the nuclear-weapon States. His delegation was not opposed to such activities, but it did wish to prevent tests allowing for the further development and modernization of nuclear weapons.

19. **Mr. de la Fortelle** (France) said that his delegation fully supported the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom. The Conference's task was to work towards the earliest possible entry into force of the CTBT, not to call that instrument into question or to reinterpret its provisions, which was clearly the purpose of the proposal made by the representative of South Africa. The arguments he had put forward in that regard were not convincing.

20. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) said that the Committee should not continue its consideration of issues relating to the interpretation of the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, but should proceed with the rest of the draft report. His delegation fully associated itself with the comments made by the representative of the United Kingdom.

21. **Mr. Amorim** (Brazil) said that the South African proposal did not detract in any way from the priority accorded to the entry into force of the CTBT, which Brazil had signed and ratified. However, it was legitimate for countries to continue to attach importance to other aspects of vertical proliferation. The proposal was not in any way an attempt to reinterpret the articles of that Treaty, and it did not exclude the possible need for tests to be conducted to ensure the safety of existing arsenals.

22. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) said that he fully agreed with the comments made by the representative of Brazil. There was no question of trying to redefine the CTBT. He could be flexible about suggestions for wording that would make it clear that stockpile stewardship testing did not fall within the ambit of the proposal; however, tests for the further development and modernization of nuclear weapons could not be allowed.

23. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America) said that some representatives seemed to want to reinterpret the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. His delegation would not play that game, which could open a Pandora's box.

24. **Mr. Miranda** (Peru) said that his delegation fully associated itself with the South African proposal, which accorded with his Government's opposition to the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

25. **Mr. Macfhionnbhairr** (Ireland) said that his delegation welcomed the assurances just provided by four of the nuclear-weapon States that they were engaged in no activities which would result in technological alternatives or new types of nuclear weapons. As the representatives of Brazil and South Africa had indicated, the sponsors of the proposal were prepared to consider ways of making the wording of the proposal clearer. He reaffirmed that the issue of safety and reliability was not included in the proposal, and that it was not the intention of his delegation or any other proponent of the proposal to include it.

26. **Mr. Vidricaire** (Canada) said that his delegation would prefer a more focused approach to the task at hand. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was not yet in force, and Canada was one of the 44 States which needed to ratify it. His country, however, had no intention of conducting nuclear tests. Since the South African proposal could not lead to a constructive debate, the Committee should move on with its work.

27. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico) said that, if there were nuclear weapons whose safety and reliability were in question, they should be dismantled, not tested. The

goal of the CTBT was to halt the qualitative proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Conference could not ignore the fact that even though that Treaty had been signed by virtually all the countries whose ratifications were needed for its entry into force, new nuclear weapons of improved design had recently been developed and deployed, giving rise to concern about the qualitative proliferation of nuclear weapons. His delegation felt that the representative of South Africa had expressed that concern in the most moderate terms possible.

28. **Mr. Luck** (Australia) said that his delegation associated itself with the views expressed by the representative of Canada. It was hard not to draw the conclusion from the South African proposal that the CTBT was in some way deficient, and that was not a message that the Conference should be sending to the world. Instead, it should make it clear that the Treaty was still very much part of the non-proliferation regime, and that those States which had not signed it should do so. The Committee should move on to other parts of the revised working paper.

29. **Mr. Thamrin** (Indonesia) said that his delegation supported the South African proposal. The issue of not conducting nuclear tests for the modernization and improvement of nuclear weapons was essential and must be included in the draft report.

30. **Ms. Abulnaga** (Egypt) said that, as one of the sponsors of the proposal put forward by the representative of South Africa, her delegation believed that the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests was one of the most important aspects of non-proliferation. While the South African proposal sought to ensure that States did not undertake any development or testing of nuclear weapons to make qualitative improvements in such weapons, the ultimate objective should be to prohibit all nuclear weapons tests, since there were differing views on the purpose of specific tests. There was no justification for rejecting the South African proposal, which was fully in line with the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

31. **Ms. Ho May Yong** (Malaysia) said that, with regard to paragraph 8, her delegation had proposed that the word "notes" should be changed to "affirms" because the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice was of great historical significance and had a direct bearing on the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by States parties and on their policies and obligations in the area of nuclear disarmament.

32. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico), speaking on behalf of the members of the New Agenda Coalition, said that those countries supported the proposal by the representative of Malaysia. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice had been the only significant development in recent years, and the least that the Conference could do was to welcome it.

33. **Ms. Chabin** (Chile), **Mr. Thamrin** (Indonesia), **Mr. Than** (Myanmar), **Mr. Thapa** (Nepal), **Mr. Randal** (New Zealand), **Mr. Miranda** (Peru), **Mr. Sorreta** (Philippines) **Ms. Cheunsomchit** (Thailand) and **Mr. Le Huy Hoang** (Viet Nam), said that they supported the Malaysian proposal.

34. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America) said that his delegation did not feel that it was appropriate to note or affirm an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the draft report.

35. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) said that his delegation felt that paragraph 8 was unnecessary and fully supported the position expressed by the representative of the United States of America.

36. **Mr. Soutar** (United Kingdom) said that his delegation would not contest the relevance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice to the Committee's work. However, it did not agree that the Committee should affirm that opinion. The Committee could not assume the power to comment on the findings of a legal instance. Therefore, his delegation could not support the Malaysian proposal.

37. **Mr. Seibert** (Germany) said that it was not appropriate to affirm an advisory opinion of a court, which stood in its own right. His delegation, however, was willing to welcome the advisory opinion or take note of it. Turning to paragraph 9 in section B of the Chairman's revised working paper, he said that the last sentence of that paragraph was misleading, because the Conference on Disarmament could have started negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material, but had not done so because of the lack of political will. It would be better to make a factual statement, and replace the phrase "could not start" by "has not yet started".

38. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) suggested that the words "could not start" should be replaced by "could not continue" because the ad hoc committee had been

established for a brief period. That would ensure full historical accuracy.

39. **Mr. Shi Zhongjun** (China) said that the Committee should approach the work of the Conference on Disarmament in a balanced and fair manner. While expressing regret that the Conference on Disarmament had not started negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material, it should at the same time express regret that the Conference had failed to begin negotiations on the weaponization of outer space, and on nuclear disarmament.

40. **Mr. Luck** (Australia) said his delegation felt that paragraph 9 should focus on the issue of fissile material, which was central to the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", rather than on the progress made by the Conference on Disarmament. Instead of referring to the work carried out in any particular forum, the Committee should concern itself with how far that issue had been addressed.

41. **Mr. Lint** (Belgium) said that he agreed with the comments made by the representatives of Germany and South Africa about paragraph 9.

42. **Mr. Seibert** (Germany) said that his delegation was ready to treat all issues in a balanced and factual manner. There had been a decision in 1995 to start negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material, which should be respected. The Committee could therefore express regret that the Conference had not been able to continue negotiations. Although the Conference had established an ad hoc committee, that committee had not actually started negotiations.

43. **Mr. Macfhionnbhairr** (Ireland) proposed that the last sentence of paragraph 9 should read: "The Conference regrets that negotiations have not been pursued on this issue as recommended in paragraph 4 (b) of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.".

44. **Mr. Shi Zhongjun** (China) said that, if the Committee wanted to be factual, it should be comprehensive. He proposed that the Committee should add the following phrase at the end of paragraph 9: "... due to the fact that some countries are conducting national missile defence systems and that there is a threat of the weaponization of outer space".

45. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America) said that his country's ballistic missile defence system in no way involved the "weaponization" of outer space. Delegations should at least adhere to fact.

46. **Mr. Vidricaire** (Canada) said that delegations should not attempt to score points on issues which were not relevant. The fact was that an immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on the issue had been agreed in 1995, but that following three weeks of negotiations in August 1998, the Conference on Disarmament had not managed to re-establish the ad hoc committee.

47. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) said that although the original formulation would have been acceptable, his delegation was prepared to support the Irish proposal concerning paragraph 9.

48. **Mr. Luck** (Australia) said that he endorsed the Irish proposal. His delegation could not, however, support language proposed by China since it was interpretative. There were as many opinions on why the negotiations had not been started as there were delegations. The paragraph could not possibly contain them all.

49. **Mr. Seibert** (Germany) and **Mr. Lint** (Belgium) said that their delegations supported the Irish proposal.

50. **Mr. de la Fortelle** (France) said that his delegation was also willing to accept the Irish proposal for the sake of compromise.

51. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) drew attention to the proposal submitted by his delegation in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.14, according to which the following text should also be incorporated in paragraph 10: "It is important to secure these achievements and ensure the irreversibility of this process by preserving strategic stability based on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty". He regretted that the compromise solution proposed by the German delegation at the previous meeting had not met with more support.

52. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America), referring to the second sentence of paragraph 10, said that his delegation favoured deletion of the words "and notes that the Treaty's final implementation is contingent upon approval of the 1997 Protocols relating to START II". Main Committee II had already covered the forward-looking elements. With regard to paragraph 12, he proposed that the operative verb "notes" should

be replaced by "welcomes", which was more appropriate, particularly if the Committee wished to stress the importance of irreversibility.

53. **Mr. Kongstad** (Norway), **Mr. Seibert** (Germany) and **Mr. Yun Byung-se** (Republic of Korea) said that they supported the amendment to paragraph 12 proposed by the United States.

54. **Mr. de la Fortelle** (France) proposed that the words "and disposition" in paragraph 12 should be replaced with the words "disposition and management".

55. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) said that an alternative formulation for the phrase "defence needs" in paragraph 12 should be devised. "Military requirements" was one possibility.

56. **Mr. Amorim** (Brazil), agreeing with the previous speaker on the need to find an alternative formulation, said that the word "requirements" also, however, posed a problem.

57. **Mr. Noboru** (Japan) said that he endorsed the United States proposal, pointing out that Japan was one of the States to which paragraph 12 referred.

58. **Mr. Naziri-Asl** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation wished to reserve the right to return to the question of the operative verbs in paragraphs 11 and 12. In respect of paragraph 11, the use of the word "significant" with regard to unilateral reduction measures was unclear.

59. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) also queried the appropriateness of the word "significant" in paragraph 11. The term was somewhat subjective.

60. **Mr. Reznikov** (Belarus), supported by **Mr. Sartayev** (Kazakhstan), **Mr. Onishchenko** (Ukraine) and **Mr. Noboru** (Japan), proposed that the following text be reincorporated in paragraph 13: "The States parties to the Treaty welcome the important contribution made by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty through their significant measures in nuclear disarmament, in particular their voluntary decision to withdraw all tactical and strategic weapons from their territories, and take note with satisfaction of the current efforts of those States to strengthen the Treaty through enhancing regional and global security". Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had voluntarily and unconditionally withdrawn all nuclear weapons from their territories, a move which had received the unanimous commendation of the General Assembly.

61. **The Chairman** said that the text had been omitted from the working paper, since it referred to events predating the 1995-2000 review period.

62. **Mr. Reznikov** (Belarus), supported by **Mr. Onishchenko** (Ukraine), maintained that the proposed text did relate to the period under review, since it referred to events in 1996 and 1997.

63. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) said that the Russian Federation had recently ratified the agreements in question. It was concerned that the other parties should do likewise to ensure their earliest entry into force. Accordingly, he proposed that the following phrase should be added at the end of paragraph 13: "and urges their approval in accordance with appropriate national procedures".

64. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) proposed that in paragraph 14, the references to "paragraph 10" and "1 May 2000" should be deleted, for the sake of clarity.

65. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America), supported by **Mr. Zimonyi** (Hungary) and **Mr. Noboru** (Japan), proposed that in paragraph 14, the operative verb "notes" be replaced by the verb "welcomes".

66. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico) said that, in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.8, the members of the New Agenda Coalition had proposed that paragraph 14 (formerly paragraph 8) should be deleted. The question of the targeting of States had little bearing on disarmament or nuclear proliferation, since computers could easily be reprogrammed. It was more a question of how computers were managed. Given that the measures taken were thus not irreversible, his delegation could not support use of the operative verb "welcomes". In a spirit of compromise, it would, however, be willing to accept the verb "notes".

67. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) expressed strong support for the amendment to paragraph 14 proposed by the United States. It would be incorrect for the Conference not to welcome the declaration, which was, moreover, the first instrument of its kind.

68. **Mr. Naziri-Asl** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation preferred to retain the operative verb "notes", but wished to reserve the right to return to the issue.

69. **The Chairman** invited the Committee to consider section C of the revised working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5/Rev.1).

70. **Ms. Aboulnaga** (Egypt), supported by **Mr. Abdelbari** (Algeria) and **Mr. Moushaiti** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), proposed that the word "all" should be inserted before the word "States" in the second line of paragraph 1 to bring the language in line with article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations.

71. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America), supported by **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation), **Mr. Zischg** (Austria), **Mr. Vidricaire** (Canada), and **Ms. Menéndez** (Spain) proposed that paragraph 1 should be deleted since the Charter hardly needed reaffirming.

72. **Mr. Shi Zhongjun** (China) said that paragraph 1 should be retained, since it was closely related to the issue of nuclear disarmament.

73. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico), supported by **Mr. Thamrin** (Indonesia) and **Mr. Moushaiti** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), said that paragraph 1 was indispensable, since the prohibition of threat or use of force against States provided the legal basis for article VII and was closely related to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

74. **Mr. Abdelbari** (Algeria) said that he endorsed the Mexican position, pointing out the precedent for citing that provision of the Charter in the twelfth preambular paragraph of the Treaty.

75. **Ms. Abulnaga** (Egypt), joining with the previous two speakers, said that she failed to understand how any delegation could possibly object to a reference to the Charter.

76. **Mr. Soutar** (United Kingdom) referred delegations to his proposal to amend paragraph 2 as contained in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.9.

77. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America) saw no prospect of negotiating a global legally binding negative security assurances treaty and could not support the use of the Preparatory Committee process for 2005 for that purpose. The Review Conference mechanism was not an acceptable forum for negotiations on that or any other treaty. He did, however, see some merit in the United Kingdom proposal.

78. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) noted that there had been extended discussions on security assurances by the non-nuclear-weapon States, although no definitive conclusion had been reached. Since the language in the proposal by the United Kingdom was extremely vague, he supported the existing text for paragraph 2.

79. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico) said that security assurances were extremely important for the New Agenda Coalition. The proposal by the United Kingdom represented a step backwards from the 1995 Principles and Objectives, which set out the possibility of a legally binding international instrument in the area of security assurances. The decisions taken in 1995 should at least be maintained and he therefore supported the current text of paragraph 2.

80. **Ms. Abulnaga** (Egypt) said security assurances were an important issue for her delegation, which had expressed its position as a member of the New Agenda Coalition (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.8) and in its own conference paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.12) and its working paper on security assurances (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.1). The language in paragraph 2 was, however, acceptable. The proposal by the United Kingdom, although a laudable attempt to find language acceptable to all delegations, was a step backwards and, like the representative of Mexico, she would have difficulty accepting it.

81. With reference to the declaration by the five nuclear Powers that their nuclear weapons were not targeted at any State, she pointed out that, although some States seemed to believe that that declaration was a form of security assurance for non-nuclear-weapon countries, those weapons could be targeted in a matter of minutes. The steps by the five countries to provide security assurances were insufficient and were, in any case, quickly reversible. The only satisfactory means of providing adequate security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States was a legally binding regime adhered to by the nuclear-weapon States. She, therefore, felt that it was important to retain the existing text of paragraph 2.

82. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) said that the current wording of paragraph 2 gave rise to certain problems. His delegation's position on security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States was very clear. The work conducted in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances set up in the Conference on Disarmament had been very useful in clarifying the positions of the countries involved. The Russian Federation, therefore, was ready to work just as

constructively as it had in 1998 in that area and favoured continuing that work in the Conference on Disarmament. If delegations had problems with the proposal by the United Kingdom, it would be best to reaffirm the decisions taken in 1995 and call for continuing the work on security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament over the next five years.

83. **Mr. Mya Than** (Myanmar) believed that the current version of paragraph 2 was acceptable and should be retained. Those States which had renounced the nuclear option were entitled to legally binding security assurances in return. He repeated the proposal that he had made in the Committee on 5 May for inserting a new paragraph after paragraph 2 which would reaffirm the 1995 commitments regarding the need for a legally binding international instrument.

84. **Mr. Seibert** (Germany) said his delegation attached great importance to negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and was ready to work to find language acceptable to all delegations. He did not believe, however, that the Conference could direct the Preparatory Committee to develop an instrument for consideration at the 2005 Review Conference. He recalled that Italy had submitted working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/ WP.7 on behalf of Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway, which contained language which might be acceptable to all delegations.

85. **Mr. Thamrin** (Indonesia) stressed the importance of negative security assurances for States which were parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other international treaties and non-proliferation regimes. Those States deserved assurances against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. He felt that the current text of paragraph 2 was preferable to that proposed by the United Kingdom and added his support for the proposal made by the representative of Myanmar.

86. **Mr. Naziri-Asl** (Islamic Republic of Iran) stressed the importance of negative security assurances and believed paragraph 2 should be retained; it would not prejudice the work of the Conference on Disarmament. His country also supported the proposal made by the representative of Myanmar.

87. **Mr. Amorim** (Brazil) said that, like the representative of Mexico, he believed the commitments made in 1995 should at least be maintained and, it was hoped, used as a basis for further progress. The current text of paragraph 2 was acceptable, although the corresponding language proposed in the New Agenda Coalition's paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.8) or working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7, especially the former, contained language which would be a step forward.

88. The proposal by the United Kingdom, however, was excessively vague and would be a step backward. It seemed paradoxical to welcome the reaffirmation of the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to security assurances. The proposal implied that only the nuclear-weapon States would exchange views on positive security assurances.

89. **Mr. Balboni Acqua** (Italy) recalled the proposal made by his delegation in working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7. The legally binding international instrument envisioned by the 1995 Conference would give the NPT greater weight, and negotiations to that end should continue in the Conference on Disarmament in order to link the non-proliferation regime with such assurances.

90. *Mr. Lint (Belgium), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

91. **Mr. Sorreta** (Philippines) said that he supported the current formulation of paragraph 2, although he saw the merits in the proposal by the New Agenda Coalition. He welcomed the spirit of the proposal by the United Kingdom and the comments by the Russian Federation. The proposal by the United Kingdom was, however, somewhat vague. On the other hand, he found the proposal made by the representative of Myanmar quite relevant and regretted that it had not been put forward earlier.

92. **Mr. Thapa** (Nepal) said that negative security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States were an essential incentive for them to renounce the nuclear option in accordance with article II of the NPT. Work on a legally binding instrument to protect those States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be expedited as part of a process leading towards the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which was the only truly effective way of eliminating that threat. He felt that the language of paragraph 2 was acceptable and also supported the proposal by the representative of Myanmar, which was based on the 1995 Principles and Objectives.

93. **Ms. Ho May Yong** (Malaysia) stressed the importance of negative security assurances and expressed her support for the current text of paragraph 2 as well as the proposal made by the representative of Myanmar.

94. **Mr. Le Huy Hoang** (Viet Nam) underscored the need to develop as soon as possible a legally binding international instrument providing nuclear security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States. His delegation supported the current text of paragraph 2 as well as the proposal made by the representative of Myanmar.

95. **Mr. Soutar** (United Kingdom) thanked those delegations which had viewed his delegation's proposal as a basis for compromise and regretted that others saw it as a step backwards. The proposal did reaffirm the 1995 commitments, and he was willing to revise the language to make the text more acceptable. The current language in paragraph 2, however, was unacceptable to his delegation.

96. **Mr. Abdelbari** (Algeria) stressed that a legally binding international instrument on negative security assurances was essential for those States which had decided to renounce nuclear weapons. In that context, therefore, his delegation supported the language of paragraph 2 as well as the proposal by the representative of Myanmar.

97. **Mr. Vidricaire** (Canada) noted the wide range of views on negative security assurances and stressed that some compromise must be found. The proposal put forth in working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7. seemed to be acceptable and had the support of his delegation.

98. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico) noted the offer by the representative of the United Kingdom to revise his proposal and said that any new text should be as close as possible to the current wording of paragraph 2 or, perhaps, that proposed in working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7.

99. *Mr. Reyes Rodriguez (Colombia) resumed the Chair.*

100. **Mr. Goosen** (South Africa) welcomed the offer by the representative of the United Kingdom to revise his proposal and agreed that any new text should closely resemble the existing wording of paragraph 2 or the proposal in working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.

Main Committee I

Summary record of the 7th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 11 May 2000 at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Reyes Rodriguez (Colombia)

Contents

Chairman's working paper
Working paper of the Chairman of Subsidiary Body 1
Draft report of Main Committee I
Completion of the work of the Committee

The meeting was called to order at 11.25 a.m.

Chairman's working paper
(NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5/Rev.2)

1. **The Chairman** said that the revision of his working paper reflected the status of the work of the Committee and took into account the fact that delegations still had opposing views on some issues. The document also attempted to provide solutions to the remaining problems. As it would be difficult to make further progress, he suggested that the Committee should submit the document to the Conference for its consideration and final decisions.

2. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico) said that the Chairman's working paper preserved the delicate balance required by the Treaty review process. He cited a number of paragraphs with which his delegation had difficulties but said that those difficulties did not detract from the Chairman's effort to preserve the required balance. Therefore, his delegation saw the paper as a good basis for further consideration of those issues.

3. **The Chairman** said he would take it that the Committee wished to take note of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5/Rev.2 and transmit it to the plenary Conference for further consideration.

4. *It was so decided.*

Working paper of the Chairman of Subsidiary Body 1 (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/SB.1/CRP.7)

5. **Mr. Pearson** (New Zealand), speaking as Chairman of Subsidiary Body 1, said that the subsidiary body had held four formal meetings and several informal meetings. It had taken a forward-looking approach and had focused closely on its mandate. While no consensus had yet been reached, a package of new steps had been assembled, and members were still working towards consensus on that package. He understood that delegations wished to continue the work of the subsidiary body, using the paper as a framework.

6. **Mr. Hu Xiaodi** (China) said that his delegation could not accept certain parts of the paper but could agree to use it as a framework. The procedure adopted should not prevent any delegation from making new proposals on the content.

7. **Mr. de Icaza** (Mexico) said it was the understanding of his delegation that the mandate of Subsidiary Body 1 was for the duration of the Conference. Therefore, the Committee could take note of the paper while continuing to work towards consensus.

8. **Mr. Grey** (United States of America) said that his delegation would welcome continued work in any manner considered appropriate.

9. **The Chairman** suggested that the Committee should take note of the Working Paper of the Chairman of Subsidiary Body 1 and transmit the document to the plenary Conference with its report.

10. *It was so decided.*

Draft report of Main Committee I
(NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.18)

Paragraphs 1 and 2

11. *Paragraphs 1 and 2 were adopted.*

Paragraph 3

12. **The Chairman** said that the following sentence should be added to the end of the paragraph: "At the time of this decision the President further stated that the purpose of the subsidiary body is to identify the areas in which and the means through which further progress should be sought in the future on the issue being considered by the subsidiary body."

13. *Paragraph 3, as amended, was adopted.*

Paragraphs 4 and 5

14. *Paragraphs 4 and 5 were adopted.*

Paragraph 6

15. **Mr. Soutar** (United Kingdom) requested that document NPT/CONF.2000/23 on systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, submitted by the United Kingdom, should be added to the list of documents in that paragraph.

16. *Paragraph 6, as amended, was adopted.*

Paragraphs 7 to 9

17. *Paragraphs 7 to 9 were adopted.*

Paragraph 10

18. **The Chairman** said that paragraph 10 should be replaced by the following: "The Committee took note of the following Chairman's Working Paper and agreed to forward it to the Conference for further consideration."

19. *Paragraph 10, as amended, was adopted.*

Paragraph 11

20. **The Chairman** said that paragraph 11 should be replaced by the following: "At the 7th meeting of Main Committee I, on 11 May 2000, the Chairman of Subsidiary Body I, Mr. Clive Pearson (New Zealand) submitted a Chairman's Working Paper, NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/SB.I/CRP.7, and the Committee agreed that this working paper provides the framework for further work at this Conference."

21. *Paragraph 11, as amended, was adopted.*

22. *The draft report of Main Committee I as a whole was adopted.*

Completion of the work of the Committee

23. **The Chairman** said that Main Committee I had thus completed its work for the Conference.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.

C. Main Committee II

Summary records of the 1st to 8th meetings

Main Committee II

Summary record of the 1st meeting

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 26 April 2000, at 3 p.m.

Chairman	Mr. Kobieracki	(Poland)
later	Mr. Suh Dae-won	(Republic of Korea)
later	Mr. Kobieracki	(Poland)

Contents

Programme of Work

General Debate

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

Programme of work

1. **The Chairman** said that, following the practice of previous conferences, Main Committee II had been assigned agenda item 16, "Review of the operation of the Treaty as provided for in its article VIII, paragraph 3, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference". More specifically, the Committee would deal with agenda item 16 (c), which concerned the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones, in accordance with (i) article III and the fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs, especially in their relationship to article IV and the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs, (ii) articles I and II and the first, second and third preambular paragraphs in their relationship to articles III and IV, and (iii) article VII. The Committee would also examine other provisions of the Treaty relating to agenda item 16 (c). In addition, it would consider agenda item 17, "Role of the Treaty in the promotion of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of nuclear disarmament in strengthening international peace and security and measures aimed at strengthening the implementation of the Treaty and achieving its universality".

2. As reflected in document NPT/CONF.2000/DEC.1, the Conference had decided to establish, for the duration, an open-ended, subsidiary body under Main Committee II, which would examine the "regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution" under the chairmanship of Ambassador Christopher Westdal of Canada. Its meetings would be held in private and the outcome of its work would be reflected in the report of Main Committee II.

3. With regard to the organization of work, he suggested that statements should be succinct and should address one specific issue at a time. Given the shortage of time, it was important that the discussions should lead, at as early a stage as possible, to specific conclusions or recommendations to be elaborated by the Committee in the form of its report, which would then be submitted by the end of the second week of the Conference. After recalling that at the 1995 Conference Main Committee II had been able to reach consensus on much of the text included in the report that it had sent to the Drafting Committee, he was optimistic that consensus could be achieved again.

4. **Mr. Westdal** (Canada), Chairman of Subsidiary Body 2, said that, given the shortage of time, work would focus specifically on the two regions where the situation was particularly complex: the Middle East and South Asia. The approach would be to evaluate the experience of the past five years, to consider the prospects of implementing the resolution on the Middle East, concerning which the Secretariat had provided useful information in document NPT/CONF.2000/7, and to analyse the situation in South Asia. He hoped that Main Committee II would thus be provided with documents containing agreements that could form part of the results of the Conference and which the Committee would incorporate in its final report.

5. The work would be carried out according to the following timetable: the first meeting would be devoted to the Middle East and the second to South Asia and related questions. At the end of the second meeting a draft text on the Middle East, drafted on the basis of informal consultations and of the discussion during the first meeting, would be submitted. The third meeting would be devoted to the Middle East, and specifically to considering the text which would have been distributed at the end of the second meeting. At the end of the third meeting, a draft text on South Asia, again drafted on the basis of informal consultations and the discussion at the second meeting, would be submitted. The last meeting would deal with both regions and it was hoped to prepare a text on the regional issues for transmission to the Conference.

6. **Mr. Nobuyasu-Abe** (Japan) supported the decision to concentrate on examining the Middle East and South Asia, although he believed that other regions also merited consideration as nuclear-weapon-free zones.

7. **The Chairman** took it that the Committee wished to adopt the draft programme of work.

8. *It was so decided.*

General debate

9. **Ms. Drábová** (Czech Republic) recalled that her delegation's position was reflected in the statement by the European Union. The increase in the number of States parties to the Treaty, currently 187, reflected

broad agreement that the further spread of nuclear weapons would endanger the security of all States. The Czech Republic, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, supported the universality of the Treaty and urged those States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty to do so.

10. As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had indicated in document NPT/CONF.2000/9, safeguards were the main component of the non-proliferation regime and represented an institutionalized way of ensuring transparency in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Believing that concluding safeguards agreements was one of the basic obligations of States parties to the Treaty, the Czech Republic had concluded its own agreement, which had come into force on 11 September 1997. The 55 States which were not fulfilling their safeguards obligations should enter into comprehensive agreements in that regard and should implement them.

11. Common experience acquired during the 1990s demonstrated the need to strengthen the system of international safeguards by providing the Agency with the means to detect undeclared nuclear activities. In that regard, the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements had contributed to greater transparency in nuclear activities. Her delegation was pleased to hear that 47 States had already entered into additional protocols, and that the latter were already in force for nine of them. The Czech Republic had signed its additional protocol on 28 September 1999 and, like many other countries, was working on the preparation of internal legislation to enable its early ratification. The additional protocol could be considered as a logical extension of the obligation contained in article III, paragraph 1 of the Treaty. All States and other parties to safeguards agreements should bring into force additional protocols to their respective agreements; as the Agency had argued, that entry into force would strengthen the safeguards process.

12. Her Government had supported from the very beginning the simplified procedure for the designation of IAEA inspectors, and it did not require visas for the inspectors. As part of its collaboration with the Agency, her Government provided information on closed or decommissioned facilities, and exhaustive descriptions of the nuclear fuel cycle and of installations with large hot cells, most of which had already been inspected. It was also constantly exchanging information on its State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material.

13. Her Government was also helping to promote the application of other components of the non-proliferation regime. For example, in 1999 it had hosted for the fourth time the international training course on physical protection of nuclear material and installations, organized in cooperation with the Agency and the United States of America, which was part of the Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material. Countries in whose territory nuclear material was stored, handled or transported should implement strict provisions regarding accounting for and control of nuclear material, and the physical protection of such material at the level of the international standards. The Czech Republic had taken part in a review of recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material held under the auspices of the Agency, and was one of the eight countries which had welcomed at their nuclear installations missions from the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS).

14. Each exporting State which was a party to the Treaty had a responsibility to control its nuclear-related exports. As a member of the *Zangger* Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Czech Republic regarded transparent national export controls as an integral part of a strong non-proliferation regime. One of the main principles of that regime was acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards, which were required as a precondition of any supply of nuclear items. In connection with the adoption of a new Atomic Energy Act in 1997, the Czech Republic had amended its legislation in compliance with requirements in that area. Her Government supported the implementation at the national level of the NSG and Zangger Committee principles. It was also supporting the holding of seminars on control regimes such as those held in Vienna and New York, which it had helped to organize. It followed that all nuclear material and equipment or material designed for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material in the territory of the Czech Republic or under its control was used solely for peaceful purposes.

15. **Mr. Albuquerque** (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union, the Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia,

Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, and the associated countries Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, as well as Iceland and Liechtenstein, countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members of the European Economic Area emphasized the importance of the provisions of the decision on principles and objectives of the Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties regarding safeguards. All States which had not yet concluded safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should do so as soon as possible, in accordance with article III, paragraph 4, of the Treaty.

16. The European Union was committed to strengthening the safeguards system, pursuant to paragraph 11 of the 1995 decision on principles and objectives, and strongly supported the May 1997 decision of the IAEA Board of Governors to adopt a Model Additional Protocol to existing safeguards agreements. Implementation of the measures contained in that Additional Protocol would lead to substantial strengthening of the effectiveness of the safeguards system and increase IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities.

17. The European Union and its member States had made an early start to negotiations with IAEA on three additional protocols to the safeguards agreements: one with the 13 non-nuclear-weapon States in the European Union, one for the United Kingdom and one for France. On 8 June 1998, the Council of the European Union had authorized the Commission to conclude the three additional protocols between the States members of the European Union, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and IAEA. Those agreements had been signed on 22 September 1998. A number of European Union member States had already ratified those agreements, and the others were well advanced in the process of doing so.

18. He welcomed the fact that the five nuclear-weapon States as well as 49 other States had concluded additional protocols, and 9 protocols were in force. The additional protocols were an integral part of IAEA safeguards agreements. Adherence to them was mandatory and they were therefore relevant to fulfilment of the obligations contained in article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty. All States should conclude and ratify the additional protocols without delay, with a view to the earliest possible implementation of a strengthened safeguards system.

19. The European Union welcomed the stateme made by the Director General of IAEA concerning t need to complete the technical framework for t implementation of integrated safeguards by the end 2001. The IAEA secretariat, in consultation w member States, was continuing to examine h existing safeguards and new measures could best integrated. Those new measures should not be appli in a mechanistic way as a mere addition to the existi system. The European Union also welcomed t secretariat's commitment to increased efficien without increased costs, and agreed that States whi had implemented the additional protocol should bene over time from a reduction in the volume of activit carried out by the Agency.

20. One issue of particular concern was that, sin the previous Review Conference, no progress had be achieved in the implementation of safeguards in t Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The Europe Union urged that country to comply with its safeguar commitments and cooperate fully with the Direct General. In the preparatory committees for t Conference, as well as in meetings of the Gener Conference and the Board of Governors of IAEA, t European Union had expressed its deep concern th IAEA had not been able to carry out its mandate in t Democratic People's Republic of Korea because of lack of cooperation on the part of its Government.

21. In the case of Iraq, the European Union w concerned that IAEA had been unable to carry out t tasks assigned to it in Security Council resolutions 6 (1991) and 1284 (1999). Although IAEA had been ab to conduct a physical inventory to verify nucl materials subjected to safeguards in January 2000, th could not be a substitute for its activities under t relevant Security Council resolutions. In that conte the European Union welcomed the appointment of t former Director General of IAEA, Dr. Hans Blix, head the United Nations Monitoring, Verification a Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).

22. The European Union reaffirmed the importan of the safe and effective management of fissile mate designated by the nuclear-weapon States as no long required for defence purposes, and called on tho States to place such material under the appropria international safeguards and physical protection, agreed at the Moscow G-7/P-8 Summit on Nucle Safety and Security. In that context, the Europe Union welcomed the further elaboration of the trilate

initiative of the United States, the Russian Federation and IAEA as a step towards the objective of paragraph 13 of decision 2 of the 1995 Conference, and called on them to continue those efforts. The European Union also welcomed the examination by the G-8 of measures to be adopted for the safe and effective management of excess fissile material in the Russian Federation.

23. It further welcomed the agreement reached in December 1997 among a group of nine countries, including the five nuclear-weapon States and two States members of the European Union, on a set of guidelines for the management of plutonium in all peaceful nuclear activities. Since confirmation of that agreement, the countries had published annual reports on their national stocks of plutonium.

24. Export controls were a responsibility and an obligation for each State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and all States must take measures to ensure that exports of sensitive materials, equipment and technologies were subject to an appropriate system of surveillance and control, facilitating cooperative technological development by reassuring suppliers that goods, technology and materials would be used only for peaceful purposes.

25. The European Union noted the work of the Zangger Committee and urged States parties to base their export control policies on the Committee's interpretations of their obligations under article III, paragraph 2 (see document INFCIRC/209 as amended).

26. The European Union commended the work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and felt it would be appropriate for the Conference to recognize its work. All States parties to the Treaty should follow the Group's guidelines when considering the export of dangerous nuclear material, equipment and technologies.

27. Effective physical protection of nuclear material, especially that which might be used for military purposes, was essential, and international cooperation in that field was needed. States which had not already done so should accede to the Vienna Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, adopt relevant physical protection measures and introduce and enforce appropriate measures to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials.

28. The European Union reiterated the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as zones free from all weapons of mass destruction, and welcomed progress made thus far, in particular towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. The members of the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the nuclear-weapon States must continue their efforts to enable the nuclear-weapon States to sign and ratify the Protocol to the Treaty. The European Union looked forward to the early entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty and strongly supported signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols of the nuclear-weapon-free zones.

29. The European Union, its member States and associated countries would play a full, cooperative and constructive role in the Conference, with a view to furthering the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation, in accordance with the decisions taken at the 1995 Conference of the Parties.

30. **Mr. De La Fortelle** (France), supplementing the statement by the European Union, recalled that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which had entered into force 30 years previously, had achieved noteworthy results. With 187 States parties, the Treaty was recognized by virtually all the international community as an important legal instrument, and it was that universality which gave it authority. The 1995 Review Conference had confirmed and reinforced that authority by deciding to extend the Treaty for an indefinite period.

31. The 1995 Conference had confirmed that IAEA was the competent authority in the matter of safeguards, and the body which States should address on issues relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The safeguards system was vitally important, and it was crucial that it should be credible and reliable. Although the IAEA safeguards agreements were becoming effective and universal, 54 of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had not yet signed a full-scope safeguards agreement, as provided in article III of the Treaty. France regarded the universality of safeguards as being equally important as that of the Treaty itself, and urged all States which had not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with IAEA.

32. In the past, the verification system of the Treaty had encountered some difficulties owing to gaps in the system itself. In fact, IAEA did not have any legal means of monitoring the installations where non-

declared material might be, still less of carrying out inspections of clandestine installations. The discovery, almost 10 years before, of Iraq's clandestine military programme had put the system to the test. The inspections carried out by IAEA under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) had shown that for 10 years that State, a party to the Treaty and a signatory to a safeguards agreement, had been carrying out activities which had brought it virtually to a position to build a nuclear weapon, in spite of the inspections carried out in accordance with the safeguards agreement. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had also called the safeguards system into question by objecting to a verification of the accuracy of its initial declaration. Those facts, which could have endangered the effectiveness of the Treaty, had instead prompted the international community to strengthen it, by agreeing upon a Model Additional Protocol, approved by the Board of Governors in May 1997, which gave the Agency considerable powers of investigation.

33. Since the acceptance of the Model Protocol almost two years previously, only 49 countries had signed it, and nine had ratified it. France urged all States which had not yet done so to conclude an additional protocol as soon as possible, and was glad that the five nuclear-weapon States, having taken part in the drafting of the Model Additional Protocol, had together decided to enter into an agreement with IAEA.

34. France, whose civil nuclear installations came under the supervision of EURATOM, had undertaken to adopt all the measures in the Protocol which could increase the efficacy of the safeguards and contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in States which did not possess them. That undertaking had taken shape with the signing of the Additional Protocol between France, EURATOM and IAEA. The United Kingdom had signed a similar protocol. Having signed, France had started the internal procedure required in order to ratify the strengthened safeguards agreement as soon as possible.

35. France was glad to note the efforts made by IAEA to optimize its management. Given that the means at its disposal ought to match the responsibilities entrusted to it, France would support a reasonable increase in the Agency's resources. The rule on zero budget increases in real terms meant that almost 20 per cent of the budget of the Department of Safeguards had to be financed from extrabudgetary funds. That form of financing, when used to excess, created an unhealthy situation and made it difficult to plan programmes.

36. France supported the work being done by IAEA to prepare an integrated safeguards system, in line with the resolution adopted at the forty-second session of the General Conference. That system should eliminate redundancies and overlapping, thus making it possible to increase the efficacy of the safeguards while reducing costs.

37. The accession of the vast majority of States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons showed that it was one of the main issues of concern to the international community, and rendered even more unacceptable the continuing obstruction by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of the Agency's efforts to monitor the implementation of the relevant safeguards agreement. France urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with its undertakings concerning the verification of nuclear installations and free access to them.

38. Iraq was also a cause for concern. Through its verification activities in Iraq since 1991, the Agency had been able to establish in 1997 a technically convincing outline of that country's clandestine nuclear programme. Although some uncertainty remained because the Agency had been unable to fulfil its mandate for over a year, that did not prevent a plan being carried out for continuous monitoring. The process which should permit the resumption of monitoring activities in Iraq was now taking place: a new Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission had been set up. France reiterated its support for Mr. Hans Blix and for the new Commission in carrying out its functions as defined in Security Council resolution 1284 (1999).

39. It was essential to re-establish security and stability in the Middle East region, and for that purpose it was necessary to prevent Iraq from re-arming and to bring about the return of on-site inspectors. When the Commission was ready to take up its duties, everything possible must be done to obtain the cooperation of Iraq, which was indispensable in implementing Security Council resolution 1284 (1999). France noted that in January 2000, IAEA had verified the physical inventory of the nuclear materials which had been declared in accordance with the safeguards agreement signed by Iraq in 1972.

40. The security of nuclear material and installations was a fundamental objective of the struggle against proliferation and illicit traffic in nuclear and radioactive materials, and was necessary in order to establish confidence with regard to the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Effective, objective and transparent export controls were also needed, with mutual respect between the States providing the technology and those which needed it for their development, in order to assure the international community that no diversion of the materials would take place for illicit purposes.

41. France also attached importance to the control of stocks of fissile material which was no longer needed for defensive purposes, but it took the view that those activities should be financed only from the regular budget, not by increasing the number of special funds.

42. France welcomed the agreement by the IAEA Board of Governors concerning the danger of proliferation of the neptunium and americium generated by the irradiation of uranium in nuclear reactors, and was glad to note that putting it into practice would not have any impact on the implementation of IAEA safeguards, and would not adversely affect other activities of the Agency.

43. France unreservedly supported the struggle of IAEA and the international community against proliferation, and urged other States to do everything possible to eliminate nuclear weapons and trafficking in nuclear material.

44. **Ms. Hallum** (New Zealand) said that comprehensive and internationally-accepted safeguards agreements buttressed international security and provided a vital form of underpinning for international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities. It was therefore of concern that there were still more than 50 States parties to the Treaty which had not yet brought safeguards agreements into force.

45. New Zealand had been one of the earliest States to sign and bring into force the Model Additional Protocol to existing safeguards agreements, with a view to strengthening the effectiveness and efficacy of the regime, and it regretted the fact that so few States had concluded additional protocols. Sadly, the goal of universal adherence to the Additional Protocol by the year 2000 had been missed.

46. New Zealand took the view that all States parties should establish a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol, in accordance with paragraph 12 of the Principles and Objectives adopted by the Conference of the States Parties in 1995. Consideration should be given to the acceptance of the Additional Protocol as a condition for the supply of nuclear material, as soon as the adherence of a larger number of States was achieved.

47. New Zealand welcomed the decisions adopted in accordance with paragraph 13 of the Principles and Objectives to ensure the safe and effective management of material which was no longer required for defence purposes, and especially the trilateral initiative of the United States, the Russian Federation and IAEA. It hoped that other nuclear-weapon States would enter into similar arrangements. Also to be welcomed was the agreement reached in 1997 on a set of guidelines for the management of plutonium. New Zealand took the view that similar guidelines were needed for the management of highly enriched uranium.

48. Reference must be made, once again, to the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, where the Director General of IAEA was still unable to verify the correctness and completeness of that country's initial declaration of nuclear material. New Zealand urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with IAEA without further delay. That agreement remained binding and in force, and must be implemented fully.

49. New Zealand also noted with concern that since December 1998 the Agency had not been in a position to implement in relation to Iraq the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council.

50. Controls on nuclear exports were complementary to safeguards. New Zealand was pleased to have been associated with two international seminars held in 1997 and 1999 on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation, and would continue to support any measure which would promote transparency in that area.

51. New Zealand strongly supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between the States of the region concerned, and emphasized the importance of nuclear-weapon States respecting and supporting the relevant protocols. It was therefore

gratifying that the United Kingdom and France had ratified the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga. She hoped that the United States would do the same as soon as possible.

52. While applauding the progress made in relation to nuclear-weapon-free zones in South-East Asia, Africa and Central Asia, she noted a regrettable lack of progress in regions of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia.

53. New Zealand was supporting and co-sponsoring the initiative led by Brazil in the General Assembly for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, and would like to examine the possibility of enhanced political cooperation between States in the zone, as a first step in that direction.

54. **Mr. Minty** (South Africa) said that the Principles and Objectives endorsed in 1995 acknowledged the strategic association between IAEA, as the depositary of the safeguards system, and the international community. That association was due to the fact that efforts to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promote disarmament could not be the responsibility of one organization or one State alone. South Africa attached great importance to the work of Main Committee II, which had to evaluate the results of that association and define goals for the future.

55. In 1995 South Africa had expressed its concern about some shortcomings in the existing non-proliferation regime, and had joined with those who were calling for a review of the safeguards system. IAEA must be congratulated on introducing a Model Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreements, in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the system.

56. South Africa welcomed the announcement by the Director General of IAEA that the secretariat of the Agency had already begun to implement some of the new measures, and that the process would continue throughout the year. IAEA would have to establish a new integrated system of safeguards, combining more quantitative aspects of the classic safeguards with the new measures, which were more of a qualitative kind.

57. South Africa had concluded negotiations with IAEA on the text of an additional protocol, and had begun preparations in its Parliament with a view to endorsing the agreement.

58. When the Agency had presented its plan for a strengthened safeguards system, it had believed that extra funds would be required for its execution in the short term, but that the expenditure would be balanced out in the longer term. It was now obvious that the new measures would not bring about any reduction in costs. In addition, new tasks had been entrusted to IAEA. South Africa therefore urged States parties to be realistic in that regard, and to bear in mind the content of paragraphs 9 and 19 of the Principles and Objectives. South Africa took the view that in order for the Agency to be able to extend its activities to other installations and countries, and to carry out the new tasks, it must be guaranteed the necessary resources, and that could not be done with a zero growth budget. It must be pointed out that neither could the problem be solved by resorting to an increase in extrabudgetary funds, which, as well as being unpredictable in the longer term, were subject to the interests of the donors and compromised the impartiality of the Agency.

59. Although there had been some setbacks in certain areas, he noted the positive developments which had occurred in relation to safeguards, especially the progress achieved through the trilateral initiative between IAEA, the Russian Federation and the United States.

60. Another important aspect relating to safeguards and verification was the physical protection of nuclear material. In that respect, mention must be made of the IAEA initiative to establish a database on illicit trafficking, which would be a useful instrument in that area.

61. South Africa had prepared a working paper for Main Committee II setting out some points for its future work, and would be grateful if it could be issued as an official document.

62. **Mr. Lipar** (Slovakia) said that nuclear energy played an irreplaceable role in the economy of the Slovak Republic. About 50 per cent of electricity production was from nuclear power. The country was developing its nuclear energy sector, and had six reactors in operation, one currently being decommissioned, one interim facility for spent fuel storage and one facility for the treatment of radioactive waste. Another storage facility for radioactive waste was currently being commissioned. All the spent fuel from the decommissioned reactor had been transported back to the Russian Federation, under an agreement

dating from 1956. The spent fuel from the nuclear power plants in operation was stored on site. There were also about 70 authorized users of small quantities of nuclear material, mainly in the form of protection containers made of depleted uranium. All the nuclear facilities and all nuclear material in the territory were subject to IAEA safeguards. In addition, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic carried out inspections on the basis of the national law on nuclear energy, which had been in force since 1 July 1998. The law regulated the classification of nuclear material and the conditions for its production, processing, procurement, storage, transportation, use, accounting and control. Nuclear material could only be procured and used on the basis of a permit issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority, which was empowered to impose fines of up to 1.2 million euros if nuclear material was procured without a licence or used for non-peaceful purposes.

63. Owners of nuclear material were obliged to keep exact records of the amounts, imports, exports, storage sites, consumption and transport of the material. All the relevant information was supplied to IAEA. Inspectors appointed by IAEA to visit Slovakia were accepted without objection, and could perform their duties without hindrance. Nuclear installations in Slovakia comprised five material balance areas, including the facility now being decommissioned. In 1999, nuclear material had been completely removed from that plant, but IAEA surveillance continued. So far, no unaccounted for material had been detected, owing in part to the requirements of the national accounting and control system administered by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority and to effective cooperation between all parties involved.

64. In the framework of the strengthened safeguards system, during the forty-third General Conference of IAEA, in 1999, a new agreement had been signed between the Slovak Republic and IAEA for the application of safeguards. The main feature of the agreement was that it reflected the new geopolitical situation following the constitution of the Slovak Republic.

65. Control of exports and imports of dual-use material, equipment and technologies served to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Law No. 547/1990 specified the basic principles of licensing and defined the obligations of exporters and importers, as well as the responsibility and powers of the licensing authority, the Ministry of Economy. The Nuclear Regulatory Authority was responsible for granting permission for the export and import of nuclear material, and equipment and technologies relating to the use of nuclear energy. In considering applications, the Authority followed the recommendations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the guidelines of the Zangger Committee, and its final decisions were binding on the Ministry of Economy.

66. Slovakia participated actively in the work of the Group, with a view to increasing transparency in the control of exports and imports. As agreed in the Zangger Committee, Slovakia reported annually on exports of source material, fissionable material, and material and equipment relating to nuclear activities.

67. Slovakia had also sought to contribute to the strengthened implementation of the safeguards system by withdrawing its reservations relating to sections 26 and 34 of articles VII and X of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of IAEA. The Slovak Republic regarded itself as bound by those provisions.

68. Slovakia, which had contributed actively to the creation of the IAEA Programme for Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System, fully supported every measure aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear materials on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, and preventing any violation of those provisions. Those measures should be supported by an effective system of physical protection for the purpose of preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. An extensive analysis should be carried out to assess the effectiveness of the assistance programmes implemented by IAEA and the member States for preventing illicit trafficking and protecting nuclear material. In that connection, the database on illicit trafficking was a useful instrument in evaluating the scale of the problem and devising effective remedial measures.

69. Slovakia took a positive view of the manner in which article III of the Treaty was being implemented, believing it was vital to continue promoting its implementation and improving current procedures, in order to reduce the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons.

70. *Mr. Suh Dae-won (Republic of Korea) took the Chair.*

71. **Mr. Tyson** (Australia) said that the IAEA safeguards system provided the means for States to demonstrate their commitment to using nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes and to have confidence in the peaceful nature of other States' nuclear activities. Those guarantees were a fundamental part of national, regional and global security. The peaceful nature of nuclear activities was the essential foundation for trade and cooperation in nuclear energy and for progress in nuclear disarmament. For those reasons, all Parties to the Treaty had an interest in strongly supporting the IAEA safeguards system and ensuring its continued effectiveness.

72. Iraq's clandestine nuclear-weapons programme, which was a determined challenge to the safeguards system, also revealed the need to strengthen the system in the area of detecting undeclared nuclear activities or material. The action taken to that end was one of the most important achievements since the 1995 Conference of the Parties. Australia strongly supported the strengthening of the safeguards system and had been the first State party to the Treaty to ratify the Model Additional Protocol. It was disappointed, however, that, three years after its adoption, only 48 protocols had been signed and 9 ratified.

73. The States parties to the Treaty must promote the early global application of the Model Additional Protocol, which served the interests of all States by increasing the ability of IAEA to provide assurance as to the peaceful nature of nuclear activities, which, in turn, enhanced global security, cooperation and progress on nuclear disarmament. It was therefore important that it should be signed by all States, including those which had declared that they did not carry out significant nuclear activities. Australia urged all States which had not yet done so to ensure that they had an additional protocol in force as quickly as possible, and it urged those which had not even signed a safeguards agreement to do so without delay.

74. In 30 years, compliance with the Treaty's safeguards obligations had been excellent. There had been only two significant violations of those obligations: by Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In both cases, the international community had responded promptly with support for the norms of the Treaty. In 1992, some inconsistencies had been detected, suggesting that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea might have separated plutonium without declaring it to IAEA. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had yet to extend to IAEA the cooperation necessary for verification of its initial inventory. Australia strongly supported the Agreed Framework which provided a mechanism for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to come into full compliance with its safeguards obligations under the Treaty and benefit fully from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His delegation noted with appreciation the good work done by IAEA in verifying the freeze of nuclear activities required by the Agreed Framework. Australia, for its part, had contributed $15.8 million thus far to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization.

75. It was of great concern that, since December 1998, IAEA had been unable to conduct its verification and monitoring activities in Iraq under the relevant Security Council resolutions. Iraq must cooperate fully with IAEA and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) in order to achieve full implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions and comply with its obligations under the Treaty. His delegation noted that, in January, IAEA had conducted an inspection under the safeguards agreement.

76. The cases of Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea highlighted the importance of access to the Security Council by the IAEA Director General and the vital role of the Security Council with respect to violations notified by IAEA.

77. The Conference should examine the area of nuclear supply, including reinforcement of barriers to nuclear proliferation, without impeding the legitimate right of non-nuclear States to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference should again highlight the importance of Parties to the Treaty ensuring that their nuclear-related exports did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It should also recognize that export controls were essential to offering the long-term security and stability that underpinned peaceful nuclear cooperation.

78. Both the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee had acted with determination to promote greater transparency in export controls and the preparation of reports for the Conference of the Parties. Australia was an active member of both bodies, reflecting its strong support for the participation of suppliers in international cooperation activities for the

peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation. Australia had long been a proponent of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply of nuclear material to non-nuclear-weapon States and hoped that the Conference would reaffirm the States parties' commitment under the Treaty to the full-scope safeguards supply condition. The Conference would also need to consider how supply arrangements would take into account measures to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system. His delegation believed that, in the near future, the INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreement, coupled with an additional protocol, should be implemented in order to ensure the full-scope safeguards required by article III of the Treaty and comply with the Principles and Objectives of the 1995 Conference of the Parties.

79. His delegation welcomed the progress made in response to the call in the 1995 Principles and Objectives for fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful activities to be placed under IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable. It also welcomed the trilateral initiative by the United States, the Russian Federation and IAEA to develop a new verification system for former weapons material.

80. Pending negotiation of the fissile material cut-off treaty, his delegation hoped that China would join the moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons announced by the other nuclear-weapon States and that India, Pakistan and Israel would place a moratorium on the production of fissile material and participate constructively in the negotiations on the cut-off treaty.

81. His delegation urged all States which had not yet done so to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material at the earliest possible date. It also wished to see the extension of international physical protection standards to domestic activities and, to that end, welcomed the current discussion of the possibility of reviewing the Convention. The Conference would also need to consider reports of illicit trafficking in nuclear material and should urge all States to implement measures and promulgate legislation designed to provide assurance as to the security of such material.

82. The Conference should note the important progress made on nuclear-weapon-free zones: since 1995, with the signature of the Protocols to the Treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba by nuclear-weapon States, the number of non-nuclear-weapon States benefiting from negative security assurances from the five nuclear-weapon States had increased from 33 to 99. The real prospect of establishing a central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone and the discussions aimed at securing the signatures of the nuclear-weapon States on the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok should also be mentioned.

83. Australia encouraged the members of the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and the nuclear-weapon States to continue their discussions aimed at resolving remaining differences and enabling the nuclear-weapon States to sign a Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok. His delegation reiterated its preparedness to offer practical assistance to the sponsors of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone initiative, drawing on its experience with the South-Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

84. Australia and a number of other non-nuclear-weapon States had prepared a series of drafts on Main Committee II issues. In addition, Australia and Japan had put forward a proposal on measures to be taken for the implementation of the Treaty, including some relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones and safeguards, which were relevant to the Committee's deliberations as well.

85. **Mr. Casterton** (Canada) said that since the beginning of the preparatory process, Canada had emphasized that the mandate of the Conference should be not merely to examine the state of implementation of the various articles of the Treaty, but also to look to the future and define the areas in which progress could be made, as well as the means for achieving that objective. That was an essential element of "permanence with accountability", a principle which all recognized was fundamental to the 1995 extension decision.

86. Undoubtedly the IAEA safeguards, administered in conformity with article III of the Treaty, should continue to be the fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as an essential element of the implementation of the Treaty. The safeguards regime ensured that all States complied with their undertakings. Consequently, the States parties should continue to promote universal application of the safeguards to all peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in all States parties, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. In spite of the significance attached to that

objective at the 1995 Conference, there were still 54 States parties which had not signed a safeguards agreement in line with the undertaking assumed under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That situation ought to be remedied as soon as possible, to demonstrate universal adherence to that provision of the Treaty and unanimous support for its objectives. On the other hand, however firmly Canada advocated universal adherence to the Treaty, it was also important, as an interim measure in line with paragraph 11 of decision 2 of the 1995 Conference, that all States which were not parties to the Treaty should be urged to enter into general safeguards agreements with IAEA, although that in itself would not be sufficient.

87. All States parties should comply fully with the provisions of their respective agreements. In that light, Canada remained gravely concerned at the fact that IAEA could not verify the accuracy of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In those circumstances, IAEA could not offer any guarantees about the fate of the material. Canada was also concerned that since December 1998 IAEA had been unable to fulfil its mandate in Iraq, as required by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. Consequently, the Agency could not offer any assurances that Iraq was complying with its obligations under those resolutions. Both questions should be resolved as a matter of urgency. Canada urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iraq to cooperate fully with IAEA.

88. In the past five years, notable progress had been achieved in the adoption of measures to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards regime, but the system was now at a crossroads. One path led on through classical comprehensive safeguards. It offered the prospect of adding the new measures to the old approach, perhaps with a few minor adjustments. The other path was clearly more challenging, offering an opportunity to conceptualize, develop and apply new safeguards approaches for a State as a whole, based on the integration of old and new measures. The aim of the new approaches was to reaffirm guarantees of the absence of undeclared nuclear material, and of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material. With the new approaches, a State which signed the additional protocol would provide the Agency with enhanced information about its nuclear activities, and greater access to the places where those activities were carried on.

89. Canada believed that the Conference should encourage all States parties to conduct negotiations as soon as possible for an additional protocol, and to apply it as quickly as national law permitted. In that connection, the additional protocol signed by Canada had yet to be ratified, pending promulgation of the new nuclear safety and control act, which was expected by the end of May 2000.

90. In the view of Canada, if the Conference did not inspire the Agency and its member States to conclude promptly the work on safeguards, which had to be carried out with the resources available, that would certainly have a negative impact on achieving the primary objective, which was to encourage States to sign, ratify and apply the protocol. As a long-term goal, States parties should consider the possibility of establishing a general agreement on safeguards together with an additional protocol, in accordance with paragraph 12 of decision 2 of the 1995 Conference.

91. As for controls on exports of material relating to nuclear activities, they were a key element of an effective non-proliferation regime, in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. Those measures also facilitated international cooperation in nuclear activities for the benefit of economic and technological development, in line with the provisions of article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. States must establish effective controls in order to comply fully with the obligation to report on exports and imports of the articles specified in annexes I and II to the Model Additional Protocol. In Canada's opinion, the Conference should recognize the important function of export controls, and should continue to argue for transparency of such controls in the framework of dialogue and cooperation among interested States parties.

92. The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities was an integral part of the effective promotion of nuclear non-proliferation. For Canada, it was essential for all States to apply the IAEA recommendations concerning the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, as set out in document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4. Canada urged States parties to ratify the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and took the view that the Conference should consider ways and means of promoting those objectives.

93. Lastly, Canada reaffirmed its strong support for establishing internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. The Conference should actively promote the creation of other nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in regions of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia.

94. *Mr Kobieracki (Poland) resumed the Chair.*

95. **Mr. Cordeiro** (Brazil) pointed to the significance of the adoption by the Disarmament Commission, in 1999, of a document containing guidelines on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and setting out concepts and principles which had been the subject of many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly over the past decade.

96. Since the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, in 1978, it had been recognized that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, based on arrangements freely arrived at among States of a particular region, constituted an important disarmament measure which enhanced regional and global peace and security, strengthened the non-proliferation regime and contributed to the attainment of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. Since 1996 Brazil and other States parties to existing agreements had been sponsoring a resolution in the General Assembly which noted that the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas were an emerging nuclear-weapon-free zone, and urging all States to contribute in consolidating that situation.

97. The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties should take account of the developments which had taken place since 1995: the consolidation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the conclusion of the Treaties of Bangkok and Pelindaba, the many ratifications of additional protocols whereby nuclear-weapon States gave negative security assurances, the steps taken by Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and the intention of States in existing zones to increase cooperation among the various nuclear-weapon-free zones and to feature that in the final published document.

98. It was a matter of priority to ensure that nuclear-weapon States which had not done so ratified as soon as possible the additional protocols to the respective treaties, and that all States considered the proposals to that effect, including those reflected in resolutions of the General Assembly on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and South Asia, issues which his country would also like to see reflected in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference.

99. Lastly, he emphasized that Brazil's support for the establishment of zones of peace was not in fact limited to nuclear-weapon-free zones. In partnership with 21 African and South American countries, Brazil had promoted the concept of a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic. In Ushuaia in 1998, the member countries and associated countries of MERCOSUR had declared MERCOSUR, Chile and Bolivia a zone of peace free from weapons of mass destruction. His delegation pledged its full support in finding common approaches to the important issue of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

100. **Mr. Rich** (United States of America) said that the international non-proliferation regime could be likened to an architectural structure deriving stability from its constitutive elements, which were mutually reinforcing. Safeguards protected and warned against any attempt to divert nuclear material for illicit use; sound conditions of supply helped to ensure that nuclear commerce did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and nuclear-weapon-free zones reinforced the Treaty regime at the global level.

101. In the past five years the safeguards system had seen noteworthy developments. In June 1995 measures had been adopted to strengthen it, under powers which the Agency had possessed in the model full-scope safeguards agreement (IAEA document INFCIRC/153); in May 1998 the member States had agreed to strengthen safeguards still further by establishing new measures under the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements. Since then they had worked diligently with IAEA to integrate those measures with the ones contemplated in document INFCIRC/153.

102. The common goal should be to optimize the combination of measures provided for both in the comprehensive safeguards agreements and in the additional protocols. The "optimum combination" should be technically sound, cover all possible paths to procurement and retain the positive aspects of the traditional measures (such as nuclear material accountancy), while augmenting their value by

introducing new measures. If the transition to that "optimum combination" was properly carried out, the safeguards system would be strengthened by giving it an added objective, rather than modifying one it already had. The new system should provide assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear activity, while continuing to guarantee that nuclear material used for declared activities could not be diverted for other purposes. By acquiring broader scope, the safeguards would strengthen the non-proliferation regime and thereby international security. The United States hoped that the new measures would be widely adopted and implemented. The strengthened system of safeguards should become the new international standard. To date 40 States, including the five nuclear-weapon Powers, had signed protocols, nine of which had already entered into force. However, many States had not even entered into the comprehensive safeguards agreements required by article III of the Treaty. The United States urged them to do so, and at the same time to sign and implement additional protocols.

103. In the context of safeguards, mention must be made of the two States which were in breach of their safeguards agreements and of related resolutions of the Security Council. The United States urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cooperate with IAEA by coming into full compliance with its safeguards agreement, and urged Iraq to respect in full its obligations under the Treaty, as directed by the Security Council.

104. The United States was convinced that strengthening the non-proliferation regime required IAEA to have adequate resources available to do its work, and was firmly committed to that. Of course, it took the view that resources should be managed with maximum efficiency and effectiveness, and commended the Agency on its efforts in that regard.

105. Although the safeguards system was available to prevent proliferation, extra care was required when dealing with weapon-usable material. It was a positive fact that in 1997, recognizing the importance of curbing the unnecessary accumulation of separated plutonium, nine countries had adopted international guidelines designed to promote transparency and strategic planning in civil applications of plutonium, which presupposed acceptance of the principle of balancing supply and demand.

106. The United States was also committed to reducing to a minimum the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for civilian purposes. It was encouraging to know that, thanks to current research, HEU in research reactors could in future be substituted by new nuclear fuels containing low-enriched uranium (LEU). A number of countries, including Australia, Canada, China, France, the Republic of Korea and Thailand, had made the commendable decision to design new research reactors using LEU as fuel. As part of the programme for Reduced Enrichment in Research and Test Reactors, supported by the United States, a number of countries were seeking to develop a process using LEU instead of HEU to produce molybdenum-99, for use in nuclear medicine. To help States substitute LEU for HEU, the Department of Energy of the United States had decided in 1996 to accept return shipments of fuel (either spent or fresh, both HEU and LEU) from reactors where a pledge had been made to shut down or convert before May 2006. The United States hoped that the Committee would recognize the importance of reducing civilian applications of HEU to a minimum.

107. As for the management of nuclear material which was usable for the manufacture of weapons, it was necessary not only to ensure that its production and use were reduced to a minimum, but also that secure methods were available for disposing finally of material released from military programmes. The United States and the Russian Federation were working together to convert excess fissile material in such a way that it would either be used for civilian purposes or remain unavailable for military applications. Both countries and IAEA were seeking to create a legal mechanism and an efficient system whereby the Agency could verify the completion of measures to render irreversible the reduction of nuclear arsenals.

108. To prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear material, it was essential to strengthen the international system of physical protection, which could not be done without increased international cooperation. Thanks to IAEA's International Physical Protection Advisory Service, member States had been able to assess and strengthen the security of their own systems. Reflecting the concern excited by the question, there had been a growth in demand for training courses and an increase in technical cooperation projects to promote the security of nuclear material and facilities. The United States hoped that the Convention on the Physical

Protection of Nuclear Material would be strengthened and that the same standards would apply to the use, storage and transport of nuclear material at the national level as in the international sphere.

109. With regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, the United States continued to support treaties which were consistent with its well-known criteria. It had already signed the Protocols to the Treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba, and was working intensively with the countries in the region to find a formula which would enable it to sign the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok. It had consulted closely with the countries which were negotiating for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

110. While trade was being promoted in nuclear technologies and materials to be used for peaceful purposes, controls must be introduced on exports in order to ensure that such trade did not lead to proliferation. Article III, paragraph 2, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty provided that nuclear material and equipment could only be supplied subject to the comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Zangger Committee had been established in order to develop a common criterion for implementing that requirement, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group ensured that nuclear trade was conducted in a manner consistent with the principle of non-proliferation, thus fostering confidence that international security would not be subjected to commercial interests.

111. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference had endorsed full-scope safeguards as a condition for the supply of new nuclear material. That condition reinforced the principle of preferential cooperation among parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States urged all States to take that principle into account in new supply arrangements and, in the case of existing agreements, to adapt them to it as soon as possible.

112. The parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had also recognized the importance of controlling dual-use exports. Dual-use technologies were becoming increasingly widespread, so the application of such controls was especially important, as shown in the case of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme.

113. In 1995 the Review Conference had also adopted the principle of transparency in the control of nuclear-related exports, within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested parties to the Treaty. To fulfil that objective, the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group had organized seminars in 1997 and 1999, in Vienna and New York respectively, on the role of export controls in strengthening nuclear non-proliferation. Representatives of members and non-members of the Group had spoken at the seminars, which all States had been invited to attend. The members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group had prepared a collective document for the seminars explaining the origins, development, purposes and effects of nuclear-related export controls, published by IAEA under the symbol INFCIRC/539.

114. The United States believed that the Treaty regime was being consolidated and that much progress had been achieved over the past five years. The IAEA safeguards system had been strengthened, cooperation in the management and control of nuclear material usable for military purposes had improved, and so too had cooperation for the physical protection of such material. Controls of nuclear-related exports were much more transparent, and nuclear-weapon-free zones were playing a more important role in regional security.

115. **Mr. Abe** (Japan) welcomed the fact that since the 1995 Review Conference, nine new countries had joined the Treaty. States parties should urge those States which had not ratified the Treaty to do so as soon as possible. States parties should also ensure the irreversibility of non-proliferation by shoring up and strengthening the Treaty regime.

116. Nuclear testing by India and Pakistan had constituted the most serious challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime over the previous five years; the international community should have continuous dialogue with both countries by sending a clear message that nuclear proliferation in South Asia was a matter of global concern and by calling for steps to be taken by both countries to respect the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Japan considered it particularly important that both countries should sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as their leaders had promised at the United Nations General Assembly.

117. Japan believed that although the Middle East was a region in which only one country was still outside the Treaty, there was some evident risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It was therefore regrettable that no significant step had been taken on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, as

stipulated in the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Serious work should be done during the coming five years to implement the resolution. In that connection, Japan was encouraged by the fact that the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), which had been established by United Nations Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), was being set up.

118. Turning to North-East Asia, he said Japan believed that the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea provided a most realistic and effective approach to keep the Democratic People's Republic harnessed to the non-proliferation regime, which it had threatened to abandon. Japan had therefore been contributing to the light water reactor (LWR) project through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

119. In that context, he recalled that under the terms of the Agreed Framework, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remained a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and was committed to allowing implementation of its safeguards agreement. The international community had repeatedly expressed the view, at meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations, that the safeguards agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and IAEA was still in force despite the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's withdrawal from IAEA, and that the State was obliged to fulfil its obligations under that agreement. The LWR project had recently entered the stage of full-scale construction and, at that critical juncture, Japan wished to reiterate that full compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its safeguards agreement with IAEA was a major premise for the construction of LWRs in the Democratic People's Republic. Furthermore, Japan encouraged the Democratic People's Republic to faithfully fulfil all the obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, in particular, to collaborate with IAEA without delay in order to achieve full compliance with the safeguards agreement.

120. The IAEA safeguards system was essential for the maintenance of the non-proliferation regime established under the Treaty. Japan wished to underscore the importance of the Model Additional Protocol and recalled that it was one of the first countries whose additional protocols with IAEA had entered into force. He reiterated that there should be some form of international action plan to rapidly conclude the protocols, and urged IAEA and member States to take concrete steps to that end. In considering such an action plan, countries might wish to convene an international conference. Japan was ready to work with IAEA and other member States in that regard.

121. With regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, Japan welcomed the fact that agreements had been concluded for two regions, namely Africa and South-East Asia, and hoped that the Pelindaba Treaty would come into force at an early date and that agreement would be reached on the protocol of the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone between the States in the region and the nuclear-weapon States. Japan vigorously supported the five Central Asian countries which were currently engaged in negotiations on a treaty to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and had offered to host a meeting at which those negotiations could be pursued.

122. His Government was convinced that there should be strict control of export licences for goods and technology which could be used for the production of nuclear weapons, and that they should be issued only when the recipient countries adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or an equivalent treaty, and had in force a safeguards agreement with IAEA. Japan urged other countries to take similarly strict steps.

123. Japan supported the mechanisms of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group as multilateral resources in that field, and appreciated recent efforts by the Group to increase transparency in its activities, in response to the decision taken by the 1995 Review Conference.

124. **Mr. Gorita** (Romania) expressed his support for the statement made by the Director General of IAEA, and recognized the importance of the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, cooperation regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment for the transfer of nuclear technologies, and assistance to States that fully applied the safeguards agreements.

125. As a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Romania had adapted its legal and institutional framework in the field of non-proliferation and control of nuclear-related activities, and had signed all relevant agreements and conventions in those areas. On 11 June 1999, Romania had signed the additional protocol to

the safeguards agreement, which allowed IAEA to establish better control over all nuclear activities.

126. At the national level, the adoption of the European convention regarding environment protection through criminal law was under consideration. With regard to the control of nuclear exports, Romania believed that the established mechanisms were important factors for nuclear non-proliferation. As a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, it fully met its obligations and commitments under that arrangement. Although it was not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, since 1993 Romania had adopted the control list and guidelines issued by the Regime. The Government had adopted Emergency Ordinance No. 158/1999, concerning the control of strategic exports, and would also adopt the consolidated list comprising the technologies and products which were subject to export control. The Romanian Non-Proliferation Group had been set up in June 1998 to prevent illicit trafficking in materials which could be used in the production of weapons.

127. Romania appealed to all countries to sign the safeguards agreements and to accede to the Model Additional Protocol to the agreements, in order to allow the necessary surveillance for the diffusion of nuclear scientific knowledge for the benefit of all humanity.

128. **Mr. Suh** Dae-won (Republic of Korea) said that the safeguards system introduced in response to article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been very effective, particularly in verifying States' declared nuclear material and facilities. However, the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme had awakened the international community to the need to strengthen the existing safeguards system. The Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements should provide IAEA with a powerful tool for verifying States' compliance with their non-proliferation commitments. Nonetheless, it was important to secure universality of the protocol for effective assurance of non-proliferation. The Republic of Korea had signed an additional protocol in June 1999 and was taking measures for its early implementation.

129. The background paper prepared by the IAEA secretariat (NPT/CONF.2000/9) reported that the Agency remained unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on its nuclear material subject to safeguards and, accordingly, could provide no assurance about non-diversion. It further reported that, despite 13 rounds of technical consultations between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since 1994, no progress had been made on certain key issues, in particular the preservation of the information needed to enable the Agency to verify the initial declaration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its nuclear material and facilities subject to safeguards. As called for by General Assembly and IAEA resolutions, his delegation urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with its safeguards obligations.

130. His delegation was pleased to note that more than 100 States had signed treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, covering more than 50 per cent of the Earth's surface. It also welcomed the guidelines and principles on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, adopted by consensus in the Disarmament Commission.

131. Moreover, an effective non-proliferation regime should be accompanied by measures to warrant nuclear material security and export control. The IAEA efforts to detect and curb illicit trafficking in nuclear material were praiseworthy. It was to be hoped that the ongoing discussion on ways and means of strengthening the regime of physical protection of nuclear material would have a satisfactory outcome.

132. With regard to nuclear export control, his delegation took note of the vital contribution of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Particularly noteworthy were the international seminars on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation, which had strengthened the regime by broadening the understanding of its legitimacy.

133. Lastly, his delegation wished to emphasize that it had faithfully fulfilled its obligations under the nuclear export control regime since joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in October 1995.

134. **Mr. Hasan** (Iraq) reiterated that his country was prepared to offer its cooperation with a view to achieving the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As the objective of the Conference was to review the implementation of the Treaty since the convening of the 1995 Conference of the Parties, distorted and incomplete versions of previous events

should not be brought up for political purposes, so as not to impede the attainment of the proposed worthy goals.

135. Iraq fully complied with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards system, as the IAEA inspectors had been able to confirm on their visit to Iraq in January 2000. IAEA had indicated that Iraq had cooperated fully with its inspection team and that all nuclear materials had been verified and the results were consistent with the reports submitted. Therefore, anyone who requested Iraq to abide by the safeguards system did not know the facts or was attempting to overlook them. Rather than rehashing erroneous information, the question to be asked was how a depositary State of the Treaty, like the United States of America, could open up its nuclear laboratories to experts from a State which was not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, namely, Israel, in accordance with an agreement signed in 2000 between the two States while preparations for the Conference of the Parties were under way.

136. As for the relationship between Iraq and the Security Council, that was a purely political question which had no connection whatsoever with Iraq's obligations under the Treaty and safeguards system. Those who insisted on that point should contemplate all the aspects of that relationship. In the first place, IAEA activities had been utilized for purposes of spying on Iraq; indeed, the information obtained in the inspections had been communicated to Washington. The inspectors themselves had admitted that espionage activities for the United States and Israeli intelligence services had been carried out, a fact which even the United States had not denied.

137. The use of IAEA and the United Nations for espionage activities had undermined the prestige of both organizations. Iraq urged IAEA to investigate that scandal and to inform the States parties to the Treaty of its findings. It was to be hoped that the Committee would formulate recommendations in that regard.

138. In the second place, IAEA had withdrawn its inspection and verification teams from Iraq in accordance with instructions from the Executive-Chairman of the Special Commission, Mr. Richard Butler, in violation of his obligations and responsibilities, without eliciting any reaction from the Security Council. That meant that activities in Iraq had been suspended since 16 December 1998. That fact had to be pointed out in order to examine the situation with complete objectivity.

139. The depositary States of the Treaty, namely, the United States and Great Britain, had organized air attacks against facilities subject to the IAEA safeguards system only hours after the departure of the IAEA inspectors. The attacks had caused the destruction of equipment left behind by the inspectors, including sensors and cameras. The illegal use of force, without any authorization from the Security Council, had destroyed the IAEA control system in various Iraqi towns. It was to be hoped that the Committee would condemn those acts of aggression and that Iraq would be compensated for the damage suffered.

140. The United States and Great Britain had utilized depleted uranium ammunition in their attacks against Iraq, in violation of their obligations under the Treaty. That ammunition had again been utilized against Yugoslavia in 1999. Radioactive weapons had also been used, causing the death of thousands of Iraqi civilians, particularly children, and various types of cancer, including leukaemia. The issue was whether the Commission would recommend the non-use of such ammunition in war and compensation for Iraq and would send an IAEA mission to eliminate uranium residue from such ammunition.

141. It should be recalled that the main blow to the safeguards system had been the 1981 Israeli attack against Iraqi nuclear facilities that were intended for peaceful uses. In its resolution 487 (1981), the Security Council had called upon Israel to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. That resolution had not been complied with thus far. It was to be hoped that the Committee would be fair to Iraq and recommend the prohibition of all types of attacks against nuclear facilities subject to the safeguards system and compensation to Iraq for the damage caused by those acts.

142. In paragraph 14 of its resolution 687 (1991), the Security Council had indicated that the actions to be taken by Iraq should be aimed at establishing a zone free from nuclear weapons and all types of weapons of mass destruction. Thus far, that paragraph had not been implemented. It was to be hoped that the Committee would recommend that Israel should accede to the Treaty and subject its facilities to safeguards with a view to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

143. He hoped that the deliberations of the Conference and Committee would include an analysis of the setbacks in order to overcome them and face the future in a spirit of collective action which promoted confidence in the Treaty and the safeguards system, and their universal application.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.

Main Committee II

Summary record of the 2nd meeting
Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 2 May 2000, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Kobieracki .... (Poland)

Contents

Exchange of views (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

Exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) said that nuclear non-proliferation, like nuclear disarmament, was an effective means and a necessary stage for the complete and comprehensive elimination of nuclear weapons, and its importance was self-evident. However, the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons could not proceed in a vacuum: it was closely linked to the international security situation and scientific and technological development. Although the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had been extended indefinitely in 1995, there had been a series of negative developments recently. The international arms control and disarmament process was now at a crossroads, and the defects and shortcomings of the international non-proliferation regime were becoming increasingly evident; correcting those unfavourable trends, overcoming problems and ensuring the correct direction for non-proliferation would be the key factors in determining the survival of the non-proliferation regime. At the same time, scientific and technological development, increasing globalization and the advent of the information age all helped to complicate the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Experience had shown that it would be very difficult to achieve the goal of non-proliferation by relying only on traditional means such as containment and pressure.

2. Under the new circumstances, the question of how to effectively prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons was an issue facing the entire international community. Accordingly, efforts needed to be made in three areas.

3. First, the countries of the world must work hard to build a new international political and economic order that was just and fair. If some countries made a commitment to renounce a nuclear deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons and pursuit of absolute military superiority, thereby giving all members of the international community a sense of security on a basis of equality, that would help to eliminate completely the incentive for some countries to acquire, develop or retain nuclear weapons. Therefore, States parties should express the firm belief that it was necessary to establish a global security environment of stability, cooperation and mutual trust; that would be the basic guarantee for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

4. Second, the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be aimed at enhancing security for all countries, and the only criterion should be whether the NPT was being observed. It should not aim to increase the security of individual countries or a few countries and should not be based on the likings of individual States; it was even more inappropriate for a State to impose its own laws or interests upon the international community and other countries. That would damage the credibility of the non-proliferation regime, and the widespread support for the regime would be lost. States parties should therefore request the abolition of the practice of double standards or multiple standards in the field of nuclear non-proliferation; that was the most important prerequisite for the success of nuclear non-proliferation.

5. Third, the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could only be undertaken by the international community as a common effort. No country, however strong, could achieve the objectives of non-proliferation solely through its own efforts, or with the help of a few allies. Any unilateral tendencies would be contrary to the mainstream of international non-proliferation efforts. States parties to the Treaty should therefore urge the international community to enhance cooperation and dialogue in the field of non-proliferation issues and to seek solutions to all concerns or issues of proliferation or non-proliferation strictly in accordance with the obligations, procedures and mechanisms established by the relevant international legal instruments. That was the correct and most effective way to deal with the issue of nuclear-weapons proliferation.

6. A second issue facing the Committee was regional non-proliferation. The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 had clouded the future of the non-proliferation regime somewhat. The international community had reacted strongly: the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the Security Council had issued a communiqué and the Security Council had adopted resolution 1172 (1998) on the subject. The States parties should therefore reaffirm that that resolution established the correct principles and directions for the solution of the nuclear issue in South Asia. The authority and integrity of the resolution must be safeguarded. The two countries concerned should fully implement it at an early date.

7. With regard to the Middle East, his delegation had made some comments on the previous day in a subsidiary body. China actively supported the proposal by the countries of the Middle East for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region and their active efforts to that end, since such a zone would promote peace and stability there. It urged Israel to accede to the NPT as soon as possible and accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. His delegation believed that active consideration should be given to the proposals made by Egypt in its working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.9).

8. With regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, the establishment of such zones would do much to advance the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the safeguarding of global peace and security, and the ultimate achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The non-nuclear-weapon States had made and were continuing to make active efforts in that regard. States parties should therefore support the efforts by non-nuclear-weapon States to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones freely arrived at among the States concerned. They should also support the efforts to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, and affirm that the principles on establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones adopted unanimously by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1999 remained valid and should be observed faithfully.

9. The IAEA safeguards mechanism was a very important means of achieving the purposes and objectives of the non-proliferation Treaty and should be effectively strengthened. States parties should fully support the IAEA 93+2 Protocol and urge all countries to conclude, ratify and implement the Protocol as soon as possible.

10. His delegation had submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.11) and hoped that it would be included in the report on the Committee's work or in the relevant parts of the final document of the Conference.

11. **Mr. Biggs** (Australia), speaking on behalf of Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Australia, said that those countries had submitted a series of working papers to the Committee, in documents NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.2 to WP.8. Their objective was to promote the successful review of article 3 and article 4 issues within the relevant Main Committees and thereby promote a fruitful outcome of the Conference as a whole. The papers all included ideas and language suitable for use in three complementary ways: for recording significant developments over the past five years, for identifying States parties' aspirations and intentions over the next five years, and as a common foundation for national statements on non-proliferation topics, while recognizing that national views were likely to go beyond the basic positions expressed in the working papers. In drafting the working papers, particular attention had been paid to the work of Main Committees II and III in 1995, to the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and to recent resolutions of the IAEA General Conference.

12. Introducing the working paper entitled "Introduction", in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.2, he said that the submitting countries were aiming at a consensus output that would incorporate all the facts, views and proposals brought to the Committee's attention. The working paper drew heavily on the report of Main Committee II of 1995 and dealt essentially with the function of verification in the non-proliferation system and a number of political items, such as universality and the inability of IAEA to implement its mandate in Iraq or to conclude that there had been no diversion of nuclear material in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

13. **Mr. Maerli** (Norway) said that his delegation attached great importance to the work of IAEA to enhance nuclear non-proliferation, particularly by strengthening the comprehensive safeguards system. The very first IAEA safeguard inspection had taken place in Norway in 1962. His Government had signed an additional protocol to its 1972 comprehensive safeguards agreement, which would enter into force shortly. It urged States which had not yet done so to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols, in order to make the safeguards system as universal as possible.

14. The circumstances which made IAEA unable to fully implement its mandate in Iraq under the relevant Security Council resolutions and the lack of cooperation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in fulfilling its obligations under the safeguards agreement were of great concern. It was therefore of

the utmost importance that the two States should fully comply with the inspection mandate given to IAEA.

15. He welcomed the efforts of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to submit excess fissile material for IAEA verification, especially considering the huge quantities of fissile material in the two States, and called on all nuclear-weapon States to do likewise.

16. The IAEA workload had significantly increased; while IAEA must strive to optimize its resources, funding for safeguards activities must be made available in a sufficient and predictable manner.

17. He called on all States to take measures to ensure that exports of sensitive material, equipment and technologies were subject to a transparent system of surveillance and control; such efforts would facilitate cooperative technological development by assuring suppliers that goods, technology and material would be used only for peaceful purposes. Moreover, States should follow the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group when considering exporting sensitive nuclear-related material, equipment and technologies, taking into account full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply, in accordance with paragraph 12 of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

18. All States must ensure that sufficient physical protection was provided for nuclear material. Strict management of fissile material until it was deposited safely and irreversibly could reduce the proliferation risk substantially. International standards would serve as an important framework for implementing national security measures.

19. He welcomed the recent revision of the IAEA recommendations for the protection of fissile materials; since the degree of implementation varied widely at the national level, consideration should be given to making the voluntary recommendations mandatory. Moreover, States which had not yet done so should accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Efforts to make the Convention applicable to nuclear material for peaceful uses while in use or storage within a country should be supported.

20. His Government acknowledged the need for adequate and effective measures to interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials and believed that new and more comprehensive cooperative efforts might be required. It therefore welcomed international and national inter-agency cooperative initiatives. The contact group model, successfully implemented in Norway, facilitated cooperation between relevant domestic agencies and could serve the needs of other States as well.

21. Norway's views were reflected in a separate working paper, in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.12.

22. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt), noting that there had been some positive developments in the safeguards regime of IAEA since the 1995 Conference, welcomed the adoption in 1997 of a Model Additional Protocol designed to strengthen existing safeguards agreements between States and the Agency. Egypt had participated in the elaboration of that regime with a view to enhancing its effectiveness as one of the main pillars for achieving nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, in accordance with the Principles and Objectives of the 1995 Review Conference.

23. At the same time, there was a need to expand the safeguards regime to include States which had not yet concluded full-scope safeguards agreements with IAEA or had nuclear programmes not covered by that regime. There was a clear relationship between the IAEA safeguards regime and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In the Middle East, for example, Israel continued its anachronistic nuclear-deterrent strategy and rejected the safeguards regime, thereby threatening the security and stability of the region. With a view to promoting non-proliferation and strengthening the safeguards regime, Egypt proposed that the conclusions of the Conference should include an appeal to the nuclear States not parties to the Treaty to accelerate the conclusion of full-scope safeguards agreements and to Israel in particular to accede without delay and to place all its nuclear facilities under the safeguards regime.

24. Egypt's initiative in the General Assembly over 25 years earlier in calling for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East reflected the importance it attached to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in that region. The President of Egypt had reiterated that call in 1990. In Egypt's view, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in any region was vital to the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and required both regional and international support. Some support was provided by

the guidelines adopted by the Disarmament Commission relating, *inter alia*, to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of a region.

25. Implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference depended on the political will of the States of the region. Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty and to submit to the IAEA safeguards regime until certain prior conditions were met impeded the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Consequently, the responsibility for attaining that goal fell to the nuclear-weapon States. Given that the Arab States had cooperated by becoming parties to the Treaty and placing their nuclear facilities under the safeguards regime or were about to sign agreements to that end, it was incumbent upon Israel to follow suit with a view to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and to enhancing the credibility of the Treaty, thereby establishing a solid foundation for a security system in the Middle East.

26. **Mr. Laohaphan** (Thailand) said that Thailand, as the depositary of the Treaty of Bangkok, establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia, appreciated the support expressed by many delegations for the progress of the Treaty, which had been signed in December 1995 and had entered into force in March 1997. Various organs had been established to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, and meetings had been held to consider the rules of procedure and future work plans. The Treaty of Bangkok also provided for constructive engagement with IAEA in many areas. Consultations had been undertaken with IAEA on the implementation of the relevant provisions and on possible forms of cooperation between States parties and IAEA.

27. Little progress had been made regarding the accession of the nuclear-weapon States to the Protocol, even though they had all agreed to principle 5 of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. To date, China was the only State which had shown a readiness to sign and ratify the Protocol. It was hoped that other nuclear-weapon States would do so in the near future and would show more flexibility in reaching a compromise solution with the countries of the region.

28. His delegation regarded the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol to strengthen existing safeguards agreements as a significant development of the safeguards system and believed that, once it was fully implemented, any undue export controls should be eliminated. Transparency and consultations with developing countries parties to the NPT were a prerequisite in strengthening the safeguards system in the future. The developments made in the safeguards system over the past five years should be reviewed, and the future plan of work needed to be determined.

29. On the financing of safeguards, his delegation believed that States which had taken part in the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, either directly or indirectly, had a special responsibility in that respect. The privilege of possessing nuclear weapons in the interests of national security should be accompanied by a responsibility to bear the burden of safeguarding those weapons and their materials. That commitment was stipulated in article I of the Treaty. It would be unjust if the States which complied with non-proliferation objectives had to assume the burden of safeguarding the dismantled materials or equipment from weapons they had never developed.

30. **Mr. Raja Adnan** (Malaysia) said that his delegation wished to associate itself with the working paper submitted by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the Treaty on the NPT (NPT/CONF.2000/18, annex) and, in particular, those paragraphs concerning articles III, IV and VII and other related provisions of the Treaty.

31. The adoption of the Model Protocol Additional to existent IAEA safeguards agreements had been a welcome development. Regrettably, there had been little progress in the signature and entry into force of such additional protocols. His delegation considered that the trigger list adopted as annex II to the Model Additional Protocol lacked explanation, giving rise to problems in its implementation, in particular by such front-line personnel as customs officers, who lacked the requisite technical expertise. There was a need to refine the trigger list by defining the relative proliferation-sensitivity of the items listed and bringing it into line with international customs coding systems. Also, assistance must be provided in training personnel from national enforcement agencies responsible for import and export control and licensing.

32. His Government considered that nuclear suppliers should apply less rigorous export controls with respect to non-nuclear-weapon States that had concluded

additional protocols with IAEA. Furthermore, unilateral export controls that went beyond the requirements of the extended safeguards system should be eased. Such measures would be consistent with the recognition of IAEA as the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with its safeguards system and would provide an incentive for States to sign additional protocols.

33. It was to be hoped that, in future, any further strengthening of the safeguards system would be undertaken with greater transparency. Due regard must be given to the concerns of States that had signed the NPT and, at the same time, were becoming major players in the legitimate international trade. The need to extend the safeguards system to include dual-use items must be reassessed.

34. The holding in 1997 and 1999 of two international seminars on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation had been a positive step, but more should be done to promote transparency in that area. His Government supported the proposal made at the 1997 seminar that the nuclear suppliers should circulate information on the approval and denial of nuclear-related exports to all States, including non-parties to the Treaty, and that IAEA should act as a clearing house for such information. The alternative was the operation of disparate multilateral nuclear-related export control regimes outside the scope and provisions of the Treaty. The recognition by the Conference of export control arrangements that were not open to all States parties to the Treaty would serve only to exacerbate the strain that already existed in the relations between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States.

35. IAEA was to be commended for its fairness and professionalism in carrying out the tasks entrusted to it by the Treaty. It would be important to draw on the Agency's experience when developing a verification system for the fissile material cut-off convention. Designating IAEA itself as the verification agency would avoid a proliferation of international arms control and safeguards bodies, ensuring thereby that the whole regime was more cost-effective and efficient.

36. His delegation, while welcoming the trilateral initiative of IAEA, the United States and the Russian Federation to consider practical measures for the application of IAEA verification to weapon-origin fissile materials, was concerned lest the Agency's no less important role in promoting the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes should be overshadowed. The Agency's technical cooperation programme was a vital confidence-building measure, which encouraged member States to be more transparent with respect to their national nuclear programmes and helped to deter the diversion of nuclear materials for non-peaceful purposes.

37. The nuclear-weapon States had long enjoyed immense privilege and power through their continued possession of weapons of mass destruction. His delegation therefore considered that those States and any States that had hosted test sites or allowed nuclear weapons to be deployed in their territories had a special responsibility for the financing of safeguards and bilateral and multilateral nuclear arms control and verification initiatives. States that had unequivocally renounced nuclear weapons should not be burdened with the cost of their dismantlement.

38. Given the lack of progress achieved in the field of nuclear disarmament and the reversion to policies allowing first use of nuclear weapons, it was imperative that the nuclear-weapon States should become parties to the protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. Regrettably, only one nuclear-weapon State had signed the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), despite the commitment to support the establishment of such zones expressed in the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".

39. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) noted with satisfaction that, since 1995, a further 28 States parties to the Treaty had concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA. All States parties that had not yet done so should conclude such agreements, in accordance with paragraph 10 of the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament". In paragraph 9 of that decision, the States parties had affirmed that IAEA was the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with its statute and safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties. The strengthening of the safeguards system would better enable the Agency to carry out its verification functions. His delegation supported IAEA efforts in that direction, in particular the adoption of the Model Protocol Additional to existent safeguards agreements. His Government, which had signed an

additional protocol on 22 March 2000, urged all States parties to the Treaty that had not yet done so to conclude such a protocol with IAEA as quickly as possible.

40. His delegation welcomed the commencement by IAEA of work on the establishment of an integrated safeguards system. Such a system must be more than the sum of the existing technical measures and monitoring procedures and the measures provided for in the Model Additional Protocol. It must be a means of ensuring that the Agency received comprehensive information on the nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, without being a burden on States that had concluded additional protocols with IAEA. The integrated safeguards system must take account of new technology developed to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials and the conversion of nuclear installations to non-peaceful purposes.

41. The Russian Federation was contributing to the technical development of safeguards through a national support programme aimed at improving analytical methods, modernizing the technical means employed, and producing and certifying samples of nuclear material. It conducted annual training for specialists working in the fields of nuclear materials accounting and monitoring and for IAEA inspectors.

42. A successful example of multilateral cooperation to enhance Agency safeguards was the trilateral cooperation between the Russian Federation, China and IAEA in developing new safeguards procedures that took account of the unique technical characteristics of gas-centrifugal equipment of Russian construction installed by the Russian Federation in a Chinese uranium-enrichment plant. Experts in the field considered that the new procedures could be applied to equipment of the same type in uranium-enrichment plants in other countries. The Russian Federation was engaged in similar cooperation with other countries members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

43. IAEA was to be commended for its efforts to organize international verification of weapon-origin fissile material deemed not to be needed for defence purposes. At their meeting in Vienna in September 1996 the Minister of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, the Secretary of Energy of the United States and the Director-General of IAEA had come to an understanding concerning the importance of establishing a verification regime that, on the one hand, would not violate the obligations of the Russian Federation and the United States under article I of the Treaty and, on the other, would demonstrate the commitment of both States to the process of nuclear disarmament. A joint working group set up to consider the technical, legal, administrative and financial issues involved had concluded that it would be possible to implement Agency verification of weapon-origin fissile material without disclosure to the IAEA secretariat or its inspectors of information on the secret parameters of such material or indirect data on the characteristics of nuclear weapons.

44. In order for the States parties to the Treaty to comply with the provisions of article III, paragraph 2, there was a need for effective systems of nuclear materials accounting and control at the national level, as well as export control procedures. The Russian Federation was an active participant in such multilateral export control mechanisms as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, which had held two international seminars on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation with a view to increasing transparency and promoting dialogue with interested States parties, in accordance with the provisions of the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted by the 1995 Conference. The Russian Federation was also cooperating with other CIS member countries in the area of export controls.

45. The Russian Federation was continuously refining its national legislation on export controls. In accordance with its international obligations, nuclear materials, equipment and technology were supplied only to those non-nuclear-weapon States that had placed their peaceful nuclear activities entirely under IAEA supervision. In order to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and other radioactive substances, it was participating in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database Programme and the review of existing international instruments in the field of physical protection of nuclear materials. In addition, it had undertaken to provide to IAEA on a regular basis data on its stocks of and strategy for handling civilian plutonium.

46. His delegation considered that significant progress had been made since 1995 in the enhancement of the IAEA safeguards system and the implementation

of the relevant provisions of the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".

47. **Mr. Mayor** (Switzerland) said that the events of the past decade in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had demonstrated the fundamental role of safeguards in generating and maintaining the confidence necessary for the harmonious development of humankind. That confidence was clearly dependent on the credibility that all sides attached to the progress made in the negotiations on disarmament on the one hand and in the balanced implementation of the NPT on the other, the two being interlinked.

48. His delegation noted with satisfaction that 182 States had renounced nuclear weapons and, in so doing, had accepted IAEA safeguards. It also welcomed the signature of full-scope safeguards agreements with the Agency by a further 28 States since 1995. The adoption of the Model Additional Protocol to existent safeguards agreements had been another positive step. However, only eight States had ratified such protocols thus far. That failure was attributable in all likelihood to the lack of progress in the area of nuclear disarmament since the Treaty's entry into force.

49. The efforts aimed at placing the weapon-origin fissile material of the nuclear Powers under IAEA safeguards were welcome, but there had been insufficient progress towards their implementation. Furthermore, if those efforts were to yield real results, there was a need to ensure that the fissile material could never return to the military cycle and that the international community had assurances, first, that the fuel removed would not simply be replaced and, second, that the arms destroyed would not be replaced by new, more sophisticated weapons. In other words, the initiative must proceed with complete transparency.

50. With the conclusion of further additional protocols, the cost to IAEA of the safeguards system would inevitably increase. That problem would be difficult to resolve since, in most States, public finances were subject to severe constraints. Nevertheless, his delegation urged other States to follow the example of Switzerland, which was to sign an additional protocol in the next few days.

51. **Mr. Kerma** (Algeria) said that the risk of nuclear proliferation had not diminished, despite the end of the arms race. All States that had yet to do so should therefore accede to the Treaty and place their nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards. The credibility of the Treaty would be measured according to its universality.

52. Algeria, for its part, had affirmed its commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and its desire to contribute to the disarmament process by acceding to the Treaty in January 1995 and concluding a full-scope safeguards agreement with IAEA in March 1996. Subsidiary arrangements with respect to the modalities for implementation of the agreement were currently being finalized. In the meantime, Algeria had submitted all its nuclear installations to Agency inspection within the framework of the new regime.

53. His Government fully subscribed to the provisions of the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted by the 1995 Conference, in particular paragraph 9, which reiterated that IAEA was the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States with their safeguards agreements. Regrettably, a significant number of States had yet to conclude such agreements.

54. With the evolution of the nuclear threat, the Agency's role was changing. It would need considerable support in the future, especially to counter the risk posed by transnational organized crime. In order to realize the legitimate right of developing countries to have access to nuclear technology, it would also be vital to ensure that the implementation of measures aimed at strengthening the safeguards system was not prejudicial to the Agency's technical cooperation programme. In conclusion, the only real guarantee against the nuclear threat was the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

55. **Mr. Al-Hadithi** (Iraq), after noting that the representative of Norway had made a reference to Iraq's supposed non-compliance with Security Council resolutions, said that the Committee was not the appropriate forum to discuss the implementation of Security Council resolutions with regard to Iraq or any other State. However, he would point out that the United States and the United Kingdom had not been authorized by the Security Council to use depleted uranium weapons in 1991 or to impose no-fly zones after the 1991 war or to begin airstrikes in 1998. Neither had the Security Council given the United States the right to use inspection teams for espionage purposes contrary to the vital security interests of Iraq.

56. Iraq was in full compliance with NPT safeguard regimes, and as recently as March IAEA had reported that an inspection had been completed successfully in January 2000 with the full cooperation of the Iraqi authorities. The Director-General of IAEA had already reported to the Security Council in October 1998 (S/1998/927) that he was satisfied that Iraq's nuclear weapon programme had failed, it had no more than a few grams of weapon-grade nuclear material and had no capacity to produce nuclear weapons.

57. Although paragraph 4 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.2 noted that IAEA had been unable to implement its mandate in Iraq since 1998, he stressed that it was the bombing campaign by the United States and the United Kingdom which had led to the withdrawal of United Nations inspectors. Iraq was complying with Security Council resolutions and IAEA inspection and he advised against politicizing the work of IAEA, which would undermine not only its credibility but that of the NPT.

58. **Mr. Twist** (Ireland), introducing the working paper entitled "Resources for safeguards" (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.6) on behalf of Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden, said that the text of the working paper was largely based on the 1995 agreed report of Main Committee II (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.II/1). In the sixth line of paragraph 3, "impending" should be replaced by "current" to reflect the work being conducted by the representative of Spain at the request of the Board of Governors. In addition, the following wording of an IAEA General Conference resolution should be added at the end of paragraph 4: "pursuing a target of equal representation of women at all levels of agency employment including senior policy level and decision-making posts."

59. **Mr. Ikeda** (Japan) said that the working papers on safeguards in documents NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.1 and WP.2 were a good starting point for discussions. He nevertheless wished to suggest some changes to the text of the second. Paragraph 9 should contain language recognizing the fact that the additional protocols had become integral parts of the safeguards system. Accordingly, he suggested that the words "and that those measures have now become integral parts of the IAEA safeguards system" should be added to the end of the third sentence. In paragraph 10, nuclear-weapon States should be urged to bring into force additional protocols as well and, in that regard, he welcomed the fact that the five permanent members of the Security Council had indicated their willingness to do so in their statements. He also called on State's not parties to follow the example of Cuba by concluding additional protocols and said that greater energy must be devoted to promoting and facilitating the conclusion of IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols.

60. Although paragraph 12 of the same working paper captured the need for measures to strengthen and improve the safeguards system, a detailed plan of action was required. The following reference to such a plan could be added at the end of paragraph 12: "(a) For these reasons, it is imperative that the conclusion of safeguards agreements with the IAEA and additional protocols must be actively encouraged and promoted; (b) To this end, the Conference recommends the Director-General of IAEA and the IAEA member States to consider a plan of action to promote and facilitate the conclusion and the entry into force of such agreements, as well as additional protocols; (c) Such a plan of action may contain specific measures to assist States with less experience in nuclear activities to implement legal requirements and, if it is deemed appropriate and necessary, an arrangement to convene a high-level conference at an appropriate time to take stock of the situation and promote exchange of information in these aspects."

61. He hoped that those points could be incorporated into a revised text and submitted to the Chair as soon as possible.

62. **Mr. Schmidt** (Austria), speaking with reference to paragraph 4 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.3, stressed that it was important that even States without significant nuclear activities should implement simplified agreements with IAEA since they were essential for the entry into force of additional protocols. Paragraph 5 was a new paragraph which dealt with the situation relating to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. With regard to paragraphs 8 and 9, he recalled that IAEA Programme 93+2 had two parts: one on the strengthening of safeguard agreements and one on additional protocols. Paragraph 8 was related to the former and paragraph 9 to the latter. Paragraph 13 made it clear that the strengthening of safeguards should not lead to a decrease in the resources available for technical assistance and cooperation or for the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

63. **Ms. Pellicer** (Mexico), drawing attention to document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.6, said that the question of resources for safeguards was a delicate one. She supported the working paper in general but believed that in the second part of paragraph 3 the reference to the "review of the safeguards financing formula" under way in Vienna should be deleted since no decision had as yet been reached on whether to maintain the current formula or develop a new formula. The text should instead simply call on members to develop an equitable and stable funding formula to ensure adequate resources for safeguards.

64. With regard to document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.3, she believed that the text was too wide-ranging in scope and should not simply repeat the language of agreed texts from the 1995 Conference. Any paragraph which reiterated 1995 documents should be deleted or summarized briefly. The new text should concentrate on a review of events from 1995 to 2000 with a view to future actions.

65. **Ms. Pettersson** (Sweden) introduced the working paper on plutonium and highly enriched uranium management (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.7). The text had been updated to reflect developments since 1995.

66. **Ms. Frederiksen** (Denmark) introduced the working paper on safeguards in nuclear-weapon States and States with unsafeguarded inventories (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.5). Conceivably, in the Committee's final report, the text could be divided into two parts (paras. 1-6 and para. 7 respectively).

67. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece) welcomed the working paper on safeguards (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.3), which for the most part had Greece's full support. Paragraph 3, however, failed to indicate that the Model Additional Protocol had been concluded as an extension of NPT safeguards and that all States might accede to it, including those not parties to the Treaty. A new paragraph might be inserted following paragraph 8 to the effect that the Conference fully supported the Additional Protocol of IAEA aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system and urged all States to conclude, ratify and implement additional protocols as soon as possible. With regard to paragraph 10, he agreed with the representative of Japan that it should include a reference to nuclear-weapon States. As for paragraph 11, it should mention that cost reduction was the eventual goal of an integrated safeguards system.

68. **Mr. Bompadre** (Argentina), welcoming the working paper on resources for safeguards (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.6), endorsed the Mexican position on paragraph 3.

69. **Mr. Pinel** (France), referring to the working paper on safeguards (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.3), questioned the relevance of paragraph 6. States, after all, were not committed to an ongoing strengthening of safeguards. Although such a process was well under way, an evaluation would be premature. In paragraph 12, the reference to safeguards-strengthening measures was somewhat ambiguous. Although those measures should be mentioned in the relevant Chairman's working paper, it would be very important to revert to the language of the previously proposed version of the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540).

70. Paragraph 1 of the working paper on safeguards in nuclear-weapon States and States with unsafeguarded inventories (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.5) seemed unnecessary: his Government did not deem it necessary to reaffirm a commitment it had never failed to uphold. With regard to paragraph 3, broadening the scope of the additional protocols was currently not an issue; emphasis should rather be laid on their application. In paragraph 6, all nuclear-weapon States were urged to submit materials and installations for international verification, but that did not take account of the fact that national situations with respect to fissile material differed. France, for its part, had always ensured that it had no excess material.

71. Although working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.7 was entitled "Plutonium and highly enriched uranium management", the Guidelines cited in paragraph 2 concerned only plutonium. In paragraph 4, it was important to adhere strictly to the language finally agreed upon by the IAEA Board of Governors.

72. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) said that the previous speaker's comments on paragraph 3 of the working paper on safeguards in nuclear-weapon States and States with unsafeguarded inventories (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.5) had considerable merit. With regard to paragraph 6 also, his delegation agreed that nuclear-weapon States were not obliged under the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards system. Given that the Agency lacked adequate resources for safeguards, one urgent task was to ensure that obligations under the Treaty could be fully carried out. The Principles and

Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament — including in relation to the transfer of peaceful or non-proscribed military utilization of nuclear-weapon materials — had already been stated in decision 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The reference in paragraph 6 of the working paper should be to nuclear materials already transferred to civil use. Moreover, it was important to stress that such transfers should be voluntary.

73. **Mr. Pygram** (United Kingdom) concurred with the comments made by the previous two speakers concerning paragraph 3 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.5. The United Kingdom had signed its Additional Protocol in September 1998; legislation to bring it into force was currently before the United Kingdom Parliament. The Additional Protocol had been negotiated with IAEA with the express intention of including all measures necessary to allow the Agency to draw up a full picture of nuclear activities relevant to non-nuclear-weapon States. The paragraph in question was thus redundant.

The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

Main Committee II

Summary record of the 3rd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 3 May 2000 at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Kobieracki .... **(Poland)**

Contents

Exchange of views (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.

Exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Cisar** (Czech Republic) said that his delegation wished to become a sponsor of the working papers in documents NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.2 to WP.5, WP.7 and WP.8. It fully supported the language proposed by Norway in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.12. It also associated itself with the working paper in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.1, on the understanding that the latter did not purport to reopen the discussion of the 1995 Principles and Objectives.

2. **Mr. Friedrich** (Switzerland) said that Switzerland had often expressed concern at the failure of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fulfil all the commitments undertaken in its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which was still in force. The continued refusal of that country to cooperate fully with the IAEA and to allow it to verify the correctness and completeness of the declaration made in accordance with the safeguards agreement was a violation of article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was in the interests of that country to accept all the verification measures deemed necessary by the IAEA in order to prove to the international community that its nuclear programme was peaceful. The Conference should once again urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cooperate fully with the IAEA.

3. There were also doubts as to Iraq's full compliance with that NPT. He regretted that that country did not always fully respect the provisions of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) and that the application of IAEA safeguards continued to pose difficulties.

4. The sole aim of export controls was the implementation of non-proliferation obligations under articles I and III of the Treaty, so that the international exchanges for peaceful purposes referred to in article IV could take place. Such controls were therefore not only compatible with the NPT but virtually required by it. States nevertheless had the sovereign right to decide whether or not to authorize exports. By applying such controls, Switzerland ensured that it could not, even inadvertently, contribute to nuclear proliferation.

5. In order to implement paragraph 17 of the 1995 Principles and Objectives, which stated that transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all interested States parties to the Treaty, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, of which Switzerland was a member, had organized two seminars on export controls which had facilitated a frank dialogue among nuclear suppliers and receivers and had clarified some misunderstandings in that field.

6. Nine countries, including Switzerland, had participated in the informal discussions to draft the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium, which had been published by IAEA on 16 March 1998 as document INFCIRC/549. As well as reaffirming existing obligations, commitments and norms in the area of non-proliferation, security, physical protection, and the management of plutonium holdings, the participating States had agreed to publish on a regular basis documents explaining their national strategy for plutonium management and annual statistics on national holdings of civil plutonium.

7. **Ms. Abdul-Rahim** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that she had two comments on the South African working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.1). Paragraph 2.2 referred to the signing of safeguards agreements by non-nuclear-weapon States, and she reminded the Committee that article XII of the Statute of the IAEA did not require States without nuclear activities to sign full-scope safeguards agreements. It was not reasonable to ask countries that were using isotopes for medical purposes to sign full-scope safeguards agreements, when the international community was not exerting any pressure on Israel, which had so many nuclear activities that were a definite threat to human beings and the environment. Yet Israel adamantly refused to submit its facilities to full-scope safeguards. In that paragraph she wished to see a re-affirmation of the Middle East resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

8. In document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.11, the content of the paragraph on the Middle East was not compatible with the mandate of the Conference, which was to review a Treaty dealing with nuclear weapons, not weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the paper should state by name the only country in the region not to have signed the NPT — Israel — and call on it to submit its nuclear facilities to international control

through the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA. Her earlier comment regarding isotopes for medical purposes was applicable also to the paragraph in question.

9. **Mr. Pygram**, (United Kingdom) referring to paragraph 10 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.3, noted that the representatives of Japan and Greece had suggested on the previous day that the Conference should call on nuclear-weapon States parties as well as non-nuclear-weapon States parties to conclude and bring into force additional protocols. He agreed entirely with that suggestion. In paragraph 11, in connection with the development of State-level integrated safeguards approaches, it might be useful also to refer to specific facility types, so that there would be both State-level and facility-level integrated safeguards approaches. The Agency's initial focus of effort was on specific facility types, and in due course it would be defining a State-level approach for each State. He assumed that paragraph 12 of the same paper referred to the additional protocols signed by nuclear-weapon States parties and the additional protocol signed by Cuba. He would appreciate any clarification if that information was not accurate.

10. Turning to document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.7, he said that the text of paragraph 4 should reflect in some way the entirety of the conclusions made by the Chairman of the IAEA Board of Governors on 20 September 1999, and not focus solely on one part of those conclusions.

11. **Mr. Markran** (South Africa) said he wished to clarify that the language used in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.1 in no way implied that the 1995 Principles and Objectives would be open to discussion but merely dealt with some of the issues concerned in a forward-looking manner without prejudice to the format of the final document.

12. **Mr. Awaad** (Egypt) welcomed the clarification given by the representative of South Africa that the Committee would not be reopening discussion on the 1995 Principles and Objectives. He endorsed the comments of the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic concerning the need to refer by name to the only State in the Middle East region which had not signed the NPT or submitted its nuclear facilities to the full-scope safeguards regime of the IAEA. Its position on the question of the Middle East was set out in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.9.

13. **Mr. Turmer** (Slovakia) said that his delegation agreed in principle with the text on safeguards submitted by the Group of Ten (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.3).

14. Reverting to the discussion of the previous day on document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.5, he noted that paragraph 3 concerned the application of the Model Additional Protocol in nuclear-weapon States. In the general debate, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia had mentioned that the nuclear-weapon States should apply the Model Additional Protocol to the extent possible.

15. Finally, turning to document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.6 on resources for safeguards, he would appreciate it if one of the authors clarified what was meant by the "equitable and stable formula" referred to in paragraph 3.

16. **Mr. Ritch** (United States of America), referring to his delegation's proposal in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.4, said that its format could be useful for the work of the Committee. The paper started by affirming certain principles, then took a look back, and finally took a look forward. The principles and objectives listed in the paper were drawn from the decision of the 1995 Conference. Some delegations had begun to make amendments and adjustments to those principles and objectives, but his delegation did not consider any changes necessary.

17. The conference room paper did not contain an exhaustive list, but it included some of the most relevant elements that had seemed under-represented or not represented in other papers. One area given particular emphasis consisted of the programmes related to nuclear materials transferred from defence programmes. It was an important part of the recent progress made and definitely came under the Committee's jurisdiction. His delegation looked forward to working with others to include the points that they found important.

18. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece), referring to document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.7 on plutonium and highly enriched uranium management, said that his delegation fully agreed with the text and simply wished to place on record that his Government, following a programme of reduced enrichment for research and test reactors, had been operating facilities in Greece with low-enriched uranium for at least 10 years. When that issue had been discussed by the IAEA Board of

Governors, there had been a reference in the Chairman's summary to americium. States were asked to cooperate with the Agency in making information on americium available on a voluntary basis.

19. His delegation supported the working paper on physical protection and illicit trafficking (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.8), and was prepared to consider a revision of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, given the many important events that had taken place since the time of its conclusion. Physical protection and illicit trafficking were two important and related issues. Discussions were also taking place in New York in connection with a convention on nuclear terrorism, and he hoped to see that convention further enhance the role of the IAEA.

20. **Mr. Raja Adnan** (Malaysia), referring to document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.1, endorsed the proposed language in paragraph 2.1, recognizing the IAEA as the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring safeguards. However, he did not agree with the suggestion in paragraph 2.6 that, as a precondition to supply, State-to-State assurances would be required. Under article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, each State party was already required not to transfer equipment or material to any State unless such equipment or material would remain subject to IAEA safeguards.

21. **Mr. Al-Hadithi** (Iraq), commenting on the statement made by the representative of Switzerland, who had expressed concern with regard to Iraq's non-implementation of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), said that the present Committee and Conference were not the appropriate forum for discussing Security Council resolutions. If there was a desire to discuss those issues, Iraq had a lot to say about the lack of compliance by permanent members of the Security Council with Security Council resolutions, the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of international law in dealing with Iraq.

22. He failed to understand why the representative of Switzerland had stated that the IAEA safeguards regime was facing difficulties in Iraq. In fact, during the first month of the present year, the IAEA had performed a successful verification process, in cooperation with the Iraqi agency concerned, which had been confirmed by the IAEA on 24 March of the present year. The IAEA had not referred to any difficulties in applying the safeguards regime in Iraq.

23. **Mr. Chang Dong-hee** (Republic of Korea) drew attention to paragraph 9 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/WP.3, which contained a reference to additional protocols that had been approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in the case of 43 States. The number of States should be verified, as a different number was indicated in the Agency's own report on the matter. The same paragraph stated that the Conference urged all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to conclude additional protocols as soon as possible, and to bring them into force or provisionally apply them as soon as their respective national legislation allowed. Paragraph 10 contained virtually the same wording. For the sake of avoiding redundancy, some rewriting would be in order.

24. Document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.12, for its part, referred to funding for safeguard activities and physical protection. As those topics were currently being discussed under the auspices of IAEA in Vienna, it was inappropriate for the Review Conference to take them up.

25. **Mr. Casterton** (Canada) introduced document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.4 on export controls, which had been submitted by 10 countries (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden). The text was largely based on an information circular, document INFCIRC/482, which had been distributed at the 1995 Conference. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 stated that national controls on exports of nuclear-related items were crucial, as they enabled States to ensure that, pursuant to articles I, II and III of the NPT, their exports did not contribute to proliferation; they also facilitated international cooperation under article IV. Paragraph 4 acknowledged that the coordination of national export control policies could contribute to the objectives of the NPT and facilitate nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes, again in accordance with article IV. Paragraphs 5 and 6 referred to the Zangger Committee, which had been recognized at previous NPT Conferences for its work in coordinating the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to exports to non-nuclear-weapon States that were not parties. All States were urged to adopt the understandings of that Committee. Paragraph 7 recommended that States parties should consider further measures for preventing the diversion of nuclear technology to weapons-related purposes. Paragraph 8 noted that some States parties also

participated in other mechanisms for the coordination of national export policies. Paragraph 9 recognized the need to ensure that such coordination activities did not hamper the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy by States parties, in accordance with articles I, II, III and IV of the NPT. Paragraph 10 recognized that certain equipment, technology and materials, while not explicitly referred to in the NPT, were relevant to the issue of nuclear proliferation and hence to the Treaty as a whole. Lastly, paragraph 11 recognized the continuing relevance of paragraph 17 of the 1995 Principles and Objectives, relating to the promotion of transparency in nuclear-related export controls within a framework of dialogue and cooperation among States parties.

26. By design, the working paper did not address the requirement for full-scope safeguards and a legally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons as a condition of supply, as set forth in paragraph 12 of the 1995 Principles and Objectives. Reaffirmation of, and support for, that paragraph were of such crucial importance that they should be expressly included in the Conference's review. Indeed, consideration should be given to requiring the signing of the Additional Protocol as a further condition of supply, the better to ensure that nuclear-related items exported to non-nuclear-weapon States were not diverted from peaceful uses.

27. **Ms. Pellicer** (Mexico) said that her delegation fully acknowledged the importance of export controls as a means of ensuring that nuclear technology was used only for peaceful purposes. It had some reservations, however, about the wording of paragraph 6 of the working paper just introduced. While the aim of strengthening export controls was admirable in itself, the terms in which that paragraph referred to the Zangger Committee were not altogether appropriate. Certainly that Committee did excellent work, but it was not a part of the United Nations family of organizations, and it was not open to participation by all States. Instead of urging all States to adopt the understandings of the Zangger Committee, then, it might be preferable for the Conference simply to take note of them. Paragraph 8 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.10 was open to the same objection and should be reworded accordingly.

28. **Mr. Stanzel** (Germany) said that his delegation also had a problem with the reference to the Zangger Committee in paragraph 6 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.4. While it was true that that Committee had been established for the purpose of negotiation and dialogue with States that were not parties to the NPT, in the light of events since 1998, that was an element that was likely to lead to misunderstanding and should not be emphasized. Consequently, the words "not parties to the Treaty" should be deleted from the first sentence of paragraph 6.

29. **Mr. Markran** (South Africa) drew attention to paragraph 2.6 of the working paper submitted by South Africa (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.1), which dealt with the application of comprehensive IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply. The language there used dovetailed neatly with that selected by the Non-Aligned Movement in document NPT/CONF.2000/18, paragraph 11, and might also serve to clarify the wording of paragraph 12 of the 1995 Principles and Objectives by requiring comprehensive safeguards, State-to-State assurances and control over retransfers.

30. **Mr. Raja Adnan** (Malaysia), referring to document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.4, said that the wording of paragraph 2 left it unclear whether nuclear or non-nuclear exports were meant. Regarding paragraph 6, it was important to remember that the Zangger Committee had been formed in connection with nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon States that were not parties to the NPT. As to the recommendation on the list of items subject to IAEA safeguards, considering the spirit and letter of the NPT, amendments to that list should be restricted to single-use items only. Concerning the reference in paragraph 8 to the participation of some States parties in other mechanisms for the coordination of national export policies, it was important to note that such participation was strictly voluntary. Paragraph 10, as worded, might entail some misinterpretation as to what was and what was not relevant; the only reliable guide was the language of the Treaty itself.

31. **Mr. Coelho** (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union, introduced document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.10 on nuclear-weapon-free zones, safeguards and export controls. The Union supported the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States concerned, and nuclear-weapon States were encouraged to sign the relevant protocols of such zones to acknowledge that Treaty-based nuclear assurances were available to them. Non-

nuclear-weapon States that had not yet concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA were called upon to do so, while nuclear-weapon States were called upon to place all fissile materials no longer required for defence purposes under appropriate international safeguards and physical protection. In the area of export controls, the efforts of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee were noted with appreciation, and all States were urged to take measures such that suppliers could be confident that nuclear-related items and technology would be used only for peaceful purposes.

32. **Mr. Kerma** (Algeria) suggested that paragraph 6 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.4 should be reworded to reflect the peculiar status of the Zangger Committee, which was not a part of the Conference.

33. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) described the issue of export controls as a complex and important one: important because of its implications for non-proliferation, and complex because of its subtle relationship with the peaceful use of atomic energy. To address it adequately, therefore, care was required. The wording "not to transfer nuclear-related items to non-nuclear-weapon States, taking into account, *inter alia*, arrangements mutually agreed upon between the States Parties concerned" in paragraph 2 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.4 required clarification, as it was not immediately apparent what sort of arrangements those might be.

34. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America) said that the issue of new supply arrangements, which was the subject of paragraph 12 of the 1995 Principles and Objectives, was addressed in a proposal submitted by his delegation (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.4). Various suggestions for possible amendments to that paragraph had been put forward at the meeting; the introduction to the document in question contained appropriate wording which would reflect participants' concerns in the matter.

35. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece) said that, in paragraph 9 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.4 he would prefer to use the word "encourage" in place of "do not hamper" for a more positive approach. He agreed with the comment of the representative of Germany regarding paragraph 6 of the working paper.

36. **Ms. Hallum** (New Zealand) introduced the working paper entitled "Physical protection, illicit trafficking" (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.8) on behalf of 10 countries (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden). Physical protection and prevention of illicit trafficking were closely related, and were required for the implementation of article III of the Treaty, in order to prevent diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to weapons. The purpose of the working paper was to record the substantive developments which had taken place in the past five years and identify aspirations for the next five years and to provide common ground on which to base national statements. The paper sought to reinforce the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and IAEA regulations in that area. The language on illicit trafficking was for the most part based on current resolutions of the IAEA General Conference, which should be acceptable to all States parties.

37. **Mr. Pinel** (France), referring to paragraph 1 of the working paper just introduced, asked what was meant by "other international instruments", as IAEA recommendations on the matter were not legally binding, and he was unaware of any other international instruments that were relevant. He suggested that, in the first line of paragraph 2, "grave" should be deleted before "concern".

38. **Mr. Pygram** (United Kingdom) said that his delegation preferred the language proposed in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the working paper submitted by Norway (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.12), because physical protection standards should be equivalent in all States.

39. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) endorsed the comments of the representative of France regarding paragraph 2 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.8.

40. **Mr. Ostrowski** (Poland) said that his delegation aligned itself with the working paper just introduced by the representative of New Zealand, as it provided solutions for several trafficking and safeguards problems. It agreed that there should be a legally binding international instrument on physical protection. Poland had received technical assistance from an international mission, which would no doubt be an acceptable solution for many countries.

41. **Mr. Al-Hadithi** (Iraq), referring to document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.4 submitted by the United States, said that the paper made reference to the Security Council in section B, paragraph 4, and section

C, paragraph 26. Those two paragraphs had nothing to do with IAEA safeguards but were of a political nature. The Security Council had been under United States influence since the end of the cold war. It was well known that the United States had used the Security Council resolutions as a pretext to spy on Iraq and extend the sanctions, which had led to the death of 1.5 million people and had caused more victims than any weapon of mass destruction. The United States was currently attempting to influence the Conference to adopt its own aggressive political stance and to undermine the relationship between Iraq and IAEA. Iraqi authorities had extended cooperation and had accepted a recent inspection under IAEA safeguards, and his delegation would have expected some reference in the United States paper welcoming the resumption of activities with IAEA. His delegation firmly rejected the paragraphs he had mentioned, and it called on the Conference to be vigilant against the references in question.

42. **Mr. Othman** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the Conference was reviewing the implementation of the NPT, not of Security Council resolutions. His delegation was surprised that in the United States paper, Iraq had been invited to cooperate fully with IAEA, yet Israel had not been invited to accede to the Treaty. The States not parties to the Treaty should have been named, as they posed a threat to regional peace and security. Israel had many nuclear reactors which had exceeded their lifespan and posed an environmental threat to the Middle East. It was essential that those reactors should be placed under IAEA safeguards.

43. **Ms. Tsirbas** (Australia) said that her delegation wished to reinforce the comments of Canada and other delegations on paragraph 12 of the 1995 Principles and Objectives. A major outcome of the 1995 Conference had been the clear endorsement of full-scope safeguards as a precondition of new supply of nuclear materials to non-nuclear-weapon States. It was crucial to the NPT regime that the Additional Protocol should also become a mandatory part of IAEA safeguards required by article III of the Treaty.

44. In the view of her delegation, paragraph 2.6 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.1 was unhelpful, as some of its language might alter paragraph 12 of the 1995 Principles and Objectives.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

Main Committee II

Summary record of the 4th meeting

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 8 May 2000 at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Kobieracki .... (Poland)

Contents

Exchange of views (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

Exchange of views

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

1. **Mr. Alimov** (Tajikistan), speaking on behalf of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, said that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones made a major contribution to the consolidation of peace and security at the global and the regional levels. That idea had been supported in a number of international documents and agreements, including the Final Document of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

2. In order to strengthen the NPT regime and to increase regional security, the five republics of Central Asia had decided to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Regional political support for the creation of such a zone had been expressed after high-level meetings in Almaty, Tashkent and Bishkek. The States of Central Asia had taken specific steps towards the establishment of the zone, and he was pleased to report that they had prepared a working document which reflected the substantial progress achieved on the draft treaty to establish the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. The States of Central Asia hoped that the working document would receive support from the participants in the Conference and that it would be reflected in the report of Main Committee II and the final document of the Conference.

3. **Mr. Kerma** (Algeria) said that the NPT, by explicitly recognizing in its article VII the right of groups of States "to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories", had confirmed the importance and complementary nature of treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. New developments in international affairs and disarmament, and non-proliferation in particular, had led to intensified efforts in that direction since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The Treaties of Bangkok and Pelindaba, concluded for the purpose of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones in South-East Asia and Africa, respectively, represented a new stage in attempts to codify the status of such zones. Currently, over 100 countries on four continents were members of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The efforts to establish such a zone in Central Asia and the desire of Mongolia to declare itself a non-nuclear-weapon State illustrated the growing commitment to work towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the world.

4. The Treaty of Pelindaba expressed the collective political will of African States in that regard, but in order for it to be effective the nuclear Powers must honour their commitments as contained in its second Additional Protocol. His Government believed that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa would enhance collective security, the international non-proliferation regime and world peace. Regional denuclearization was an essential complement to global disarmament. However, because of the close ties between Africa and the Middle East and their geographical proximity, Algeria was deeply concerned at the lack of progress in creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the latter region, where Israel alone persisted in refusing to join the NPT and to submit its nuclear installations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. A greater commitment was needed, therefore, in the effort to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region, which the United Nations General Assembly had already supported by consensus.

5. **Mr. Bompadre** (Argentina) said that, as a member of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone, established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Argentina was convinced of the benefits of such zones. Indeed, that area of the non-proliferation regime had seen the greatest progress since the 1995 Conference, with the adoption of the Treaties of Bangkok and Pelindaba and the negotiations under way in Central Asia.

6. In order for a zone to be effective, all the States of the region must accede to the treaty establishing the zone and the nuclear Powers must accede to the relevant protocol. The exchange of information on non-proliferation between the various zones should also be encouraged. The resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas (resolution 53/77 Q) was clearly in the spirit of article VII of the NPT. The results obtained in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, South-East Asia and Africa should encourage the Conference to promote the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions, especially those where sources of tension were located.

7. **Mr. Thamrin** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that its members which were States parties to the Treaty expressed their support for measures taken to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and proposals to establish such zones in other parts of the world where they did not exist, such as the Middle East and South Asia, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned as a measure towards the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. They welcomed the initiative taken by the States in Central Asia, freely arrived at among themselves, to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region, and supported the recent adoption by the Mongolian parliament of legislation as a concrete contribution to the international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

8. The States parties which were signatories of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba reaffirmed their commitment to promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. They reaffirmed their determination to extend their fullest cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

9. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that his delegation supported the statement by the previous speaker. Egypt had actively participated in the process leading to the adoption of the Treaty of Pelindaba, which sent a clear message about its resolve to avoid the horrors of nuclear weapons. Fifty States had signed the Treaty, while 12 had ratified it and deposited their instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity.

10. The security of Africa was organically connected to security in the Middle East because of the geographical and political overlap between the two regions. He drew attention to United Nations General Assembly resolution 54/48 and urged that the interaction between those two regions should be taken into consideration in the Committee's deliberations. The 1995 Principles and Objectives had addressed the Middle East specifically as well. Israel should accede to the NPT and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards in implementation of the Treaty of Pelindaba.

11. His delegation welcomed the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones, all of which would contribute to the goals of the NPT. Making the southern hemisphere free of nuclear weapons would show respect for the most fundamental human right: the right to life.

12. **Mr. Tucknott** (United Kingdom) said that the positive developments in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones were heartening. His Government had ratified the protocol to the Treaty of Rarotonga, and had supported General Assembly resolution 53/77 D on Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status.

13. His delegation welcomed the establishment of two new nuclear-weapon-free zones since the 1995 Conference. However, its ratification of the protocol to the Treaty of Pelindaba was only part of the picture, as only 12 out of the 28 necessary States had ratified the Treaty thus far. His delegation urged the completion of the ratification process as soon as possible.

14. The United Kingdom would work with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty of Bangkok and would also work with the States of Central Asia in their efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region.

15. **Mr. Cordeiro** (Brazil) reaffirmed the statement delivered by his delegation on 24 April 2000 and expressed support for the statements made by Argentina and by Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. In that regard, his delegation particularly wished to stress paragraph 37 of the document introduced by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.6). Moreover, in preparing his report, the Chairman should take into account the proposal made by Brazil at the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/35)

16. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) said that China had always believed that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones helped to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote nuclear disarmament, while helping to preserve regional peace

and security. That was why China had signed and ratified the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba. His delegation had also endorsed the General Assembly resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In recent years, China had actively supported the efforts of the five Central Asian countries to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region and hoped that those countries would be able to establish such a zone as soon as possible. His delegation also supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Mongolia.

17. **Mr. Reznikov** (Belarus) said that achieving the universality of the NPT brought into play both past events, such as the entry into force of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties in various areas of the world, and future events, such as the need for Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty and for the early establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. In that regard, he called for the early signing and entry into force of an agreement on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and for the establishment of such a zone in South Asia. The international community must consistently support initiatives for the establishment, on the basis of internationally accepted principles, of nuclear-weapon-free zones by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. In that regard, his delegation found the initiatives to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in the southern hemisphere and the southern Caucasus, respectively, encouraging.

18. His country, which had renounced the nuclear-weapons option, had eliminated such weapons from its territory and had acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State, intended to launch an initiative for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free space in central Europe. Such an area would strengthen regional security, especially in the light of the extremely explosive situation in the Balkans. Moreover, the mechanism for the illicit trafficking in nuclear material and the prevention of the transport of fissile material across that region would be strengthened. He hoped that, as a result of broad support from Eastern European countries, consultations could start in order to discuss the ultimate goal of establishing nuclear-weapon-free areas in Central and Eastern Europe in order to further strengthen security in the region. His delegation had submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF. 2000/MC.II/WP.16) which reflected the national position of Belarus on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free space in Central and Eastern Europe. That document was not intended to influence or affect the positions of other States.

19. **Ms. Abdul-Rahim** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in areas of conflict, helped to strengthen regional and international peace and security and would ultimately lead to global disarmament. The nuclear-weapon-free zones that were currently in place had been extremely successful and had permitted the strengthening of international criteria with respect to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Israel's persistent refusal to accede to international treaties on the subject or to support such texts as General Assembly resolution 54/51 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East had made the Middle East a region of tension and conflict. Consequently, the reaffirmation by the Conference of the need to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in areas of tension, would require the accession by Israel to the NPT and its agreement to open up its facilities for inspection by IAEA. In that regard, it was regrettable that the Chairman's draft report did not contain any reference to Israel, which was the only country in the Middle East with a military nuclear arsenal, and which therefore represented a serious threat not only to the Middle East but also to international peace and security. Moreover, the report did not exert any pressure on Israel to accede to the NPT or to submit its nuclear facilities to international inspection. A reference was made to the States parties to the Treaty that had yet to conclude comprehensive agreements with IAEA. In her view, a reference should also be made to those States not members of the Treaty, including Israel. Indeed, the policy of double standards could have incalculable implications.

20. **Mr. Ikeda** (Japan), referring to the statement made by the representative of Tajikistan, said that his Government hoped that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan would finalize the treaty as soon as possible, thus establishing the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the northern hemisphere. He believed that the establishment of such a zone would contribute not only to the disarmament of the region, but also to the enhancement of regional security.

21. **Ms. Tsirbas** (Australia) said that her delegation supported efforts to establish new nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States concerned. It placed great importance on nuclear-weapon-free zones as a vehicle for providing negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. In that regard, her delegation welcomed the significant progress that had been made since the 1995 Review Conference. With the signature by nuclear-weapon States of the Protocols to the Treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba, the number of non-nuclear-weapon States benefiting from legally binding negative security assurances from all five nuclear-weapon States had trebled, from 33 to 99.

22. She welcomed the signing by the United Kingdom of the Protocol to the Treaty of Pelindaba, the finalization of the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone and the further discussions aimed at securing the signature by nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok. Her Government was prepared to offer practical assistance to the Central Asian States and to Mongolia in respect of its consideration of establishing a single nuclear-weapon-free zone State.

23. **Mr. Apunte** (Ecuador) reiterated the statement made by his delegation on 2 May 2000, in which it had encouraged the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned. He supported the comments which the representative of Indonesia had made on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, with respect to paragraphs 36 and 37 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.6.

24. **Mr. Friedrich** (Switzerland) welcomed the growing success of nuclear-weapon-free zones. His delegation, which had given its full support to the initiative of the five Central Asian States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their area, hoped that agreement in that regard would be concluded soon. In order to be effective, such zones must be based on the guidelines of the Disarmament Commission, including the need to be internationally recognized and to be the result of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned.

25. **Mr. Tongprasroeth** (Thailand) said that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions was a step towards achieving the final objective of the NPT: a nuclear-weapon-free world. Such zones also greatly enhanced regional security and served as confidence-building measures in the areas concerned. In that regard, he urged all nuclear-weapon States to support the aims of various nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and arrangements and welcomed their stated intention to complete the process of signing the protocols thereto. With regard to the Treaty of Bangkok, nuclear-weapon States were once again urged to show greater flexibility in reaching a compromise with ASEAN countries in connection with the signing of the protocol to that Treaty.

26. **Mr. Tomaszewski** (Poland) expressed surprise at the statement made by the representative of Belarus on the establishment of a Central and Eastern European nuclear-weapon-free space since, during the general debate, the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belarus had clearly stated that his country was aware of the attitudes of countries in the region towards that proposal. His delegation had stated its position and concern with regard to that proposal on several occasions in the past and would do so again after it had taken full cognizance of the document.

27. **Ms. Hallum** (New Zealand) said that the Chairman's revised working paper of 20 May 1999 in document NPT/CONF.2000/1 contained most of the elements needed and formed a good general basis for the Committee's work. Her delegation had already proposed the addition of a paragraph urging all nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so to ratify the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. She welcomed the statement made by the nuclear-weapon States on 1 May regarding plans to ensure the necessary ratifications; that statement was of relevance to the Treaty of Rarotonga, for which one ratification was outstanding.

28. The other aspect of the proposal which her delegation had made at the third session of the Preparatory Committee related to the text on the nuclear-weapon-free status of the southern hemisphere and moves towards attaining that goal. Her delegation had recommended for inclusion the text referred to by the representative of Brazil at the same session of the Preparatory Committee.

Export controls

29. **Mr. Naziri** (Iran), referring to document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.14, which his delegation had submitted, noted that paragraph 1 referred to the importance of the role of IAEA in verifying States

parties' compliance with the Treaty. Paragraph 2 proposed multilateral negotiations to develop effective transfer guidelines, a similar proposal being under consideration in the context of the ad hoc group dealing with the question of biological weapons. Paragraph 3 noted that unfortunately some States were keeping to unilaterally enforced measures rather than collective measures which could take place in the context of IAEA, thus hampering the access of developing countries to nuclear materials.

30. The present version of the Chairman's working paper was not satisfactory in terms of export controls. His delegation could not agree to the text unless the Iranian working paper was taken into account.

31. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) expressed concern that the export control regime currently in force laid down rules which applied to States that had not participated in their establishment. Accordingly, the non-nuclear-weapon States did not feel that their concerns were being taken into account, especially concerns relating to access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the purposes of socio-economic development. All States should be able to voice their opinions and have them taken into account prior to the implementation of export controls.

32. **Mr. Griccioli** (Italy) noted that Italy currently held the Presidency of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and had already spoken about transparency in that connection. Paragraph 2 of the Iranian working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.14) called on countries members of the NSG to take practical steps to fulfil the task of promoting transparency. His country had taken that duty very seriously and hoped that the statement in the paper submitted by Italy had been fully considered. The Iranian paper also stated that transparency in the proceedings and decision-making of the nuclear-related export control regimes should be promoted within the framework of dialogue and cooperation (para. 2). That had been another of Italy's concerns. It had conducted several dialogues with countries outside the Group and during its Presidency the Group had enlarged to include three new member States.

33. **Ms. Tsirbas** (Australia) said that in the context of States parties' clear obligation to take steps to prevent nuclear proliferation, export controls were a means to that end. Effective export controls were also central to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which depended on the existence of a climate of certainty about non-proliferation. There was a clear relationship between the non-proliferation obligations in articles I, II and III and the peaceful-uses objectives of article IV. Export controls did not impede legitimate nuclear trade and cooperation. Rather, they fostered the environment of long-term assurance and stability that was essential to nuclear cooperation.

34. Good progress had been made in implementing the call made in the 1995 Principles and Objectives for transparency in nuclear-related export controls. In response to that call, members of the NSG had made a concerted effort to promote transparency and openness towards non-members. Her delegation welcomed the paper submitted to the Conference by Italy, in relation to the NSG's transparency activities, and also the paper presented by the Zangger Committee describing the work of that Committee and setting out its objectives. Her Government had been a consistent supporter of greater transparency and had organized NSG transparency seminars and conducted annual outreach programmes on nuclear export controls for the countries of South-East Asia and the South Pacific.

35. **Mr. Abdullah Faiz** (Malaysia) said that his delegation shared the concerns expressed by the representative of Egypt. The NPT made no provision for any export regime. To achieve effective transparency, membership of the Zangger Committee should be made universal and not restricted to an elite group which imposed its will on non-members.

36. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China), referring to document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.14, said that some of the proposals it contained were very reasonable. The Chinese Government understood that the purpose of the proposals was to strengthen the national security of all countries, to contribute to promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to remove double standards in the field of nuclear exports, which was an important prerequisite for the successful prevention of nuclear proliferation. On the basis of that understanding, his delegation supported the proposals contained in the working paper.

37. **Mr. Kerma** (Algeria) noted that the delegations of Egypt, Iran and Malaysia had referred to the difficulties of the non-nuclear weapon States in acquiring equipment for peaceful purposes. His delegation had experienced similar difficulties. The export control process had thus far been conducted in a

non-transparent manner, and it was clear that the guidelines and rules for exports were not entirely being followed and actually constituted obstacles for countries. Multilateral guidelines should be prepared in conjunction with IAEA and with the participation of all States concerned, and the export control process should be endorsed with greater transparency.

38. **Mr. Schmidt** (Austria), referring to the transparency issue, said that article III, paragraph 2, of the NPT clearly meant that every State party, whether a major supplier or a non-major supplier, had a specific obligation to provide for legislation and for national criteria to meet the objectives of the NPT in order to ensure that any export from its own country complied with the particular criteria provided for in that article. On that basis, several States, later referred to as the Zangger Committee, had met at the beginning of the 1970s to consider what their obligations were and to take account of the understanding of other countries. They had come to the conclusion that a certain minimum level of export criteria was required. Since September 1974, the understanding of the Zangger Committee had been available in document form to all interested members of the IAEA and hence to all States parties. The NSG also gave seminars and issued papers. Sufficient information had been available for years.

39. He would support the proposal on multilateral export control arrangements if it helped to achieve greater acceptance of the provisions of article III, paragraph 2. He was in favour of the multilateralization, or internationalization of export control criteria, always on the understanding that it remained the sovereign obligation of each individual State to make sure that whatever was exported was not used for any other purposes, as required by the NPT. Multilateralization could imply making transparent criteria available to all States, but of course the decision as to whether something left the country or not had to remain the decision of each individual country. Multilateralization might therefore not be appropriate to the first part of export controls, which was licensing, but it definitely related to the second part of export controls, when an item had gone across the border. It was not a new idea, and was already reflected in the IAEA Additional Protocol. The exporters informed IAEA of exports of trigger-list items, which were articles subject to article III, paragraph 2, of the NPT. IAEA then evaluated whether the items transferred were appropriate to the nuclear programme of the recipient country. It would verify that the item arrived in the country and then observe how it was used. An element of multilateralization thus already existed. Delegations should exchange ideas on how that process could be improved.

40. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that at present export controls were being imposed by a group of States with a monopoly in nuclear matters, on other States, which had not been allowed to participate in the decision-making process. There were two groups of States parties to the Treaty: States that had nuclear weapons and States that did not. It was not right for one group to make the decisions and apply them to the other group. The countries importing nuclear materials had the right to participate in the decision-making process which established the rules governing the use and export of those materials. There was no transparency. The importing States were subject to decisions adopted behind closed doors. It was not a democratic system.

41. As the representative of Austria had said, there had to be an internationalization process. Otherwise the gap between the "haves" and the "have nots" would get even larger.

42. **Mr. Cordeiro** (Brazil) said that his country was a member of the NSG but was not a member of the Zangger Committee. His delegation hoped that the Committee would do what was necessary to achieve the necessary balance between safeguards, export controls and the right of all States parties to the NPT to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but it was not in favour of an excessive emphasis on new conditions in that area.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

Main Committee II

Summary record of the 5th meeting

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 8 May, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Kobieracki .... (Poland)

Contents

Exchange of views (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

Exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **The Chairman** invited the Committee to begin consideration of the Chairman's draft of the Report of Main Committee II (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/...). The draft was a starting point which took into account all views that he believed would be generally acceptable. He urged delegations to continue consultations with him and other delegations and in the informal open-ended meeting in order to arrive at an acceptable text. He suggested that delegates first give their comments on the text in general, after which the Committee would examine the draft item by item.

2. **Mr. Coelho** (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union, welcomed the draft report as an excellent basis for discussion. He recalled the points raised by his delegation in introducing working paper NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.10 on behalf of the European Union and stressed that the European Union and its States members were committed to a successful outcome for the Committee's deliberations.

3. **Mr. Biggs** (Australia), speaking also on behalf of Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden, welcomed the draft report as a good basis for discussion. He noted that the draft referred to both backward-looking and forward-looking elements at various points and suggested that, if those notions were retained in the final version of the document, care should be taken to organize the text in such a way as to clearly distinguish between the two categories. He expressed satisfaction that the draft reaffirmed the importance of the Principles and Objectives adopted in 1995.

4. **Mr. Wiranata-Atmadia** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and in his capacity as Chairman of the Movement's working group on disarmament, welcomed the draft report as a good basis for discussion. The Non-Aligned Movement's official position would be presented the next day.

5. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) said that the draft report was an excellent basis for discussion which reflected the delegations' various positions. The document was somewhat long however, and could be shortened, for example by eliminating the list of documents.

6. **Mr. Lee Kie-cheon** (Republic of Korea) said that the draft did a good job of taking into account the various working papers, key issues, relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the views of delegations. As such, it was an excellent starting point.

7. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America) said that he associated himself with the statement made by the representative of Australia and stressed the importance of reaffirming the 1995 Principles and Objectives.

8. **Mr. Nederlof** (Netherlands) said that he supported the statement made by the representative of Australia and felt that the draft report was an excellent basis for discussion. Some elements might require redrafting, for example in the specific action-oriented recommendations beginning in subparagraph 45, the language did not always seem especially action-oriented or forward-looking and those paragraphs might therefore require revision.

9. **Mr. Hossein** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that he associated himself with the statement made by the representative of Indonesia but, with reference to the section on export controls reiterated that his delegation was not in a position to discuss that issue on the basis of the current draft.

10. **Mr. Al-Hadithi** (Iraq) regretted that the draft report did not seem to take into account a number of the points raised by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Group of Arab States, including points raised by the representative of Egypt. Nor did it refer to the Resolution on the Middle East and the need for Israel to immediately implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty, abandon its nuclear arsenal and subject its nuclear facilities to the safeguards regime. He took exception to the reference in paragraph 6 of the conclusions and recommendations to Iraq's alleged non-compliance with its safeguards agreements. He stressed that the Committee was not the appropriate forum to discuss implementation of Security Council resolutions on such questions and warned against attempts by the United States and the United Kingdom to involve the Committee in matters which did not concern it. Those delegations were simply trying to cover up their own violations of Security Council resolutions and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

11. The United States continued to provide material and technical assistance to Israel and other countries and maintained large stockpiles of nuclear warheads. The use by the United States and the United Kingdom of depleted uranium weapons in 1991 had caused a human catastrophe in Iraq, and the IAEA verification and monitoring teams had been used to spy on Iraq. The aerial attacks on Iraq's civil and military infrastructure since 1998 were a violation of Iraq's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, guaranteed by all relevant resolutions, and the United States and the United Kingdom continued to use Security Council resolutions to perpetuate the inhuman embargo against Iraq, which had led to the deaths of some one and a half million Iraqis.

12. In 1994, IAEA had removed all weapons grade nuclear materials from Iraq in accordance with the appropriate safeguards and had reported in August 1997 that Iraq had never had any real nuclear weapon potential. In October 1998, the Director-General of IAEA had reported to the Security Council that there was no reason to believe that Iraq had any real capability of producing nuclear weapons. In addition, in March 2000, IAEA had reported that Iraq was in compliance with the safeguards regime and, in a letter dated 10 April 2000 (S/2000/300) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the IAEA Director-General had said that, during a verification visit from 22 to 25 January 2000, Agency inspectors had verified the nuclear material subject to safeguards and that the Iraqi authorities had cooperated with the inspection team. In that context, he supported the contents of the working paper presented by the Islamic Republic of Iran on safeguards and export controls (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.14), in particular paragraph 1, concerning the sole responsibility of IAEA for verifying compliance with the NPT and the need for IAEA to verify any allegations of non-compliance.

13. **The Chairman**, noting that the sub-headings would not be included in the final version, invited comments on the "conclusions and recommendations" section of the draft report (paragraph 7, subparagraphs 1-58).

14. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) proposed that in subparagraph 3, the words "and dialogue" should be deleted. In the second sentence of subparagraph 4: the words "only the" should be inserted before the word "universal", the words "is the best way to" should be replaced with the word "can", the word "all" should be replaced with the words "the four", and the words "unconditionally and without any further delay" should be inserted after the words "accede to it". The last sentence of subparagraph 4 should be deleted. In subparagraph 5, at the end of the second sentence, the word "energy" should be replaced with the word "material"; in the fourth sentence, the words "States parties that have" should be replaced with the words "Any State party that has". In subparagraph 7, after the first reference to "IAEA", the words "and after the decision by the Board of Governors" should be inserted.

15. **Mr. Wiranata-Atmadia** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, proposed that, in subparagraph 1, the words "and article VII of the Treaty, in particular paragraphs 5-7 and paragraph 1 of the Principles and Objectives, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East" should be added at the end of the sentence. The Non-Aligned Movement supported the amendments to subparagraphs 3 and 4 proposed by Egypt, although it favoured the words "without delay" rather than "without any further delay" in the proposed amendment to subparagraph 4. In the first sentence of subparagraph 4, the word "spread" should be replaced with the word "proliferation". The Movement agreed with Egypt that the phrase "nuclear material" was more appropriate in subparagraph 5. The first sentence of subparagraph 5 should form a separate subparagraph, and the words "are a fundamental pillar of" should be replaced with the words "is an essential element in guaranteeing compliance with". He would be submitting a final version of the proposed separate subparagraph in writing.

16. **The Chairman** explained that he had merely sought to group all the proposed references to the importance of IAEA safeguards within the one paragraph.

17. **Mr. Hossein** (Islamic Republic of Iran), fully endorsing the amendments proposed by Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, proposed, in addition, that subparagraph 7 should be deleted. The relationship agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) already governed the access of its Director-General to the principal organs of the United Nations.

18. **Ms. Jorge** (Mexico) said that her delegation agreed with the amendment to subparagraph 1 proposed by Indonesia.

19. **Mr. Al-Hadithi** (Iraq) proposed that the references to Iraq should be deleted from subparagraph 6.

20. **Ms. Abdul-Rahim** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that her delegation fully supported Indonesia's proposed insertion, in subparagraph 1, of a reference to the Resolution on the Middle East, as well as Egypt's proposed amendments to subparagraphs 3, 4 and 5. She also agreed that subparagraph 7 should be deleted, since it was not the appropriate place to refer to Security Council resolutions.

21. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) said that in subparagraph 5, the words "nuclear energy" should be retained to reflect the language adopted in the Principles and Objectives, especially since that decision was cited in subparagraph 1.

22. **Mr. Wiranata-Atmadia** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries proposed that the following sentence should be added at the end of subparagraph 5: "Measures should be taken to ensure that the inalienable rights of all States parties under the provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty are fully protected and that no State party is limited in the exercise of this right based on allegations of non-compliance not verified by IAEA".

23. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that he endorsed all the amendments to subparagraphs 1 and 5 proposed by Indonesia. His delegation wished to know why no reference had been made in subparagraph 6 to the report of the inspection mission to Iraq in January 2000.

24. **The Chairman** said that the Committee might consider including such a reference in subparagraph 6.

25. **Ms. Jorge** (Mexico) said that her delegation agreed with the additional amendments to subparagraph 5 proposed by Indonesia.

26. **Mr. Biggs** (Australia), referring to subparagraph 7, said that the concept of access of the Director-General of IAEA to the Security Council was vital. He accepted the point made by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the existence of a relationship agreement, however no interference with the modalities of that agreement was intended. The question of measures to be taken in case of breaches of the "nuclear peace" was a central element of the verification system, as was the undisputed role of the Security Council as the ultimate keeper of that peace. In view of the explanatory note provided at the beginning of subparagraph 6, detailed discussion of that subparagraph was premature. It would, however, be unusual not to refer to the work of IAEA in Iraq, given that it had played an important role in the verification process over the past five years.

27. **Mr. Kerma** (Algeria) said that his delegation supported the amendments proposed by Indonesia, particularly in regard to subparagraph 1.

28. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America) proposed that at the end of subparagraph 3, the word "international" should be deleted to take account of bilateral agreements on nuclear cooperation and non-proliferation. His delegation was in favour of retaining the original wording of subparagraph 4. However, if the suggestions of other delegations were to be reflected, the reference to "full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and the relevant safeguards agreements" could be incorporated into the second sentence as appropriate. His delegation also wished to associate itself with the comments made by the Russian Federation on subparagraph 5.

29. **Mr. Elgweri** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that his delegation agreed with the position regarding the unnecessary reference in subparagraph 6 to Iraq in connection with Security Council resolutions.

30. **Mr. Markram** (South Africa) said that his delegation supported all proposals made by Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

31. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece) said that his delegation was not in favour of deleting subparagraph 7, since the provision on non-compliance and the submission of reports to the Security Council made the International Atomic Energy Agency distinct from other organizations of the United Nations system, as reflected in the Agency's Statute (article III, B.4) and in the agreements between the Agency and States in connection with the Treaty. In the third line of subparagraph 7, after the words "safeguards agreements", the word "and" should be deleted and the following text inserted: "in accordance with article XII.C of the Agency's Statute and paragraphs 18 and 19 of INFCIRC/153, thus". In subparagraph 4, the

words "bring into force" should be replaced by the word "implement"; and the words "as soon as possible" should be inserted after the word "agreements". In the second sentence of subparagraph 5, the word "only" should be inserted before the words "competent authority".

32. **Mr. Hossein** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that, with regard to subparagraph 7, his delegation felt that the Committee should not use wording that failed to respect the authority of the Director-General of IAEA. The Director-General had to be mandated by IAEA to appear before United Nations bodies like the Security Council. He therefore proposed the deletion of that subparagraph. In subparagraph 3, the word "international" was essential. Although it was not known how many bilateral instruments there were, international legal instruments were binding on the international community.

33. **Ms. Hallum** (New Zealand) said that her delegation had serious reservations about the proposal to delete subparagraph 7 and sought clarification about that proposal. The paragraph embodied a very important concept which needed to be preserved; and the enforcement capacity of the Security Council was an important aspect of the integrity of the safeguards regime. It seemed that there was some scope to reinforce what was meant by "access". Her understanding was that the Director-General should be able to bring issues to the attention of the Security Council and provide briefings to it.

34. The suggestions made by the representative of Greece seemed acceptable on first hearing. Her delegation stressed the importance that it attached to the concepts in subparagraph 6. With regard to subparagraph 5, New Zealand did not favour the proposal to change the word "pillar" to "essential element" since that suggested a reduction in emphasis on safeguards. Lastly, she sought clarification on the reasons for the proposal to delete the word "dialogue" in subparagraph 3; if cooperation was desirable, dialogue should be desirable too.

35. **Mr. Thiebaud** (France) said that his delegation was fully in favour of retaining subparagraph 7, which should specify that the Director-General of IAEA would transmit information to the Security Council in accordance with article 12 (c) of the Statute. His delegation had difficulties with the language of subparagraph 6, since it placed two different situations on the same footing: the situation in Iraq was a matter for the Security Council and its resolutions, while the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was an issue between that country and IAEA. That subparagraph therefore needed to be re-drafted. His delegation could agree to some of the proposals made on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries with regard to subparagraphs 4 and 5, but had questions about other proposals, such as the proposed separate subparagraph based on the first sentence of subparagraph 5.

36. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) said that his delegation did not support the deletion of the word "international" in subparagraph 3. If the Committee did not specifically refer to international legal instruments, there would be loopholes, because some countries might try to use their own legal norms as a basis for resolving disputes. That would be likely to lead to double or even multiple standards.

37. **Mr. Neve** (United Kingdom) said that, with regard to subparagraph 7, it was important to retain a reference to the ability of the Director-General of IAEA to draw to the attention of the Security Council concerns about non-compliance with safeguards agreements. There could be a reference to the need for a prior decision by the Board of Governors, or to the role of the Board of Governors in accordance with the comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and article 12 (c) of the Statute. Referring to the proposal that, in subparagraph 5, the word "energy" should be changed to "material", he pointed out that the term "nuclear energy" was used in paragraph 9 of the Principles and Objectives for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and in article III of the Treaty.

38. **Mr. Nederlof** (Netherlands) said that his delegation agreed that subparagraph 7 should be retained, and supported the proposals made by the representative of Greece. With regard to subparagraph 7, it believed that access to the Security Council was an essential part of the verification system, since the Security Council was the only body in the United Nations which could monitor and act on the peace and security implications of breaches of the Safeguards Agreements. It was difficult to understand the objection to retaining a paragraph which accorded entirely with the Statute of IAEA.

39 **Mr. Casterton** (Canada) said that his delegation associated itself with the view that subparagraph 7

contained a very important concept which should be retained in the text. With regard to subparagraph 5, he believed that the first sentence contained a very important element, which should be retained, and agreed with the rationale put forward by the representative of the United Kingdom for retaining the phrase "nuclear energy". His delegation felt that it was very important to retain the last sentence of subparagraph 4. If the sentence was deleted for the sake of logical consistency, it should appear somewhere else in the document. Canada could accept the other proposals concerning subparagraph 4. Those points were covered to some extent by the inclusion of the words "without delay" in subparagraph 49.

40. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that, with regard to subparagraph 3, his delegation was in favour of deleting the words "and dialogue", because mere dialogue was not enough: what mattered was enhanced cooperation, which, of course, could be preceded by dialogue. He could agree to the use of the word "energy" in subparagraph 5 for the sake of consistency, but would understand it to mean material.

41. **Mr. Ikeda** (Japan) said that his delegation reserved the right to revert to some points, such as the proposal to delete certain sentences in subparagraphs 4 and 5. If those sentences were restored elsewhere in the text, his delegation could be flexible. Japan associated itself with the delegations which had expressed support for subparagraph 7. It felt that IAEA was the basic mechanism and should not be changed. The concerns expressed about the IAEA decision-making process could be addressed at some point. His delegation would make specific comments about the references to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in subparagraphs 6 and 11 at a later stage.

42. **Mr. Coelho** (Portugal) said that his delegation supported the retention of subparagraph 7, and of the first sentence of subparagraph 5.

43. **The Chairman** said that the suggestions made by delegations should be viewed in the context of the entire report; some of them were already covered in the last section of the report.

44. **Mr. Hossein** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the section on safeguards (paras. 8-18) was too long and was inconsistent with other parts of the draft report. There was also a certain amount of repetition.

45. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) said that since subparagraph 8 referred to States parties to the Treaty, the word "parties" should be added after the word "States" in each case. In the second sentence, it should be specified that the safeguards were the 1995 safeguards. Moreover, the safeguards did not help strengthen collective security, but strengthened trust among States. The words "reaffirms the conviction" should be changed to "considers"

46. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that the members of IAEA consisted of States parties and States which were not parties to the Treaty. While non-States parties had Safeguards Agreements with IAEA, they did not cover all nuclear facilities. It was therefore correct to refer to "States".

47. **Mr. Biggs** (Australia) said that Safeguards Agreements with States which were not parties to the Treaty were important for security and mutual confidence. The reference to States in subparagraph 8 was therefore appropriate.

48. **Mr. Wiranata-Atmadia** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, proposed that, in the first sentence of subparagraph 10, the phrases "the continued pursuit by States parties of the principle of" and "parties in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved" should be deleted; and that the words "peaceful nuclear activities" should be changed to "sources of special fissionable materials".

49. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) said that the first sentence of subparagraph 10 was somewhat repetitive and should be reworded to read: "The Conference reiterates the call of the States Parties that safeguards should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.". The text would then correspond to paragraph 13 of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

50. **Mr. Ikeda** (Japan) said that the long sentence at the beginning of subparagraph 10 had been put together from various texts. He would prefer to follow the wording of paragraph 13 of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and delete the phrase "once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved", which changed the meaning of the paragraph. The

deleted phrase could be added at the end of subparagraph 20.

51. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that his delegation supported the proposal made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries regarding subparagraph 10. The language of that subparagraph gave the impression that States parties supported the principle of the universal application of IAEA safeguards, but that was not the case. The Committee must reaffirm the call made at the 1995 Conference for universal application of safeguards. Any radioactive or fissile materials that a State possessed, anywhere in the world, must be subject to the safeguards regime. That objective could not realistically be related to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, since it was not known when that would be achieved. All materials and facilities must therefore be subject to international safeguards and IAEA monitoring. Any other formulation would perpetuate discrimination between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, which was unacceptable.

52. **Mr. Twist** (Ireland) proposed that, in the first sentence of subparagraph 10, the Conference should call for the universal application by States parties of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in all States.

53. **Ms. Abdul-Rahim** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that her delegation wished to associate itself with the views expressed by the representative of Egypt. Subparagraph 10 was discriminatory. The second footnote to the subparagraph referred by name to the States parties to the Treaty that had yet to conclude Safeguards Agreements with IAEA, but there was no mention of Israel, which, although it was not a party to the Treaty, had a large nuclear arsenal and had not concluded a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency.

54. **Mr. Neve** (United Kingdom) said that, as a result of the juxtaposition of language from various texts, the meaning of the first sentence of subparagraph 10 was at odds with its purpose. The proposal by the representative of Japan was a satisfactory solution to that problem. With regard to the comments by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic, he said that the application of safeguards by States not yet party to the Treaty was a separate issue.

55. **Mr. Casterton** (Canada) said that his delegation supported the proposal by the representative of Japan and agreed with the representative of the United Kingdom that it would not be practical to address all the issues in one subparagraph.

56. **Mr. Pinel** (France) expressed support for the Japanese proposal, which was clear and logical.

57. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) said that it must be made clear that subparagraph 10 was concerned solely with non-nuclear-weapon States parties, which were required by article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. As the representative of Japan had stated, the application of safeguards by nuclear-weapon States was a separate point, which was, in fact, dealt with elsewhere in the text.

58. **Ms. Hallum** (New Zealand) said that her delegation supported the wording proposed by the representative of Ireland, but agreed that the Japanese proposal was also an acceptable solution. She noted that the need which the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic had emphasized for States not yet party to the Treaty to conclude Safeguards Agreements with IAEA was covered in subparagraph 49. Indeed, many of the problems raised had less to do with the substance of the draft report than with its structure, which was encouraging.

59. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece) said that he agreed with previous speakers that the first sentence of subparagraph 10 was open to misinterpretation and should be simplified. He proposed that the Conference should reaffirm the need to move forward with determination towards the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, in accordance with the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament".

60. **Mr. Al-Hadithi** (Iraq) said that his delegation supported the proposal made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the statements by the representatives of Egypt and the Syrian Arab Republic.

61. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation), referring to subparagraph 12, said that it was not clear why paragraph 11 of the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" had not been cited in full. If there was agreement that the new measures contained in the Model Additional Protocol would enable the Agency to

detect undeclared nuclear activities, the subparagraph must contain a statement to that effect.

62. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America) expressed concern that, in a number of instances, the draft report cited provisions of the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" without reproducing the exact wording. The decisions of the 1995 Conference were not open to amendment. To avoid any confusion, subparagraph 1, in which the Conference reaffirmed that decision should be retained and, if necessary, the text of the decision should be reproduced in full.

63. **Mr. Hossein** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that subparagraph 14 gave too much weight to the decisions by the IAEA Board of Governors on safeguards-strengthening measures, implying that they had the same status as Safeguards Agreements, which were legally binding instruments ratified in accordance with the procedures stipulated in the domestic legislation of the signatories. Indeed, he had a number of questions with regard to the authority under which the strengthening measures had been introduced, which he should like to put to the representatives of IAEA.

64. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) proposed that the second sentence of subparagraph 14 should contain only a general reference to strengthening measures, rather than a list that included some measures, but omitted others. Such an amendment would also be consistent with the objective of producing a streamlined text.

65. After a discussion in which **Mr. Ikeda** (Japan), **Mr. Hossein** (Islamic Republic of Iran), **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece), **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) and **Ms. Abdul-Rahim** (Syrian Arab Republic) took part, **the Chairman** suggested that delegations with questions regarding the strengthened safeguards measures referred to in subparagraph 14 should meet informally with the representatives of IAEA before the Committee's next meeting.

66. **Mr. Gerstler** (Germany), supported by **Mr. Delhaye** (Belgium) and **Mr. Kerma** (Algeria), said that he was not convinced of the need to retain subparagraph 14, since the strengthening measures referred to had become less relevant with the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol and the steps taken to integrate safeguards.

67. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America) said that, on the contrary, the implementation of the strengthened safeguards measures, which had been introduced under comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, remained vital, particularly in those countries that had yet to conclude additional protocols to their Safeguards Agreements.

68. **Mr. Neve** (United Kingdom) said that his delegation fully supported the statement by the representative of the United States. The authority under which the strengthening measures had been introduced was not an issue.

69. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece) welcomed the clarification provided by the representative of the United States. Subparagraph 14 should be reformulated so as to emphasize that the strengthening measures were being implemented under the authority conferred upon IAEA by existing comprehensive Safeguards Agreements.

70. **The Chairman** suggested that those delegations that continued to have questions regarding subparagraph 14 should hold informal consultations with IAEA and that the Committee should revert to the issue at its next formal meeting.

71. *It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.

Main Committee II

Summary record of the 6th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 10 May 2000, at 10.35 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Kobieracki .... (Poland)

Contents

Exchange of views (*continued*)

Other matters

The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

Exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **The Chairman** invited the Committee to resume its first reading of the Chairman's draft of the report of Main Committee II (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/___), leaving aside the section on export controls and all action-oriented recommendations on the subject. There it had been felt that a compromise solution could best be achieved if they were dealt with in informal, open-ended consultations; and he had asked Mr. Schmidt of Austria to direct those consultations. Accordingly, the Committee would continue its consideration of the paragraphs in the section on conclusions and recommendations.

Paragraph 15

2. **Mr. Turner** (Slovakia) proposed inserting, in the last sentence, the phrase "in an effective and efficient manner" between the words "will provide" and "increased confidence".

3. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece) said that it was not correct to state in the final sentence that the measures in the Model Additional Protocol had now become an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system, because as yet they had not.

4. **Mr. Raja Adnan** (Malaysia) said that the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries had accordingly, in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.7, proposed replacing the words "have now" in the last sentence of paragraph 15 with the words "will eventually".

5. **Mr. Neve** (United Kingdom) said that the expression "will eventually" was too cautious, because the measures were in the process of being introduced. His delegation proposed instead substituting the phrase "are now being introduced as" for the phrase "have now become".

6. **Mr. Hosseini** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that there were repetitions in the wording of paragraphs 15, 16 and 18 that required editorial revision.

7. **Mr. Fernandes** (Brazil) proposed replacing the term "wider access" in the second sentence of paragraph 15 by the term "complementary access" in keeping with the wording of the Model Additional Protocol.

Paragraph 16

8. **Mr. Neve** (United Kingdom) said that it was not clear what was meant by the expression "symbiotic relationship" in the third sentence, and that it would probably be safest to keep to the language of article I of the Model Additional Protocol.

Paragraph 17

9. **Mr. Raja Adnan** (Malaysia) said that, in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.7, the non-aligned countries, bearing in mind that one of the arguments put forward by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was that the measures in the Model Additional Protocol would eventually result in a reduction in the level of traditional verification, had proposed replacing the words "corresponding changes" in the third sentence by the words "eventual reduction".

10. **Mr. Turner** (Slovakia) proposed that, in the same sentence, the expression "increased confidence" should be replaced by the expression "credible assurance". The current full-scope safeguards offered a certain level of assurance, and the Model Additional Protocol would provide increased assurance. The goal should therefore be that the integrated system would in the future provide a credible assurance.

11. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece) proposed that, at the beginning of the paragraph, the Conference should not simply note the high priority that IAEA attached to an integrated system, but rather endorse it.

Paragraph 18

12. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt), supported by **Mr. Hosseini** (Iran) and **Mr. Markram** (South Africa), said that, as proposed by the non-aligned countries in their conference room paper, the words "all non-nuclear-weapon States parties" in the first sentence should be replaced by the words "all States parties".

13. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece) said that the expression "to conclude and bring into force" in the last sentence was redundant and should be replaced by the phrase "implement as soon as possible".

14. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America) said that the final sentence in paragraph 18 was action-oriented and should therefore be moved to the section in the Chairman's draft containing action-oriented recommendations. The same applied to the

recommendations to be found in paragraphs 10, 11, 14, 18, 25, 26, 27, 40 and 41. Regarding the amendment proposed by Egypt, if the adjective "non-nuclear-weapon" was deleted, the Conference's recognition at the beginning of the first sentence no longer made sense.

15. **Mr. Neve** (United Kingdom) said that his delegation supported the proposal of the United States regarding paragraph 18. The second sentence of the paragraph did not accurately reflect the situation and should be replaced by the following text: "The Conference also recognizes that the interests of nuclear non-proliferation will be effectively served by the acceptance of relevant IAEA safeguards strengthening measures by countries with item-specific safeguards agreements."

16. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) said that his delegation could not agree with the proposal of Egypt, but supported the suggestion by the United States.

17. **Mr. Casterton** (Canada) said that, in the understanding of his delegation, the United States proposal was intended to encourage States to conclude protocols as soon as possible. In its view, the reference to non-nuclear-weapon States was accurate, and the case of the nuclear-weapon States was covered in the last sentence of the paragraph. The use of the term "universally" in the fifth line might be problematic, however, and could be deleted.

Paragraph 19

18. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America) said that the addition to paragraph 19 of the text proposed in the conference room paper submitted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.7 would not represent a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States, and therefore, it should not be included.

19. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt), supported by **Mr. Hosseini** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the following sentence should be added at the end of the paragraph: "The nuclear-weapon States should also commit themselves not to enter into any kind of nuclear technical cooperation with non-States parties to the NPT directly or indirectly."

20. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation), supported by **Mr. Neve** (United Kingdom) and **Mr. Pinel** (France) said that the part of the paragraph after the phrase "nuclear-weapon States" in the first line should be replaced by "in accordance with article I".

Paragraph 20

21. **Mr. Ikeda** (Japan) said that the reference to "nuclear supplies" in the second line of the paragraph was ambiguous. The Group of 10 confirmed in that paragraph that they were referring to nuclear material supplied to nuclear-weapon States. In order to make that clear, he proposed that the first sentence should be replaced by the following: "The Conference recognizes that nuclear materials supplied to nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes should not be diverted for the production of nuclear weapons and other explosive devices.".

22. Any loopholes in the application of safeguards to peaceful uses in nuclear-weapon States could also be closed by adding the following text [illegible] the end of the paragraph: "Comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved. In the meantime, the Conference calls for wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources.".

23. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) said that the NPT contained specific provisions governing the peaceful nuclear imports of nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, the second sentence was not necessary and should be deleted.

Paragraph 21

24. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that it was a matter of course for nuclear-weapon States to conclude additional protocols to the voluntary offer safeguards agreements. Therefore, there was no need to express appreciation for those actions. The proposals contained in the conference room paper submitted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries had sought to include all measures capable of contributing to the non-proliferation and effective aims of the Model Additional Protocol.

25. **Mr. Neve** (United Kingdom), supported by **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) and **Mr. Pinel** (France) said that the last sentence of the paragraph implied that States under the Model Protocol had not done what was

required of them, which was not the case. The sentence, therefore, was unnecessary and should be deleted.

26. **Mr. Biggs** (Australia), supported by **Mr. Ikeda** (Japan), **Mr. Casterton** (Canada), **Mr. Raja Adnan** (Malaysia) and **Mr. Delhaye** (Belgium) said that many delegations wished to see the additional protocols applied as widely as possible, and no criticism was implied by that sentence. The sentence could be reworded to encourage nuclear-weapon States to keep the scope of their additional protocols under review. That would take into account the fact that non-proliferation was an evolving matter with disarmament as its eventual objective. The five nuclear-weapon States had, in examining their options under the additional protocols, come to different conclusions about what could be done, but circumstances could still change and those Governments would continue to review the situation.

Paragraph 22

27. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) said that paragraph 22 dealt with disarmament, which was not within the purview of the Committee, and furthermore, was being discussed in Main Committee I. Therefore, it should be deleted.

28. **Mr. Biggs** (Australia) said that he understood the concern of China regarding overlap in the work of the Main Committees, but that his delegation saw the cessation of production of fissile material as a non-proliferation matter. It was appropriate for the Committee to note the voluntary moratoriums on fissile material production instituted by many States.

29. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) said that his delegation had no objection to the content of the paragraph, but agreed with China that it was not in the proper context.

Paragraphs 23 to 25

30. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt), supported by **Mr. Hosseini** (Islamic Republic of Iran) drew attention to the proposal of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries regarding paragraph 25: the remainder of the second sentence after the word "urges" should be replaced by the phrase "that excess nuclear material in military stockpiles and nuclear material removed from nuclear weapons as a result of nuclear weapons reduction agreements should be placed under IAEA verification".

31. **Mr. Fernandes** (Brazil) supported by **Mr. Yturriaga** (Spain) and **Mr. Bompadre** (Argentina) said that, while Brazil supported the activities mentioned in paragraph 25, it was not fair to expect his country, which had renounced the nuclear option, to bear the costs of such arrangements. Therefore, the phrase "and be financed primarily by the nuclear-weapon States" should be added to the end of the paragraph.

32. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America), regarding the addition proposed by Egypt for the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, recalled that such verification activities would be precluded by his country's obligations under article I of the NPT. Therefore, the proposal could not be accepted. Financing for the arrangements should be worked out at IAEA.

33. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) suggested that paragraph 25 could be replaced by the first part of paragraph 13 of the 1995 Principles and Objectives.

34. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) said that the word "underlines" in the first line of paragraph 25 should be replaced by "notes" and the word "military" in the second line should be deleted. He also proposed that the rest of the paragraph after the phrase "IAEA verification arrangements" should be deleted. His delegation supported the statement by the United States on financing and on the proposal of Egypt.

35. **Mr. Neve** (United Kingdom) said that his delegation supported the statement by the United States, while it had some reservations about the last sentence of paragraph 25. The nature of voluntary offer safeguards agreements was at issue; such agreements did not legally provide for irreversibility. If that sentence was to be retained, it should read: "The verification arrangements should provide assurance of removal of fissile material from military to peaceful use.".

36. **Ms. Sriswasdi** (Thailand) said that she supported the statement by Brazil. Even though the financing details were to be worked out at IAEA, the matter should be discussed at the Conference first.

Paragraphs 26 and 27

37. **Mr. Ikeda** (Japan), supported by **Mr. Casterton** (Canada) said that the second sentence of paragraph 27 should be amended to read: "It further notes the

financial constraints under which the IAEA safeguards system has to function and calls upon all States parties, particularly nuclear-weapon States, to continue their political, technical and financial support of the IAEA safeguards system in order to ensure that the Agency is able to meet its increasing safeguards responsibilities.".

38. **Mr. Gerstler** (Germany) said that he supported the proposal by Japan and proposed that the word "substantial" in the first line of paragraph 27 should be deleted.

39. **Mr. Yturriaga** (Spain), supported by **Mr. Bernhardsen** (Norway), endorsed the proposal of the Japanese delegation.

40. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) proposed deleting the remainder of paragraph 27 after the expression "support of the IAEA" in the fifth line and endorsed the German delegation's proposal.

41. **Mr. Raja Adnan** (Malaysia) said that his delegation was satisfied with paragraph 27 as drafted but felt that the proposal of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries should be incorporated therein.

42. **Mr. Neve** (United Kingdom) said that his delegation would support the Japanese delegation's proposal if the expression "particularly nuclear-weapon States" were deleted, bringing the amendment into line with the United States proposal.

Paragraphs 28 and 29

43. **The Chairman** drew attention to document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.7, which contained a drafting suggestion with regard to paragraph 29.

44. **Mr. Raja Adnan** (Malaysia) said that the expression "should not entail a decrease in the resources available" in the second line of paragraph 29 should be replaced with the phrase "should not affect the resources available for technical cooperation". In the third and fourth lines, the expression "should be compatible with the Agency's function" should be replaced with the phrase "it should be equitably emphasized with the Agency's statutory function".

45. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) said that, in the second line of paragraph 29, the phrase "other statutory responsibilities including" should be inserted between the words "for" and "technical".

46. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt), referring to the first Malaysian proposal, suggested inserting the word "negatively" between the words "not" and "affect". At the end of paragraph 29, and in line with the proposal put forward by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the word "and" between the words "uses" and "with" should be deleted and the word "unimpeded" should be inserted after the word "with".

47. **Mr. Kerma** (Algeria) said that his delegation supported the Malaysian delegation's proposal and the amendment proposed by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to the last sentence.

48. **Mr. Neve** (United Kingdom) proposed replacing the first sentence of paragraph 29 by the following text: "The Conference considers that the allocation of resources for the strengthening of IAEA safeguards should take account of the need to continue to devote adequate resources to technical assistance and cooperation.".

49. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America) said that he supported the proposal by the United Kingdom, which could be combined with that of the Russian Federation.

50. **Mr. Hosseini** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that his delegation supported the amendments proposed by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and by the Egyptian and Malaysian delegations.

51. **Mr. Delhaye** (Belgium) expressed support for the proposal of the United Kingdom.

52. **Mr. Fernandes** (Brazil) said that, while he was satisfied with paragraph 29 as drafted, the amendments proposed by Egypt and Malaysia to the first sentence would improve it considerably. The paragraph as a whole was essential to maintaining a balance between the verification and promotion activities of the Agency.

53. **Ms. Sriswasdi** (Thailand) and **Ms. Jorge-Cholula** (Mexico), said that they endorsed the Malaysian proposal.

54. **Mr. Pinel** (France) expressed support for the proposals by the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation.

55. **Mr. Casterton** (Canada) drew attention to the fact that paragraph 27 dealt with the issue of safeguards and that Main Committee III would cover resource issues for the other activities of the Agency.

Paragraphs 30 to 36

56. **The Chairman** drew attention to document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/CRP.7, which contained proposals with respect to paragraph 30.

57. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece), supported by **Mr. Gerstler** (Germany) and **Ms. Raheem** (Syrian Arab Republic) proposed that the paragraph should be deleted.

58. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that his delegation fully supported paragraph 30 (*bis*) proposed by the non-aligned countries in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.7.

Paragraphs 37 and 38

59. **The Chairman** drew attention to document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.8, which contained drafting suggestions with regard to paragraph 37.

60. **Mr. Stromberg** (Sweden) said that the language in the second line of paragraph 37 could be made more positive by saying that the Conference "notes with appreciation" or "notes and welcomes" instead of simply "notes".

61. **Mr. Gerstler** (Germany) stressed that prudence was of the essence in the use of weapons-useable material for peaceful purposes and drew attention to his country's proposal to redraft paragraph 37 in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.10.

62. **Ms. Jorge-Cholula** (Mexico) said that paragraph 37, as currently drafted, was unacceptable.

63. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America) drew attention to the suggestions put forward by his delegation in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.8. Matters would be greatly simplified if the Committee discussed the situation with respect to the use of highly enriched uranium in research reactors and matters related to plutonium as separate subjects.

64. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) proposed that the last sentence of paragraph 38, which dealt with highly enriched uranium, should be deleted, since no decision had been taken on that issue.

65. **Mr. Biggs** (Australia) said that that sentence had not been meant to imply that the question of highly enriched uranium had been settled. It was meant to encourage efforts towards that end. That was a very important objective.

66. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China) said that he supported the Russian Federation's proposal.

67. **Mr. Neve** (United Kingdom), referring to the fourth line of paragraph 38, proposed that the expression "laying down policies" should be replaced with the words "setting out the policies" to avoid implying that the guidelines were actually establishing a new set of policies, which was not generally the case. With respect to the last sentence of that paragraph, he agreed that it was premature to include a reference to the establishment of similar guidelines for highly enriched uranium. That sentence could either be deleted or reworded to read: "Furthermore, the Conference encourages the States concerned to adopt and implement similar policies for the management of highly enriched uranium.".

68. **Mr. Yturriaga** (Spain) said that, while he had no objection to the text proposed by the United Kingdom, he believed that the last sentence must be retained. It might be premature to take up the question immediately but it was important to emphasize that the Conference supported efforts towards that end.

69. **Mr. Stromberg** (Sweden) expressed support for the Australian delegation's position.

70. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that the proposal made by the non-aligned countries should be reflected in paragraph 38. In the first line, the expression "welcomes the additional" should be replaced by the word "encourages". In the fifth line, the words "have decided to" should be replaced by the word "would". In the second sentence, the word "encourages" should be replaced by the words "calls upon". The last sentence should be retained.

71. **Ms. Hallum** (New Zealand) said that she agreed with the Australian delegation that the final sentence should be retained. Noting that the additional language proposed by the United Kingdom further clarified the sentence, she wondered whether the Australian and United Kingdom proposals could not be combined.

Paragraphs 39 and 40

72. **Mr. Bernhardsen** (Norway) suggested that the language proposed by his delegation in paragraph 2 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.12 could be added to the end of paragraph 40. The physical protection of nuclear materials was the primary barrier against unauthorized access to materials, and

controlling the materials at the facility level would limit the proliferation risk substantially. The physical protection of nuclear materials was a State responsibility, and the relevant requirements should be part of national nuclear legislation. Traditionally, such requirements had been based on international guidelines, but there were great variations at the national level as to the extent to which the IAEA standards were being implemented in different countries, due to technical, financial and other differences.

73. Currently, the IAEA standards for physical protection contained in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (corrected) were recommendatory in nature, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material applied only to such material in international transit. A more coherent and stronger international approach to physical protection requirements was needed. Strengthening international standards and the Convention on Physical Protection was therefore an important step towards reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation.

74. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China), referring to line 3 of paragraph 40, suggested adding the word "practicable" after the word "highest". The second sentence should be reworded to read: "The Conference acknowledges the responsibility of individual States for the physical protection of nuclear material within their territories and notes that international cooperation in physical protection is needed.".

75. **Mr. Friedrich** (Switzerland) said that he endorsed the Norwegian proposal.

76. **Mr. Delhaye** (Belgium), recalling that all issues relating to physical protection were currently the subject of a complex review process in IAEA, said that paragraph 40 was acceptable in its present form, as it had been drafted in a balanced manner and was open to change in the future.

77. **Mr. Casterton** (Canada), referring to a proposal by the representative of China, noted that the wording "highest standards" had been agreed on in 1995. Changing the wording could lead to the misinterpretation that those standards were being lowered.

78. **Mr. Gerstler** (Germany) emphasized that, in view of the discussions in Vienna on whether and how to enlarge the Convention on Physical Protection, he would hesitate to accept the Norwegian proposal and preferred to retain paragraph 40 in its current form.

79. **Mr. Ostrowski** (Poland) said that he supported the Norwegian point of view, stressing that cooperation might be insufficient and that some kind of regulation was required.

80. **Mr. Pinel** (France) said that he agreed with the representative of Belgium that revising the wording of paragraph 40 was an extremely sensitive issue, given the current state of affairs in the discussions in Vienna. The current text of the paragraph was well-balanced and should be retained.

81. **Mr. Neve** (United Kingdom) said that he supported the comments made by the representatives of France, Germany and Belgium.

82. **Mr. Schmidt** (Austria) said that he accepted the current wording of paragraph 40, but it should not restrict the discussions in Vienna in any way.

83. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece) associated himself with the statement made by the representative of Austria.

Paragraphs 41-44

84. **The Chairman** drew attention to the drafting suggestion in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.7 relating to paragraph 42.

Paragraph 45

85. **Mr. Lee Kie-cheon** (Republic of Korea) said that the words "both current and future" in the second sentence should be deleted, as, in some cases, there were also past nuclear activities that should be placed under IAEA safeguards.

86. **Ms. Raheem** (Syrian Arab Republic) suggested that the words "of the safeguards agreements" should be inserted in the first sentence after "subsidiary arrangements", for clarification.

87. **Mr. Ikeda** (Japan) said that the first sentence of paragraph 45 was not clear. Did "subsidiary arrangements with the IAEA" refer to safeguards agreements with the IAEA in accordance with article III, or did it refer to subsidiary arrangements to the safeguards agreements? The second sentence was already covered by paragraph 49 and should therefore be deleted.

Paragraph 46

88. **Ms. Raheem** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that paragraph 46 was contradictory. She did not see what the Director General of IAEA could have to negotiate with the countries that did not have significant nuclear activities. The paragraph should be deleted or redrafted.

89. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that the words "and the entry into force of such agreements" at the end of the second sentence should be deleted. The Director General was empowered to assist and facilitate the conclusion of safeguards agreements, but it was not within his power to facilitate their entry into force.

The meeting was suspended at 12.35 p.m. and resumed at 12.45 p.m.

Paragraphs 47-58

90. **The Chairman** noted that paragraphs 51 to 56 would be discussed in the framework of informal consultations on export controls.

91. **Mr. Gerstler** (Germany) referring to paragraph 47, proposed deleting the rest of the second sentence after the words "as possible" in order to avoid any incorrect legal interpretation with regard to the additional protocol.

92. **Mr. Raja Adnan** (Malaysia) proposed inserting the phrase "in particular those States parties with significant nuclear programmes" in the third last line of paragraph 47 following the words "urges all States parties", in order to emphasize the significance of the additional protocol for such States parties.

93. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece) proposed deleting the references to the "plan of action" in paragraph 48, since it concerned activities to be taken on the part of IAEA. There seemed to be something missing in paragraphs 57 and 58. The paper submitted by the United States contained a proposal in connection with the operation of research reactors using low-enriched uranium, which should be included there.

94. **Ms. Raheem** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that paragraphs 47 and 48 contained a lot of repetition and could be combined in one paragraph, stating that the Conference welcomed the fact that some States had signed the Protocols and would invite other States to accelerate that process. Her delegation supported the proposal submitted by the non-aligned countries relating to paragraph 48 and stressed the need to name the three States referred to in paragraph 49 in the paragraph itself, rather than a footnote. In relation to paragraphs 50 and 51, she endorsed the amendments submitted by the non-aligned countries because they clarified the meaning of those paragraphs. Lastly, paragraphs 53 and 54 were ambiguous and should be reformulated.

95. **Mr. Ikeda** (Japan) reminded the Committee that conference room papers had been submitted on paragraphs 50 and 57. In paragraph 50, it should be made clear in the second sentence that support for IAEA safeguards activities would be contingent on its efforts to improve the cost-efficiency and effectiveness of those activities. The outcome of the discussions in Vienna should not, however, be prejudged. Paragraph 57 did not address the long-term arrangements for plutonium management. It might be better if the first line read "The Conference encourages States to consider further ways to improve the transparency of".

96. **Mr. Fu Zhigang** (China), referring to paragraph 48, shared the view expressed by the representative of Greece, that it would be better not to refer to the plan of action. Accordingly, the words "to consider a plan of action" in the second sentence and the entire third sentence should be deleted. In paragraph 50, the end of the first sentence should read "efficiently all its responsibilities, including safeguards". In the second sentence, the words "to make every effort" should be inserted after "Member States of the IAEA". Paragraph 57 should remain unchanged. Lastly, in paragraph 58, the words "with a view to broadening its scope" should be deleted, as informal discussions were still taking place.

97. **Mr. Casterton** (Canada) said that, earlier in the meeting, he had indicated that the Group of 10 had drafted a text concerning the relationship between INFCIRC/153 agreements, the additional protocol and paragraph 12 of the 1995 principles and objectives document. One of those proposals was relevant to paragraph 47: "The Conference notes the symbiotic relationship between the comprehensive safeguards agreements, INFCIRC/153, and the additional protocol, INFCIRC/540 (corrected). The Conference encourages States parties to aim towards establishing an INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreement, coupled with an additional protocol, as constituting the IAEA full-scope safeguards referred to in paragraph 12 of Decision 2 of the 1995 NPT Conference." Those two

sentences set forth an important, forward-looking objective and could be included in paragraph 47, inserted as a separate paragraph, or added elsewhere within the documents of the Conference.

98. **Mr. Turner** (Slovakia) said that his delegation had views similar to those expressed by Japan concerning the last sentence of paragraph 50 regarding the new formula for financing of IAEA safeguards activities. As it was as yet premature to speak about how to proceed, it would suffice to state that IAEA Member States should discuss the issue, without saying how and when. He also shared the views of Japan and Germany on paragraph 27 relating to safeguards resources.

99. **Mr. Schmidt** (Austria) said that he supported the statement made by the representative of Canada in connection with paragraph 47. If the paragraph were to end after the word "possible", a very important element which related the paragraph to article III, paragraph 1, of the NPT would be lost. He therefore felt that the end of the second sentence should be retained.

100. **Ms. Jorge-Cholula** (Mexico) said that her delegation supported the proposed amendments in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.7 and also wished to propose the deletion of the rest of the second sentence of paragraph 50 after the word "financing".

101. **Mr. Bompadre** (Argentina), referring to paragraph 50, recalled his delegation's proposal to delete the rest of the paragraph after the word "financing" in the fifth line. An additional sentence could be added, for example, "The Conference also takes note of current discussions concerning the funding of the Agency's safeguards activities.". The proposal made by Japan in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.9 was also acceptable.

102. **Mr. Neve** (United Kingdom), referring to paragraph 57, said that the first part did not take account of the fact that some States had already adopted guidelines, while others, including the United Kingdom, were pursuing national measures and policies. The guidelines for plutonium management were not aimed solely at avoiding the stockpiling of nuclear material that could potentially be diverted to direct use for nuclear weapons. The balancing of supply and demand for civil plutonium was another of the factors to be taken into account. The paragraph was therefore unbalanced in its current form and should be reworded to read: "The Conference encourages States to continue to examine and adopt long-term arrangements for the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium.".

103. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt), referring to paragraph 47, said that the word "urges" in the second sentence should be replaced by the word "encourages", as the conclusion of additional protocols was not mandatory, but depended on the judgement and sovereign right of States. In paragraph 48, it was not appropriate to give equal treatment to safeguards agreements and additional protocols. In the first sentence, therefore, the reference to additional protocols and the words "it is imperative that" should be deleted. However, his delegation could accept a version of the paragraph stating that the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols would be encouraged. In addition, he proposed that the words "such agreements and protocols" at the end of the second sentence of paragraph 48 should be replaced by the phrase "safeguards agreements and protocols as a basis for further progress towards the conclusion of additional protocols".

104. Egypt, together with the other non-aligned countries, had also proposed an additional paragraph, 48 *bis*. The footnote to paragraph 49 should be integrated into the main text. The countries referred to should become parties to the Treaty without any further delay. Lastly, many speakers had insisted on adding a reference to the nuclear-weapon States to paragraph 50. That was the price those States had to pay for maintaining their nuclear-weapon status. When the elimination of nuclear weapons had taken place, they would have the same status as the rest of the international community.

105. **Mr. Fernandes** (Brazil) said that he shared the view of the representatives of Mexico and Argentina that paragraph 50 should end after the word "financing" in the fifth line. He could support the alternative proposal from Argentina, or the proposal from Japan contained in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.9.

106. **Mr. Ikeda** (Japan) said that he supported the proposal by the non-aligned countries concerning the second sentence of paragraph 48 since the action-oriented part of the paragraph was very important. The Conference had to send the message that IAEA and its Member States were considering a plan of action. The paragraph should be retained, together with the

amendments proposed by the non-aligned countries and Egypt.

107. **Ms. Sriswasdi** (Thailand) said that she supported the proposal by the non-aligned countries concerning paragraph 48 and the new paragraph 48 *bis*. Her delegation also preferred to retain the last part of paragraph 48 in its current form, as it complemented the regional efforts being made, and was significant in the context of future cooperation.

108. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation), referring to the first sentence of paragraph 58, proposed deleting the words "and other international instruments on the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities" because he was not aware of any such instruments, other than the Convention on Physical Protection. In relation to paragraph 49, the names of those States not yet party to the Treaty should be included in the main text, rather than the footnote. Only three of those mentioned did not have comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency, as Cuba had a full-scope agreement with the Agency, as well as an additional protocol. Finally, he could not agree with the proposal by the representative of Canada to connect the additional protocol and paragraph 12 of Decision 2 of the 1995 Conference.

109. **Mr. Lee Kie-cheon** (Republic of Korea) said it was important to have a clear picture of what was stated in the action-oriented recommendations. Paragraphs 45 to 58 should not be the only recommendations, and the Committee should consider the proposals made by the United States and other delegations to see what other elements could be included.

110. In connection with the proposal to delete paragraphs 45 and 46, the universal application of IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols would play a pivotal role in strengthening non-proliferation in the twenty-first century. He believed that the call by the Conference urging all States parties concerned to conclude and bring into force safeguards agreements and additional protocols should be reflected in the final recommendations as one of the most important elements. Paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 should be retained, as amended by several delegations. Paragraph 48 did seem to contain some repetition, and should therefore begin with the words "The Conference recommends" in the second sentence.

111. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America), referring to paragraph 57, proposed making it more action-oriented by replacing the word "examine" with "adopt" and the phrase "in order to" with the words "that would". In response to the statement by the Russian Federation, he suggested that, while Cuba did not have unsafeguarded nuclear activities, it did lack a comprehensive safeguards agreement. The IAEA could be asked to confirm that point.

Paragraph 10

112. **Mr. Al-Hassan** (Oman), referring to the second footnote to paragraph 10, noted that Oman was included in the list of countries which had yet to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA. However, Oman had signed the NPT in 1997 and had entered into a safeguards agreement that had been approved by the General Conference on 20 September 1999. As the process of entering into a safeguards agreement had been started, and no problems were foreseen, its conclusion could be considered a fait accompli. The footnote should be deleted, and IAEA should be requested to submit the most up-to-date information, as the information in the document seemed to be from 1999. His country was a very strong advocate of the NPT, and took its commitments seriously.

113. **Mr. Althagafi** (Saudi Arabia) supported the view of the Non-Aligned Movement that the second footnote should be deleted. He also reiterated that his country's position also applied to paragraph 6 of the report of the Chairman of the Subsidiary Body discussed on the previous day.

114. **Mr. Al-Otaibi** (Kuwait) reiterated his delegation's full support for the position of the Non-Aligned Movement on paragraph 10. His country had acceded to the NPT on 17 November 1989 and had concluded and signed a safeguards agreement on 10 May 1999, although the procedure was not yet fully completed.

115. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America), referring to paragraph 10, said that his delegation had no objection to the footnote being removed. If it were deleted, the other footnotes should also be deleted.

116. **Mr. Al-Neyadi** (United Arab Emirates) and **Mr. Raja Adnan** (Malaysia) said that they agreed that the footnotes should be deleted.

Paragraph 6

117. **Mr. Hasan** (Iraq) said that his delegation had already expressed the view that paragraph 6 of the Committee's draft report was neither objective nor related to the work of the Conference and should, therefore, be deleted. On the previous day, the IAEA representative had made a statement on the status of Iraq's compliance with the safeguards regime. That statement had been written by the United States, and IAEA had simply rubber-stamped it. It reminded his delegation of the statements made by Richard Butler, which had been written in the United States Mission and then sealed with the United Nations stamp.

118. The statement ran counter to the objectives and principles of the NPT, the statute of IAEA, and its safeguards regime. Indeed, it contradicted previous statements made by IAEA. It was almost an exact reproduction of the statement made by a United States representative in a previous meeting. The contradiction and lack of fairness were demonstrated by the following. The first paragraph referred to past events, which had no relation to the period being reviewed by the Conference.

119. The second paragraph of the statement contradicted itself. At the beginning, it stated that safeguards activities had taken place since 1991 within the IAEA activities mandated by Security Council resolutions. Then it concluded that IAEA was unable to state that Iraq had complied with its safeguards agreement. That meant that IAEA, between 1991 and 1999, had renounced its obligation to ensure the implementation of the safeguards agreement, and at the same time implied that Iraq had not complied with that agreement.

120. IAEA had been called upon to continue its activities under the safeguards agreement since 1991. It would seem that the Agency had decided to subsume the safeguards agreement into the regime of inspections, espionage and acts of provocation carried out by the United States inspectors. The latter, using the most sophisticated technical means available, had carried out thousands of inspection and monitoring operations over eight years. At the end, IAEA had concluded that the Iraqi nuclear programme had reached point zero. In that case, what did Iraq have to do for IAEA to say that it had complied with the safeguards agreement?

121. According to the so-called IAEA statement, the Agency had carried out in January 2000 a physical inventory verification of the nuclear material subject to safeguards in Iraq with the limited objective of verifying the presence of the declared nuclear material. That was an erroneous description of the inspection that had taken place in Iraq in January 2000 under the safeguards agreement between IAEA and Iraq. All nuclear facilities in Iraq had been destroyed, nuclear fuel had been transferred out of Iraq, and all the peaceful nuclear activities in Iraq had come to a halt. The only remaining task under the safeguards agreement, as the Agency itself had admitted, was to verify the nuclear material. Why then did the statement describe that inspection as one with a "limited objective"? What were the other objectives under the safeguards regime which IAEA had been supposed to achieve, but had not been able to?

122. The Agency's statement further indicated: "This inspection is not however sufficient to provide assurance that Iraq is in full compliance with all its safeguards obligations.", which was simply untrue. The safeguards agreement was clear, and the activities covered under it were well known. IAEA had requested the resumption of the inspections in its letter of December 1999 (S/2000/120). Iraq had agreed and an IAEA inspection team had carried out its mission in Iraq in January 2000. IAEA, in its letter to the Security Council of 10 April 2000 (S/2000/300) had stated "The Agency inspectors were able to verify the nuclear material subject to safeguards, which consists of low enriched, natural and depleted uranium. Iraq provided the necessary cooperation for the inspection team to perform its activities effectively and efficiently." What, then, would compliance with the safeguards regime be?

123. The IAEA statement said that it had no assurance that Iraq did not divert its nuclear materials, nor did it have assurance of the non-existence of undeclared nuclear activities. That was extremely irrational. It contradicted the statement made by the IAEA Director General after the conclusion of the January inspection. Saying that the Agency did not have any assurances that there were no undeclared nuclear activities was the same as insisting that a party was guilty until proven innocent, the exact opposite of the legal principle usually applied. The United States had attempted for many years to impose that logic on the United Nations, to justify the continued imposition of comprehensive sanctions against Iraq. It was calling on Iraq to prove a

negative assertion. That logic had to be rejected and IAEA should state that it had completed its tasks under the safeguards agreement. If the Agency had any factual evidence as to Iraq's lack of compliance with the safeguards agreement, it should submit that evidence to the Board of Governors and the international community as a whole. To continue a policy of genocide under the pretext of doubt and suspicion was illegal and immoral.

124. The last sentence of the United States/IAEA statement said that it was necessary, until the Security Council decided otherwise, for IAEA to resume its verification activities under the relevant Security Council resolutions, including those under the NPT safeguards. That showed that the authors of the statement were not interested in implementing the safeguards agreements with Iraq or in strengthening the relationship between Iraq and IAEA. They actually sought to confuse the Agency's professional, technical and neutral tasks with the coercive measures imposed on Iraq. Such an attitude would destroy the credibility and independence of the safeguards regime and undermine the credibility of both IAEA and the NPT.

Other matters

125. **Mr. Ostrowski** (Poland) announced that the ratification instruments for the additional protocol concluded between Poland and IAEA in 1997 had been delivered to the Director General on 5 May 2000 and had been duly acknowledged.

The meeting rose at 1.40 p.m.

Main Committee II

Summary record of the 7th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 11 May 2000 at 4 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Kobieracki .... (Poland)

Contents

Exchange of views (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 5.15 p.m.

Exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **The Chairman** regretted that the Committee had been unable to achieve consensus on his suggested draft report (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.13). However, he informed members of the Committee that, in a final effort to achieve consensus, he had prepared a revised version (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.13/Rev.1) in which he had tried to take into account the various points of views expressed and find some common ground for agreement. His intention was to adjourn the meeting and allow delegations some time to examine the revised draft report. He would then meet informally with any interested delegations at 8 p.m. in Conference Room 6, to determine whether the revised draft was acceptable to the Committee. He urged all delegations to reflect carefully on their positions with a view to reaching agreement, even if some aspects of the report were not totally satisfactory.

2. **Mr. Schmidt** (Austria), speaking as chairman of the informal working group on export controls, noted that the proposed text contained both backward-looking and forward-looking language. Discussions had been fruitful and had clarified some points although no agreement had been reached. He remained optimistic that consensus could be achieved and therefore proposed to meet informally with any interested delegations immediately after the adjournment of the meeting to try and reach a consensus. He would then report to the Chairman before the latter met informally with the members of the Committee to discuss the revised draft report.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.

Main Committee II

Summary record of the 8th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 12 May 2000, 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Kobieracki . . . . (Poland)

Contents

Draft report of Subsidiary Body 2

Draft report of Main Committee II

The meeting was called to order at 10 a.m.

Draft report of Subsidiary Body 2
(NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/WP.1/Rev.2)

1. **The Chairman** suggested the suspension of the meeting to enable delegations to familiarize themselves with the revised draft report.

The meeting was suspended at 10.05 a.m. and resumed at 11.30 a.m.

2. **Mr. Westdal** (Canada), speaking as the Chairman of Subsidiary Body 2 and introducing the draft report of that body (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/SB.2/WP.1/Rev.2), noted that, although some elements of the report did not enjoy consensus, the report as a whole provided a good basis for further consultations.

3. **The Chairman** suggested that the Committee should take note of the draft report, which would be incorporated in its own report to the plenary Conference.

4. **Mr. Al-Anbuge** (Iraq) said that, although his delegation categorically rejected paragraph 14 of the draft report and called for its deletion, it could agree to take note of the report as a basis for further consultations.

5. **The Chairman** said he took it that the Committee wished to take note of the draft report of Subsidiary Body 2, which would be incorporated in paragraph 8 of the draft report of the Committee.

6. *It was so decided.*

Draft report of Main Committee II
(NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.13/Rev.2)

7. **The Chairman**, inviting delegations to consider the draft report, drew attention to the 75 conclusions and recommendations in paragraph 7. He reminded delegations that those paragraphs which were set out in bold type required further work, as they had not enjoyed consensus.

8. He announced that there had been a number of proposals for further amendment of the contested paragraphs and suggested that the Committee should consider them in numerical order. He urged the members to bear in mind that, since time was limited, they should not reopen negotiations on the texts of the various paragraphs. Rather, the Committee should take note of the draft report for onward transmission to the plenary Conference. If any delegation contested the wording of an amendment that he introduced, the text of the amendment would still be incorporated, but the paragraph would remain in bold type, as being contested.

Paragraph 22

9. **The Chairman** said it had been proposed that, the words "by all nuclear States parties to the Treaty" should be added at the end of the first sentence.

Paragraph 24

10. **The Chairman** said it had been proposed that, in the second sentence, after the words "technical cooperation", the words "and assistance" should be added.

Paragraph 26

11. **The Chairman** said that the end of the paragraph should be amended to read "and should be, if required by the supplier, subject to appropriate IAEA safeguards agreements". It was his understanding that, with that amendment, the paragraph could be transferred to the uncontested category.

12. *It was so decided.*

Paragraph 30

13. **The Chairman** said that he had received a proposal to replace the last sentence of paragraph 30 with the following: "Fissile materials designated by each of the nuclear-weapon States as no longer required for defence purposes should, as soon as practicable, be placed under IAEA or other relevant verification". The text of the paragraph remained contested and would appear in bold type.

14. **Mr. Baiedi-Nejad** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that, in the proposal just read out, "defence" should be replaced by "military".

15. **Mr. Fernandes** (Brazil) said that his delegation had made two proposals for incorporation in the paragraph concerning financing of such activities which had not been reflected, but in an effort to achieve consensus it would not insist on those amendments.

16. Brazil supported all measures related to arms control and disarmament, including the Trilateral Initiative, which it considered a positive example and an additional encouragement to the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It encouraged the irreversible withdrawal of nuclear material from military use and its conversion for peaceful purposes.

17. Nevertheless, Brazil was of the firm view that verification of nuclear materials transferred from military use to peaceful purposes should be financed primarily by the nuclear-weapon States. It was not appropriate to expect that non-nuclear-weapon States, which had renounced the nuclear option, especially those which had never benefited from any military arrangement involving nuclear weapons, should be required to finance those activities.

18. In the view of his delegation, there was some similarity with the discussion in environmental forums regarding the financing of mechanisms to cope with atmospheric pollution. The "polluter-pays" principle internationally agreed in that field was simple and fair: those chiefly responsible for causing pollution bore the cost of combating it. Brazil advocated a similar approach to the issue dealt with in paragraph 30.

19. When the time came to discuss the issue at IAEA, Brazil would continue to defend its position that the nuclear-weapon States bore special responsibility for the financing of activities which — although desirable and universally beneficial — existed only because those States had decided to pursue the development of nuclear weapons. In arranging for international verification of nuclear material transferred from military use, the nuclear-weapon States should be as self-sufficient as they had been when building their arsenals.

Paragraph 31

20. **The Chairman** said it had been proposed that the words "in particular" should be included in the second sentence, before the words "nuclear-weapon States".

Paragraph 35

21. **The Chairman** said it had been proposed that, at the end of the second sentence, the words "which may enable them to produce or develop nuclear-weapons capabilities" should be added.

22. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) suggested that, with the amendment read out by the Chairman, the paragraph might enjoy general agreement and be removed from the contested category.

23. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America) said that the paragraph, as amended, would require further thought and that it should remain in the contested category.

24. **The Chairman**, noting the lack of consensus, said that the paragraph would remain in the contested category.

Paragraph 40

25. **The Chairman** said that, following consultations, it had been proposed that the first part of the paragraph should read: "The Conference encourages the States parties to ensure, within their national rules and regulations, that the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items to States parties to the Treaty ...". He wondered whether, with that amendment, the paragraph could be transferred to the uncontested category.

26. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that he welcomed the amendment and further proposed that the words "States parties" should be amended to read "all States, whether parties or not parties".

27. **The Chairman**, noting the additional amendment, said that the paragraph would need to remain in the contested category.

Paragraph 44

28. **The Chairman** said it had been proposed that the second and third sentences should be removed from paragraph 44 and should replace the current text of paragraph 74. Since those sentences were uncontested, paragraph 74 would accordingly become uncontested.

29. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) said that, according to his understanding, it had been agreed that the last part of the paragraph should read: "to consider similar policies for additional transparency in the management of highly enriched uranium used for peaceful purposes."

30. **The Chairman**, noting that there seemed to be some confusion over the wording of paragraph 44, suggested a suspension of the meeting with the aim of

reaching agreement on the texts of paragraphs 44 and 74.

The meeting was suspended at noon and resumed at 12.15 p.m.

31. **The Chairman** said that new paragraph 44 would consist of the first sentence of the existing paragraph. The rest of the paragraph would be deleted. It was his understanding that, with that amendment, the paragraph was no longer contested.

32. *It was so decided.*

Paragraph 45

33. **The Chairman** said it had proposed that the paragraph should end after the word "devices" in the third line.

34. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that the paragraph should remain as currently drafted.

35. **The Chairman** noted that the paragraph would need to remain in the contested category.

Paragraph 56

36. **The Chairman** said it had been proposed that the words "Israel, the only State in the region not a party to the NPT to accede to the NPT and" should be added before the expression "all States directly concerned" in the second sentence. At the end of the paragraph, the following sentences should be added in bold: "The Conference calls upon all countries of the region that have not done so pending the establishment of the zone to agree to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards. The Conference also invites those countries pending the establishment of the zone not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories or territories under their control of nuclear weapons or nuclear devices. The text of the paragraph remained contested and would appear in bold type.

37. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America) said that such additions seemed to be taking the Committee further away from a consensus. The report should be forwarded to the plenary Conference with the text in bold as currently drafted.

38. **The Chairman** said that, since he had been asked by delegations to make those additions, he had no choice but to do so.

39. **Mr. Sulaiman** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the wording of the second sentence should be changed to read: "It urges Israel, the only State in the region which is not a party to the NPT, to accede to the Treaty and to place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981)".

Paragraph 58 (bis)

40. **The Chairman** said it had been proposed that the following new paragraph should be inserted between the current paragraphs 58 and 59: "The Conference strongly believes that the international community should continue to promote the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones around the globe and welcomes the efforts and initiatives of States parties aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, including the initiative on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free space in Central and Eastern Europe proposed by Belarus." The text would appear in bold print, since it was contested.

Paragraph 61

41. **The Chairman** said that the following new text for paragraph 61 had been proposed: "The Conference invites States parties to consider at the next Review Conference the possibility of establishing an additional protocol (INFCIRC/540/Corr.) as an element of IAEA full-scope safeguards referred to in paragraph 12 of Decision 2 of the 1995 NPT Conference". He wondered whether the text as amended could be transferred to the uncontested category.

42. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that the paragraph should remain in the contested category.

Paragraph 65

43. **The Chairman** said that the following new text for paragraph 65 had been proposed: "The Conference recognizes the agreements under which the United States of America is purchasing LEU blended down from HEU from Russian nuclear weapons and the purchase of 80 tons of such material to date. The Conference also recognizes the affirmation by President Clinton and Yeltsin in the Moscow statement of 1998 of the intention of the Russian Federation and the United States to remove approximately 50 tons of plutonium from their nuclear weapons and convert it so that it can never again be used in nuclear weapons. The

Conference further recognizes the measures taken to implement this commitment." He wondered whether, with that amendment, the paragraph could be transferred to the uncontested category.

44. **Mr. Markram** (South Africa) said that paragraph 65 remained contested.

Paragraph 74

45. **The Chairman** said that the following new text for paragraph 74 had been proposed: "The Conference encourages all other States that separate, hold, process or use separate plutonium in their civilian nuclear activities to adopt policies similar to those which have been adopted by the participants in the Plutonium Management Guidelines (INCIRC/549). Furthermore, the Conference encourages the States concerned to consider similar policies for the management of highly enriched uranium used for peaceful purposes." It was his understanding that the paragraph, as amended, was no longer contested.

Paragraph 51

46. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that the text of paragraph 51 was taken from resolutions which had been adopted by consensus in other bodies. Therefore, it should not be presented as contested.

47. **The Chairman** said that he would take it that the Committee agreed with that comment and wished the bold type to be removed from paragraph 51.

48. *It was so decided.*

Paragraph 55

49. **Mr. Zahran** (Egypt) said that in the second sentence of the paragraph "welcomes" should be replaced by "takes note of".

Paragraph 59

50. **Mr. Al-Hassan** (Oman) said he wondered whether the country names in the footnote to paragraph 59 should be arranged according to the five formal regional groupings recognized by the United Nations or should appear in alphabetical order.

51. **Mr. Rosenthal** (United States of America) said that, since the paragraph was contested in its current form, it should be carried forward in that form.

52. **The Chairman** said that both options would be included in the report.

53. He suggested that the Committee should take note of the amended draft report, including the report of Subsidiary Body 2, and agree to forward it to the plenary Conference.

54. *It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

D. Main Committee III

Summary records of the 1st to 4th meetings

Main Committee III

Summary record of the 1st meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 27 April 2000, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Reimaa .... (Finland)

Contents

Programme of work

General exchange of views

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Programme of work

1. **The Chairman** recalled that, in accordance with the allocation of items to the Main Committees adopted by the Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/1, annex VIII), the Committee would focus on agenda item 16 (d). The Committee would also consider, in parallel with the other Main Committees, item 17. Because of the links between international cooperation in the nuclear field and non-proliferation through safeguards, the work of Main Committees III and II might overlap. Consequently, the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen would maintain close contacts with their counterparts in Main Committee II so as to avoid any unnecessary duplication of work.

2. The first two meetings would be devoted to a general exchange of views on the issues before the Committee. At the second meeting, the Director of the Division of Technical Cooperation Programmes of IAEA would brief the Committee on the Agency's activities in the field of technical cooperation. He drew attention to the documentation prepared by IAEA on articles IV and V (NPT/CONF.2000/10 and NPT/CONF.2000/11 respectively) and on article III (NPT/CONF.2000/9).

General exchange of views

3. **Mr. de Albuquerque** (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union, the associated countries Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey, and, in addition, Iceland and Liechtenstein, said that the European Union reaffirm the importance of the commitment made in paragraph 14 of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament that particular importance should be attached to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II as well as III of the Treaty. While the European Union was actively engaged in measures to facilitate and support the peaceful use of nuclear energy by all States, it wished to emphasize the importance of full compliance by all States with their obligations under the Treaty.

4. In recent years, the European Union had strongly promoted transparency in nuclear-related export controls, in accordance with paragraph 17 of the decision on principles and objectives. Several publications about the origins, role, structure and activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group had been issued and two international seminars on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation had been held in 1997 and 1999 with the participation of the States Members of the United Nations, experts from international organizations and academic and industry specialists. The European Union believed that effective export controls should not be regarded as a hindrance to international nuclear trade, but as an essential element in strengthening cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the transfer of nuclear technology. It would therefore continue to promote transparency in that area. Mention must also be made of the work done in that field by the Zangger Committee.

5. For the European Union, it was extremely important that "the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety" should be in place everywhere in the world, as provided for in paragraph 18 of the decision on principles and objectives. It recognized that responsibility for the safe design, construction and operation of any nuclear installation rested with the State having jurisdiction over the installation, but that international cooperation could play an indispensable role in helping to achieve the highest standards of safety. Thus, the European Union, through the PHARE and TACIS programmes, and its member States were major contributors to the international efforts to assist the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, including the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, in improving nuclear safety.

6. The first review meeting on the implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety held in April 1999 in Vienna had shown that the Convention was a valuable instrument for assessing and improving nuclear safety levels. The European Union hoped that that encouraging example of international cooperation would further the early signature and ratification by States of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

7. The European Union recalled paragraph 19 of the decision on principles and objectives, which stated, *inter alia*, that every effort should be made to ensure

at IAEA had the financial and human resources ecessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the reas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear afety. The members of the European Union ollectively provided more than one third of the gency's regular budget for the financing of activities those three areas. They provided a similarly large roportion of the voluntary contributions to the echnical Cooperation Fund of IAEA. The European nion was confident that IAEA had the means ecessary to carry out its activities and supported the gency's efforts to improve them. It considered that e technical assistance provided by the Agency should e aligned with national development programmes and at responsibility for so doing lay primarily with the ecipient States. It also believed that the recipient tates should pay their assessed programme ontributions in full in order to demonstrate the nportance that they attached to the projects.

. **Ms. Drabova** (Czech Republic) said that her ountry had a relatively extensive nuclear programme riented entirely towards the peaceful uses of nuclear nergy. Her Government was fully aware of the nportance of maintaining the highest possible andards of nuclear safety and radiation protection and nsuring the necessary resources to meet its esponsibilities in the field.

. The Czech Republic recognized IAEA as the rincipal body for the transfer of expertise and echnology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and as participating in the Agency's Technical ooperation Programme. In the framework of that rogramme it was participating in a number of projects, e most important of which concerned the stablishment of a cyclotron centre for the production f short-lived radiopharmaceuticals and the application f positron emission tomography to medicine. The roject was a cost-effective means of increasing apacity in health care and was an example of the ffectiveness of the new IAEA technical cooperation trategy introduced in 1997.

0. The Czech Republic participated in a number of ctivities within the framework of the regional echnical cooperation programme. Some of the ctivities included physical protection of nuclear aterial and nuclear facilities, emergency reparedness, security of radioactive sources and aterials, and information and quality assurance in the edical applications of ionizing radiation. In response to the needs of developing countries, it had also contributed to the Technical Cooperation Fund and had been involved in the financing of several technical assistance projects, in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Fellowship programmes for experts from developing countries were offered on an ongoing basis in all those areas.

11. The Czech Republic fully supported IAEA in its efforts to enhance cooperation in implementing the Programme for Preventing and Combatting Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material. Furthermore, as part of the process of accession to the European Union, it took part in consultations with the European Commission, participated in the PHARE programme, collaborated with the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and was involved in cooperation for nuclear safety within the Group of 24.

12. In order to ensure the safe use of nuclear energy, recipient countries must sign and ratify international agreements and conventions creating an international legal framework for safe management of both nuclear facilities and nuclear material, in particular the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

13. **Mr. Minty** (South Africa) said that the splitting of the atom had prompted almost universal optimism about the possibility of solving the world's energy problems and seeing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy become the magic key that could unlock new doors to a better future for all. Since then, nuclear technology applications were being use routinely in hospitals, farms, industry and universities.

14. In Africa, the application of nuclear technology had in many instances brought viable solutions to some problems. In that connection, South Africa commended IAEA which through its Technical Cooperation Programme, was making a meaningful contribution to sustainable development. The African region had largely succeeded in tailoring a common approach to the peaceful uses of nuclear science through the work of the African regional cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA). That unique Agreement was an intergovernmental pact of mutual assistance in the field of nuclear science and technology that brought together in one forum the scientific experts of Africa to find common solutions to the problems faced by the continent as a whole. The establishment of specialized teams to carry out

missions in member States was a commendable development which had produced laudable results. Over the past five years, IAEA had helped AFRA members formulate new projects around four themes: radiation safety, human health, increased agricultural productivity and industrial applications.

15. Turning to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, he commended the Agency for accepting only technical cooperation projects with sustainable socio-economic benefits on regional and model projects. Concerning the latter, South Africa was strongly committed to education and training in radiological protection and nuclear safety and the establishment, in collaboration with IAEA, of an African regional centre for radiation protection and training in South Africa. The first course on radiation protection had been held from July to October 1999 at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. His delegation welcomed the assistance provided by the Agency in the establishment of that centre of excellence. Among other successful projects currently being implemented in South Africa were the sterile insect technique for fruit flies, new screening methods to detect drug resistance in tuberculosis patients in two days and neonatal screening techniques.

16. Although there was a high rate of implementation of the technical assistance programme — made possible by contributions from both donor and recipient countries — problems could still arise unless steps were taken to ensure sufficient financial resources. He appealed to all, in particular the major donors, to ensure that the dues to the Technical Cooperation Fund were paid in full and on time. It was the task of the international community to ensure that humanity prospered from the advantages of radioactivity, by perfecting ways of minimizing its risks.

17. **Ms. Pellicer** (Mexico) said that her country had always attached great importance to article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and in particular to paragraph 2 thereof, acceptance of which had represented a major success for those who hoped to see balance in the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States and the developing countries. Her delegation believed that the commitment made in that paragraph for the first time established a legal obligation for certain countries to contribute to the scientific and technical development of others. The gap separating rich and poor countries in the area of technology was one of the fundamental problems of the current era. If nothing was done to facilitate and accelerate the transfer of scientific and technological knowledge in the nuclear field while ensuring that it was used for peaceful purposes, the situation could only get worse.

18. The IAEA report on its activities (NPT/CONF.2000/10) gave a clear idea of the implementation of article IV, with particular emphasis on the events which had taken place since the previous review conference. The Agency's efforts to increase the effectiveness of its cooperation programmes should be noted. IAEA conducted activities in various fields of nuclear energy, from the generation of electricity to the application of radio isotopes in the fields of health care, food, industry, agriculture, water resources and the environment. The efforts to strengthen the global security regime for radiation, nuclear waste and transport of nuclear materials were particularly commendable. IAEA activities had expanded to include capacity-building, scientific analysis, assistance with legislation and exchange of information, which explained why States were making use of its services more and more frequently. All States should thus contribute to the strengthening of its technical cooperation activities.

19. Decision 2 adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference stated that every effort should be made to ensure that IAEA had the financial and human resources necessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. However, there might be grounds to be concerned about the paucity of financial resources earmarked for technical cooperation. Unlike other IAEA programmes, the technical cooperation programme basically depended on voluntary contributions from Member States. However, although such contributions were voluntary, they flowed from a legal obligation under article IV of the Treaty. Not much could be said about the willingness to honour that provision if those who were in a position to do so did not provide the necessary support for the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Yet, in recent years, certain States had only partly fulfilled or failed to fulfil altogether their undertakings with respect to contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund. Consequently, it had not been possible to complete a large number of projects submitted to the Agency. There was a considerable gap between the target for

payments into the Technical Cooperation Fund set every two years by consensus by the IAEA General Conference and the financial resources that were actually paid into the Fund as voluntary contributions by both donor and recipient countries. Her delegation wished to call for the strengthening of IAEA technical cooperation activities, which meant that the States Party to the Treaty would be more firmly committed to paying their contributions to the Fund.

20. **Mr. Lipár** (Slovakia) said that his delegation aligned itself with the statement of the European Union. The issue of the regulation of the use of nuclear energy was of vital importance to his country. Slovakia had promulgated an Energy Management Act in 1998, which governed the terms and conditions that were applicable to businesses operating in the electricity, gas and heating industries sectors. The Act also specified that the use of nuclear power was subject to the approval of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic. Another act, which entered into force the same year, regulated obligations and rights with respect to the safe use of nuclear energy and nuclear material, the management of radioactive waste, compensation for damages caused by nuclear accidents and State supervision of nuclear installations. In January 2000, his Government had approved a national medium-term energy plan, part of which was dedicated to the future role of nuclear energy. Its main features were energy savings, environmental protection and energy price development. Safety was the most important precondition for the use of nuclear energy. Thanks to international cooperation, two projects for the gradual reconstruction of nuclear power plants and extensive safety upgrading had been completed.

21. In 1999, Slovakia had presented its national report to the review meeting convened in accordance with the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The meeting had confirmed that outstanding results had been achieved in setting up a regulatory body and in the area of safety improvement programmes. That result had also been acknowledged by the International Conference on Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Eastern Europe held in Vienna in June 1999.

22. IAEA had played a vital role in the improvement of the level of safety in all nuclear power plants in the country. A number of activities were still pending, including determining whether the safety improvements with respect to earlier IAEA recommendations had been implemented. Apart from technical services in the field of nuclear safety, cooperation with IAEA covered other important aspects, including 12 national projects and over 30 regional and interregional projects undertaken since 1995. In that regard, Slovakia would fulfil all its obligations arising from technical cooperation with IAEA.

23. Since 1995, Slovakia had concluded bilateral cooperation agreements with Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia and Ukraine; it also maintained outstanding relations with the Governments of Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Switzerland and the United States of America. Such bilateral activities were mainly devoted to the development of human resources in the form of training programmes and consultations, the transfer of technical know-how and the partial supply of equipment. Cooperation with the European Commission had also been essential.

24. Slovakia was now no longer just a recipient country of technical assistance; it was involved in assistance projects developed in cooperation with other Governments and IAEA for other countries of the region.

25. **Mr. Balboni Acqua** (Italy) said that his delegation fully supported the statement made by the European Union. The countries members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group had taken a number of steps to increase transparency. The first step was the drafting, in 1997, of a collective paper on the origins, role, structure and activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Members of the Group had requested that the paper should be circulated to all IAEA member States as an information circular. The paper explained that the NSG Guidelines aimed to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices without hindering international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field. The Guidelines therefore complemented the various international legally binding instruments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

26. The Group had then organized two international seminars on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation in Vienna in October 1997 and in New York in April 1999, respectively. Leading figures and senior experts in nuclear non-proliferation and export controls from all over the world had made statements at

those seminars, which had also drawn over 350 participants from NPT and non-NPT countries, international organizations, including IAEA, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. NSG countries and the European Union had provided financial support for the participation of experts from least developed and other countries facing economic hardship in the two seminars. The seminars, which were aimed at promoting an open and all-inclusive dialogue, had helped to clarify a number of misconceptions and misunderstandings about how export controls functioned. All the speeches, together with the concluding remarks by the Chairmen of the seminars, had been compiled in two booklets, which were easy to acquire. With the aim of additional transparency, it was planned to set up an NSG web site where information and documentation about the Group could be made available to Governments and the public at large. That would provide easy access to the text of the NSG Guidelines, the list of items covered by those Guidelines, the NSG collective paper and the speeches and concluding remarks of the two international seminars.

27. The NSG member States were determined to promote further transparency in nuclear-related export controls, since they believed that such transparency would enable States to participate to the fullest extent possible in the exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information. While reinforcing the international security environment, the Guidelines did not in any way affect the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

28. **Mr. Yang Dazhu** (China) said that promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was one of the main objectives of NPT, which, under its preamble and article IV, gave all the parties the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, and the right to participate in international cooperation.

29. China had always believed that the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the promotion of peaceful uses were complementary. It wished to step up its technical assistance to developing countries and lift unreasonable restrictions imposed on technology transfers so that all humanity could benefit from nuclear energy.

30. China attached great importance to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It currently had three nuclear power plants with a capacity of 2,001 megawatts and was building four others whose total capacity would be 6,600 megawatts in order to cope with rising energy needs. China had always stressed safety and quality.

31. China participated in technical cooperation activities and in exchanges with other countries in compliance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty. The cooperation agreements it had signed with 16 countries formed a solid basis for its activities. Recognizing the sovereignty of other countries, and within the framework of reciprocal exchanges in the area of nuclear scientific research, it had provided assistance to developing countries and imported technologies from developed countries, including France, the Russian Federation, Canada, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

32. At the multilateral level, China participated in the technical cooperation activities of IAEA, to which it had always paid its contribution on time and in full; it had even made additional financial contributions within its means, particularly for projects in Ghana, Zanzibar and the Asia-Pacific region. Being a developing country itself, China benefited from IAEA technical assistance.

33. China had always fulfilled its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation within the framework of the bilateral and multilateral agreements to which it was a party. With regard to the export of nuclear materials, it subscribed to the following three principles: the export must be made for peaceful purposes; it must be made within the framework of the IAEA safeguards regime; and materials could not be transferred to a third State without the prior agreement of China.

34. Nonetheless, the prevention of nuclear proliferation should not be subject to a double standard and should not be utilized to impede international cooperation. The legitimate right of all countries, in particular most of the developing countries, to benefit from nuclear technology should be guaranteed.

35. China recognized the positive contribution and active role of IAEA in the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international cooperation. The Agency participated in more than 1,000 assistance projects for its members and had set up a new strategic framework for technical cooperation, which was proving to be effective. Nonetheless, he shared the

concerns expressed by the representatives of Mexico and South Africa at the drastic decline in resources allocated to technical cooperation, despite the fact that States parties were obligated under article IV to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. All States parties to the Treaty must therefore pay their contributions to IAEA for technical cooperation activities on time and in full. His delegation congratulated the many countries which had not only done so but were also participating in those activities in other ways. It was regrettable, however, that certain countries had reduced their contributions or even stopped paying them altogether, which had caused IAEA insurmountable difficulties.

36. His delegation wished to draw all delegations' attention to the situation and announced that it had submitted a working paper on the subject to the Conference. It requested that the document should be distributed as an official document of the Conference and hoped that that suggestion would be supported by the other delegations.

37. **Mr. Wood** (Canada) reaffirmed his country's commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as illustrated by the comprehensive review of Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy undertaken in 1999 by its Parliament and Government. The review had reaffirmed the benefits of international cooperation in the nuclear field and had concluded that nuclear power was a safe and cost-effective source of energy.

38. Canada had a well-developed nuclear industry and was a major supplier of nuclear goods and services. It shared its knowledge and experience with a significant number of NPT signatories; it had concluded bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with 38 countries. Those agreements provided additional assurances that cooperation would be used only for peaceful end-uses. They provided for the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information, in accordance with Canada's NPT obligations.

39. Nuclear safety and the storage and disposal of nuclear waste were among the major issues relating to peaceful nuclear cooperation. The Conference should reaffirm the objective adopted in 1995 that all States should, through rigorous national measures and international cooperation, maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, particularly with regard to waste management, and observe standards and guidelines in nuclear materials accounting, their protection and transport. Canada would soon be implementing new legislation that would place increased emphasis on nuclear safety. Although nuclear safety was a national responsibility, international cooperation was essential, and Canada actively participated in many important initiatives undertaken by IAEA to strengthen safety standards and practices. It also participated in the nuclear safety working group of the Group of Seven.

40. Canada was the signatory of a number of major nuclear conventions, particularly the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Safety in the international transport of nuclear material, particularly by sea, was critical, and Canada encouraged the Conference to endorse the 1997 decision taken by the International Maritime Organization to incorporate a code for the safe transport of irradiated nuclear fuel into the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.

41. The Agency played an important role in facilitating nuclear cooperation and ensuring that it was only for peaceful purposes. Every effort must be made to ensure that it had the financial and human resources necessary to effectively meet its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear energy and safety. The Agency should make every effort to use its available resources in the most efficient manner possible, in accordance with its mandate and the priority needs of member States.

42. Canada was a major donor to the Agency's technical cooperation programme and funding was always a major concern. The Conference should encourage the Agency to endeavour to find ways to fund its technical assistance activities, particularly by broadening the donor base.

43. Those issues should be addressed in a programme of action approved by the Conference for the coming five years to ensure the relevance and effectiveness of the Treaty. His delegation was prepared to participate in the preparation of the Committee's report and of the final document of the Conference.

44. **Ms. Ngawati** (New Zealand) said that New Zealand, having chosen not to develop a nuclear power industry, was not a major participant in exchanges of nuclear technology. It nonetheless recognized that it was important to ensure the right of parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. Her Government was assisting developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through the Regional Cooperative Agreement in Asia and the Pacific and cooperating in the Agency's training programmes in areas where New Zealand had particular expertise.

45. A culture of nuclear safety was a prerequisite for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The sometimes tragic incidents in nuclear installations over the past year demonstrated only too vividly the need for the highest safety standards and unwavering vigilance in their implementation. The activities of the Agency in strengthening the global regime for nuclear, radiation, waste and transport safety were of crucial importance.

46. Her Government attached particular importance to the Agency's cooperation with States in assessing radiological conditions at former nuclear test sites. It particularly welcomed the independent investigation carried out by an international advisory committee under the auspices of the Agency on the environmental impact of nuclear testing at the atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa in the South Pacific.

47. Ships carrying nuclear materials and radioactive waste passed along the coast of New Zealand at regular intervals. That was a source of concern for New Zealanders and the inhabitants of many other coastal States in the region. At their latest summit meeting, the South Pacific States had explicitly requested that such shipments should be carried out in a manner which addressed all risks of accident and the concerns of the countries involved, including the coastal States. In particular, they had requested that the shipments should be of demonstrably minimal risk, that ships should comply with the highest safety standards and that the shipping States should agree to promote the safety of the cargoes and provide compensation for any industries harmed in the event of an accident, even a non-nuclear one.

48. Her Government was disappointed that the dialogue with South Pacific States on compensation and liability issues had recently been suspended by the transport States, namely Japan, France and the United Kingdom. The talks had been called to address the inadequacies of the current regime. Her Government was ready to resume them at any time. Her Government's objective was a strong legal regime requiring prior notification and informed consent procedures for transboundary movements of radioactive materials, a goal it was also pursuing within IAEA and IMO. The current Conference offered a further opportunity for parties to the Treaty affected by the shipment of such materials to join together to seek a regime which would provide stronger assurances on safety, security, liability and compensation.

49. **Mr. Daban** (France) supported the statement by the representative of Portugal on behalf of the European Union. In accordance with its undertaking to fully implement article IV of the Treaty and the principles and objectives adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, his Government was endeavouring to promote civilian applications of atomic energy at the national and international levels and in the framework of the European Union. France was also helping to fund the Agency's regular budget and its Technical Cooperation Fund, and participated regularly in the Agency's activities. Over the past four years, French nuclear experts had been involved in about 180 technical cooperation missions run by the Agency. France was also supporting individual programmes organized in collaboration with the Agency, and had entered into many bilateral and multilateral agreements in the area of peaceful applications of nuclear power, including 130 intergovernmental agreements with non-nuclear-weapon States.

50. Development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was only possible if they fulfilled three conditions: non-proliferation and security, safety and transparency. As for the first of those, it was essential to combat proliferation and illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. Exchanges of equipment, materials and scientific and technical data would be acceptable only if they gave rise to no diversion for illicit purposes; that, in turn, required effective, objective and transparent export monitoring, active support for the Agency's safeguards system and adherence by States to those policies. States should

work together against the threat from illicit trafficking in and diversion of nuclear materials for the purpose of proliferation or for criminal ends, through improved sharing of information and cooperating to improve their national systems of accounting and physical protection of nuclear materials. To that end, in 1998 it had helped IAEA organize an international conference on illicit trafficking and it called on all States to sign the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

51. However, the maintenance of strict nuclear-export controls was not an end in itself and must not be an obstacle to the development of nuclear trade. In that regard, France welcomed the success of the two international seminars on the role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation held in Vienna in 1997 and in New York in 1999 and the plan to establish an information site on the Internet. It also welcomed the role played by the Zangger Committee in the application of the provisions of article III, paragraph 2, of the NPT.

52. The second condition, safety, was related to the danger inherent in the use of nuclear energy. Safety must be a constant concern and improvements were needed in all areas (nuclear reactors, management of high-level and long-lived waste, transportation of nuclear materials, management of radioactive sources and long-term waste management). France was continuing to work actively to that end, both in an individual capacity and within the framework of the European Union and IAEA. It was contributing, in particular, both directly and through the PHARE and TACIS programmes of the European Union, to the enhancement of the safety of the nuclear installations of the States of Central and Eastern Europe and the States members of CIS.

53. France called on all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Nuclear Safety Convention and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. France itself was a party to the first of those conventions and had completed the domestic procedures for the approval of the second one. With respect to nuclear civil liability, it was contributing to the enhancement of existing instruments. As to environmental responsibility, it was a party to the OSPAR Convention and the Convention on Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter.

54. France considered it vital that nuclear and radioactive materials should be transported as securely and safely as possible, in conformity with the highest international standards. It was a party to the international conventions dealing directly or indirectly with that issue and participated in the relevant work of IAEA and IMO, incorporating its outcome into domestic legal instruments. Thus, vessels sailing under the French flag and transporting irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium or highly radioactive waste in flasks had to comply with the provisions of IMO resolution A/748 (XVIII) of 4 November 1993.

55. France was involved in the efforts to improve existing safety standards and ensure the application of the new standards adopted. For example, it had participated in the meeting organized by IAEA in 1998 for the purpose of reviewing the international instruments on transportation of radioactive materials and it was taking part in the activities of the working group charged with the review of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its operation.

56. As to the third condition, transparency, France was committed to continuing the efforts it had already undertaken, notably in the area of safety. It was very much aware of the need for special vigilance with respect to the supervision, in conditions of transparency, of nuclear procedures and installations and for the maintenance of the independence and plurality of the bodies responsible for safety and radiation protection. It was also concerned with transparency in the management of its stocks of civil plutonium: it was a member of the group of nine States signatories of the guidelines for the management of plutonium in all peaceful nuclear activities adopted in 1997 and it made public each year the status of French stocks of civil plutonium, which was published by IAEA, as well as information on its policy in that area.

57. Development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be a crucial challenge in the twenty-first century insofar as it would help to solve the daunting economic and human problems in the fields of energy, agriculture, health and the environment. That development could take place only in a climate of trust characterized by compliance with the commitments made in respect of non-proliferation and increased safety and transparency. France hoped that the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and of international cooperation in that area would receive

the necessary attention and that it would be given a powerful impetus at the conclusion of the Conference.

58. **Ms. Beliaeva** (Russian Federation) said that her country paid particular attention to maintaining the strictest compliance with its obligations under article IV of the Treaty. The Russian Federation was in favour of international cooperation, on the basis of equality, in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and provision of assistance to developing countries in order to meet their needs, in strict conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty, that was to say based on the principle of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It supported broad access by countries to the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to cooperation in that area, at both the bilateral and multilateral levels, within the framework of IAEA for example.

59. Nuclear energy was currently the only energy source capable of being a substitute for organic fuel. The burning of fuel of that type to produce energy was leading to the rapid exhaustion of reserves and the loss of a source of important raw materials for the chemical industry and for medicine, as well as contributing to the degradation of the environment.

60. At the third Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, measures had been proposed with a view to restricting and reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. The participating countries had undertaken to take steps to halt the continued degradation of the environment.

61. Given the growth of global needs in fuel and energy and the limitations of traditional sources of energy, there was an urgent need to develop new technology in the field of energy capable of satisfying most of the increased needs. Research in the Russian Federation showed that it was possible to create a nuclear fuel cycle free of the shortcomings of today's nuclear energy. The principle of "natural safety" was a generalization of the internal safety principle in nuclear power stations through its application to the entire fuel cycle, taking into account the problem of radioactive waste and the non-proliferation regime. That principle entailed, *inter alia*, the elimination of serious nuclear accidents that exposed the population to the dangers of irradiation, safe burial of waste and technical support for the non-proliferation regime. The users of such technology could be both developed countries and developing countries whose desire to gain access to nuclear technology was legitimate.

62. The organization of an international project aimed at developing promising nuclear technology, under the auspices of IAEA and with the participation of interested developed and developing countries, could combine the efforts of the participating countries with a view to realizing the fundamental aims relating to the use of nuclear energy.

63. The Russian Federation accorded considerable importance to the Agency's technical cooperation programme and activities. One of the main elements of technical assistance was cooperation in the areas of training of national staff and scientific research. Since the establishment of IAEA, her country had been actively involved in technical assistance programmes through the supply of equipment, machinery and materials; it had also organized interregional and regional training programmes in its institutes and enterprises, and had disseminated data acquired through its rich experience.

64. Under the IAEA technical cooperation programme, the Russian Federation organized every year in its scientific and technical institutes and enterprises, scientific training programmes and visits for specialists from developing country members of the Agency. Despite its difficult economic situation, her country continued to provide assistance to those countries, in particular with respect to the construction of accelerators and neutron generators; it also continued to train specialists. In March 1999, her Government had delivered a cyclotron to Egypt which would serve as the basis for the establishment in that country of a regional medical research centre. The Agency was involved in that project.

65. The Russian Federation accorded considerable importance to cooperation with the States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Such cooperation was carried out in accordance with the 1992 framework agreement on the basic principles of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Council of Heads of Government of the CIS member countries adopted in 1997 a long-term plan to develop cooperation among those countries in that area and to strengthen the safety of nuclear facilities. The plan defined the legal, normative, organizational, economic, scientific, technical, environmental and social aspects of such cooperation as well as its main policies and

tasks. The Council had decided to establish a committee of CIS member countries on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

66. In the field of nuclear energy, the Russian Federation promoted cooperation with respect to the construction and safe operation of nuclear power plants and the construction of research reactors with many member countries signatories to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Over the previous two years, the Russian Federation had launched two projects in Slovakia and was currently building new facilities in China and the Islamic Republic of Iran. It supplied fresh fuel for reactors and provided investment services.

67. The project for the construction of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) was an example of success in international cooperation. It had demonstrated that it was possible to settle complex legal, international, environmental, economic and political problems. In May 1998, that international project had been praised by the G-8 Summit at Birmingham, which had noted that the results of the technical studies confirmed the validity of hopes that the physical objectives could be achieved, and demonstrated the technical viability of the concept as a whole. The technical project would be completed in 2001. The project marked a decisive stage towards the use of a new source of energy for the benefit of all countries.

68. Turning to cooperation with respect to small nuclear reactors, including sea water desalination plants, she said that her Government intended to participate in the implementation, within the framework of the IAEA programme, of an international experimental project on the construction of a nuclear desalination plant. A project on the construction of a desalination unit at sea had been undertaken with Canada; work was ongoing on a similar project in collaboration with Indonesia.

69. The guarantee of a sufficient level of nuclear safety remained a priority concern in the utilization of nuclear energy and technologies. Reference should be made, in that regard, to the convening under the auspices of IAEA of the first review meeting of the contracting parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The positive atmosphere during the deliberations had made it possible to carry out an objective assessment of the status of all the nuclear power plants in activity. Participants had overcome their political differences and considered the problems from a purely technical standpoint.

70. In 1999, the Russian Federation had signed the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. The Convention should be able to secure the number of signatures required for its entry into force in 2000.

71. The Russian Federation participated in the IAEA programme on the establishment of a network of regional and international experimental research centres on the processing of radioactive waste from the application of nuclear technology in medicine, scientific research and industry. In 1999, the Agency had opened within the framework of that programme, in the Russian Federation, an experimental centre for the CIS region, specifically for Eastern Europe.

72. The NPT had provided an exceptional framework of constantly expanding international cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the coming decade. Her country was committed to pursuing cooperation with all the countries concerned and was convinced that nuclear energy was the technology of choice for the production of energy that would give humankind an alternative to the continued environmental damage that would be inevitable if the earth's organic resources were further exploited. Nuclear technology offered new and practical prospects in terms of know-how and new models for ongoing global and societal developments.

73. **Mr. Rich** (United States of America) recalled the mandate of Main Committee III, noting that it had to assess achievements, review the current situation and determine what had to be done in future in order to improve still further the effectiveness of cooperation with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

74. His delegation noted the cluster III debates on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy that had taken place in each of the Preparatory Committee meetings for the current Review Conference. Those debates had set the stage for the deliberations of Committee III and demonstrated the value of the strengthened review process as it applied to article IV, and of cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The United States had clearly demonstrated its depth of commitment to the goals of the NPT, especially those of article IV which established the inalienable right of

all the parties to the Treaty to pursue peaceful nuclear development and to engage in the fullest possible exchange to facilitate such development. Both bilaterally and through international organizations, including IAEA, the United States had supported nuclear cooperation in fields ranging from nuclear power to nuclear applications in medicine, agriculture, hydrology and industry. Since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the United States had provided some $100 million to support the Agency's technical cooperation activities.

75. A review of the current situation showed that impressive results had been achieved. An illustrative success story was how nuclear-based technology, known as the sterile insect technique, had been used to eradicate the tsetse fly from the island of Zanzibar a few years previously. That environmentally friendly technology had given hope to over 700,000 families and had also been applied in Ethiopia in an initial effort to eliminate the tsetse fly from the African continent. His Government was proud to have supported the Agency's work in Zanzibar. That experience proved that peaceful nuclear cooperation activities could make a substantial difference in the lives of people throughout the world.

76. The international community should not lose sight of the imperative of nuclear safety. The United States had contributed over $550 million to programmes to assist many countries bilaterally and through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). His Government also supported the Agency's work on nuclear safety and had pledged a voluntary contribution for 1999 of $750,000. States parties had an obligation to ensure that cooperation under the Treaty did not contribute to the risk that nuclear explosive capabilities could proliferate or spread to additional countries or regions. Compliance with non-proliferation commitments was critical to the future of cooperation under article IV.

77. Looking ahead, the United States believed that what had already been done in the area of cooperation under article IV made it possible to realize the considerable potential of nuclear technology, which could greatly improve the well-being of people throughout the world. Nuclear applications could improve many aspects of life, including medical care, the supply of potable water, electricity generation, the shelf life of food supplies and the health of livestock. The United States remained committed to peaceful nuclear cooperation under responsible non-proliferation undertakings as provided for by the Treaty. His Government would continue to cooperate, on the basis of those principles, with the least developed countries in cases where nuclear techniques could safely contribute to sustainable development. By working together, the States parties to the Treaty could help to realize the full promise of peaceful nuclear cooperation for the benefit of current generations and those of the future.

78. **Mr. Twist** (Ireland) said that his delegation supported the statement made by the representative of Portugal on behalf of the European Union. Ireland was committed to both the Treaty and the Agency, which were symbiotically related. There were however elements in both the Treaty and the Statute of the Agency on which his delegation placed more emphasis.

79. After reading out paragraph 1 of article IV of the Treaty, he said that the international community could not ignore the scientific developments and resulting health and environmental awareness in the more than 40 years since the foundation of the Agency. Nuclear accidents generated headlines, some would say in disproportion to their real effects, but such negative publicity did nonetheless reflect an underlying reality, which was that the potential for catastrophe was always present when nuclear energy was used. One of the key functions of the Agency was to ensure that the world relied more on expertise than luck in avoiding the risks inherent in the use of nuclear energy, the potential consequences of which demanded the highest possible safety standards and emergency preparedness.

80. In recent years the member States of the Agency, together with its secretariat, had been developing a family of international legal instruments to implement the nuclear safety culture, particularly the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. His delegation welcomed those developments but noted that some lacunae remained, particularly regarding the regime of liability for nuclear damage, which did not yet meet the concerns of all States; the issue of research reactors, which required greater attention; and the issue of maritime transport of radioactive material, which was a matter of particular concern for Ireland as a coastal State. In relation to that last issue, his delegation shared the concern expressed by New Zealand. Pending the establishment of an international legal monitoring

system, his delegation urged all States shipping radioactive material to respond positively to the invitation issued at the Agency's 1999 General Conference to provide, as appropriate, assurances to potentially affected States upon their request that their national regulations took into account the Agency's Transport Regulations and to provide them with relevant information relating to shipments of radioactive materials.

81. States which had forgone the nuclear military option and ratified the Treaty should receive assistance in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Under no circumstances should those who had refused to accept the non-proliferation commitment be treated more favourably. Ireland joined those who urged the three States operating unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accede to the Treaty unconditionally as non-nuclear-weapon States.

82. **Mr. Abe** (Japan) said that the Treaty was founded on three pillars, namely, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, all of which were essential to the credibility of the non-proliferation regime. The Treaty provided an international framework to facilitate cooperation between industrialized and developing countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His Government was determined to do its best to extend its cooperation bilaterally and multilaterally and promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while ensuring non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It supported the particularly important role of the Agency in that respect.

83. Nuclear energy had an important role to play in economic and social development and in electric power generation. If it stopped its nuclear power stations, Japan would have to import 1.5 million more barrels of oil per day, and world oil production would have to increase by 16 million barrels per day. In response to the current crisis in oil prices, the OPEC countries had had difficulty in agreeing to increase their production by 1.5 million barrels per day, which was just 9 per cent of the additional oil the world would need if all nuclear reactors were to be replaced. That would also entail adding 2 billion more tons of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere every year and the construction of much infrastructure throughout the world.

84. The development and utilization of nuclear energy must go hand in hand with assurances of nuclear non-proliferation and safety. While the primary responsibility lay with individual countries, international cooperation also had an essential role to play. His Government had financed a number of projects to help the countries of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Central and Eastern Europe to improve their nuclear facilities. It had contributed to various funds created by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and to support programmes under the auspices of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD.

85. The entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 1996 had been an important milestone in the area of cooperation. Japan was a party to that Convention and hoped that more countries would accede to it. A thorough investigation had been carried out into the serious nuclear accident in Tokaimura in September 1999. His Government had made recommendations for prevention of similar accidents and was ready to share the information and lessons learned from the accident with other countries.

86. It was important to address the management of radioactive waste, which was being produced in increasing quantities. Japan was determined to continue its pursuit of an acceptable solution to the problem. It also shared grave concerns about illicit trafficking in fissile materials and had provided assistance to countries such as Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine in order to improve their national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material. His delegation appreciated the Agency's efforts in that area and would continue to contribute to activities aimed at improving physical protection.

87. The policy of his Government for the management of plutonium and other nuclear materials was based on the principle that States should have no more of such materials than was necessary for a rational and logical plan for peaceful use. His Government would continue to improve transparency in that regard by publishing the information required by international guidelines.

88. His Government supported the Agency's technical cooperation programmes and welcomed efforts to strengthen them. Japan was a major contributor to the Technical Cooperation Fund, and was participating actively in programmes of bilateral

cooperation with developing countries; it would continue its efforts in that regard, taking into account the financial situation, technical capabilities and needs of recipient countries. As for the concerns expressed by some delegations about the level of the Fund, his delegation believed that that issue should certainly be addressed seriously in the Agency's deliberations, but that more care should be taken to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of each project.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

Main Committee III

Summary record of the 2nd meeting

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 1 May 2000, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Reimaa . . . . (Finland)

Contents

Exchange of views (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

Exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Barretto** (Department of Technical Cooperation, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) said that, with the help of slides, he would like to give the Committee an overview of the Agency's technology transfer activities, which had been an essential part of its function since its creation, under its Statute. The Agency had developed a "One-House Approach" to technology transfer, supported by three pillars: safety, technology and verification.

2. The Agency had two mechanisms for technology transfer, its regular programme and its technical cooperation programme. Under the regular programme, funded by mandatory contributions, the Agency pursued its technology transfer work on four different fronts. It developed standards, codes of practice, guides and seminars; in that area, it held about 400 meetings and 10 to 14 conferences each year and produced approximately 170,000 publications. Another aspect of the regular programme involved research contracts concluded with outside scientists. The number of such contracts had steadily increased. Currently there were some 3,600 scientists participating in research with IAEA. Also under the regular programme, the Agency operated two laboratories, the Marine Environment Laboratory in Monaco and the Seibersdorf Laboratory in Austria, concerned chiefly with analysis in connection with safeguards, but also with scientific services, research and development, and training of scientists. The Agency was also in partnership with the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Italy, where it sent many people for training.

3. The bulk of the Agency's technology transfer activities, however, were carried out under its technical cooperation programme. Of the 98 member States receiving technical cooperation, 22 were least developed countries; 50 had a small-to-medium atomic energy infrastructure; 17 already had operating nuclear power programmes; and half a dozen were in the planning or construction phase of creating a nuclear power programme.

4. Programme priorities were set by the member States themselves. The technical cooperation priorities of States with nuclear power programmes were radiation and nuclear safety; waste management; nuclear power operation and maintenance; human health; environmental protection; and sustainable energy options. For States without nuclear power programmes, the priorities were radiation and waste safety; food and agriculture; water resources management; human health and nutrition; human resources development; environmental protection; and industrial applications.

5. In 1999, the technical cooperation programme had comprised 815 operational projects in 98 countries. Counting experts recruited from member States to assist other member States, scientists on fellowships or scientific visits and participants in training courses, the technical cooperation programme had mobilized some 10,000 people in 1999. Equipment had also been provided. The value of the cooperation actually delivered to the countries, excluding IAEA administrative costs and in-house technical support, which were covered by the regular budget, was $64 million.

6. The bulk of the funds, 92.2 per cent, came from the Technical Cooperation Fund, with much smaller amounts from extrabudgetary resources, the United Nations Development Programme and cost-sharing by the recipient countries. Since contributions to the Fund were strictly voluntary, they were also unpredictable. Moreover, since 1985 both pledges and income to the Fund had fallen well below the target set by the General Conference of IAEA, averaging only 85 per cent of target over the last 15 years.

7. A breakdown of disbursements by programme area showed that the smallest percentage of the funds, 4.1 per cent, went to nuclear power as such. Disbursements on safety (19.9 per cent) and human health (21.2 per cent), for example, were far higher. Broken down by component, 41 per cent of disbursements were for equipment, 23 per cent for experts' services, 19 percent for fellowships and scientific visits and 17 per cent for training courses.

8. To receive technical cooperation, a State must be a member of IAEA and must enter into a two-part agreement, comprising the Revised Supplementary Agreement as well as the model in INFCIRC/267, whereby it committed itself to use the assistance only for peaceful applications, to adhere to the Agency's safety standards, to respect the Agency's safeguards rights and responsibilities and to provide for physical protection of any nuclear facilities, equipment or materials.

9. To sum up, the Agency's large technical cooperation programme was well-defined, simple and non-controversial and was guided by the priorities of the recipient States. Unfortunately, it had limited, voluntary and therefore non-assured resources. Although it derived from the Agency's own Statute and not from its safeguards responsibilities under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it did have mechanisms to address non-proliferation concerns.

10. In response to the question from the representative of Nepal, he would be happy to supply a list of the 22 least developed countries receiving technical cooperation, many of which were in Africa. In the Asian region, Bangladesh and Mongolia were recipients.

11. **Mr. Othman** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that it had been in the expectation of enjoying the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, in such fields as agriculture, medicine and industry, that the developing countries had joined with the nuclear-weapon States in agreeing to an indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Article IV of the Treaty stated clearly that all Parties, without discrimination, were entitled to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and that all Parties would work to facilitate exchanges of materials, equipment and information to that end. It appeared, however, that some Parties, having obtained the indefinite extension of the NPT that they had wanted, were placing obstacles in the way of the implementation of article IV by, for example, denying the necessary training to scientists from developing countries or charging exorbitant fees for providing it.

12. The Syrian Arab Republic, for its part, had cooperated fruitfully with IAEA in the area of training in radiation protection, agricultural and industrial applications and non-destructive testing, in line with the Agency's mandate to propagate atomic energy for exclusively non-military purposes. The developed countries should provide much more funding for such technical cooperation programmes, instead of focusing so strongly on safeguards, important as that system was.

13. Yet some countries, while placing severe restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon Parties, were simultaneously lavishing nuclear technology, both secretly and openly, on Israel, the only State in the Middle East that had not acceded to the NPT, in flagrant disregard of United Nations resolutions calling upon it to do so. As a result, Israel had acquired a nuclear weapons capability, with which it threatened its neighbours. The possibility that peaceful nuclear facilities might be attacked or threatened with attack, especially by States that were not parties to the NPT, was a source of concern, in view of the potentially harmful, even lethal, consequences of such an attack for human beings and the environment. Accordingly, the international community should put pressure on Israel to accede to the NPT without delay and to conclude a safeguards agreement with IAEA, for the sake of the universal application of the Treaty, the creation of a climate of confidence and the enhancement of the peace and security, not only of the Middle East but of the world as a whole.

14. **Mr. Tyson** (Australia) said that facilitation of the peaceful application of nuclear energy was one of the central tenets of the Treaty, but it depended on the existence of a climate of certainty about non-proliferation. The non-proliferation objective and the peaceful use objective were essential parts of the balance of rights and obligations States assumed under the Treaty.

15. The two components underpinning the stability of international trade in nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes were the international safeguards system and the nuclear-export controls regime. Australia had long regarded the strengthening of the safeguards system as a priority. It had been the first State to ratify an additional protocol with IAEA and the first to host an IAEA complementary access visit. It was an active participant in the work on integrated safeguards.

16. As the country with the world's largest uranium reserves, a major uranium exporter and a significant participant in technology exchange, Australia was a strong supporter of export controls to ensure that its exports remained exclusively in peaceful use. It participated actively in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, which served to reinforce the non-proliferation objectives of the NPT. The existence of an export controls regime contributed to the expansion of trade and cooperation by making nuclear suppliers more willing to export because of the assurance a regulated framework provided.

17. His Government's commitment to its obligations under article IV of the Treaty was demonstrated by a number of concrete measures. It paid its pledged contribution to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund in full each year, in the conviction that the Agency's work enabled many countries to reap the benefits of nuclear technology in human health, industry, resource management and food and agriculture. His delegation supported the Agency's efforts to make technology transfer more effective, while bearing in mind the need to ensure that available funding was not exceeded. In addition, his country participated in a lively exchange of information and experts, particularly within the region of Asia and the Pacific, and was a substantial contributor to a radioisotope project under the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology. Australia's nuclear-related agencies regularly provided experts for IAEA and bilateral projects and met with regional counterparts.

18. He expressed his staunch support for the international legal framework underpinning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Adherence to internationally accepted standards of nuclear safety was a key factor for successful development. All trade in nuclear materials should be conducted in accordance with the safeguards requirements of the NPT and the physical protection conditions contained in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. His delegation would like to see physical protection standards extended to domestic activities. Australia had been an active participant in the first review of the Convention on Nuclear Safety; it also had signed and was preparing to ratify the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. He urged States which had not yet become parties to those instruments to do so as quickly as possible. The primary responsibility for preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear materials lay with States themselves, but IAEA could make a major contribution to international security by coordinating the development of national systems for nuclear accounting, monitoring and protection under its existing mandate.

19. While most efforts to strengthen the international legal and institutional framework for nuclear cooperation and commerce focused on the interests of States engaged in nuclear research or power generation, a far greater number of countries had an interest in ensuring that peaceful nuclear activities were carried out in accordance with the highest international standards of safety and security. In particular, the countries of the South Pacific region were concerned at the risks entailed in the maritime transfer of nuclear materials and expected shipping States to promote the safety of such materials and to guarantee compensation for any industries harmed in the event of an accident. In that regard, his Government hoped that the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage and the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage would soon enter into force in order to enhance the existing framework for compensation by establishing a global liability regime.

20. **Mr. Listre** (Argentina), speaking on behalf of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and, in addition, Bolivia and Chile, said that all parties to the Treaty had an inalienable right to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Treaty guaranteed the right of States parties to economic and technological development through international cooperation. He therefore attached great importance to the IAEA technical cooperation programme. As recipients under that programme and, in some cases, exporters of nuclear material and technology, the MERCOSUR countries were in favour of the exchange of materials, equipment and technologies for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It was important that IAEA should ensure an adequate balance between its function of promoting technical cooperation and its role as regulator of nuclear security. Accordingly, the Review Conference should transmit to the negotiations currently in progress in Vienna a clear signal of the need to provide adequate funding for the technical cooperation programme for the period 2000-2005.

21. Nuclear export control regimes, the purpose of which was to ensure that nuclear energy was used solely for peaceful purposes, played an important role in promoting cooperation. He stressed the importance of transparency and the need to meet international standards for nuclear safety as a means of protecting the environment and thereby gaining public acceptance of the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In particular, he called for cooperation to strengthen the guidelines regulating the maritime transport of radioactive waste.

22. **Mr. Miranda** (Peru) recalled that article IV of the Treaty affirmed the right of all States parties to develop the use of nuclear energy for peaceful

purposes, while at the same time committing States to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nevertheless, past debates on article IV had been based more on principle than on the practical effects of those provisions. The group of global suppliers who controlled the transfer of dual-purpose technology to other States parties to the Treaty should be expanded to allow developing countries to participate in the adoption of decisions on technology transfer. Continued discrimination towards those countries could lead only to greater suspicion concerning the real motives for the prohibition of the transfer of nuclear technology.

23. His Government believed that the role of IAEA should be strengthened to enable it to serve as the principal conduit for the transfer of nuclear technology. To that end, it was necessary to ensure that the resources for cooperation projects were adequate, predictable and assured. His delegation encouraged cooperating States to pay in full and on time their contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund of IAEA.

24. At the same time, new challenges and realities made it necessary to review the future role of IAEA in such areas as physical protection of nuclear waste, illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and verification in nuclear-weapon-free zones. The 2000 Review Conference should encourage the adoption of appropriate measures to regulate international maritime transport of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.

25. Peru had benefited from IAEA assistance in a number of fields in accordance with the priorities set out in its medium-term plan for the uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear technology had been used to improve child nutrition, to control and eradicate insect plagues and to study the water balance in Lake Titicaca, among other projects. In addition, the control of radiation sources stemming mainly from medical and industrial applications had been enhanced. Mention should also be made of the Agency's willingness to support the consolidation of the peace agreements between Peru and Ecuador. He drew attention in that regard to the Agency's initial support for two water projects and one medical project which would be of major benefit to the frontier populations.

26. His Government, as a party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, had participated in the first review meeting held in Austria in 1999 and had submitted a report on the measures taken to comply with its obligations under the Convention. Moreover, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, the 1997 Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management were in the final stages of approval by the legislative branch. Lastly, he drew attention to the signing in March of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between IAEA and Peru, which would enhance the efficiency of the safeguards system as a contribution to fulfilling the objectives of the Treaty.

27. **Mr. Suh Dae-won** (Republic of Korea) said that his country had established itself as one of the largest generators of nuclear power in the world. Currently, 16 nuclear power plants were in operation, providing 44 per cent of the country's total electricity supply, and four more units were under construction. To meet the growing electricity demand, his country had developed the Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant, in which safety and reliability had been upgraded. His country was redoubling its research and development efforts in the area of small and medium-sized reactors to be used for co-generation and desalination.

28. His delegation attached particular importance to ensuring the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. More benefits should be provided for non-nuclear-weapon States which complied fully with their NPT obligations regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such States were entitled to acquire nuclear technologies and know-how, including a stable supply of nuclear fuel. On the other hand, strict sanctions should be imposed on States which remained outside the Treaty or did not fulfil their obligations under the Treaty.

29. Nuclear safety and environmental management must be of the utmost concern in future planning for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Every country should maintain the highest possible levels of nuclear safety through national measures and international cooperation. Every country should take concrete steps

to allay public concern about the operational safety of nuclear power plants and the disposal of radioactive waste. All countries should redouble their efforts to implement standards and guidelines in the accounting, physical protection and transport of nuclear materials. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the successful outcome of the first review meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety held in April 1999. Recognizing the importance of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, his delegation looked forward to its early entry into force. It called upon those States which had not yet done so to accede to all relevant conventions as soon as possible. In view of the important role of IAEA in the transfer of nuclear technology and development assistance, his delegation shared the view that the Agency should be given greater authority and responsibility and provided with the necessary financial and human resources to carry out its tasks.

30. **Mr. Raja Adnan** (Malaysia) said that he associated himself with the working paper submitted by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the NPT (NPT/CONF.2000/18, annex) and, in particular, with the paragraphs relating to articles III, IV, V and IX of the Treaty.

31. Paragraph 19 of decision 2 ("Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament"), adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/32/Part I, annex), stated that every effort should be made to ensure that IAEA had the financial and human resources necessary to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety. Implicit in that principle was the need for IAEA activities to give equal emphasis to technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.

32. Since 1995, substantial progress had been made in the area of safeguards through the adoption of the Model Addition Protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement and in that of nuclear safety through the adoption of the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage; the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage; and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Regrettably, however, the issue of funding the Agency's technical cooperation programme through predictable, assured resources remained unresolved.

33. Although the method by which technical cooperation should be provided was not made explicit in the Treaty, it was generally recognized that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund played a key role in that regard. However, the degree to which the Fund's resource targets had been met had varied widely during the past decade. His delegation considered that the unpredictability of funding and the ever-growing imbalance between the promotional and regulatory activities of IAEA were due largely to the concept of "voluntary" contributions to the Fund, despite the fact that the target figures for such contributions had been agreed to unanimously by the General Conference of IAEA. While the Fund had grown significantly, the number of States requiring technical assistance and cooperation had also increased in recent years. Moreover, there had been an average gap of 20 per cent between target and actual contributions during the past five years and, even taking into account additional funding from extrabudgetary and other sources, there had been a 15 per cent shortfall in funding for projects to meet the needs of developing States.

34. He thanked donors that had contributed in excess of their assessed contributions to the Fund and stressed the need to explore all voluntary, negotiated and extrabudgetary funding sources. His delegation was also in favour of creating a mandatory technical cooperation fund, managed by IAEA, to supplement the voluntary Fund. The International Atomic Energy Agency Department of Technical Cooperation should also be assured of adequate funding under the Regular Budget.

35. While Malaysia had once been almost exclusively a recipient under the IAEA technical cooperation programme, it was currently assisting other developing States in peaceful applications of nuclear technology. Technical cooperation was an important means of promoting transparency in national nuclear programmes, thereby deterring the misuse of nuclear technology or its diversion for non-peaceful purposes. National nuclear technology programmes could not be developed in isolation from international institutions; he therefore urged the strengthening of links between developing States through the IAEA mechanism for technical cooperation among developing countries.

36. Lastly, his delegation believed that the rising cost of implementing additional safeguards measures would soon affect the voluntary financing of technical cooperation. It was therefore following with interest the development of a proposal to establish a nuclear arms control verification fund, particularly the option paper on financing that was being prepared by the Director-General of IAEA. He hoped that assessed contributions for the funding of such disarmament verification measures would be weighted towards the nuclear-weapon States so as to minimize negative repercussions for voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund.

37. **Ms. Laohaphan** (Thailand) noted with satisfaction the significant progress made in the technical cooperation activities of IAEA, despite its lack of predictable and assured resources. Her delegation commended IAEA on its role as a key mechanism for scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and for technology transfer to its developing member States. Her delegation also believed that that effort would yield more tangible results if the States concerned lived up to their funding commitments. The role of IAEA should be expanded; in that regard, her delegation welcomed the Agency's effort to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its activities. Emphasis should be placed on international cooperation for the promotion of nuclear safety standards, radioactive waste management and security of nuclear materials.

38. Her Government was strongly committed to the provisions of the Treaty and had done its best to pay its contribution to the Technical Cooperation Fund of IAEA despite the economic difficulties which Thailand was facing. It believed that the Fund, while voluntary, should be viewed as a political commitment consistent with a country's Treaty obligations. The Fund must have predictable, adequate and assured resources; her delegation therefore urged the member States of the Agency to pay their contributions to the Fund in full.

39. Under the Treaty, States parties had an inalienable right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Accordingly, any unjustified restriction on the export of materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes to developing countries was inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. Export controls for the purpose of promoting non-proliferation should be implemented in a transparent and realistic manner within the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all States parties concerned.

40. Her delegation agreed that there was a linkage between peaceful nuclear cooperation and nuclear non-proliferation. States parties were thus obliged to ensure that cooperation would not pose any risk or contribute to nuclear proliferation. On the other hand, the promotion of non-proliferation must not impede technical cooperation and technology transfer. Her delegation would find it unacceptable if nuclear non-proliferation under article I of the Treaty was pursued by nuclear-weapon States at the expense of the peaceful use of nuclear energy by compliant, non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, nuclear-weapon States had a responsibility under the Treaty to ensure that their nuclear materials and technology did not fall into the hands of non-compliant States without passing on the costs of such measures to compliant non-nuclear-weapon States.

41. **Mr. Schmidt** (Austria) expressed his delegation's full support for the statement made by the representative of Portugal on behalf of the European Union, and for paragraphs 14 to 19 of the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" adopted in 1995. Austria had always maintained that nuclear power did not contribute to sustainable development and should not play a key role in future energy policies.

42. Preferential treatment in cooperation activities for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be given to non-nuclear-weapon States which had concluded and were implementing IAEA safeguards agreements. IAEA played a key role in assisting developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its efforts to enhance the effectiveness of its technical cooperation programme were commendable. Resources for IAEA technical cooperation activities must be assured, predictable and adequate; his delegation therefore urged Member States to make their contribution to the Agency's Technical Cooperation Fund in full and on time. Austria was participating in the IAEA technical cooperation programme in the areas of non-power applications and safety. As host country of IAEA, Austria offered training in such fields as radiation protection, nuclear medicine, agriculture, basic physics and radio chemistry and had seconded scientists to developing countries to give training courses or practical advice on scientific projects. Moreover, Austria regularly made its pledged

contribution early and in full to the Technical Cooperation Fund.

43. Transparency in export controls was directly related to cooperation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The acceptance of export controls depended largely on the establishment of clear and predictable criteria, developed in an atmosphere of cooperation and dialogue. In that connection, it was vital to heed developing countries' complaints about industrialized countries' unwillingness to cooperate in technical assistance programmes owing to stringent and unpredictable expert policies. His delegation commended the work done in the past five years to improve transparency, including two seminars organized by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, at which both supplier countries and non-aligned countries had expressed their views, and the work of the Zangger Committee, often referred to as the NPT Exporters Committee. In that connection, he drew attention to document NPT/CONF.2000/17.

44. In addition to its position on nuclear power, Austria attached particular importance to the protection of health and safety at existing nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities. Of crucial importance was an adequate national technical, human and regulatory infrastructure in nuclear safety, radiological protection and waste management for the peaceful application of nuclear energy. National efforts should be supplemented by international cooperation in those areas. His delegation strongly supported IAEA activities to strengthen nuclear safety in the operation of power and research reactors and welcomed increased international cooperation to that end. It also welcomed the First Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, held in Vienna in April 1999, which had demonstrated a high level of awareness of nuclear safety at both the national and international levels as well as the merits of peer review and peer pressure. It hoped to see improved reporting by Member States at the next meeting, particularly in areas where safety had been found to be deficient. It also urged all States, particularly those operating, constructing or planning nuclear power reactors, to become parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and called for a voluntary extension of the Convention beyond the operation of power plants, for example, to research reactors.

45. His delegation welcomed the conclusion of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and hoped that it would soon enter into force. It urged States which had not yet done so to become parties to the Convention and stressed the importance of applying the Convention's standards for civil activities to the military. He commended IAEA for its waste management activities and hoped they would be strengthened. In particular, he endorsed IAEA programmes to help Member States with regard to safety standards, peer reviews and other technical activities.

46. The application of proper physical protection standards by recipients of nuclear material and other radioactive substances was a prerequisite for cooperation. Austria was participating in IAEA efforts to improve the existing Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, whose scope was too narrow and should be extended to domestic use, storage and transport. A newly structured Convention should also provide guidance to Member States on setting up a national system for physical protection.

47. **Mr. Mayor** (Switzerland) said that his delegation attached great importance to its inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including with regard to the choice of nuclear fuel cycle. Since, like other non-nuclear-weapon States, Switzerland had already made a major concession by acceding to the NPT and adopting its Additional Protocol, his Government expected stronger implementation of article IV in return. It was also keenly aware of its duty to guarantee the safety of the civilian nuclear cycle at all times. In that connection, it noted with satisfaction that, contrary to certain predictions, illicit traffic in nuclear material had not attained the volume expected. Given that 2 billion people currently lacked access to electricity, that population was expected to increase by 3 billion during the next decade, not to mention the limited fossil fuel supplies and the need to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, the importance of maintaining the nuclear option to provide for energy needs was self-evident.

48. His Government's commitment to the NPT was demonstrated by its regular contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund, its involvement in various programmes designed to increase the safety of nuclear reactors, its participation in IAEA committees and its secondment of specialized experts to various parts of the world.

49. Switzerland was legally and structurally prepared to implement both the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which it had ratified in 1996, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which it had ratified in 1999 and whose drafting group had been chaired by a Swiss professor. Fine-tuning national regulations on the elimination of radioactive waste was the only remaining step to be taken in Switzerland's implementation of the latter Convention. Lastly, Switzerland participated actively in IAEA discussions on whether to amend the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and extend it to nuclear power plants.

50. **Mr. Lilland** (Norway) said that his delegation was strongly committed to the nuclear non-proliferation obligations set out in article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. The NPT Exporters Committee, later known as the *Zangger* Committee, had since its inception in 1971 established a common understanding on how to implement that article with a view to ensuring a consistent interpretation of the obligations contained therein. As a member of the Zangger Committee, his Government implemented the basic understanding of the Committee in its national export control policy. His Government urged other countries not members of the *Zangger* Committee to adopt the IAEA trigger list and full-scope safeguards as a minimum requirement within their national export control system.

51. Article III, paragraph 2, had certain limitations; for instance, it did not include technology, or dual-use items, nor did it explicitly require full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. With a view to better promoting the nuclear non-proliferation efforts, his Government had joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and abided by the collective policy agreement of the member States. Paragraph 17 of the "Principle and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference stated that transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue in cooperation among all interested States parties to the Treaty. Since 1995 NSG had, in addition to its ongoing outreach activities, strengthened its dialogue with non-members in 1997 and 1999, it had organized international seminars on the role of export controls and nuclear non-proliferation.

52. **Mr. Thamrin** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, drew attention to the Non-Aligned Movement's working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/18, annex) and, in particular to its position as outlined in: paragraph 2, on the non-discriminatory transfer of materials, equipment and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and paragraphs 13 to 18, on the inalienable right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy, the need to remove unilaterally enforced restrictive measures on peaceful nuclear development, undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes and States parties' strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use IAEA technical cooperation programmes as a tool for political purposes, the responsibility of nuclear supplier States to developing countries with regard to the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes; comprehensive and universal norms and standards prohibiting attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses; and measures to regulate international maritime transportation of radioactive waste and spent fuel.

53. **Mr. Issa** (Egypt) said that while preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons was one half of the issue, the other half was technology transfer and technical cooperation for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, as the NPT itself stated. The placing of arbitrary obstacles in the way of such transfer and cooperation, in an effort to hinder non-nuclear States parties, especially in the developing world, from obtaining nuclear know-how, was a clear and unjustifiable breach of article IV of the NPT. It would be more relevant to restrain nuclear cooperation with States that were not parties to the Treaty and did not abide by its provisions, instead of rewarding such States for their rejectionist attitude.

54. The IAEA technical cooperation programmes relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, in accordance with articles II, III and IV of the NPT, were admirable and benefited all concerned. All the more reason, then, for States to pay their assessed contributions for the Agency's work in full and on time.

55. Nuclear safety was a fundamental component of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and consequently the IAEA was rightly seeking to enhance the

effectiveness of nuclear safety measures relating to reactors and fissile materials. A nuclear accident would inevitably have far-reaching effects on public health and the environment, not only within the borders of the State in which it occurred, but far beyond them. The Tokaimura nuclear accident in Japan had been a spectacular recent example, and there were bound to be others. The question arose: if an accident could occur at a scrupulously managed and safeguarded site such as Tokaimura, how much more of a risk must an unsupervised and unsafeguarded nuclear facility represent, especially as it approached the end of its useful life? Consequently, it was to be hoped that the IAEA safeguard and supervision regime would soon extend to all nuclear facilities worldwide.

56. The IAEA was playing an important role in opening up new and broader horizons for economic development and the welfare of the world's peoples through the strengthening and promotion of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. An effective system of safeguards was a necessary part of that role.

57. Egypt fully supported the working paper submitted by the Group of 77 and China on technology transfer and technical cooperation activities in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy under the auspices of the IAEA, and had submitted a working paper of its own on the same subject, in token of its importance.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.

Main Committee III

Summary record of the 3rd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 2 May 2000, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Reimaa (Finland)

Contents

General debate (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Kadri** (Algeria) fully supported the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. He said that Algeria, which had become a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1963, attached great importance to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. By acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1995, Algeria had wished to demonstrate its commitment to the collective endeavour of nuclear disarmament with a view to making the Treaty an effective instrument for non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and promotion of the peaceful uses of the atom.

2. In March 1996, Algeria had concluded full-scope safeguards agreements with IAEA and had placed all its nuclear activities under Agency supervision in application of article III of the Treaty, thus reaffirming its commitment to the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes.

3. In that connection Algeria appreciated the cooperation programme it was undertaking with IAEA, which was being implemented both through bilateral cooperation with the Agency and within the framework of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA Agreement).

4. Algeria, which had paid its financial contributions to IAEA in full and on time, believed that there was a need to strengthen the Agency's role, which should not be confined to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

5. IAEA must be able to ensure the transfer of technology necessary for the development of the countries party to the Treaty that had renounced the military nuclear option. In order to continue to discharge that mandate without restrictions and imbalances — and to do so without safeguards affecting cooperation or without regional cooperation being pursued to the detriment of bilateral cooperation — IAEA must continue to receive resources in a regular and predictable manner.

6. His delegation also wished to reaffirm the inalienable right of the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination or hindrance, as stipulated in
of the Treaty, which was far from having bee
practice because of the numerous obsta
impeded the cooperation provided for therein

7. Indeed, new and ever more discr
regimes had appeared outside the universal f
of the Treaty imposing further constr
developing countries in the name of prevent
proliferation of nuclear weapons.

8. Algeria had always supported the ide
NPT should be a powerful vehicle for the pro
the peaceful uses of the atom. His deleg
therefore asking that Main Committee III sh
into consideration the points raised on that
the working document presented by Indo
behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Cou

9. **Mr. Bompadre** (Argentina), speakin
issues of nuclear cooperation and nucle
export-control regimes, emphasized that Arge
actively participating in the IAEA
cooperation programme and, in particula
projects launched in the context of the
Cooperative Arrangements for the prom
nuclear science and technology in Latin
(ARCAL).

10. Argentina was also organizing annua
the framework of the IAEA technical c
programme, advanced courses on ra
protection and nuclear safety, notably for pro
and technicians from Latin American countri

11. Regarding international nuclear cooper
export controls, it should be pointed out
Argentine nuclear programme had always
encourage the development of local tec
capacity. Thus, Argentina had acquired know
had enabled it to offer other countries access
technologies.

12. Argentina had quickly elaborated polic
at establishing precise and non-discriminat
with respect to the export of nuclear
products and technologies. Those rules spec
alia that the recipient countries must und
implement IAEA safeguards and to com
commitments made concerning the peacef
nuclear materials and equipment and that
consent of the Argentine Government was a
for the transfer of nuclear materials to third co

13. The evolution of non-proliferation policy since the early 1990s had led Argentina to accede to the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), then to the NPT, and finally to the conditions laid down by the Zangger Committee.

14. Not only had acceptance of export-control regimes not impeded Argentina's capacity to export nuclear products and technologies, but it had also facilitated the establishment of bilateral cooperation in that area, which had led to the signature of more than 30 bilateral cooperation agreements on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

15. Argentina was convinced that the guidelines of such nuclear-related export control regimes were not intended to hinder cooperation in that area, and it considered that nuclear trade and cooperation were not only possible, but indeed preferable, when a country subscribed to the standards established in respect of controls by NSG and the Zangger Committee.

16. Furthermore, control regimes were not aimed at restricting legitimate access to nuclear technology. Argentina was opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but supported the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

17. Lastly, in order to achieve those objectives, regimes must be transparent and the related guidelines must not be applied solely in order to obtain commercial advantages. The nuclear-related export-control regime could be effective only if the guidelines were applied impartially to all international suppliers. Transparency and broad application were the keys to achieving greater acceptance of export controls as non-proliferation safeguards.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.

Main Committee III

Summary record of the 4th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Thursday, 11 May 2000, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Reimaa (Finland)

Contents

Exchange of views III (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.

Exchange of views (*continued*)

1. **The Chairman** said that document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/CRP.15/Rev.1, which the Committee had before it, had broadly and constructively taken into account the comments and suggestions made by delegations at the meeting held the previous day. The criterion used in preparing the revised document had been to achieve broad acceptance of the final report. New paragraphs had been added and the numbering had therefore been altered. So far, section II B, paragraph 12, and the last sentence of paragraph 11 in section III did not have the support of all delegations.

2. **Mr. Yang** Dazhi (China) said that at the meeting held on the previous day his delegation had said that it needed more time to study the revised draft report. To some extent, the revised text reflected the opinions put forward by delegations and, if appropriate amendments were made, it might become a compromise text that would be submitted to the Conference for adoption. His country had participated in the work of the Committee in a constructive and cooperative spirit and hoped that it would be possible, without too much difficulty, to conclude the work on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly in relation to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

3. The structure and content of the revised draft were positive, in spite of the fact that certain parts needed to be improved. In the first place, there was no mention in the text of nuclear power even though a large proportion of the electric power generated throughout the world was of nuclear origin; it was therefore essential, in considering the peaceful use of nuclear energy, to mention that contribution which was of benefit to mankind. In the second place, the subjects of nuclear safety, radioactive waste, the transport of radioactive material, the conversion of military materials to peaceful uses and the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes took up a major part of the revised draft, while only a small part was devoted to technical cooperation, particularly the subject of funds for technical cooperation. Many delegations had emphasized the voluntary nature of the Technical Cooperation Fund which had reduced its importance. Accordingly, that part of the report should be strengthened. In the third place, many developing island countries had repeatedly expressed their concerns with respect to the transport of radioactive materials. His country considered that those concerns were legitimate and should be reflected in the report.

4. Specifically, in section III, paragraph 2, of the initial draft (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/CRP.15), the words "power generation" should be added after "inter alia". During the debate that suggestion had been supported by many delegations, even though it was understandable that some countries, because of their particular situations, had opted not to develop nuclear energy. The elements mentioned in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/CRP.7 should be reflected in the final report, in particular paragraphs 1, 3 and 6. In section III, paragraph 6, second sentence, relating to technical cooperation, the word "voluntary" should be deleted so that the sentence would read: "It urges member States of the IAEA to make every effort to pay in full and on time their contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund ...". Certain delegations had suggested the addition of the phrase "and reminds them of their obligation to pay their assessed programme costs". His country saw no problem in that. The first version of the report correctly reflected the relevant resolution adopted by IAEA at the 1999 General Conference; accordingly, it was to be hoped that the wording that had been adopted by consensus some months earlier at the Conference would be maintained and that the delegations concerned would reconsider their suggestions. His country supported the proposal made by the Islamic Republic of Iran for the inclusion in the report of the relevant elements given in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/WP.10, in particular paragraphs 2 and 4.

5. Turning to editorial suggestions, he said, with reference to section I, paragraph 6, that his delegation supported the proposal by the United Kingdom with respect to the medium-term strategy. In section II A, paragraph 2, the word "all" should be deleted in the second sentence. His delegation supported the position of France and the United Kingdom concerning section II A, paragraph 4, second sentence, and pointed out that, in paragraph 7 of that section, the word "transparency" should be deleted. In the middle of paragraph 13 of the same section, the expression "to build consensus" should be deleted so that the sentence would read: "The Conference recognizes the activities of IAEA in the search for new approaches on radioactive waste management solutions that are both

safe and publicly acceptable". His delegation proposed that, in the last sentence in paragraph 15 of that section, the expression "notes that it is important" should be used instead of the word "urges". He also proposed the deletion of the phrase "nationally or in cooperation with others to ensure that they have efficient liability mechanisms in place". The revised sentence should read: "The Conference notes that it is important for all States to have in place an efficient liability mechanism". Finally, in section II B, paragraph 8, specific reference should be made to "international standards and international law".

6. **Mr. Gerstler** (Germany) said that the text prepared by the Chairman was balanced and represented a consensus formulation of the various proposals made by delegations. However, the proposal by China to amend the wording with respect to matters such as technical cooperation was not acceptable. The same applied to the issues of liability and the transportation of radioactive materials which were technical cooperation matters and should be dealt with in Vienna or Paris. The Chairman's text could not achieve a consensus if it were substantially amended, particularly with respect to the matters he had mentioned.

7. **Mr. Pohan** (Indonesia) said that section II B, paragraph 11, was of the greatest importance for countries of the Non-Aligned Movement and that it could be strengthened still further. Section I, paragraph 1, of the revised draft should be replaced by the text in paragraph 1 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/CRP.7, which read: "The Conference reaffirms the legal obligations of the States Parties, set forth in Article IV of the Treaty, to facilitate the fullest possibility exchange of equipment, materials, scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to cooperate with other States to further development of applications of nuclear energy".

8. **Mr. Kerpens** (Suriname), while acknowledging the efforts made by the Chairman to prepare a text that would make it possible to reach a consensus, said that the text did not fully take account of his delegation's concerns. In section II B, paragraph 9, of the revised text the concerns of certain delegations had been reflected, particularly with respect to national and international regulations. However, the important proposals put forward by New Zealand, which had been supported by many delegations, had not been taken into account since the paragraph continued to
insist on rights but made no mention of obliga
paragraph 10 of the same section the proposal
that the expression "welcomes" be replaced by
had not been reflected. He welcomed the fact
Chairman had not given in to pressure in favou
deletion of paragraph 12 of the revised text; h
he pointed out that the important amendment p
by Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, among
concerning the environmental impact assessm
been omitted. That was important as a m
enabling small countries to take certain measur
event of an accident. The proposals made
Zealand concerning the liability regime sh
included in the text so as to avo
misunderstandings or ambiguities. It was imp
emphasize that the overwhelming majority o
supported certain opinions and that only fou
were opposed to them. Those States should put
amendments to the text in a constructive spirit
of merely insisting on the deletion of certain pa

9. **Mr. de Yturriaga** (Spain) agreed w
statement by the representative of Germa
disagreed with the proposal by China concern
deletion, in section III, paragraph 6, of th
"voluntary", since the drafting of that pa
reflected reality and was consistent with th
Statute according to which the technical coo
contributions were voluntary.

10. **Mr. Eslanizad** (Islamic Republic of Ira
that he fully supported the proposals made by
strengthen section III of the draft. Specifically,
proposal to add "power generation" after "inter
the second line of paragraph 2 of that sect
received the support of many delegations but
been taken into consideration; nevertheless th
nuclear power to generate electricity was a reso
many Third World countries. For the same re
was difficult to accept section I, paragraphs 8
in which the peaceful use of nuclear ener
subordinated to sustainable development, whic
be interpreted in the restrictive sense that, in
achieve such development, the use of such
would have to be curbed. That was inadm
because for some countries sustainable deve
depended precisely on nuclear power. On th
hand, in the penultimate line of section III, pa
6, after the words "Assessed Programme Co
following text should be inserted: "It also vi
rejects any attempt by any Member State to

Technical Cooperation Programme of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an instrument for attaining political objectives in contravention of the IAEA Statute". Again, section III, paragraph 4, should provide for a balance between the regular budget and the extrabudgetary resources of IAEA, on the one hand, and the political will of donor States with regard to their contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund, on the other. Accordingly, the Iranian and Thai delegations would submit a document with a proposed amendment to that effect. Lastly, the second sentence of section III, paragraph 11, should be deleted.

11. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece) said that he agreed with the representative of Germany. With regard to China's proposal that the words "power generation" should be inserted after the words "inter alia", in section III, paragraph 2, there were a large number of countries, including his own, which disagreed with it. He proposed that the list beginning with "inter alia" and ending with "industry" should be deleted and replaced by the words "which are referred to in article III, paragraph A, subparagraph 2 of the IAEA Statute", since that subparagraph made a generic reference to what was proposed by China. As he understood it, in the last part of the last sentence of section II A, paragraph 6, it was assumed that nuclear accidents would continue to occur, which was inadmissible; accordingly, he proposed that the sentence should end with the words "international cooperation" and that all the remainder should be deleted. The amendments proposed with regard to the safe transport of radioactive materials were not acceptable; firstly, because the expressions used in the draft under consideration corresponded to those used at the IAEA General Conference the previous year and, secondly, because those proposals affected highly specialized areas, such as environmental law and the law of the sea, which fell within the domain of other forums and in which Main Committee III did not have sufficient competence. Greece was not convinced by China's proposal with regard to section III, paragraph 6, because, in its view, if the word "voluntary" was deleted, the word "urges" would also have to be replaced by another word in order for the sentence to make sense. He also proposed that the last sentence of the same paragraph should be drafted as follows: "It also encourages IAEA to continue to manage its technical cooperation activities efficiently and effectively, having regard to the costs".

12. **Ms. Ngawat** (New Zealand), referring to section II B, paragraph 9, reiterated her firm opposition to the inclusion of the words "maritime, river and air navigation rights and freedom as provided for in international law", because it was too restrictive and did not include the relevant obligations provided for in international law, which should be referred to in the draft report under consideration. With regard to section II D, the amendments to old paragraph 15 proposed by New Zealand had not been included in the new text, and her delegation insisted on the importance of replacing "or in cooperation with others" by "regionally or multilaterally", since it was highly desirable that there should be a regional dialogue with transporting States in the Pacific Forum. She supported the comments made by Suriname at the current meeting and those made by the Caribbean Community the previous day. Lastly, with regard to the wording of section II B, paragraph 9, New Zealand had been accommodating, but, in its view, no considerable advance had been made over the 1995 version.

13. **Mr. Yang** Dazhu (China) said that the amendments which he had submitted in his previous statement took into account the fact that the draft report under consideration constituted a good working basis that could be improved on. Replying to the comment made by Spain with regard to the voluntary character of contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund, he said that, at the opening meeting of the last General Conference of IAEA, the Director-General of the Agency had stated that, although from a strictly legal point of view, contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund might be termed voluntary, in his view, within the broader scope of contributions to the Fund by States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, those contributions were not voluntary but constituted solemn and binding commitments. With regard to the statement by Greece with regard to the amendments proposed by China, those amendments were in perfect harmony with the decisions of the IAEA 1999 General Conference. Lastly, he agreed with the proposal made by Indonesia.

14. **Mr. Wood** (Canada) said that he agreed with the statements concerning the need to draft a balanced text that would be the subject of general consensus. He supported the proposal made by Greece with regard to section II A, paragraph 6. He was in favour of retaining section II B, paragraph 12, and section III, paragraph 11, in the draft. With regard to section IV, he proposed

that, at the end of paragraph 3, after the words "Trilateral Initiative", the following words should be added: "and in order to guarantee the irreversible withdrawal of fissionable material from weapons programmes", which had been contained in earlier versions of the draft, since, in his opinion, the idea of irreversibility was extremely important for inspiring confidence in the Trilateral Initiative. Lastly, he proposed that paragraph 4 of that section should be deleted, because the reference to the environmental consequences in the production of nuclear weapons lay outside the competence of Main Committee III.

15. **Ms. Chahin** (Chile) said that her delegation had a special interest in section II B of the draft report, concerning safe transport of radioactive materials. While it was appropriate to include the text of paragraph 12, the call contained in it for improved cooperation and exchange of information among the States concerned and the establishment of a regime of prior notification and prior consultation entailed certain limitations and, in her view, was not sufficient. Accordingly, her delegation drew the Committee's attention to paragraph 18 of the document submitted on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NPT/CONF.2000/18) and requested that mention should be made in paragraph 12 of the revised draft of the need to improve the international regulation of the transportation of that type of materials. She also supported the proposals made by the Caribbean Community and New Zealand for the inclusion of the concept of obligations in the last sentence of paragraph 9.

16. **Mr. Issa** (Egypt) endorsed the proposal submitted in document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/CRP.7 concerning cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and supported the statements made by the representatives of China, Indonesia, on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and Iran. With regard to the revised draft, he felt that section I, paragraph 8, placed excessive emphasis on sustainable development as a guiding principle in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The reference to mechanisms developed under the Kyoto Protocol for the formulation of projects with the objective of protecting the global environment was also inappropriate, since the Committee could not be expected to approve mechanisms that had not yet been negotiated or agreed. In that regard, the text concerning sustainable development contained in the report of Main Committee III of the 1995 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1, draft text of the Final Declaration, section I, para. 6), might serve as a basis for the formulation of the present section I, paragraph 8. With regard to section II A, paragraph 1, his delegation would like to have an explanation of the meaning of the phrase "the safety of nuclear installations within their territories" and to know whether it was taken from the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety.

17. **Mr. Abe** (Japan) said that contributions to the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund were partly voluntary in character and partly obligatory. If they had been totally obligatory, they would have had to form part of the IAEA regular budget, while, as things stood, they represented a separate account whose growth had been more rapid than that of the regular budget. Accordingly, he urged the Committee to accept the compromise text that had been submitted. Secondly, in accordance with the consultations held on the subject with the delegation of Ukraine, he wished to introduce two amendments to section II A, paragraph 6, of the draft text, namely to add at the end of the first sentence the words "and welcomes the decision by the Ukraine Government to close the Chernobyl nuclear power plant during the year 2000"; and to insert in the second sentence, after the words "the importance of" the words "the role of the States concerned". Thirdly, with regard to section II B, the text of paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/CRP.15 was preferable. The first sentence of paragraph 9 of the most recent text contained controversial elements such as the expression "full protection of States concerned"; the meaning of the word "full" in that context was not clear, and, accordingly, that sentence should be deleted. While it would be preferable to delete paragraph 12, a compromise solution would be to delete the second sentence, to move the first sentence of paragraph 10 of the revised text to the beginning of paragraph 12 and to change the current first sentence of paragraph 12, which would become the second sentence, to read: "the Conference encourages States Parties to continue working bilaterally and through the relevant international organizations to further improve such cooperation and exchange of information". Lastly, the new wording of section D, paragraph 16, concerning liability, should be retained.

18. **Ms. Sriswasdi** (Thailand) said that she supported the statement made by the delegation of Indonesia on

behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and fully endorsed the criteria expressed by the representatives of China and Ukraine. With regard to section III of the draft text, she stressed the importance of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund. She pointed out that during the period 1995-1999 there had been a disparity of more than 20 per cent between the contributions of States and the agreed targets and that, even with additional financing from extrabudgetary and other resources, there would still be a deficit of approximately 14 per cent. The revised document submitted by the Chairman did not incorporate the changes to paragraph 4 of that section based on document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/CRP.7, namely, to insert in the first sentence of paragraph 4 after the words "IAEA's Technical Cooperation Fund" the words "though voluntary in character, should be interpreted as a political obligation consistent with article IV of the Treaty, that needs to be respected". The following words should be added after the last sentence of the same paragraph: "The Conference also places particular emphasis on the achievement and maintenance of a proper balance between IAEA's promotional and regulatory activities". Lastly, paragraph 6 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/CRP.7 should be new paragraph 8 of section III of the revised draft text.

19. **The Chairman** said that, as he had previously informed delegations, the sole criterion followed in accepting texts, amendments and proposals for improvements was that they were likely to receive support that would lead to consensus. On the other hand, it would be for the delegation or delegations concerned to obtain such consensus. The proposal referred to by the delegation of Thailand had been the subject of consideration, and the result was reflected in the revised document.

20. **Mr. Papadimitropoulos** (Greece), in reply to the view expressed by the delegation of China, which had referred to the statements by the Director-General of IAEA concerning contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund, reiterated that, in fact, in article XIV of the IAEA Statute the voluntary character of its contributions was explicitly recognized. His delegation vigorously supported the strengthening of IAEA's technical cooperation, since Greece was a donor country but also a receiving country which benefited from its activities. He believed that the revised draft had taken that aspect into account by requesting that the resources in question should be "assured, predictable and sufficient" (section III, para. 6), which took care of the interests of many countries, and that the introduction of new phrases would only complicate the Chairman's work. Consequently, Greece joined in the consensus in favour of adopting that document in its current version.

21. **Ms. Forde** (Barbados), referring to section II B of the revised draft, said that, although it was an improvement as compared with the earlier text, certain questions that were vital for developing small island and coastal States had still not been satisfactorily addressed. Specifically, in paragraph 9, account had not been taken of the amendment proposed by New Zealand relating to the inclusion of the concept of obligations; in that connection the text needed to be better balanced and emphasis should be placed on the clearly defined obligations under international law. Her country noted with satisfaction that, the present paragraph 12, incorporated the proposal made by the Caribbean Community, Ireland, New Zealand, and other South Pacific countries with the support of several delegations. She also noted the comments of other delegations concerning the relevance of that paragraph but considered that the discussion of the matter in Main Committee III was not in any way incompatible with those that took place in other forums such as the United Nations Environment Programme, the International Maritime Organization and the Commission on Sustainable Development. She also supported the view of the delegation of Chile to the effect that the revised text of paragraph 12 was not adequate. The amendment proposed by the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement concerning regulation of the transport of dangerous waste might be a more appropriate formulation for that paragraph. She endorsed the proposal made by Trinidad and Tobago, with the support of Suriname and New Zealand, for the inclusion in the second sentence of paragraph 12, between the words "*prior notification*" and "*prior consultation*" of a reference to the environmental impact assessment, and expressed the hope that it might be included in the draft final text. Lastly, her country endorsed the amendment to former paragraph 15 in section III D proposed by New Zealand.

22. **Mr. Kuchinov** (Russian Federation) said that the revised draft submitted by the Chairman was balanced but needed some further amendments to improve its drafting. With respect to the proposal by Canada

concerning section IV, paragraph 3, on the implications of nuclear materials for disarmament, he considered that the present text of that paragraph did not need to be amended.

23. **Ms. Frederiksen** (Denmark) supported the statement made by the representative of Greece concerning section I, paragraph 2 of the revised draft. If reference were to be made to the numerous activities of IAEA, mention should also be made of articles 3 and 4 of the Agency's Statute, but in her judgement it would not be desirable to lengthen sentences which should be brief and to the point. In connection with Section I paragraph 8, she noted what had been stated by the delegation of Egypt concerning the undue emphasis on sustainable development as a guiding approach to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and was not opposed to the deletion of the first sentence of that paragraph. However, with a view to favouring a compromise solution, it would be sufficient to make some changes to the remainder of the paragraph. Her delegation acknowledged that the Kyoto Protocol was the ideal instrument for discussions on the world environment and that no definitive decisions on that matter had yet been taken, even in IAEA, and she therefore considered that the proposed text was acceptable.

24. **Mr. Krokhmal** (Ukraine) commended the brevity and precision of section II A, paragraph 6, and welcomed the inclusion in it of the proposals submitted jointly by the delegations of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the purpose of which was to draw attention to the consequences of the Chernobyl accident which was directly related to the application of the Treaty. With reference to the suggestion made by the representative of Greece concerning that paragraph, he agreed to the deletion of the last part of the last sentence but was categorically opposed to the addition of the end of the first sentence of the words "... and welcomes the decision by the Ukraine Government to close the Chernobyl nuclear power plant during the year 2000", as had been proposed by the representative of Japan. The Government of Ukraine had reaffirmed that undertaking in the framework of the corresponding bilateral and multilateral negotiations and the final document of the Conference was not the appropriate instrument in which to reflect undertakings made by one of the States Parties.

25. **Ms. Ramoutar** (Trinidad and Tobago) regretted that there was no reference in section II to the vulnerability of island and coastal States. She therefore supported the proposal by New Zealand to make a specific reference to rights and obligations under international law. With reference to paragraph 12, she accepted the suggestion by Japan to move the first sentence in paragraph 10 to the beginning of paragraph 12 but replacing the words "welcomes that" by "takes note that", as had been proposed by Haiti. A possible definitive wording of that paragraph based on the proposal by Japan might be: "In this context, the Conference encourages States Parties to continue working to develop additional measures to improve cooperation and exchange of information in areas such as notification and prior consultation, and the assessment of environmental impact among the States concerned".

26. **Mr. Zarkasi** (Indonesia) pointed out that there was no reference in section III to the transfer of technology and proposed the incorporation in paragraph 3 of that section as part of the first sentence in section III, paragraph 2, of document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1 which read: "The Conference acknowledges the importance of IAEA as the principal agent for technology transfer".

27. **Ms. Chan** (Singapore) agreed with the comments made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement, in particular with respect to section II B. She had no objection to making a reference in paragraph 9 of obligations under international law, as proposed by New Zealand and other delegations.

28. **Mr. Pinel** (France) said that many delegations, including his own, had problems with section I, paragraph 8, because of its vagueness in referring to the mechanisms which might be developed under the Kyoto Protocol. He suggested, in the interests of clarity, the inclusion of the second part of paragraph (f) of the preamble to the resolution adopted by the IAEA General Conference in 1999, entitled "Strengthening of the Agency's technical cooperation activities", which read: "*Conscious* of the great potential of nuclear power for meeting energy requirements in many countries and the need to protect the environment, and *recognizing* that many countries consider nuclear power, being a climatically benign source of energy, to be an eligible option under the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol". With regard to section II A, paragraph 6, he supported the proposal of the representative of Greece to end the paragraph after

the words "international cooperation", since the rest of the sentence had a negative and pessimistic tone. As for section II B, which his delegation considered essential, he supported the statement by Japan, especially concerning the suggestion to delete the first sentence of paragraph 9 because the reference to regulations and standards was too imprecise. The suggestion to move the first sentence of paragraph 10 to the beginning of paragraph 12 and the new wording for the first sentence of that paragraph also had merit. However, he could not accept the last sentence in paragraph 12, as it was premature to refer to a prior notification regime. What was being referred to in section IV, paragraph 4 must be clarified. Finally, the question of transport was essential to his delegation, which was prepared to hold consultations on the subject with other interested delegations.

29. **The Chairman**, replying to the representative of France, said that section IV, paragraph 4, had been included on the proposal of the delegations of Kazakhstan and other States of Central Asia. Furthermore, the wording was not totally new, but could be found in document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1.

30. **Ms. Gallini** (United States of America) endorsed the proposal to shorten the second sentence of section II A, paragraph 6, and to delete the second sentence of section II B, paragraph 12, and said that her delegation opposed any change to the text of section II D and section III, paragraph 6. It agreed with the delegation of the United Kingdom that the wording of section IV, paragraph 2, was inadequate and proposed that it should be replaced by paragraph 29 of document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/1, which read "The Conference takes note of the Declaration of the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit of April 1996, including in relation to the safe and effective management of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes, and the initiatives stemming from it". With regard to section IV, paragraph 4, her delegation agreed that it should be deleted. Lastly, it accepted the proposal of the delegation of Indonesia to add the first sentence of section III, paragraph 2, of document NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1 to the beginning of paragraph 3.

31. **Mr. Akopov** (Belarus) said he welcomed the fact that the proposal of the three delegations affected by the Chernobyl accident had been reflected in section II A, paragraph 6, and supported the position of the delegation of Ukraine regarding the proposal by Japan. Concerning the suggestion of Greece that the last part of the last sentence of section II A, paragraph 6, should be deleted, he said that the first part would then be meaningless, and it would therefore be better to delete the entire sentence.

32. **Ms. Cliff** (United Kingdom) said that document NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/CRP.15 and its revised version constituted a sound basis for a consensus text. With respect to technical cooperation, her delegation supported the comments of the German, Greek and Japanese representatives to the effect that the current text established a careful balance that the new paragraph 8 proposed by Thailand would undoubtedly upset. With regard to section IV of the draft report, the United Kingdom supported the suggestions by the Canadian and a number of other representatives that new paragraph 4 should be deleted. In the view of her delegation, the text proposed by Japan on transport was balanced, reasonable and conciliatory. Although her delegation had indicated that it was prepared to accept the amendments to paragraph 9 requested by some States parties, specifically the final sentence regarding the concerns of small island developing States and other coastal States, it had difficulty accepting the new wording which had been added to section II B, paragraph 9, of the revised text and shared the concerns and endorsed the comments of the representatives of Japan and France in that regard. Concerning the reference to international standards in that paragraph, her delegation had previously expressed its preference for maintaining the text of the first draft, which read "in accordance with the relevant standards of IAEA and the International Maritime Organization (IMO)". It strongly believed that that all of paragraph 12 should be deleted. Although the suggestion of the representative of Japan was interesting, she would prefer to consider it in greater depth. For the moment, she suggested the following text: "The Conference notes that some States Parties would welcome improved cooperation and exchange of information among the States concerned". Her delegation was, however, prepared to accept other formulations. The second sentence of paragraph 12 created difficulties for her delegation.

33. **Mr. Yang** Dazhu (China) supported the Indonesian suggestion regarding transfer of technology. The positive suggestion of France with respect to the

text of the IAEA General Conference resolution was also worth considering.

34. **Mr. Tyson** (Australia) said that his delegation felt that, in certain paragraphs, the previous text should be reinstated. With regard to section II B, concerning the safe transport of radioactive materials, his delegation had some difficulties with the first sentence of the new paragraph 9, and therefore supported the proposal by the representative of Japan to delete that sentence. The Japanese proposal to move the first sentence of paragraph 10 to the beginning of paragraph 12 was also reasonable, and his delegation supported the United Kingdom proposal that paragraph 9 should include a reference to the relevant standards of IAEA and IMO. It had no difficulty with the inclusion of the second sentence in paragraph 12, although it was not sure what the practical effect of that sentence would be. It would prefer to maintain the existing wording of section II D, concerning liability. His delegation was satisfied with the existing wording of the section on technical cooperation. It had no objection to the inclusion of a reference to power generation, as proposed by the representative of China, although there did not seem to be consensus in that respect. The Greek proposal to make a reference to the IAEA Statute instead of including a list of items should therefore be given careful consideration. His delegation would prefer to maintain the existing text of section III, paragraph 11. With regard to section IV, paragraph 3, concerning the conversion of nuclear materials to peaceful uses, his delegation supported the Canadian proposal to include a reference to the irreversible withdrawal of fissionable material. It also supported the Canadian proposal to delete paragraph 4 of that section, since it opened up a debate which was not germane to the work of the Committee.

35. **Mr. Bompadre** (Argentina) said that in general the revised draft report was a balanced document which was acceptable as it stood to his delegation. There was no doubt that the suggestions made during the debate could enrich it, provided that they did not depart too much from the minimum language acceptable to everyone, which was reflected in the current document. His delegation supported the proposal made by the representative of China with regard to section III, paragraph 2 that a reference should be made to power generation, although it recognized that the topic was not acceptable to all delegations. Like the representative of Australia, it believed that the Greek proposal to avoid specific descriptions and to refer to the IAEA Statute could be an acceptable solution for everyone.

36. **Mr. Abe** (Japan) proposed that, at the end of the first sentence of section II A, paragraph 6, the following words should be added: "in support of the actions taken by the Governments concerned"; that would meet the concerns expressed by the representative of Ukraine and by his own delegation. He could also support the deletion of the second sentence of that paragraph.

37. **Mr. Hoey** (Ireland), referring to section II B, paragraph 9, proposed that the word "full" should be deleted from the first sentence; the meaning of that sentence would not be changed. His delegation had no problem with the addition of the words "and obligations" in the second sentence of the same paragraph. With regard to section II B, paragraph 12, the delegations of Japan and of Trinidad and Tobago had made very valid points and, in the light of those points, his delegation proposed that the first sentence of paragraph 10 should be moved to the beginning of paragraph 12, replacing the word "welcomes" by the word "notes", and that that sentence should be followed by a sentence along the following lines: "In this context, the Conference encourages States parties to continue working to formulate additional measures aimed at improving cooperation and the exchange of information among the States concerned in areas such as prior notification and consultation and environmental impact assessments".

38. **Mr. Al-Berkdar** (Iraq) said that a few days earlier he had requested that some additions should be made to section III, paragraph 1, concerning agriculture and medicine. With regard to medicine in particular, he proposed that a reference should be made to cancer, the incidence of which had increased considerably in Iraq after the United States of America and the United Kingdom, in their attacks on that country, had used substances like enriched uranium and depleted uranium. An explanation was needed as to why there had been no mention at all of the amendment his delegation had proposed in that respect.

39. **Mr. Poban** (Indonesia), referring to the proposal by the representative of Ireland concerning section II B, paragraph 12, said that the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries was proposing a new version of that paragraph, but remained flexible as to the final

wording. The new version of the paragraph would be along the following lines: "The Conference calls upon States parties to continue working through the competent international organizations to develop and enhance international measures and norms in relation to the international maritime transport of radioactive waste and spent fuel. In that respect, the Conference calls for the adoption of additional measures, such as measures to improve cooperation and the exchange of information among interested States, and for the consideration, along with the competent international organization, of an effective and detailed regime for prior notification and advance consultations with States which might be affected by the transport of radioactive materials". His delegation also felt that it was very important to maintain the first sentence of section II B, paragraph 9.

40. **Mr. Du Preez** (South Africa) said that he supported the proposal by the representative of Indonesia, which incorporated valuable elements of the document submitted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/CRP.8) and better reflected the interests of the States parties, especially small island States and other coastal States like South Africa. He took note with satisfaction of the proposal made by the representative of Ireland with regard to paragraph 12, which was very close to the Indonesian proposal. He also supported the proposal made by the representative of Ireland with regard to the first sentence of section II B, paragraph 9. He agreed that a reference should be made to obligations in the second sentence of that paragraph. Lastly, associating himself with the Canadian proposal with regard to section IV, paragraph 3, he proposed that, after the words "Trilateral Initiative", a phrase should be added along the following lines: "to cover the five nuclear-weapon-States in similar agreements and ensure the irreversible withdrawal of fissionable material from weapons programmes".

41. **Mr. Kerpens** (Suriname), speaking on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations belonging to the Caribbean Community, took note with satisfaction of the position of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries with regard to security in the transport of radioactive materials, expressed by Indonesia. He also commended Ireland for proposing a compromise solution for that difficult question, particularly in relation to section II B, paragraph 12. Lastly, he thanked South Africa for having shown the way to be followed to achieve progress.

42. **Ms. Frederiksen** (Denmark), referring to section I, paragraph 8, said that her text was based on the resolution of the General Conference of IAEA referred to by the representative of France, but was based on an operative paragraph, not a preambular paragraph.

43. **Mr. Malolo** (Tonga) said that he fully supported Ireland's proposals with regard to section II B, paragraphs 9 to 12. He also supported the proposal to add "and obligations" to the second sentence of section II B, paragraph 9.

44. **Mr. Cabiera** (Peru), referring to section II B, paragraph 9 of the draft revised text, said that the current wording was better than that of the earlier version, but should include the main elements of the relevant paragraphs of the proposal made by the Caribbean Community, New Zealand and other countries. He also supported Ireland's proposal that the word "full" should be deleted in the first sentence of that paragraph. Furthermore, and in order to contribute to a compromise solution, his delegation fully supported the proposal made by Indonesia on paragraph 12 of the same section.

45. **The Chairman** requested delegations, in view of the time constraints, to make compromise proposals on section I, paragraph 8, and section II A, paragraph 6; in relation to the latter paragraph, he called on the delegations of Japan and Ukraine to reach agreement. He would also welcome duly negotiated compromise proposals with regard to section II B, paragraphs 9 and 12, and called on the delegations of Indonesia and Ireland to try to formulate a joint proposal. He also wished to know about the position of delegations with regard to section III, paragraph 11. He would therefore adjourn the meeting so that delegations could try to reach agreement on the basis of consensus.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

Main Committee III

Summary record of the 4th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 12 May 2000, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Reimaa .... (Finland)

Contents

Draft report of Main Committee III (*continued*)

The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

Draft report of Main Committee III (*continued*) (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/CRP.15/Rev.2)

1. **The Chairman** said that the meeting would be suspended to allow for the continuation of informal consultations on the draft report of Main Committee III.

The meeting was suspended at 10.35 a.m. and resumed at 1.05 p.m.

2. **The Chairman** thanked the delegations that had taken an active part in the informal consultations and said that at the conclusion of the meeting, which was the last meeting of Main Committee III, he would transmit the Committee's draft report (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.III/CRP.15/Rev.2) to the plenary meeting that day. As the Committee had been unable to achieve a consensus on the entire text during the informal consultations, the passages on which there was disagreement would be indicated in bold.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

E. List of participants

I. STATES PARTIES

ALBANIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Albania to the United Nations
320 East 79th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021
Telephone: (212) 249-2059

Mr. Agim Nesho	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Adrian Spirollari	First Secretary Permanent Mission Deputy head of delegation

ALGERIA

Address: Permanent Mission of Algeria to the United Nations
326 East 48th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 750-1960, 1961, 1962

M. Abdelmajid Fasla	Secrétaire Général Ministère des affaires étrangères Chef de la délégation
M. Abdallah Baali	Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire Représentant permanent auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies

M. Abderrahmane Kadri	Commissaire à l'énergie atomique
M. Mokhtar Reguieg	Ambassadeur Représentant permanent de l'Algérie auprès de l'AIEA, Vienne
M. Abdelkader Mesdoua	Ministre conseiller Mission permanente
M. Youssef Touil	Directeur Central chargé de la sûreté nucléaire, auprès du Commissariat à l'énergie atomique
M. Sid Ali Abdelbaki	Sous-Directeur du désarmement Ministère des affaires étrangères
M. Mohamed Chikouche	Conseiller au Commissariat à l'énergie atomique
M. Akbel Mehenni	Conseiller au Commissariat à l'énergie atomique
M. Ahcène Kerma	Conseiller Mission permanente
M. Said Khelifi	Conseiller Mission permanente d'Algérie auprès de l'AIEA, Vienne

ANDORRA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Principality of Andorra to the United Nations
Two United Nations Plaza, 25th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 750-8064

Mr. Juli Minoves-Triquell	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation

Mrs. Roser Suñé-Pascuet	Minister Plenipotentiary Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Joan Forner-Rovira	Minister Counsellor Permanent Mission
Ms. Jelena Pià-Comella	Minister Counsellor Permanent Mission

ANGOLA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Angola to the United Nations
125 East 73rd Street, New York, N.Y. 10021
Telephone: (212) 861-5656

Mr. Jose Goncalves Martins Patricio	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Jose Paulino Gunha da Silva	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Pedro Manuel Caetano da Silva	Second Secretary

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Address: Permanent Mission of Antigua and Barbuda to the United Nations
610 Fifth Avenue, Suite 311, New York, NY 10020
Telephone: (212) 541-4117

Mr. Patrick Albert Lewis	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Conrod Hunte	Minister Counsellor Permanent Mission

ARGENTINA

Address: Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations
One United Nations Plaza, 25th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 688-6300

Sr. Arnoldo M. Listre	Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas Jefe de delegación
Sr. Luis Enrique Cappagli	Ministro Representante Permanente Adjunto ante las Naciones Unidas
Sr. Pedro Villagra Delgado	Ministro Director de Seguridad Internacional Asuntos Nucleares y Especiales Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto
Sr. Gerardo Bompadre	Primer Secretario Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto Dirección de Seguridad Internacional, Asuntos Nucleares y Especiales
Sra. Gabriela Martinic	Primera Secretaria Misión Permanente

ARMENIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the United Nations
119 East 36th Street, New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone: (212) 686-9079

Mr. Vartan Oskanian	Minister for Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr. Movses Abelian	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Deputy head of delegation

Mr. Vabram Kazhoyan	Director Department of International Organizations Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Vabram Gabrielyan	Director Department of Arms Control and International Security Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Arman Akopian	Counsellor Permanent Mission Alternative Representative
Ms. Dziumik Aghajanian	Head of Division Department of Policy Planning Ministry of Foreign Affairs Adviser
Mr. Arman Hovhanissyan	Second Secretary Permanent Mission Adviser

AUSTRALIA

Address: Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations
150 East 42nd Street, 33rd Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 351-6600

Mr. Alexander John Gosse Downer	Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Leslie Richard Luck	Ambassador Permanent Representative to the United Nations and to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva
Ms. Penelope Anne Wensley	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Alternative Representative

Mr. Robert James Tyson	Alternate Representative
Mr. Andrew Roger Leask	Adviser
Ms. Marina Tsirbas	Adviser
Mr. Ian David Grainge Biggs	Adviser
Ms. Penelope-Ann Burtt	Adviser
Ms. Bronte Nadine Moules	Counsellor Permanent Mission Adviser
Ms. Sandra Lianne Vegting	Adviser
Mr. Adam Justin McCarthy	Adviser
Mr. Joshua Anthony Frydenberg	Adviser
Mr. Richard Travers Sadleir	Adviser
Mr. John Malcolm Page	Adviser
Mr. Phillipa Jane King	Adviser

AUSTRIA

Address: Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations
823 United Nations Plaza, 8th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 949-1840

Mr. Wernfried Köffler	Minister Director for Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Vienna Head of delegation
Mr. Robert Zischg	Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs Adviser
Mr. Fritz W. Schmidt	Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs Adviser

Ms. Christine Göstl	Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs Adviser
Ms. Petra Schneebauer	Permanent Mission Adviser

AZERBAIJAN

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 560, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 371-2559, 2832, 2721

Mr. Vilayat Gouliyev	Minister for Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr. Eldar Kouliev	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Hafiz Pashayev	Ambassador of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the United States
Mr. Mr. Agshin Mehdiyev	Director of Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Yashar Aliyev	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Elmar Mamedyarov	Counsellor Embassy, Washington, D.C.
Mr. Elchin Amirbekov	Head of Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Eldar Rzayev	Head of Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Farid Shafiyev	Third Secretary Permanent Mission

BAHAMAS

Address: Permanent Mission of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to the United Nations
231 East 46th Street, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 421-6925

Mr. Anthony Rolle	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Ms. Marilyn T. Zonicle	Minister Counsellor Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Ms. Sandra P. Carey	First Secretary Permanent Mission

BANGLADESH

Address: Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to the United Nations
821 United Nations Plaza, 8th Floor
Telephone: (212) 867-3434, 3435, 3436, 3437

Mr. C.M.Shafi Sami	Foreign Secretary Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh Head of delegation
Mr. Anwarul Karim Chowdhury	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Alternate head of delegation
Mr. F.A. Sharmim Ahmed	Minister Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Ms. Saida Muna Tasneem	Senior Assistant Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs

BARBADOS

Address: Permanent Mission of Barbados to the United Nations
800 Second Avenue, 2nd Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 867-8431, 8432, 8433

Miss June Clarke	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mrs. Betty Russell	Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Ricardo Browne	Minister Counsellor Permanent Mission
Miss Donna Forde	First Secretary Permanent Mission

BELARUS

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Belarus to the United Nations
136 East 67th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021
Telephone: (212) 535-3420

Mr. Sergei Martynov	First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr. Alyaksandr Sychov	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Deputy head of delegation

Alternates

Mr. Valentin Rybakov	Head Department for International Security and Arms Control Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Aleg Laptsenak	Head Department of International Organizations Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Advisers

Mr. Yury Kazhura	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Vadim Reznikov	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Karen Akopov	Third Secretary Permanent Mission

BELGIUM

Address: Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations
823 United Nations Plaza, 4th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 378-6300

M. Jean De Ruyt	Ambassadeur Directeur général des relations politiques multilatérales et des questions thématiques Ministère des affaires étrangères, Bruxelles
M. Jean Lint	Représentant permanent de la Belgique auprès de la Conférence du désarmement Genève
Mme Mireille Claeys	Directrice de la Direction non-prolifération désarmement et contrôle de l'armement Ministère des affaires étrangères, Bruxelles
Mme Danielle Haven	Chef du Service non-prolifération, désarmement Ministère des affaires étrangères, Bruxelles
M. Gérad Cockx	Représentation permanente de la Belgique auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, New York

M. Evert Marechal	Représentation permanente de la Belgique auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, New York
M. François Delhaye	Représentant permanent de la Belgique auprès de la Commission préparatoire de l'OTICE, Vienne
M. Damien Angelet	Représentant permanent de la Belgique auprès de la Conférence du Désarmement, Genève
M. Sigurd Schelstraete	Représentation permanente de la Belgique auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, New York
M. Bertrand Hayez	Ministère de la défense, Bruxelles
M. Baudouin Briot	Ministère de la défense, Bruxelles
M. Félicien Vandermaelen	Ministère des affaires économiques, Bruxelles
M. Kurt Franck	Ministère des affaires économiques, Bruxelles
M. Jean-Jacques David	Ministère de la défense, Bruxelles (à confirmer)
M. Valère Mantels	Représentation permanente de la Belgique auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, New York
M. Frank Meeussen	Ministère de la santé publique, Bruxelles
M. Guillaume Robeyns	Expert Représentant de la Belgique au Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation auprès du Directeur général de l'AIEA, Vienne

BELIZE

Address: Permanent Mission of Belize to the United Nations
800 Second Ave., Suite 400G, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 593-0999

Mr. Stuart Leslie	Chargé d'affaires Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Ms. Dina Shoman	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Alfonzo Gahona	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Trevor Jeffries	Second Secretary

BENIN

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Benin to the United Nations
4 East 73rd Street, New York, N.Y. 10021
Telephone: (212) 249-6014, 6025

M. Joel W. Adechi	Ambassadeur Representant permanent de la Republique du Benin auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies Chef de la délégation
M. Samuel Amehou	Ministre Conseiller auprès de la mission
M. Bantole Yaba	Premier Conseiller auprès de la mission
M. Eric Saizonou	Conseiller auprès de la mission

BHUTAN

Address: Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Bhutan to the United Nations
Two United Nations Plaza, 27th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 826-1919

Mr. Om Pradhan	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Yeshey Dorji	Deputy Permanent Representative Permanent Mission to the United Nations
Mr. Tashi Tsering	Second Secretary Permanent Mission

BOLIVIA

Address: Permanent Mission of Bolivia to the United Nations
211 East 43rd Street, 8th Floor (Room 802), New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 682-8132

Sr. Roberto Jordán-Pando	Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas
Sr. Alberto Salamanca Prado	Embajador Representante Permanente Suplente

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Address: Permanent Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 580, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 751-9015

Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Ms. Lidija Topić	Counsellor First Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Tomislav Grubeša	Special Adviser Permanent Mission

BOTSWANA

Address: Permanent Mission of Botswana to the United Nations
103 East 37th Street, New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone: (212) 889-2277, 2331, 2491

Mr. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Leutlwetse Mmualefe	Deputy Permanent Representative Alternate head of delegation
Mr. Tebelelo A. Boang	First Secretary Representative Permanent Mission
Mr. Collen Vixen Kelapile	First Secretary Alternative Representative Permanent Mission

BRAZIL

Address: Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations
747 Third Avenue, 9th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 372-2600

Mr. Celso Luiz N. Amorim	Ambassador Permanent Representative to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, Geneva
Mr. Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Ricardo Maschietto Ayrosa	Second Secretary Permanent Mission, Geneva
Mr. Leonardo Luís Gorgulho Nogueira Fernandes	Second Secretary Permanent Mission

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

Address: Permanent Mission of Brunei Darussalam to the United Nations
771 First Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 697-3465

Mr. Haji Jemat Haji Ampal	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Johan Thani	Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mrs. Dk Faezah Pg. Hj Abdul Rahman	Second Secretary Permanent Mission

BULGARIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations
11 East 84th Street, New York, N.Y. 10028
Telephone: (212) 737-4790, 4791

Mr. Vassiliy Takev	Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs

BURKINA FASO

Address: Permanent Mission of Burkina Faso to the United Nations
115 East 73rd Street, New York, NY 10021
Telephone: (212) 288-7515

M. Michel Kafando	Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire Représentant permanent auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies Chef de délégation
M. Jean-Baptiste Kambire	Deuxième Conseiller Mission permanente

CAMBODIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Cambodia to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 420, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 223-0676, 0435, 0530

Mr. Ouch Borith	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Nay Meng Eang	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Pal Piseth	Second Secretary Permanent Mission

CANADA

Address: Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations
885 Second Avenue, 14th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 848-1100

Mr. Lloyd Axworthy	Minister of Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr. Christopher Westdal	Permanent Representative and Ambassador to the United Nations for Disarmament Permanent Mission of Canada to the Office of the United Nations at Geneva Alternate head of delegation

Deputy heads of delegation:

Mr. Robert McDougall	Director Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Mr. Marc Vidricaire	Counsellor Permanent Mission, Geneva

Col. J. Michael Snell	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. David Viveash	Deputy Director Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Mr. Leigh Sarty	Desk Officer (Nuclear Issues) Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Mr. Trevor Smith	Assistant/Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Mr. Terry Wood	Deputy Director Nuclear and Chemical Disarmament Implementation Agency Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Ms. Heidi Hulan	Policy Adviser Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Donald Sinclair	Director Middle East Division Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Ms. Chantal Goupil	Policy Officer Directorate of Arms Proliferation Control Policy, Department of National Defence
Mr. James Casterton	Counsellor Science and Technology Permanent Mission of Canada to the International Organizations, Vienna

Mr. André Guilbaud	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Officer Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Safeguards, and Security Division Atomic Energy and Control Board Ottawa
Ms. Jennifer Allen Simons	Adviser
Mr. Tariq Rauf	Adviser
Mr. Ernie Regchr	Adviser

CAPE VERDE

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cape Verde to the United Nations
27 East 69th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021
Telephone: (212) 472-0333

Mr. José Luis Monteiro	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Severino Soares Almeida	Minister Plenipotentiary Permanent Mission

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Address: Permanent Mission of the Central African Republic to the United Nations
386 Park Avenue South, Suite 1114, New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone: (212) 679-8089, 7349

M. Fernand Poukre-Kono	Conseiller Mission permanente

CHILE

Address: Permanent Mission of Chile to the United Nations
3 Dag Hammarskjold Plaza
305 East 47th St., 10th/11th Floors, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 832-3323

Sr. Raimundo Gonzales	Embajador Director de Política Especial Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores
Sr. Cristián Maquieira	Embajador Representante Alterno Misión Permanente
Sr. Juan Eduardo Eguiguren	Consejero Misión Permanente
Sra. Verónica Chahín	Segunda Secretaria Misión Permanente, Ginebra
Sr. Álvaro Jara	Tercero Secretario Misión Permanente

CHINA

Address: Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China
to the United Nations
350 East 35th Street, New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone: (212) 655-6100

Mr. Sha Zukang	Ambassador Director-General of Department of Arms Control and Disarmament Foreign Ministry Head of delegation
Mr. Hu Xiaodi	Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs Deputy head of delegation
Mr. Gu Ziping	Deputy Director-General of Department of Arms Control and Disarmament Foreign Ministry Adviser
Mr. Hu Side	Expert Adviser

Mr. Shi Zhongjun	Director Department of Arms Control and Disarmament Foreign Ministry Adviser
Mr. Wu Haitao	First Secretary Permanent Mission Adviser
Mr. Fu Zhigang	Second Secretary Permanent Mission Geneva Adviser
Mr. Yang Dazhu	Official of China Atomic Energy Authority Adviser
Mr. Mu Changlin	Officer Ministry of Defence Adviser
Ms. Zhang Xiaoqian	Officer Ministry of Defence Adviser
Mr. Zou Zhibo	Officer Ministry of Defence Adviser
Mr. Wu Gang	Officer Ministry of Defence Adviser
Mr. Xu Zhaoyang	Third Secretary Permanent Mission Geneva Adviser
Ms. Chen Xiaoqiong	Attaché Department of Arms Control and Disarmament Foreign Ministry Adviser

Mr. Wang Lei	Attache Permanent Mission Adviser
Mr. Sun Lei	Staff Member of Department of Arms Control and Disarmament Foreign Ministry Adviser
Mr. Xia Tian	Staff Member of Department of Arms Control and Disarmament Foreign Ministry Adviser

COLOMBIA

Address: Permanent Mission of Colombia to the United Nations
140 East 57th Street, 5th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10022
Telephone: (212) 355-7776

Sr. Camilo Reyes Rodríguez	Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas, Ginebra
Sr. Alfonso Valdivieso Sarmiento	Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas
Sr. Andrés Franco	Representante Permanente Adjunto ante las Naciones Unidas
Sr. Camilo Ruiz Blanco	Ministro Consejero Misión Permanente, Ginebra
Sr. José Renato Salazar	Ministro Consejero Misión Permanente

COSTA RICA

Address: Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations
211 East 43rd Street, Room 903, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 986-6373

Sr. Bernd Niehaus	Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas Jefe de delegación
Sr. Carlos Lizano	Ministro Consejero Misión Permanente
Sr. Carlos Fernando Díaz	Consejero Misión Permanente
Sr. Frédéric Bijou	Agredado Misión Permanente

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Address: Permanent Mission of Côte d'Ivoire to the United Nations
46 East 74th Street, New York, NY 10021
Telephone: (212) 717-5555

M. Claude Stanislas Bouah-Kamon	Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire Représentant permanent auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies Chef de délégation
M. Noël-Emmanuel Ahipeaud Guebo	Premier conseiller

CROATIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations
820 Second Avenue, 19th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 986-1585

Mr. Vladimir Drobnjak	Ambassador, Assistant Minister Head of delegation
Mr. Ivan Šimonović	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Deputy head of delegation

Ms. Jelena Grčić	Minister Plenipotentiary Permanent Mission
Mr. Igor Pokaz	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Joško Klisović	Counsellor Permanent Mission

CYPRUS

Address: Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations
13 East 40th Street, New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone: (212) 481-6023, 6024, 6025

Mr. Sotirios Zackheos	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Demetris Hadjiargyrou	Second Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. George Christofides	Attaché Ministry of Foreign Affairs

CZECH REPUBLIC

Address: Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the United Nations
1109 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10028
Telephone: (212) 535-8814, 8815, 8818

Mr. Martin Palouš	Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mrs. Dana Drábková	Chairperson State Office for Nuclear Safety
Mr. Vladimír Galuška	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Mr. Alexander Slabý	Director, United Nations Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Miroslav Somol	Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Geneva Special Adviser
Mr. Pavel Vacek	Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Vienna Special Adviser
Mr. Karel Bohm	Deputy Chairman State Office for Nuclear Safety
Mr. Miroslav Tuma	Deputy Director United Nations Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Alexander Sporýš	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Pavel Klucký	United Nations Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Ladislav Barták	Director, Nuclear Materials Department State Office for Nuclear Safety
Mr. Pavel Mikolajek	Military Adviser Permanent Mission
Mr. Vladimír Císa	State Office for Nuclear Safety
Mr. Václav Pasák	Ministry of Defence

DENMARK

Address: Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations
885 Second Avenue, 18th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 308-7009

Mr. Jørgen Bøjer	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Mr. Theis Truelsen	Ambassador Political Director Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Karsten Petersen	Ambassador Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Jesper Toftlund	Head of Section Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mrs. Ulla Schiøtt Frederiksen	Counsellor Royal Danish Embassy, Vienna

DJIBOUTI

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Djibouti to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 4011, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 753-3163

Mr. Roble Olhaye	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Djama Mahamoud Ali	First Counsellor Permanent Mission

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Address: Permanent Mission of the Dominican Republic to the United Nations
144 East 44th Street, 4th Floor, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 867-0833

Sr. Sully B. Saneaux	Consejero Misión Permanente

ECUADOR

Address: Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Room 516, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 935-1680, 1681

Mr. Mario Alemán	Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas
Mr. Santiago Apunte	Ministro Misión Permanente
Mr. Marcelo Vázquez	Consejero Misión Permanente

EGYPT

Address: Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations
304 East 44th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 503-0300

Mr. Ahmed Aboul Gheit	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Mounir Zahran	Ambassador Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Soliman Awaad	Ambassador Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs for Multilateral Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mrs. Fayza Aboulnaga	Ambassador Permanent Representative to the United Nations at Office, Geneva
Mr. Nabil Fahmy	Ambassador of Egypt to the United States of America

Mr. Mohamed Tawfik	Counsellor Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office, Geneva
Mr. Ismail Khairat	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Alaa Issa	First Secretary Director of Disarmament Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Ahmed Ragab	Third Secretary Permanent Mission

EL SALVADOR

Address: Permanent Mission of El Salvador to the United Nations
46 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone: (212) 679-1616, 1617

Sr. José Roberto Andino-Salazar	Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas Jefe de delegación
Sr. Guillermo A. Meléndez-Barahona	Embajador Representante Permanente Adjunto ante las Naciones Unidas
Sr. Carlos Enrique García-González	Consejero Misión Permanente

ERITREA

Address: Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the United Nations
800 Second Avenue, 18th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 687-3390

Mr. Haile Menkerios	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Mr. Kibreab Y. Habteselassie	Second Secretary Permanent Mission

ESTONIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Estonia to the United Nations
600 Third Avenue, 26th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone: (212) 247-0499

Ms. Merle Pajula	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Estonia to the United Nations Head of delegation
Ms. Malle Talvet	Counsellor Political Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia
Mr. Caius Kull	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of the Republic of Estonia to the United Nations
Ms. Eve Sirp	Second Secretary Permanent Mission of the Republic of Estonia to the United Nations

ETHIOPIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the United Nations
866 Second Avenue, Third Floor, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 421-1830

Mr. Fesseha A. Tessema	Minister Counsellor Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Chargé d'affaires Head of delegation
Mr. Berhanemeskel Nega	Counsellor Permanent Mission

Mr. Meheret Getahoun	Second Secretary Permanent Mission

FIJI

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Fiji to the United Nations
630 Third Avenue, 7th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 687-4130

Mr. Amraiya Naidu	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation

FINLAND

Address: Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 222, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 355-2100

Mr. Markku Reimaa	Ambassador Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva Head of delegation
Mr. Kari Kahiluoto	Director Division for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Jussi Manninen	Director Energy Department Nuclear Energy Division Ministry of Trade and Industry
Mr. Timo Kantola	Counsellor Division for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Mr. Mauri Riihonen	Counsellor (Nuclear Affairs) Permanent Mission of Finland to IAEA Vienna
Ms. Marja-Leena Vuorenpää	Counsellor Permanent Mission Geneva
Mr. Jukka Pesola	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Ms. Arja Tanninen	Counsellor Energy Department Nuclear Energy Division Ministry of Trade and Industry
Ms. Teija Katajainen	Assistant Permanent Mission of Finland, Geneva

FRANCE

Address: Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations
245 East 47th Street, 44th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 308-5700

Mr. Jean-David Levitte	Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire Représentant permanent de la France auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies
Mr. Hubert Forquenot de la Fortelle	Ambassadeur Représentant permanent de la France auprès de la Conférence du désarmement
Mr. Régis de Belenet	Ambassadeur Directeur des affaires stratégiques, de sécurité et du désarmement Ministère des affaires étrangères

Ms. Bérengère Quincy	Ambassadeur Représentant permanent de la France auprès de l'Office des Nations Unies et des organisations internationales à Vienne
Mr. Philippe Thiebaud	Gouverneur pour la France auprès de L'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique Directeur des relations internationales au Commissariat à l'énergie atomique
Mr. Michel Picard	Chef de la Division forces nucléaires Etat-Major des Armées Ministère de la défense
Mr. Olivier Caron	Adjoint au Sous-Directeur du désarmement et de la non-prolifération nucléaires Ministère des affaires étrangères
Mr. Paul Dahan	Représentant adjoint auprès de la Conférence du désarmement
Mr. Jean-Claud Brunet	Premier secrétaire Mission permanente de la France auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies New York
Mr. Michel Richard	Adjoint au Directeur des relations internationales au Commissariat à l'énergie atomique
Mr. Thomas Wagner	Premier secrétaire Mission permanente de la France auprès de la Conférence du désarmement
Mr. Bruno Le Maire	Sous-direction du désarmement et de la non-prolifération nucléaires Ministère des affaires étrangères
Mr. René Faure	Adjoint au Chef de la division forces nucléaires Etat-Major des Armées Ministère de la défense

Mr. Francis Brossard	Etat-Major des Armées Division maîtrise des armements Ministère de la défense
Mr. Michel Lanternier	Conseiller militaire Représentation auprès de la Conférence du désarmement
Mr. Philippe Andrie	Conseiller nucléaire Représentation auprès de la Conférence du désarmement
Mr. Camille Grand	Chargé de mission Délégation aux affaires stratégiques Ministère de la defense
Mr. Cyril Pinel	Adjoint au Conseiller nucléaire Représentation permanente de la France auprès de l'office des Nations Unies et des organisations internationales Vienne

GAMBIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Gambia to the United Nations
800 Second Avenue, Suite 400F, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 949-6640

Mr. Baboucarr-Blaise J. Jagne	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mrs. Juliana G. Baldeh	First Secretary Permanent Mission

GEORGIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Georgia to the United Nations
One United Nations Plaza, 26th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 759-1949

Mr. Peter Chkheidze	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations

GERMANY

Address: Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations
871 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 940-0400

Mr. Wolfgang Ischinger	State Secretary Head of delegation
Mr. Günther Seibert	Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva Alternative head
Mr. Volker Stanzel	First Counsellor Head of the Civilian Use of Nuclear Energy Division Federal Foreign Office
Col. Christian von Mirbach	First Counsellor Branch Chief, Armed Forces Staff Federal Ministry of Defence
Mr. Klaus Achenbach	Counsellor Deputy Permanent Representation to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva
Mr. Alexander Olbrich	Counsellor Deputy head of the Civilian Use of Nuclear Energy Division Federal Foreign Office
Col. Gerhard Schepe	Permanent Representation to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva
Mr. Walter J. Lindner	Counsellor Permanent Mission

Mr. Rüdiger Gerstler	Counsellor Permanent Representation to International Organizations, Vienna
Mr. Michael Reiffenstuel	First Secretary Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Division Federal Foreign Office
Mrs. Sabine Gans	Armed Forces Staff Federal Ministry of Defence
Mr. Stefan Kordasch	First Secretary Permanent Representation to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva
Ms. Hildegard Schmid	Attaché Permanent Representation to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva
Prof. Harald Müller	Hessische Stiftung für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Frankfurt
Mr. Gotthard Stein	Research Centre Jülich
Mr. Uta Zapf	Member of Parliament
Ms. Petra Ernstberger	Member of Parliament
Mr. Hans Raidel	Member of Parliament
Ms. Angelika Beer	Member of Parliament
Mr. Hildebrecht Braun	Member of Parliament
Ms. Heidi Lippmann	Member of Parliament
Mr. Mechthild Surholt	Assistant

GHANA

Address: Permanent Mission of Ghana to the United Nations
19 East 47th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 832-1300

Mr. Nana Effah Apenteng	Ambassador Permanent Representative Designate to the United Nations
Mr. Yaw Odei Osei	Minister Counsellor Permanent Mission

GREECE

Address: Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations
866 Second Avenue, 13th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 888-6900

Mr. Elias Gounaris	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Yannis Souliotis	Minister Counsellor Permanent Mission Deputy head of delegation
Mr. George Augoustis	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Ms. Aliki Hadji	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. P. Papadimitropoulos	Adviser
Mr. P. Tsakonas	Adviser

GUATEMALA

Address: Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations
57 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone: (212) 679-4760

Mr. Gert Rosenthal	Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario Representante Permanente de Guatemala ante las Naciones Unidas
Mr. Luis Raúl Estévez López	Ministro Plenipotenciario Representante Permanente Suplente ante las Naciones Unidas
Mr. Luis Fernando Carranza Cifuentes	Ministro Consejero Misión Permanente
Mr. Roberto Lavalle Valdés	Ministro Consejero Misión Permanente

GUYANA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Guyana to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 555, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 527-3232

Mr. Samuel R. Insanally	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Ms. Sonia Elliott	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. George Talbot	Second Secretary Permanent Mission

HAITI

Address: Permanent Mission of Haiti to the United Nations
801 Second Avenue, Room 600, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 370-4840

M. Pierre Lelong	Ambassadeur Représentant permanent d'Haïti auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies

M. Bertrand Fils-Aimé	Conseiller Mission permanente

HOLY SEE

Address: Permanent Observer Mission of the Holy See to the United Nations
25 East 39th Street, New York, N.Y. 10016-0903
Telephone: (212) 370-7885

Archbishop Monsignor Jean Louis Tauran	Secretary for Relations with States Head of delegation
Archbishop Monsignor Reanto R. Martino	Permanent Observer to the United Nations, Apostolic Nuncio Joint head of delegation
Monsignor Francis Chullikat	Member of delegation
Monsignor Marek Zalewski	Member of delegation
Prof. Douglas Roche	Member of delegation
Mr. Alfred Edward	Member of delegation
Mr. John L. Fiorilla	Member of delegation
Mr. Xavier Reyes Ayral	Member of delegation
Mr. Paolo Conversi	Member of delegation

HUNGARY

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Hungary to the United Nations
227 East 52nd Street, New York, N.Y. 10022
Telephone: (212) 755-5419

Mr. János Herman	State Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs Head of delegation

Alternates

Mr. Rudolf Joó	Deputy State Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. André Erdõs	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. József Rónaky	Director International Department, Hungarian National Atomic Energy Authority

Advisers

Mr. Sándor Élõ	Director International Department, Hungarian National Atomic Energy Authority
Ms. Ildikó Czoch	Director Safeguards and Export Control Department, Hungarian National Atomic Energy Authority
Mr. Dezsõ Horváth	Minister Permanent Mission
Mr. István Posta	Deputy head International Organizations Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Attila Zimonyi	Counsellor Department of Security Policy and Arms Control Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ms. Barbara Faragó	Senior Expert Defence Policy Department Ministry of Defence
Mr. László Deák	First Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs

ICELAND

Address: Permanent Mission of Iceland to the United Nations
800 Third Avenue, 36th Floor, New York, NY 10022
Telephone: (212) 593-2700

Mr. Thorsteinn Ingólfsson	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Gunnar Gunnarsson	Ambassador Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ms. Gréta Gunnarsdóttir	Minister Counsellor Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Axel Nikulásson	First Secretary Permanent Mission

INDONESIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations
325 East 38th Street, New York, NY 10016
Telephone: (212) 972-8333

Mr. Nugroho Wisnumurti	Director General for Political Affairs Department of Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr. Makarim Wibisono	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. N. Hassan Wirajuda	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Geneva

Mr. Makmur Widodo	Ambassador Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Senior Adviser
Mr. Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat	Director for International Organizations Department of Foreign Affairs Senior Adviser
Mr. Hazairin Pohan	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Iwan Wiranataatmadja	Counsellor Permanent Mission, Geneva
Mr. A. M. Fachir	Official Department of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Yuri Octavian Thamrin	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Amin S. Zarkasi	Official Nuclear Energy Control Board Adviser
Mr. Imron Cotan	Official State Secretariat Adviser
Mr. Conakry Marsono	Attaché Permanent Mission Adviser

IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF)

Address: Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the United Nations
622 Third Avenue, 34th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 687-2020

Mr. Javad Zarif	Deputy Minister for Legal and International Affairs

Mr. Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotenriary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Mohmmad Hassan Fadaifard	Ambassador Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Alternate Representative
Mr. Mohammad Reza Alborzy	Director-General for Political International Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alternate Representative
Mr. Ali-Akbar Salehi	Resident Representative to the International Atomic Energy, Vienna Adviser
Mr. Hamid Baeidi-Nejad	Counsellor Permanent Mission Adviser
Mr. Hamid-Reza Eslamizad	Deputy Director Department for Disarmament Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Adviser
Mr. Mohsen Naziri-Asl	Expert Ministry of Foreign Affairs Adviser
Mr. Mohammad Taghi Hosseini	Permanent Mission, Vienna Adviser

IRAQ

Address: Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations
14 East 79th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021
Telephone: (212) 737-4433

Mr. Saeed Hasan	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Naji S. A. Al-Hadithi	Ambassador of Iraq to Austria
Mr. Rokan Noman Al-Anbuge	Minister Plenipotentiary Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Faiz H. Ali Al-Berkdar	Director-General Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency
Mr. Karim G. Alwan	Third Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs

IRELAND

Address: Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations
885 Second Avenue, 19th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 421-6934

Mr. Brian Cowen T.D.	Minister for Foreign Affairs Head of delegation

Alternate Representatives

Mr. Richard Ryan	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Richard Townsend	Assistant Secretary-General Department of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Michael Hoey	Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Darach MacFhionnbhairr	Head of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Department of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Kevin Dowling	Permanent Mission, Geneva Advisor
Mr. Nicholas Twist	Embassy of Ireland, Vienna
Mr. Michael Moloney	
Mr. Tony d'Costa	

ITALY

Address: Permanent Mission of Italy to the United Nations
Two United Nations Plaza, 24th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 486-9191

Mr. Umberto Ranieri	Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr. Sergio Vento	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Deputy head of delegation
Mr. Giuseppe Balboni Acqua	Ambassador Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva Deputy head of delegation
Mr. Marcello Griccioli	First Counsellor Ministry of Foreign Affairs Adviser
Mr. Angelo Persiani	First Counsellor Permanent Mission of Italy to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva Adviser
Mr. Tullio Guma	First Counsellor Permanent Mission Adviser

Col. Giuseppe Cornacchia	Ministry of Defence Adviser

JAMAICA

Address: Permanent Mission of Jamaica to the United Nations
767 Third Avenue, 9th Floor, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 935-7509

Miss Mignonette Patricia Durrant	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mrs. Diane Marie Quarless	Minister Counsellor Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Ms. Joan Elaine Thomas	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Craig Lawrence	First Secretary Permanent Mission

JAPAN

Address: Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, 2nd Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 223-4300

Mr. Ichita Yamamoto	State Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Yukio Satoh	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Seiichiro Noboru	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Head of the delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

Mr. Yuji Ikeda	Special Assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Nobuyasu Abe	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the International Organizations in Vienna
Mr. Norio Hattori	Director-General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Yukiya Amano	Deputy Director-General for Arms Control and Scientific Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Hideaki Kobayashi	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Kiyotaka Akasaka	Minister Permanent Mission to the United Nations
Mr. Saichi Nakazawa	Deputy Director-General Minister's Secretariat Science and Technology Agency
Mr. Motohide Yoshikawa	Minister Permanent Mission to the United Nations
Mr. Hisao Yamaguchi	Minister Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament
Mr. Toshio Sano	Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Masayuki Nakano	Director International Affairs and Safeguards Division Atomic Energy Bureau Science and Technology Agency

Mr. Kenichi Suganuma	Counsellor Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna
Mr. Mitsuru Kurosawa	Professor, Osaka Graduate School Adviser
Mr. Nobuaki Yamamoto	Counsellor Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament Adviser
Mr. Kazutoshi Aikawa	Counsellor Permanent Mission to the United Nations Adviser
Mr. Jun Shimmi	Counsellor Permanent Mission to the United Nations Adviser
Mr. Yoshio Yamawaki	First Secretary Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna Adviser
Mr. Kazuhiko Kimura	First Secretary Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament Adviser
Mr. Ryotaro Suzuki	First Secretary Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna Adviser
Ms. Setsuko Kawahara	First Secretary Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament Adviser
Mr. Hiroyuki Minami	Deputy Director Science and Nuclear Energy Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs Adviser

Mr. Masato Kagami	First Secretary Permanent Mission Adviser
Mr. Yasushi Noguchi	Assistant Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs Adviser
Mr. Taijiro Kimura	Second Secretary Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament Adviser
Mr. Yasuhito Fukui	Official Arms Control and Disarmament Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs Adviser
Mr. Shingo Miyamoto	Second Secretary Permanent Mission Adviser
Mr. Hijime Furuya	Nuclear Energy Industry Division Agency of Natural Resources and Energy Ministry of International Trade and Industry Adviser
Mr. Hidetaka Ikeda	Chief of Section International Affairs and Safeguards Division Atomic Energy Bureau Science and Technology Agency Adviser
Mr. Hiroshi Tsuboi	Special Assistant to Safeguards Science and Technology Agency Adviser
Mr. Shoko Iso	Special Assistant to the Minister of State for Science and Technology

Mr. Takashi Inutsuka	Senior Staff Office of Research and International Affairs on Space Activities Space Policy Division Research and Development Bureau Science and Technology Agency Adviser
Ms. Rie Kadota	Special Assistant Permanent Mission Adviser

JORDAN

Address: Permanent Mission of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
to the United Nations
866 Second Avenue, 4th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 832-9553

Mr. Hasan Abu Nimah	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
H.R.H Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein	Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Deputy head of delegation
Mr. Zaid Al-Hadidi	Minister Plenipotentiary Permanent Mission
Mr. Walid Al-Hadid	Second Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Samer Anton Naber	Second Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Salah Suheimat	Third Secretary Permanent Mission
Col. Falah Hashem Jam'an	Counsellor Military Adviser (Peacekeeping Affairs) Permanent Mission

KAZAKHSTAN

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 586, New York, N.Y. 10021
Telephone: (212) 230-1900, 1192

Mr. Kairat H. Abuseitov	Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mrs. Madina B. Jarbussynova	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Sartayev Issatay	First Secretary Permanent Mission

KENYA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Room 486, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 421-4740

Mr. Fares M. Kuindwa, EGH, EBS	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Marx G. N. Kahende	Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Lt. Col. Haggai Olang-Dulo	Counsellor Military Adviser Permanent Mission
Mr Thomas B. Amolo	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Ms. Amina Mohamed	Counsellor Permanent Mission

KUWAIT

Address: Permanent Mission of the State of Kuwait to the United Nations
321 East 44th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 973-4300

Mr. Mohammad A. Abulhasan	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Mansour Ayyad Sh. A. Al Otaibi	Second Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Bader Mohammad E. Al Awdi	Second Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Ayadah Al Saidi	Third Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Hisham Al Ghanim	Attaché Permanent Mission
Mr. Tareq Al Banai	Attaché Permanent Mission

KYRGYZSTAN

Address: Permanent Mission of the Kyrgyz Republic to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 477, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 486-4214, 4654

Mr. Naken Kasiev	State Secretary Head of delegation
Ms. Elmira Ibraimova	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Deputy head of delegation
Mr. Marat Oussoupov	Counsellor Permanent Mission

Mr. Esen Saliev	Foreign Policy Division Administration of the President
Mr. William Potter	Director Center for Non-proliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies Adviser to the Permanent Representative

LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Address: Permanent Mission of the Lao People's Democratic Republic
to the United Nations
317 East 51st Street, New York, N.Y. 10022
Telephone: (212) 832-2734, 0095

Mr. Alounkèo Kittikhoun	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Khenthong Nouanthasing	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Khampheng Douangthongla	Third Secretary Permanent Mission

LATVIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Latvia to the United Nations
333 East 50th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022
Telephone: (212) 838-8877

Mr. Jănis Priedkalns	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mrs. Dace Dobrăja	Counsellor Deputy Permanent Representative of Latvia to the United Nations

LEBANON

Address: Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Room 531-533, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 355-5460

Mr. Sélim Tadmoury	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Houssam Diab	Counsellor Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Brahim Assaf	First Secretary Permanent Mission

LESOTHO

Address: Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Lesotho to the United Nations
204 East 39th Street, New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone: (212) 661-1690, 1691,1692

Mr. Percy M. Mangoaela	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Phakiso Mochochoko	Counsellor Permanent Mission

LIBERIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Liberia to the United Nations
820 Second Avenue, 13th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 687-1033, 1034

Mrs. Neh Dukuly-Tolbert	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mrs. Famatta Rose Osode	Minister Deputy Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Christian M. Wisseh	Minister Counsellor Permanent Mission Adviser

LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
to the United Nations
309-315 East 48th St. New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 752-5775

Mr. Abuzed Omar Dorda	Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Isa Ayad Babaa	Ambassador Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Deputy head of delegation
Mr. Ahmed A. Own	Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation Alternate Representative

Mr. Rajab J. Moushaiti	Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation Alternate Representative
Mr. Sedding M. Sh. El-Gweri	Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation Alternate Representative
Mr. Mohamed Matri	Chargé d'affaires a.i. Libyan People's Bureau in Brazil Adviser

LIECHTENSTEIN

Address: Permanent Mission of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the United Nations
633 Third Avenue, 27th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 599-0220

Mrs. Claudia Fritsche	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Christian Wenaweser	Counsellor Permanent Mission

LITHUANIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Lithuania to the United Nations
420 Fifth Avenue, 3rd Floor, New York, N.Y. 10018
Telephone: (212) 354-7820

Mr. Algirdas Saudargas	Minister for Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr. Gediminas Šerkšnys	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the to the United Nations

Mr. Stasys Sakalauskas	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Lithuania Embassy Washington, D.C.
Mr. Rytis Paulauskas	Head of the NATO Integration Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Donatas Žiugžda	Head of the OSCE and Arms Control Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ms. Audra Plepyte	Counsellor Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Dainius Baublys	Second Secretary Permanent Mission

LUXEMBOURG

Address: Permanent Mission of Luxembourg to the United Nations
17 Beekman Place, New York, N.Y. 10022
Telephone: (212) 935-3589

M. Charles Goerens	Ministre de la défense
M. Hubert Wurth	Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire Représentant permanent auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies
M. Paul Kayser	Ambassadeur en mission spéciale
M. Marc Bichler	Représentant permanent adjoint auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies
M. Stan Myck	Premier secrétaire Mission permanente
Mme Angèle da Cruz	Chargée de mission Mission permanente

MADAGASCAR

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Madagascar to the United Nations
820 Second Avenue, Suite 800, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 986-9491, 9492

M. Jean Delacroix Bakoniarivo	Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire Représentant auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies Chef de la delegation
Mme Léa Raholinirina	Premier conseiller Représentant permanent adjoint auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies
M. Modeste Randrianarivony	Conseiller Mission permanente
Mme Lydia Randrianarivony	Conseiller Mission permanente
M. Dauphin Rakotonirina	Attaché Mission permanente

MALAYSIA

Address: Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations
313 East 43rd Street, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 986-6310

Mr. Hasmy Agam	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Hussein Haniff	Under-Secretary Multilateral Political Affairs Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Mohammad Kamal Yan Yahya	Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Mr. Abdullah Faiz Mohd. Zain	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Raja Abdul Aziz Raja Adnan	Science attaché Embassy of Malaysia in Vienna
Ms. Ho May Yong	Principal Assistant Secretary Multilateral Political Affairs Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MALDIVES

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Maldives to the United Nations
800 Second Avenue, Suite 400E, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 599-6194, 6195

Mr. Hussain Shihab	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Ahmed Khaleel	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Zeenad Abdul Wahid	Attaché Permanent Mission

MALTA

Address: Permanent Mission of Malta to the United Nations
249 East 35th Street, New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone: (212) 725-2345

Mr. Walter Balzan	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Gaetano Brincau	Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Ms. Sandra Vassallo	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Ms. Julian Vassalo	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Pierre Hili	First Secretary Permanent Mission

MARSHALL ISLANDS

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands
to the United Nations
800 Second Avenue, 18th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 983-3040

Mr. Jackeo A. Relang	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Ms. Cathy O. Relang	First Secretary Permanent Mission

MAURITIUS

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Mauritius to the United Nations
211 East 43rd Street, 15th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 949-0190, 0191

Mr. Anund Priyay Neewoor	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Rakesh Bhye Bhuckory	Second Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Premsagar Bholah	Attaché Permanent Mission

MEXICO

Address: Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations
Two United Nations Plaza, 28th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 752-0220

Sra. Rosario Green	Embajadora Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores Jefa de la Delegación
Sra. Carmen Moreno de Del Cuelo	Embajadora Subsecretaria para Naciones Unidas, Africa y Medio Oriente Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores
Sr. Manuel Tello	Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas
Sr. Antonio de Icaza	Embajador Representante Permanente ante los Oganismos Internacionales con sede en Ginebra
Sra. Olga Pellicer	Embajadora Representante Permanente ante los Oganismos Internacionales con sede en Viena
Sra. Peria Carvalho	Embajadora Representante Permanente Suplente ante los Oganismos Internacionales con sede en Ginebra
Sra. María Angélica Arce de Jeannet	Ministra Misión Permanente
Sr. Socorro Jorge Cholula	Tercer Secretario Jefe de Departamento de Desarme Dirección General para el Sistema de las Naciones Unidas Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores
Sr. Fernando González Saiffe	Agregado Diplomático Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores

MICRONESIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Federated States of Micronesia to the United Nations
820 Second Avenue, Suite 17A, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 697-8370

Mr. Masao Nakayama	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Tadao P. Sigrah	Minister Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Alternate head of delegation
Mr. Jeem S. Lippwe	Minister Permanent Mission

MONACO

Address: Permanent Mission of the Principality of Monaco to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 520, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 832-0721

M. Jacques Louis Boisson	Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire Représentant permanent auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies Chef de la délégation
Mme Isabelle F. Picco	Conseiller Représentant permanent adjoint auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies
Mme Valérie Bruell-Melchior	Deuxième secrétaire Mission permanente
Mlle Fleur Forcherio	Attachée Mission permanente

MONGOLIA

Address: Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations
6 East 77th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021
Telephone: (212) 861-9460

Mr. Jargalsaikhany Enkhsaikhan	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Tserenpil Dorjsuren	First Secretary Permanent Mission

MOROCCO

Address: Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Morocco to the United Nations
866 Second Avenue, 6th and 7th Floors, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 421-1580

M. Ahmed Snoussi	Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire Représentant permanent auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies Chef de la délégation
M. Mohamed Amar	Conseiller Mission permanente
Mme Zohour Alaoui	Chef Division des Nations Unies Direction des Nations Unies et des organisations internationales Ministère des affaires étrangères et de la coopération
M. Mohiedine El Kadiri	Conseiller des affaires étrangères Direction des Nations Unies et des organisations internationales Ministère des affaires étrangères et de la coopération

MOZAMBIQUE

Address:: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Mozambique to the United Nations
420 East 50th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022
Telephone: (212) 644-5965

Mrs. Frances Rodrigues	Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
Mr. Carlos dos Santos	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Cesar Gouveia	Counsellor Permanent Mission to the United Nations
Mr. Fernando Chomar	Second Secretary Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
Mr. Valter Fainda	Adviser

MYANMAR

Address: Permanent Mission of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations
10 East 77th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021
Telephone: (212) 535-1310

U Win Mra	Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
U Mya Than	Permanent Representative to the United Nations Geneva Alternate head of delegation
Y Ko Ko	Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
U Ko Ko Shein	Second Secretary Permanent Mission to the United Nations

NAMIBIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Namibia to the United Nations
135 East 36th Street, New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone: (212) 685-2003

Mr. Martin Andjaba	Permanent Representative of Namibia to the United Nations
Mr. Arthur Pickering	Under-Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information and Broadcasting
Mr. Egidius Hakwenye	First Secretary Permanent Mission to the United Nations
Mr. George Kaxuxwena	First Secretary Permanent Mission to the United Nations

NAURU

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Nauru to the United Nations
800 Second Avenue, Suite 400D, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 937-0074

Mr. Vinci Neil Clodumar	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Fredrick Pitcher	Minister Counsellor Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Deputy head of delegation

NEPAL

Address: Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Nepal to the United Nations
820 Second Avenue, Suite 17B, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 370-3988, 3989

Mr. Murari Raj Sharma	Permanent Representative Designate to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Durga Prasad Bhattarai	Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Deputy head of delegation
Mr. Hira Bahadur Thapa	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Bharat Kumar Regmi	Second Secretary Permanent Mission

NETHERLANDS

Address: Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
to the United Nations
235 East 45th Street, 16th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 697-5547

Mr. Chris C. Sanders	Ambassador for Disarmament Netherlands Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva Head of delegation
Mr. Boudewijn J. van Eenennaam	Director-General for Political Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Herman A. Schaper	Director of Security Policy Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Kees A. Nederlof	Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Vienna Adviser

Mr. Paul W. J. Wilke	Deputy head Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Adviser
Mr. François Naeff	First Secretary Permanent Mission Adviser
Ms. Henriette D. A. W. Houben-van Notten	First Secretary Netherlands delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva Adviser
Mr. Marc D. Gerritsen	Policy Officer Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Adviser
Ms. Ellen C. P. H. Van Eijk	Policy Officer Energy, Technology and Research Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs Adviser
Mr. Ben Sanders	Adviser
Mr. Daniel Voorhoeve	Adviser
Ms. Nicky van 't Riet	Member of Parliament Special Adviser
Mr. Tom Pitstra	Member of Parliament Special Adviser
Mr. Thanasis Apostolou	Member of Parliament Special Adviser

NEW ZEALAND

Address: Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the United Nations
One United Nations Plaza, 25th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 826-1960

Mr. Matt Robson	Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control
Mr. Geoff Randal	Director International Security and Arms Control Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Head of delegation
Mr. Clive Pearson	Ambassador Permanent Mission, Geneva Alternate head of delegation
Ms. Joan Mosley	Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Vienna
Ms. Victoria Hallum	Second Secretary Permanent Mission
Ms. Nicola Ngawati	Policy Officer International Security and Arms Control Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Mr. Roger King	Private Secretary to the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control
Mr. Alyn Ware	Non-Governmental Organization Representative, Tauranga Adviser

NICARAGUA

Address: Permanent Mission of Nicaragua to the United Nations
820 Second Avenue, 8th Floor, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 490-7997

Sr. Mario Castellón Duarte	Embajador Suplente Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas Jefe de la delegación
Sr. Mario Rodriguez Castillo	Primer Secretario Misión Permanente

NIGER

Address: Permanent Mission of the Niger to the United Nations
417 East 50th Street, New York, NY 10022
Telephone: (212) 421-3260

M. Ousmane Moutari	Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire Représentant permanent auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies
M. Boubacar Tankoano	Conseiller Mission permanente

NIGERIA

Address: Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations
828 Second Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 953-9130

Mr. Arthur C.I. Mbanefo	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Teniola Olusegun Apata	Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Alternate head of delegation
Mr. R.O Akeju	Deputy Director International Organizations Directorate Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. S. Ogunbanwo	Member Eminent Persons Group
Mr. A.O. Idowu	Minister Counsellor Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mrs. Omolabake S. Shodeinde	Minister Counsellor Permanent Mission

Mr. Idigbe	Senior Counsellor Permanent Mission, Geneva
Mr. Ahmed Sule	Third Secretary Permanent Mission

NORWAY

Address: Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations
825 Third Avenue, 39th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10022
Telephone: (212) 421-0280

Mr. Thorbjørn Jagland	Minister of Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr. Leif Arne Ulland	Deputy Director General Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy head of delegation
Mr. Steffen Kongstad	Minister Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office at Geneva Deputy head of delegation
Mr. Torbjørn Norendal	Special Adviser Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Jostein Bernhardsen	Deputy Director General Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Jørn Gjelstad	Adviser Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ms. Siren Gjerme Eriksen	Adviser Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Harald van Rees Rotler	Adviser Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ms. Anne Kari Husum	Adviser Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Petter Meier	Senior Adviser Royal Ministry of Defense

Mr. Odd Inge Kvalheim	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Ms. May Elin Stener	Second Secretary Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Morten Bremer Meaerli	Adviser Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority

OMAN

Address: Permanent Mission of the Sultanate of Oman to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 540, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 355-3505

Mr. Fuad Mubarak Al-Hinai	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Mohammed Al-Sameen	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Mohamed Al-Hassan	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Ms. Sarah Al-Moosa	Second Secretary Permanent Mission

PANAMA

Address: Permanent Mission of Panama to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 4030, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 421-5420, 5421

Mr. Ramón A. Morales	Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario Representante Permanente de Panamá ante las Naciones Unidas

Mr. Hernán Tejeira	Ministro Consejero Representante Permanente Suplente ante las Naciones Unidas

PARAGUAY

Address: Permanent Mission of Paraguay to the United Nations
211 East 43rd Street, Room 400, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 687-3490, 3491

Mr. Jorge Lara Castro	Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas
Mr. Genaro Pappalardo	Consejero Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas

PERU

Address: Permanent Mission of Peru to the United Nations
820 Second Avenue, Suite 1600, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 687-3336

Sr. José Antonio Bellina	Embajador Director de Asuntos Políticos, Multilaterales y de Seguridad Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
Sr. Manuel Picasso	Encargado de Negocios, interino Ministro Representante Permanente Adjunto ante las Naciones Unidas
Sr. Juan Miguel Miranda	Consejero Misión Permanente
Sr. Paul Duclós	Segundo Secretario Misión Permanente

PHILIPPINES

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines
to the United Nations
556 Fifth Avenue, 5th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10036
Telephone: (212) 764-1300, 01, 02

Mr. Felipe Mabilangan	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Ms. Maria Lourdes V. Ramiro Lopez	Ambassador Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Deputy head of delegation
Mr. Anacleto Rei Lacanilao III	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Carlos Sorreta	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Miguel R. Bautista	Second Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Alain M. Maulion	Attaché Permanent Mission

POLAND

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Poland to the United Nations
9 East 66th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021
Telephone: (212) 744-2506

Mr. Przemyslaw Grudziński	Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Janusz Stańczyk	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation

Mr. Tadeusz Chomicki	Director Department of Export Policy Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Jerzy Niewodniczański	President National Atomic Agency
Mr. Adam Kobieracki	Director Department of European Security Policy Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mrs. Anna Komorowska-Grupihska	Senior Adviser to the Minister Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Kazimierz Tomaszewski	Senior Adviser to the Minister Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Jacek Sawicz	Chief Specialist Department of Export Policy Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Slawomir Lemański	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Andrzej Ostrowski	Head Non-proliferation Section National Atomic Energy Agency

PORTUGAL

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Portugal to the United Nations
866 Second Avenue, 9th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 759-9444, 9445

Mr. António Monteiro	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Filipe de Albuquerque	Co-ordinator for Disarmament Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Nuno Brito	Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mrs. Maria de Fátima Mendes	Counsellor Director of the Department for Defence and Security Organizations Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Fernando Coelho	Counsellor Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Mário Miranda Duarte	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Licínio Bingre do Amaral	First Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Paulo Chaves	First Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs Adviser
Mrs. Annalisa Giannella	Director of Security and Defence Policy Unit General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union Adviser
Mrs. Clara Ganslandt	General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union Adviser

QATAR

Address: Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations
809 United Nations Plaza, 4th Floor, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 486-9335

Mr. Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Jamal Nassir Al-Bader	Counsellor Permanent Mission

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations
335 East 45th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 439-4000

Mr. Sun Joun-yung	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Suh Dae-won	Ambassador Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Lee Hun-gyu	Director General for Nuclear Energy Bureau Ministry of Science and Technology
Mr. Yun Byung-se	Minister Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Kim Young-mok	Minister Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Kim Myong-jin	Deputy Director-General for Disarmament Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Mr. Chang Dong-hee	Counsellor Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna
Mr. Lee Kie-cheon	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Park Dong-hyong	Counsellor Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Choi Sung-joo	Director Disarmament and Nuclear Affairs Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Mr. Sul Kyung-hoon	First Secretary Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Han Gwang-sup	Deputy Director Security Policy Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Mr. Moon Duk-ho	Deputy Director Disarmament and Nuclear Affairs Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Mr. Lim Chae-hong	Deputy Director International Disarmament Division Ministry of Defense
Mr. Bahk Sahng-hoon	Second Secretary Permanent Mission to the United Nations
Mr. Lee Sang-soo	Assistant Director Disarmament and Nuclear Affairs Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Mr. Kang Kun-ki	Assistant Director International Nuclear Cooperation Division Ministry of Science and Technology
Mr. Lee Seo-hang	Professor Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security Adviser
Mr. Kim Byung-goo	Head Technology Centre for Nuclear Control Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute Adviser
Mr. Oh Keun-bae	Head Department of Nuclear Foreign Policy Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute Adviser

Mr Min Gyung-sik	Manager Technology Center for Nuclear Control Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute Adviser
Mr Lee Byung-wook	Principal Researcher Department of Nuclear Foreign Policy Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute Adviser

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Address	Permanent Mission of the Republic of Moldova to the United Nations 573-577 Third Ave. New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone	(212) 682-3523

Mr Iurie Leanca	First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr Ion Botnaru	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr Victor Moraru	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr Vitalie Robu	First Secretary Permanent Mission

ROMANIA

Address	Permanent Mission of Romania to the United Nations 573-577 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone	(212) 682-3273, 3274

Mr Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu	Secretary of State Ministry of Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr Ion Gorita	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotenitary Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Mr. Sorin Eugen Constantin	Director National Authority for the Control of Strategic Exports
Mr. Stelian Stoian	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Razvan Victor Rusa	Third Secretary Permanent Mission

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Address	Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations 136 East 67th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021
Telephone	(212) 861-4900, 4901

Mr. Yuriy S. Kapralov	Director of Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr. Boris D. Kvok	Deputy Director of Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy head of delegation
Mr. Anatoliy I. Antonov	Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva Deputy head of delegation
Mr. Valentin S. Kuznetsov	Chief of Department Ministry of Defence
Mr. Vladimir P. Kuchinov	Deputy Chief of Department Ministry of Atomic Energy
Mr. Yuriy N. Marakhovskiy	Deputy Chief of Department Foreign Intelligence Service
Mr. Alexander N. Mostovets	Head of Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Vladimir N. Verkhovtsev	Ministry of Defence Adviser

Mr. Vladimir S. Evteev	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Adviser
Mr. Sergey Ye. Kutafin	Senior Counsellor Permanent Mission Adviser
Ms. Marina P. Beliaeva	Ministry of Atomic Energy Expert
Mr. Yuriy F. Zabaluyev	Ministry of Defence Expert
Mr. Viktor L. Vasiliev	First Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs Expert
Mr. Yevgeniy V. Prokhorenkov	First Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs Expert
Mr. Sergey I. Smirnov	First Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs Expert
Mr. Igor O. Gribok	Second Secretary Permanent Mission Expert
Mr. Vladimir G. Zemliakov	Second Secretary Permanent Mission Expert
Mr. Dmitriy V. Spirin	Second Secretary Permanent Mission Expert
Ms. Olga I. Kuznetsova	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Expert

SAINT LUCIA

Address: Permanent Mission of Saint Lucia to the United Nations
800 Second Avenue, 9th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 697-9360, 9361

Mr. Julian R. Hunte	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mrs. R. Sonia Leonce-Carryl	Minister Counsellor Permanent Mission

SAMOA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Independent State of Western Samoa to the United Nations
800 Second Avenue, Suite 400J, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 599-6196, 6197

Mr. Tuiloma Neroni Slade	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Ms. Desna Solofa	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Ms. Andie Fong Toy	Adviser

SAUDI ARABIA

Address: Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations
405 Lexington Avenue, 56th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 697-4830

Mr. Fawzi Bin Abdul Majeed Shobokshi	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation

Mr. Esam A. Althaqafi	Member
Mr. Mohammed Al-Wathnany	Member
Mr. Abdulrahman Al-Ahmed	First Secretary Permanent Mission

SENEGAL

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Senegal to the United Nations
238 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021
Telephone: (212) 517-9030, 9031

Mr. Ibra Deguène Ka	Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire Représentant permanent du Sénégal auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies Chef de la délégation
Mr. Alioune Diagne	Ministre-conseiller à la Mission permanent du Sénégal auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies

SIERRA LEONE

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone to the United Nations
245 East 49th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 688-1656, 4985

Mr. Ibrahim M'baba Kamara	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Sylvester Ekundayo Rowe	Ambassador Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Deputy head of delegation
Mr. Alliu Ibrahima Kanu	Ambassador Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Legal Affairs) Alternate Representative

Mr. Nikita Kyne-Sam	First Secretary Permanent Mission

SINGAPORE

Address Permanent Mission of the Republic of Singapore to the United Nations
231 East 51st Street, New York, N.Y. 10022
Telephone (212) 826-0840, 0841

Mr. Kishore Mahbubani	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Ms. Tan Yee Woan	
Col. Yap Ong Heng	Counsellor/Military Adviser Permanent Mission
Ms. Venessa Chan	First Secretary Permanent Mission

SLOVAKIA

Address Permanent Mission of the Slovak Republic to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 494, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone (212) 980-1558, 3308

Mr. Eduard Kukan	Minister for Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr. Peter Tomka	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Alternate head of delegation
Mr. Miroslav Lipár	Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Authority

Ms. Mária Krasnohorská	Ambassador Director Department of OSCE, Disarmament and Council of Europe Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Miloš Koterec	Chief Department of OSCE Disarmament and Council of Europe Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Jozef Zlatňanský	Vice-Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Authority
Mr. Mikuláš Turner	Director Division of International and Public Relations Nuclear Regulatory Authority Adviser
Mr. Stanislav Bezák	Director Division of Nuclear Materials Nuclear Regulatory Authority Adviser
Mr. Rastislav Gabriel	Third Secretary Permanent Mission Adviser

SLOVENIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the United Nations
600 Third Avenue, 24th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone: (212) 370-3007, 1831

Mr. Aljaž Gosnar	State Under-Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr. Miroslav Gregorič	Director Nuclear Safety Administration
Mr. Samuel Žbogar	Minister Plenipotentiary Permanent Mission

Ms. Irena Mernik	Second Secretary Permanent Mission

SOUTH AFRICA

Address	Permanent Mission of the Republic of South Africa to the United Nations 333 East 38th Street, 9th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone	(212) 213-5583

Mr. Abdul S. Minty	Deputy Director-General Department of Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr. Dumisana S. Kumalo	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Peter Goosen	Chief Director Department of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Tom Markram	Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva Alternate Representative to the Conference on Disarmament
Mr. Nic von Wielligh	Counsellor Permanent Mission Vienna Adviser
Mr. Jean du Preez	Counsellor Permanent Mission Adviser
Mr. Leslie Gumbi	Counsellor Permanent Mission Adviser
Mr. Pat Thema	First Secretary Permanent Mission Vienna Adviser

SPAIN

Address: Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations
345 East 46th Street 9th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 661-1050

Sr. Inocencio F. Arias	Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas Jefe de delegación
Sr. Jose Antonio de Yturriaga	Asesor para Asuntos de Seguridad y Desarme Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores Jefe adjunto de delegación
Sra. Ana Menéndez	Consejera Misión Permanente
Sr. Enrique de Yturriaga	Secretario Misión Permanente, Ginebra

SRI LANKA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka to the United Nations
630 Third Avenue, 20th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 986-7040, 7041

Mr. H.M.G.S. Palihakkara	Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva Head of delegation
Mr. Ranjith Uyangoda	Ambassador Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. M.R.K. Lenagala	Second Secretary Permanent Mission

SUDAN

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan to the United Nations
655 Third Avenue, Suite 500-10, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 573-6033

Mr. Elfatih Mohamed Ahmed Erwa	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Omer Dahab Fadol Mohamed	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Tarig Ali Bakhit	First Secretary Permanent Mission

SURINAME

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Suriname to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 320, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 826-0660

Mr. Subhas Chandra Mungra	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Michel Orlando Kerpens	Minister Plenipotentiary Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations

SWAZILAND

Address: Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Swaziland to the United Nations
408 East 50th Street, New York, NY 10022
Telephone: (212) 371-8910

Mr. Clifford Sibusiso Mamba	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation

Mr. Joel M. Nhleko	Counsellor Permanent Mission Deputy head of delegation
Mr. Jeffrey Shabalala	Ministry of Defence
Mr. Sotsha Dlamini	Army Officer Ministry of Defence
Mr. Melusie M. Masuku	First Secretary (Legal Affairs) Permanent Mission Adviser
Mr. Leonard M. Maphalala	First Secretary (Information) Permanent Mission Adviser

SWEDEN

Address: Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations
885 Second Avenue, 46th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 583-2500

Ms. Anna Lindh	Minister for Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr. Henrik Salander	Ambassador Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament Head of delegation
Mr. Hans Dahlgren	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Alternate head of delegation
Mr. Lars Ångstöm	Member of Parliament
Ms. Viola Furubielke	Member of Parliament
Mr. Holger Gustavsson	Member of Parliament
Mr. Agne Hansson	Member of Parliament

Mr. Lennart Kollmats	Member of Parliament
Mr. Goran Lennmarker	Member of Parliament
Mr. Willi Söderdahl	Member of Parliament
Mr. Lars-Hjalmar Wide	Director Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Paul Beijer	Director Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ms. Annika Markovic	Deputy Director Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ms. Anneli Lindahl Kenny	Counsellor Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Kent Edberg	Military Adviser/Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Jan A. Lodding	Senior Administrative Officer Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr Jörgen Persson	First Secretary Embassy of Sweden, Vienna
Ms. Katarina Rangnitt	First Secretary Permanent Mission to the United Nations Office at Geneva
Mr. Anders Wallberg	Second Secretary Permanent Mission
Ms. Monica Andersson	Political Adviser to the Minister Adviser
Mr. Lars-Göran Strömberg	Scientific Adviser Defence Research Establishment Adviser

Ms. Lena Spjuth	Scientific Adviser Defence Research Establishment Adviser
Mr. Bengt Pettersson	Scientific Adviser Nuclear Power Inspectorate Adviser

SWITZERLAND

Address: Permanent Observer Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations
633 Third Avenue, 29th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 286-1540

M. Jenö C. A. Staehelin	Ambassadeur Observateur permanent de la Suisse auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies Chef de la délégation
M. Andreas Friedrich	Chef de la Section de la politique du désarmement et des questions nucléaires Département fédéral des affaires étrangères
M. René Haug	Conseiller militaire Mission permanente de la Suisse près les organisations internationales, Geneve
M. Matthias Halter	Conseiller militaire Mission permanente d'observateur
M. Josef Schaerli	Divisionnaire, Chef du Groupe de la promotion de la paix et de la coopération en matière de sécurité, Etat major général Département fédéral de la défense, de la protection de la population et des sports
M. Stephan Reinhardt	État major général Département fédéral de la défense, de la protection de la population et des sports
M. Pierre Mayor	Vice-directeur Office fédéral de l'énergie

M. Beat Wieland	Chef de section Office fédéral de l'énergie
M. Bruno Pellaud	Conseiller

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

Address: Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations
820 Second Avenue, 15th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 661-1313

Mr. Mikhail Wehbe	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Ibrahim Osman	General Director of the Board of Atomic Energy
Mr. Fayssal Mekdad	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Ghassan Obeid	Second Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Mhd. Wael Deirki	Second Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Tammam Sulaiman	Third Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Hussam-edin A'Ala	Third Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Ahmad Al-Hariri	Third Secretary Permanent Mission
Miss Maha Abdul Raheem	Board of Atomic Energy
Mr. Abdou Al-Moula Nakkari	Attaché Permanent Mission

Ms. Randa Rizk	Attaché Permanent Mission Adviser

TAJIKISTAN

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Tajikistan to the United Nations
136 East 67th Street, New York, NY 10021
Telephone: (212) 744-2196

Mr. Rashid Alimov	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Abdukakhor Nurov	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Khousrav Ismoilov	Third Secretary Permanent Mission

THAILAND

Address: Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations
351 East 52nd Street, New York, N.Y. 10022
Telephone: (212) 754-2230, 2231

Mr. Asda Jayanama	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Ms. Laxanachantorn Laohaphan	Director-General Department of International Organizations Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Kulkumut Singhara Na Ayudhaya	Minister Permanent Mission
Mr. Samart Sriyanong	Counter-terrorism Expert Office of National Security Council

Mr. Apirath Vienravi	Minister Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Poonsuk Pongpat	Director Radiation Measurement Division Office of Atomic Energy for Peace Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment
Mr. Chittipat Tongprasroeth	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Ms. Morakot Sriswasdi	First Secretary Royal Thai Embassay, Vienna
Mr. Apirat Sugondhabhirom	First Secretary Permanent Mission to the United Nations at Geneva
Mr. Nadhavathna Krishnamra	Second Secretary Division 1 Department of East Asian Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ms. Saipan Cheunsomchit	Third Secretary Political Division Department of International Organizations Ministry of Foreign Affairs

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
to the United Nations
865 United Nations Plaza, Suite 517, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 308-8504, 8723

Mr. Aleksandar Dimitrov	Minister of Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr. Nase Čalovski	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Mr. Igor Dzundev	Director for Political Affairs Multilateral Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mrs. Svetlana Geleva	Head of Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ms. Donka Gligorova	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Goran Stevcevski	Second Secretary Permanent Mission

TOGO

Address: Permanent Mission of Togo to the United Nations
112 East 40th Street, New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone: (212) 490-3455, 3456

Mr. Roland Kpotsra	Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire Representant permanent du Togo auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies Chef de la délégation
Mr. Kodjo Menan	Premier Secretaire Mission Permanente
Mr. Simbawa Awesso	Premier Secretaire Mission Permanente

TONGA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Tonga to the United Nations
800 Second Ave., Suite 400B, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 599-6190

Mr. Sonatane Tu'a Taumoepeau Tupou	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Mr. Viliami Malolo	First Secretary (Legal) Permanent Mission
Mrs. Alisi Malolo	First Secretary (Political) Permanent Mission

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago
to the United Nations
820 Second Avenue, 5th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 697-7620, 7621

Mr. George Winston McKenzie	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Ms. Gaile A. Ramoutar	First Secretary Permanent Mission

TUNISIA

Address: Permanent Mission of Tunisia to the United Nations
31 Beekman Place, New York, N.Y. 10022
Telephone: (212) 751-7503, 7534

M. Said Ben Mustapha	Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plenipotentiaire Représentant permanent auprès de l'Organisation des Nations Unies Chef de la delegation
M. Othman Jerandi	Ambassadeur Représentant permanent adjoint
M. Anouar Ben Youssef	Secrétaire des affaires étrangères

TURKEY

Address: Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations
821 United Nations Plaza, 10th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 949-0150

Mr. Volkan Vural	Ambassador Extraordinary and *Plenipotentiary* Permanent Representative Permanent Mission to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Ömür Orhun	*Director General* International Security Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alternate head of delegation
Mr. Safak Gökrük	Counsellor Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Col. Tahsin Tank	Military Adviser Permanent Mission
Mr. Mehmet Samsar	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Ms. Damla Say	First Secretary Permanent Mission, Geneva
Ms. Aysun Yücel	Chief Section of Nuclear Material Safety Turkish Atomic Energy Authority

TURKMENISTAN

Address: Permanent Mission of Turkmenistan to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 424, New York, N.Y. 10021
Telephone: (212) 486-8908

Mrs. Aksoltan Ataeva	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Esen Aidogdyev	Counsellor Permanent Mission

UGANDA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Uganda to the United Nations
336 East 45th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 949-0110, 0111

Prof. Semakula Kiwanuka	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Fred Beyendeza	Minister Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mrs. Juliet Semambo Kalema	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Nester Odaga Jalomayo	First Secretary Permanent Mission

UKRAINE

Address: Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations
220 East 51st Street, New York, N.Y. 10022
Telephone: (212) 759-7003

Mr. Olexander O. Chalyi	First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr. Volodymyr Yu. Yel'Chenko	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations Deputy head of delegation
Mr. Valeri P. Kuchynski	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary First Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Deputy head of delegation
Mr. Volodymyr G. Krokhmal	Counsellor Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations Deputy head of delegation
Mr. Vladyslav O. Demyanenko	Deputy Director Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Yuriy V. Polurez	Deputy Director Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Oleksandr I. Sherstiuk	Deputy Director Verification Directorate General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Mr. Oleksandr D. Shevchenko	Counsellor Permanent Mission
Mr. Yurii V. Onishchenko	Second Secretary Permanent Mission

Ms. Yevheniia I. Filipenko	Third Secretary Permanent Mission

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Address: Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations
747 Third Avenue, 36th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 371-0480

Mr. Mohammad J. Samhan	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Col. Khalifa Hameed Saed Al-Kaabi	United Arab Emirates Armed Forces
Lt. Col. Hamad Saif Mohammad Saif Al-Ghofli	United Arab Emirates Armed Forces
Major Salim Rashid Salim Khalfan Al-Hasani	United Arab Emirates Armed Forces
Major Matar Hamid Halis Al-Neyadi	United Arab Emirates Armed Forces
Mr. Yacub Yousif Al-Hosani	First Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Anwar Barout Saleem	Second Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Hameed Ali Said AlSabosi	Attaché Ministry of Foreign Affairs

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Address: Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations
885 Second Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 745-9200

Mr. Peter Hain, MP	Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Head of delegation
Mr. Ian Soutar	Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva Head of official delegation
Mr. John Tucknott	Foreign and Commonwealth Office Alternate head of delegation
Mr. Frank Baker	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Mr. Tim Andrews	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Mr. Nigel Casey	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Ms. Louise Lilly	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Mr. Stephen Willmer	Ministry of Defence
Mr. John Neve	Department of Trade and Industry
Mr. Anthony Pygram	Department of Trade and Industry
Mr. John Wattam	United Kingdom Permanent Representation to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva
Ms. Janet Godden	United Kingdom Permanent Representation to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva
Mr. John Freeman	Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Vienna
Ms. Carol Cliff	Permanent Mission, Vienna
Mr. John Grainger	Counsellor Permanent Mission

Ms. Cathy McKay	Second Secretary Permanent Mission
Ms. Sarah Broughton	Second Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. John Simpson	University of Southampton

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the United Republic of Tanzania
to the United Nations
205 East 42nd Street, 13th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 972-9160

Mr. Daudi N. Mwakawago	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Tuvako N. Manongi	Minister Plenipotentiary Permanent Mission
Mr. Kagyabukama E. Kiliba	Minister Plenipotentiary Permanent Mission
Mr. Muhammad Yussuf	Minister Counsellor Permanent Mission

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Address: United States Mission to the United Nations
799 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 415-4000

Ms. Madeleine K. Albright	Secretary of State Representative
Mr. Bill Richardson	Secretary of Energy Deputy Representative

Mr. Richard C. Holbrooke	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Deputy Representative
Ms. Nancy Soderberg	Ambassador Alternate Representative for Special Political Affairs United States Mission
Mr. John D. Holum	Senior Adviser for Arms Control and International Security Department of State Alternate Representative
Mr. Norman Wulf	Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Non-Proliferation Department of State Alternate Representative
Mr. Robert Einhorn	Assistant Secretary Bureau of Non-Proliferation Department of State Special Adviser
Ms. Rose Gottemoeller	Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation Department of Energy Special Adviser
Mr. Robert Grey	United States Representative to the Conference on Disarmament United States Mission, Geneva Special Adviser
Mr. John B. Ritch, III	United States Representative to the Vienna Office of the United Nations and Deputy United States Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency United States Mission, Vienna Special Adviser

Ms. Katharine C. Crittenberger	Deputy United States Representative to the Conference on Disarmament United States Mission, Geneva Senior Adviser
Mr. Frank Miller	Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction Department of Defense Senior Adviser
Mr. Michael D. Rosenthal	Director Office of Multilateral Nuclear Affairs Bureau of Non-Proliferation Department of State Senior Adviser
Mr. Gary Samore	Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls National Security Council Senior Adviser
Mr. Peter Olson	Assistant Legal Adviser for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Office of the Legal Adviser Department of State Legal Adviser
Ms. Lisa Owens Davis	Office of Multilateral Nuclear Affairs Bureau of Non-Proliferation Department of State Adviser
Mr. Scott Davis	Office of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Department of Energy Adviser
Ms. Trisha Dadik	Office of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Department of Energy Adviser

Mr. Jack Ebetino	Office of Nuclear Energy Bureau of Non-Proliferation Department of State Adviser
Ms. Linda Gallini	Deputy Director Office of Multilateral Nuclear Affairs Bureau of Non-Proliferation Department of State Adviser
Ms. Elisabeth Healey	United States Mission to the United Nations Adviser
Mr. Donald M. Johnson	Office of Non-Proliferation Policy Office of the Secretary of Defense Department of Defense Adviser
Mr. David Jonas	Lieutenant Colonel, USMC Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Department of Defense Adviser
Mr. James Kelman	Office of Congressional and Public Affairs Bureau of Non-Proliferation Department of State Adviser
Mr. John King	Executive Secretary United States delegation to the Conference on Disarmament United States Mission, Geneva Adviser
Mr. John Kniley	Office of Multilateral Nuclear Affairs Bureau of Non-Proliferation Department of State Adviser
Mr. Dunbar Lockwood	Office of Strategic Transition Bureau of arms Control Department of State Adviser

Mr. Stephen P. Metruck	United States Mission to the United Nations Adviser
Mr. Gregory Mohrman	Office of Multilateral Nuclear Affairs Bureau of Non-Proliferation Department of State Adviser
Mr. Dean Rust	Office of Multilateral Nuclear Affairs Bureau of Non-Proliferation Department of State Adviser
Mr. Kenneth Sanders	Office of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Department of Energy Adviser
Mr. Steven L. Schleien	Office of Non-Proliferation Policy Office of the Secretary of Defense Department of Defense Adviser
Mr. Leonard S. Spector	Director Office of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Department of Energy Adviser
Mr. Michael Yaffe	Office of Regional Affairs Bureau of Non-Proliferation Department of State Adviser

URUGUAY

Address: Permanent Mission of Uruguay to the United Nations
747 Third Avenue, 21st Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 752-8240

Sr. Jorge Pérez-Otermin	Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas Jefe de delegación
Sr. Julio Benítez Sáenz	Embajador Representante Permanente Adjunto ante las Naciones Unidas
Sr. Alberto Guani	Consejero Misión Permanente
Col. José Viggiano	Attaché Misión Permanente

UZBEKISTAN

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 326, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 486-4242

Mr. Abdulaziz Kamilov	Minister for Foreign Affairs Head of delegation
Mr. Alisher Vohidov	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mrs. Alla Karimova	Head United Nations and International Political Organizations Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Nodir Ibragimov	Third Secretary Permanent Mission

VENEZUELA

Address: Permanent Mission of Venezuela to the United Nations
355 East 46th Street, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 557-2055

Sr. Ignacio Arcaya	Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario Representante Permanente ante las Naciones Unidas Jefe de delegación
Sr. Luis Herrera Marcano	Embajador Representante Permanente Suplente ante las Naciones Unidas
Sr. Wilmer Méndez	Primer Secretario Misión Permanente
Sr. Víctor F. Manzanares Veloz	Director de Asuntos Multilaterales Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores

VIET NAM

Address: Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 435, New York, N.Y. 10010
Telephone: (212) 644-0594

Mr. Nguyen Thanh Chau	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of delegation
Mr. Pham Binh Minh	Ambassador Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Hoang Chi Trung	First Secretary Permanent Mission
Mr. Le Huy Hoang	Assistant Director Department of International Organizations Ministry of Foreign Affairs

YEMEN

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Yemen to the United Nations
413 East 51st Street, New York, NY 10022
Telephone: (212) 355-1730

Mr. Abdalla S. Al-Ashtal	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Mohamed A. Al-Sindi	Ambassador Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Mr. Walid Al-Ethary	Second Secretary Permanent Mission

ZAMBIA

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zambia to the United Nations
800 Second Avenue, 9th Floor, New York, NY 10017
Telephone: (212) 972-7200

Mr. Mathias Daka	Counsellor (Economic Affairs) Charge d'Affaires a.i. Permanent Mission Head of Delegation
Mrs. Encyla Sinjela	First Secretary (Legal Affairs) Permanent Mission Deputy Head of Delegation
Mr. Noah Nsonje Mpashi	Ministry of Defence

ZIMBABWE

Address: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zimbabwe to the United Nations
128 East 56th Street, New York, NY 10022
Telephone: (212) 980-9511

Mr. Tichaona Joseph B. Jokonya	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations Head of Delegation
Mr. Emmanuel Runganga-Gumbo	First Secretary Permanent Mission

II. OBSERVERS

A

CUBA

Address:	Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations 315 Lexington Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone:	(212) 689-7215, 7216, 7217

B

PALESTINE

Address:	Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations 115 East 65th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021
Telephone:	(212) 288-8500

Mr. Marwan A. Jilani	First Counsellor Deputy Permanent Observer to the United Nations

III. UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala	Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs
Mr. Evgeniy Gorkovskiy	Director and Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs
Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail	Chief of the Geneva Branch, Department for Disarmament Affairs and Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Address: International Atomic Energy Agency Liaison Office with the United Nations
United Nations, DC1-1155, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 963-6010

Mr. Mohamed ElBaradei	Director General Head of delegation
Mr. Pierre Goldschmidt	Deputy Director-General for Safeguards
Ms. Merle Opelz	Head IAEA Office in Geneva
Ms. Jan Priest	Head Verification, Security of Material and Safety Policy Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination Office of the Director General
Ms. Anita Nilsson	Senior Coordinator and Head Office of Physical Protection and Material Security Department of Safeguards

Mr. Paulo Barretto	Director Division for Europe, Latin America and West Asia Department of Technical Cooperation
Mr. Michael Bedke	Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination
Mr. Massoud Samiei	Head Europe Section Department of Technical Cooperation
Mr. Vilmos Cserveny	Senior Policy Officer Verification, Security of Material and Safety Policy Section Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination Office of the Director-General
Mr. Piet de Klerk	Director Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination, Office of the Director General
Mr. Kwaku Aning	Representative of the Director General of IAEA to the United Nations, IAEA Office at the United Nations
Ms. Tracy C. Brown	Liaison/Information Officer IAEA Office at the United Nations
Ms. Laura Rockwood	Senior Legal Officer Legal Division Department of Management
Mr. Michael Akrawy	Technical Cooperation Expert Department of Technical Cooperation

IV. INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

AGENCY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (OPANAL)

Address: Sierra Tarahumara 715-A, Col. Lomas de Chapultepec
México D.F. 11000, México

Mr. Enrique Román-Morey	Secretary-General
Mr. Gregory Pachuta	Adviser

BRAZILIAN-ARGENTINE AGENCY FOR ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL (ABACC)

Address: Av. Rio Branco 123 - 5° and 20040-005
Rio de Janeiro, Brasil
Telephone: (5521) 221-3464

Dr. Carlos Feu Alvim	Deputy Secretary

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Address: Delegation of the European Commission to the United Nations
3 Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 12th Floor
305 East 47th Street, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 371-3804

Mr. Giancarlo Chevallard	Head of Unit External Relations Directorate-General
Mr. Stephan Klement	External Relations Directorate-General

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

Address: Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross
to the United Nations
801 Second Avenue, 18th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone: (212) 599-6021

Ms. Sylvie Junod	Head of delegation

Mr. Patrick Zahnd	Deputy head of delegation
Mrs. Ariane Sand-Trigo	Delegate
Mrs. Veronique Christory	Attaché

LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

Address: Office of the Permanent Observer for the League of Arab States
to the United Nations
747 Third Avenue, 35th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017
Telephone (212) 838-8700

Mr. Hussein Hassouna	Ambassador Permanent Observer to the United Nations
Mr. Ali A. Abbas	Counsellor Deputy Permanent Observer to the United Nations
Mr. Mohamed El-Fatah Naciri	Director-in-charge of Disarmament Affairs
Mr. Mohamed M. Morsi	Adviser

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY

Address: Le Seine St. Germain
12 Boulevard des Iles, 92130 Issy-les-Moulineaux, France
Telephone: (33-1) 45 24 8200

Mr. Sam Thompson	Deputy Director-General

ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Address: Johan de Wittlaan 32 NL-2517 JR, The Hague, Netherlands
Telephone: 31-70-416 3300

Mr. Anil Wadhwa	Head Government Relations and Political Affairs Branch

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

Address: Permanent Observer Mission of the Organization of African Unity
to the United Nations
346 East 50th Street, New York, NY 10022
Telephone: (212) 319-5490

Mr. Amadou Kebe	Ambassador Permanent Observer to the United Nations
Mr. Omotayo R. Olaniyan	Adviser Permanent Observer to the United Nations

ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE

Address: Office of the Permanent Observer for the Organization of the
Islamic Conference to the United Nations
130 East 40th Street, 5th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10016
Telephone: (212) 883-0140

Mr. Ahmad Jaji Hosseini	Deputy Permanent Observer

PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY ORGANIZATION

Address: Vienna International Centre
P.O. Box 1200
A-1400 Vienna, Austria
Telephone: (43 1) 26030-6177

Mr. Wolfgang Hoffmann	Executive Secretary
Mr. Thomas Stelzer	Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary
Ms. Daniela Rozgonova	Chief, Public Information
Mr. Alexander Vorobiev	Chief, Conference Services
Mr. Michal Stancel	External Relations Officer

SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM

Address: GPO Box 856
Suva, Fiji
Telephone: 679 312600, 300019

Ms. Andie Fong Toy	International Legal Adviser

V. RESEARCH INSTITUTES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Abolition 2000
c/o Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
PMB 121, 1187 Coast Village Rd., Suite 1
Santa Barbara, California 93108

Ms. Cara Lynn Ong
Ms. Pilulaw Khus
Mr. Ross Wilcock

Acronym Institute
24, Colvestone Crescent, London E8 2LH, England

Ms. Rebecca Johnson
Mr. Jenni Rissanen
Ms. Nicola Butler

Alliance for Nuclear Accountability
1801 18th Street NW, Suite 9-2
Washington DC 20009, USA

Ms. Loulena Miles
Mr. Konstantin Segeevich Kozlov
Mr. Nadjada Lvovna Kutepova
Ms. Natalia Mironova
Mr. Sergei Eduardovich Pashenko
Mr. Andrei Aleksandrovich Tavlevlin
Ms. Olga Gassan-Zade

American Friends Service Committee

Mr. Bruno Martin
Ms. Yael Martin

Arab Coordination Center
Cairo, Egypt

Mr. Bahig Nassar

Arms Control Association
Washington, DC

Mr. Charles Van Doren

Artistes Pour la Paix
Canada

Mr. Paul Klopstock

Atomic Mirror
P.O. Box 220, Port Hueneme, CA 93044-0220

Mr. Tatsuaki Oshiro
Ms. Janet Bloomfield
Ms. Pamela Meidell
Ms. Kathleen Sullivan

Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security (BITS)
Rykestr. 13, 10405 Berlin, Germany

Mr. Ottfried Nassauer

British American Security Information Council (BASIC)
11-13 Leathermarket Street, London SE1 3HN

Mr. Daniel Plesch
Ms. Christine Kucia
Mr. Tom McDonald

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)
162 Holloway Rd, London N7 8DQ

Mr. Sam Akaki
Mr. Dave Knight

Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility

Ms. Barbara Seifred

Canadian Peace Alliance

Ms. Judith Berlyn

Carnegie Endowment
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036

Mr. Joseph Cirincione
Ms. Adrienne Weiner

Carter Center
Atlanta , Georgia, USA

Mr. Harry Barnes

Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies
Moscow, Russia

Mr. Eugene Miasnikov

Center for Defence Information
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036

Mr. Bruce Blair
Ms. Gloria Scher
Mr. Joseph Deblinger
Mr. John Lottman

Centre for European Security and Disarmament
115 rue Stevin, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium

Ms. Sharon Riggle

Center for Russian Environmental Policy
Vavilova 26, Moscow 117808, Russia

Mr. Alexey Yablokov

Center for War, Peace and the News Media
Department for Journalism and Mass Communication
New York University, 418 Lafayette Str. Suite 554
New York, NY 10003

Mr. Alex Tiersky

Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers
110 Maryland Ave., Suite 201
Washington DC 20002, USA

Mr. Stephen Young
Mr. Daryl Kimball

Committee of 100
Peace Station Veturitori 3, Fin-00520, Helsinki , Finland

Ms. Marja-Liisa (Malla) Kantola

Common Heritage Institute

Dr. Colleen M. Driscoll

Communications Coordination Committee

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Mr. Dean Loren
Ms. Anne Zones
Ms. Ruth Garbus
Ms. Annie Wilson Miguet

Communities Forestry and Social Development Organization
Headquarters, P.O. Box 507, Winneba, Ghana, West Africa

Mr. Alex Benjamin Quanoo
Mr. Bernard Nyarko
Mr. John Addison

Cristman Cua Associates
443 Sayre Drive, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA

Ms. Florence Cua Cristman

Earth Action- Congo
P.O. Box 1967, Brazzaville, Republic of Congo

Mr. Jean Clautaire- Frerreys Pouele
Mr. Wilson Robert Mboungou- Mbaki
Ms. Annette- Mariette Laure Olotara

Economists Allied for Arms Reduction
211 East 43rd Street, New York, NY

Dr. Lloyd J. Dumas
Dr. Lucy Webster
Mr. Kelley Bates

Ms. Kate Cell
Ms. Charmaine Crockett
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Dr. Beshara Ghorayeh
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Ms. Neenu Sharma
Mrs. Nancy Strong
Mr. William Strong
Ms. Dorrie Weiss
Ms. Susan J.Zipp

Engaged Democracy for the Nuclear Age

Ms. Marguerite Kahrl

Environmental Justice Alliance
115 West 30th St #709, NY, NY 10001

Ms. Mari Carmen Ecoro

Fellowship of Reconciliation
Nyack, New York, USA

Mr. Clayton Ramey

Fourth Freedom Forum
803 North Main Street, Goshen, IL 46528, USA

Mr. Kevin Martin

Gundjehmi Aboriginal Corporation
P.O. Box 245, Jabiru Northern 0886, Australia

Ms. Jacqui Katona

Global Education Associates
475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1858, New York, NY 10115, USA

Mr. Richard Jordan

Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space
P.O. Box 90083, Gainesville, FL 32607, USA

Mr. Bruce Gagnon
Mr. Karl Grossman
Dr. Rashmi Mayur
Ms. Rose M. Mannara

Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE)
15 East 26th Str., Room 915, New York, NY 10010

Ms. Diane Hatz
Ms. Gloria Lawrence
Ms. Alice Slater
Mr. Stephen Ayo Adeyinka

Global Resource Bank Foundation
Stockholm

Mr. Lennart Bylund

Gray Panthers
205 Avenue A, New York, NY 10009

Ms. Joan Davis

Greenpeace International
Keizersgracht 176, Amsterdam 1016 DW, Netherlands

Ms. Jean McSorley
Mr. William Peden
Mr. Ben Pearson
Mr. Damon Moglen
Ms. Nancy Zook
Ms. Jan Johnson
Mr. Jon Walter
Mr. Bruce Hall

Hampshire College

Mr. Michael Klarl

Hiroshima Peace Institute
Hiroshima Mitsui Bldg. 12th Fl., 2-7-10 Otemachi,
Naka-ku, Hiroshima 730-0051, Japan

Mr. Masamichi Kamiya
Mr. Kazumi Mizumoto
Mr. Nobumasa Akiyama

Institute for Defence and Disarmament Studies
675, Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA, 02139

Mrs. Ann Lakhdhir

Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
Block No.1, Old JNU Campus, New Delhi – 110067

Mr. Jasjit Singh

Institute for Energy and Environmental Research
6935 Laurel Avenue Suite 204, Takoma Park MD 20912 USA

Ms. Michele Boyd
Ms. Lisa Ledwidge
Ms. Annie Makhijani
Dr. Arjun Makhijani
Mr. Hisham Zerriffi
Dr. Naseem Irfan
Mr. Arvind Kumar
Ms. Victoria Geba
Mr. Joshua Handler
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Mr. Christopher Paine
Mr. Kevin Kelly
Ms. Doreen Williams
Ms. Fatima Karina De Almeida
Ms. Hanna Newcombe
Mr. Noah Sachs
Ms. Roberta Sachs

Institute for Science and International Security
236 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Suite 500 , Washington DC 20002

Mr. David Albright
Mr. Kevin O'Neill

Ms. Corey Hinderstein

Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation

Ms. Julie Ward
Mr. David Levine
Mr. Ruth Zolf

Institute on Religion and Public Policy
1101 15th str., N.W., Suite 115, Washington, D.C. 20005, USA

Mr. Aurel-Dragos Mumeanu
Mr. Douglas Shaw
Mr. Joseph Grieboski

International Association of Democratic Lawyers
17 Lawyers Chambers, Supreme Court, New Delhi 110001 India

Mr. Professor Carol Fine
Ms. Beth Lyons
Ms. Colleen Downes
Mr. Christopher Albanese

International Association of Educators for World Peace
849 A, 2nd Avenue, NY, NY 10017

Sir Peshotan Mehta
Mrs. Amanda Mehta

International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA)
Anna Paulownastraat 103, 2518 BC The Hague, The Netherlands

Ms. Bernice Boermans
Phon van den Biesen
Ms. Marija Davidovic
Ms. Martina Siegfried
Mr. Dietmar Goettling

International Center for Advanced Studies
New York University, 53 Washington Square South, Room 401 E
New York, NY 10012, USA

Ms. Srirupa Roy

International Committee for Arab-Israeli Reconciliation
20 Waterside Plaza #27D , New York NY 10010 , USA

Ms. Carola Collier
Ms. Lucia Rajner

International Institute of Strategic Studies

Mr. Terence Taylor
Ms. Isabelle Williams

International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation
c/o IANUS, Darmstadt University of Technology
Hochschulstr. 10, 64289 Darmstadt, Germany

Mr. Jurgen Scheffran
Mr. Tobias Damjanov
Ms. Regina Hagen
Mr. Eugene Miasnikov
Mr. Paul Podvig
Mr. George Lewis
Mr. Frank Gobeler
Mr. Michael Schaaf
Mr. Goetz Neuneck

International Nuclear Societies Council
11136 Powder Horn Drive, Potomac, MD 20854, USA

Dr. E. Gail de Planque
Dr. Chang Kun Lee
Mr. Jorge Spitalnik
Dr. Konrad Hädener
Mr. Manuel Acero

International Peace Bureau
41 rue de Zurich, CH-1201 Geneva, Switzerland

Mr. Colin Archer

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War - International Office
Cambridge, MA, USA

Ms. Merav Datan
Dr. Mary-Wynne Ashford, M.D.

Ms. ElizabethWaterston
Ms. Katherine Mack
Mr. Lars Pohlmeier
Dr. Barbara Birkett, M.D.
Ms. Cathey Falvo
Ms. Anne Gallivan
Mr. David Rush
MV Ramana
Mr. Gunnar Westberg
Mr. Jan Larsson
Mr. Klas Lundius
Dr. Boris Bondarenko, M.D.
Mr. Lev Feotistov
Ms. Liling Tan
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Mr. John Loretz
Ms. Piji Protopsaltis
Mr. Brian Rawson
Ms. Lynn Martin
Mr. Michael Christ
Mr. Peter Wilk
Mr. Peter Zheutlin
Dr. Russell Davidson, M.D.
Ms. Mrina Temkina
Mrs. A Feotistov

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War - German Section
Kortestr. 10, Berlin 10967, Germany

Ms. Xanthe Hall
Mr. Lars Pohlmeier

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War - Swedish Section
Palsundsgatan 8, SE-117 31 Stockholm, Sweden

Mr. Jan Larsson
Mr. Lars G. Lindskog
Mr. Gunnar Westberg
Mr. Klas Lundius

International Shinto Foundation
NY, 10545

Mr. John T. Brinkman
Ms. Mary Knoll

Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.
1-13, Shimbashi 1 - Chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105, Japan

Mr. N. Oi

Japan Campaign Landmines

Ms. Motoko Mekata

Japan Congress Against A- and H- Bombs (GENSUIKIN)
5F Sohyo-Kaikan, 3-2-11 Kanda-Surugadai,, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-0062, Japan

Mr. Aoki Sakae
Mr. Harada Hiroshi
Mr. Ishikawa Kunio
Mr. Inagaki Shuishi
Mr. Inoue Toshihiro
Mr. Isono Yuji
Ms. Izumi Yoko
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Ms. Tada Miyuki
Ms. Miwa Hayashi
Ms. Kotake Zunko
Ms. Tada Mijuki
Ms. Utsunomiya Satoka

Japan Council Against A and H Bombs (Gensuikyo)
6-19-23, Shimbashi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105-0004, Japan

Mr. Koichi Akamatsu
Mr. Ai Takada
Mr. Satoru Konishi
Ms. Fujko Sato

John D and Catherine T MacArthur Foundation
Program on Global Security and Sustainability, 140 South Dearborn Street,
Suite 1100, Chicago, IL 60603

Dr. Renee de Nevers

Kawasaki Peace Information Center
C/o Kawasaki Peace Museum, 1957-1 Kizuki-Sumiyoshi-cho
Nakahara, Kawasaki City 211-0021, Japan

Mr. Takashi Kikuchi

Kurtz Institute of Peacemaking
P.O. Box 1748, Doylestown, PA 18901, USA

Dr. Colleen Driscoll

Landau Network-Centro Volta
Villa Olmo, Via Cantoni 1, I-22100 COMO, Italy

Prof. Maurizio Martellini
Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino

Latin American Initiative on Nuclear Disarmament
Calle Malaga #72, Urb. Sultana, Mayaguez, Puerto Rico 00680

Mr. Elmer Maas
Ms. Johanna Wilson
Ms. Melissa James

Lawyers' Alliance for World Security
1901 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Suite 201, Washington DC 20006, USA

Amb. Thomas Graham Jr.
Mr. Jonathan G. Granoff
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Amb. Richard Butler
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Mr. Jeremy Ross
Mr. Suzuki Katfuji
Ms. Rebecca Deo
Ms. Valerie Nash

Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP)
211 E. 43rd St. Suite 1204, New York NY 10017, USA

Mr. John Burroughs
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Mr. Patrice M. Wynne
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Ms. Abby Luby

Lawyers for Social Responsibility
400 – III, Dunsmir Str., Vancouver, B.C. Canada

Ms. Penelope Simons

Le Mouvement de la paix
139 Bd Victor Hugo, 93400 Saint-Ouen, France

Ms. Kristine Poirier

Ms. Lysiane Alezard
Mr. Daniel Durand
Mr. Mouloud Sadi
Mr. Roland Nivet
Ms. Nicole Logeais
Mr. Daniel Salhorgne
Ms. Christine Rosenberg

Los Alamos Study Group
212 E. Marcy St. #10, Los Alamos New Mexico 87501, USA

Mr. Greg Mello
Ms. Vilma Ruiz

Middle Power Initiative
c/o IPPNW, 727 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139, USA

Sen. Alan Cranston
Ms. Bruna Nota
Mr. David Krieger
Mr. Robert Green
Pat McGoey
Mr. Christopher Hynes
Ms. Suzanne Pearce

Military Toxics Project
Lewiston Maine, USA

Ms. Judy Scotnicki

Monterey Institute of International Studies
425 Van Buren Str., Monterey, CA 93940 USA

Ms. Lawrence Scheinman
Ms. Amy Sands
Mr. John Parachini
Ms. Mary-Beth Nikitin
Ms. Masako Toki
Anand Elchuri
Ms. Anna Vassileva
Ms. Sarka Krcalova
Mr. Anand Elchuki
Ms. Sarka Krcalana

Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament

Mr. Praful Bidwai
Mr. Achin Vanaik

Ms. Magazine
New York, NY

Ms. Hannah Wallace

Nation Institute
33 Irving Place, New York, NY 10003, USA

Mr. Jonathan Schell

National Association of Korean-Americans
New York Chapter, 276 5th Avenue #806, New York, NY 10001

Mr. John H. Kim

Nei Til Atomvapen
Youngsgt. 7, 0181 Oslo, Norway

Terje Stokstad

New Future Foundation
477 West 142nd Street #2, New York, NY 10031, USA

Ms. Rebecca Akande
Dr. Delois Blakely
Ms. Evelyn Wufka

NGO Committee on Disarmament
777 U.N. Plaza #3B, New York NY 10017, USA

Ms. Melanie Bush
Mr. Burkhard Conrad
Ms. Ann Purvis
Ms. Betty Obal SL
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Mr. Raj Jadhav
Mr. Chaitanya K. Kalevar
Ms. Mary E. Singsen

Mr. Raj Zodhav
Ms. Carole Abnahams

Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
PMB 121, 1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 1
Santa Barbara CA 93108-2794

Mr. David Krieger
Rev. Vernon Nichols
Ms. Masako London

Nuclear Control Institute
1000 Connecticut Ave NW Suite 804
Washington DC 20036, USA

Mr. Paul Leventhal
Mr. Tom Clements

Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance
P.O. Box 5743, Oak Ridge, TN 37831

Ms. Paloma Galindo

Pacific Islands Association of NGOs
Honolulu, Hawaii

Mr. Richard Salvador

Pax Christi USA
Erie, Pennsylvania, USA

Mr. Dave Robinson
Mr. Frank Dworak

Pax Romana

Mr. Kevin Ahern

Peace Action
1819 H Street NW #420
Washington, DC USA 20006

Ms. Kaaren Anderson
Mr. Jim Bridgman
Mr. Peter Brunette

Mr. Gordon Clark
Mr. John Jureller
Ms. Mary Jureller
Ms. Tracy Moavero
Mr. Zachary Moore
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Mr. Marvin Clarke
Colby Lowe

Peace Depot
Hiyoshi Gruene 102 3-3-1 Minowa-cho Kohoku-ku, Yokohama 223-0051, Japan

Mr. Hiromichi Umebayashi
Ms. Akira Kawasaki

Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
Leimenrode 29-D-60322 Frankfurt

Prof. Dr. Harald Müller
Mr. Stefan Bleysteiner
Mr. Christian Röhrs
Mr. Ulas Sener
Ms. Stephanie Sohnius
Ms. Daniela Tepe
Mr. Jonas Wolff
Ms. Hilary Palmer

Physicians for Social Responsibility
P.O. Box 7241, Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Dr. Daniel Fine

Dr. Evelyn Mauss

P.I.R. Center for Policy Studies
Moscow, Russia

Mr. Vladimir A. Orlov
Mr. Roland Timerbaev

Ploughshares Fund
Fort Mason Center, San Francisco CA 94123, USA

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Ms. Ann Gertler

Princeton University - Center for Energy and Environmental Studies
Von Neumann Building, Princeton New Jersey, USA

Dr. M.V. Ramana
Dr. Zia Mian
Dr. Sharon Weiner
Mr. Joshua Handler

Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN)
Ben Sanders, 240 East 27 Street, New York NY 10016

Mrs. Emily Taylor

Mrs. Abigail Sanders King

Project EDNA (Engaged Democracy for The Nuclear Age)
33 Flatbush Avenue, Brooklyn NY 11217, USA

Dr. Kathleen Sullivan

Project Abolition
85 John Street, Providence, RI 02906, USA

Ms. Karina Wood

Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PENN) - Netherlands
Working Group Eurobomb, S. Bolivarstraat 79, 3573 ZK Utrecht, The Netherlands

Mr. Karel Koster

Promoting Enduring Peace
112 Beach Avenue, Milford, CT 06460, USA

Ms. Janet Michelle Cuevas
Ms. Ann Mayer

Proposition One Committee
P.O. Box 27217, Washington DC 20038

Mr. Ellen Thomas
Mr. William Thomas

Quaker Peace and Service Friends House
173 Ereton Road, London, NWI 2 BF, UK

Mr. David Gree

Religious Society of Friends Philadelphia Yearly Meeting
1515 Cherry Street, Philadelphia PA 19102, USA

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Mr. Edward Brinton

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Ms. Theresa Fitzgibbon

Scarsdale Campaign for Peace through Common Security
Scarsdale, New York USA

Mr. Hank Elkins
Ms. Mary Ellen Singsen
Ms. Elisie Smoler
Ms. Kuniko Katz
Ms. Marcia Wallace
Ms. Gert Hofheimer
Ms. Julia Axtell

Simons Foundation
Suite 400-111 Dunsmuir St., Vancouver, British Columbia, V6B 5W3, Canada

Dr. Jennifer Simons
Dr. Penelope Simons

Socio-Ecological Union
Ul Krupskaya 8-1-187, Moscow 117311, Russia

Mr. Alexander Nikitin
Mr. Alexey Yablokov

State University of New York
Stony Brook, NY 11794-3733

Mr. Leonid Teleshevsky
Mr. Sean Winchell
Mr. Fred Kantrow
Mr. Matthew Murray
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Mr. Michael Roddin
Ms. Elizabeth Roddin

Mr. Andrew Roddin
Mr. William Henning
Mr. Lester Paldy
Ms. Judith Paldy
Mr. Matthew Paldy

Summit Friends Meeting
Summit, NJ, USA

Ms. Mary Alice Benson
Mr. Dan Wade

Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society
Box 4134 102 63, Stockholm, Sweden

Mr. Jens Petersson
Ms. Sara Olsson

Swedish Peace Council
Erik Segersalls vag 3, 12640 Hagersten, Sweden

Ms. Agneta Norberg

Tokyo Foundation

Ms. Motoko Mekata

Tri-Valley Citizens Against a Radioactive Environment
2582 Old First Street, Livermore, California, USA

Ms. Marylia Kelley
Ms. Sally Light
Mr. Rene Steinhauer
Mr. Robert Civiak
Ms. Joanne Dean-Freemire
Ms. Noriko Tani
Ms. Roberta Mitchell

Union of Concerned Scientists
1616 P Street NW, Washington DC 20036

Ms. Lisbeth Gronlund

United Church of Christ
821 Carroll Street, Brooklyn NY 11215, USA

Mr. David Robinson

Unitarian Universalist - All Soul's Church
340 E. 80th Str. #12D, New York, NY 10021

Ms. Monica Russell
Mr. Timothy Kelley
Mr. Mark Johnson

United Nations Association of the United States of America
801 Second Avenue, New York, NY 10017-4706
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 610, Washington DC 20036

Mr. Jeffrey Laurenti
Mr. Joshua Black
Mr. Thomas Osborne
Mr. John Buonpane

US Campaign to Free Mordechai Vanunu
2206 Fox Avenue, Madison, WI 53711 USA

Mr. Rabbi Philip J. Bentley

US China Friends Society

Mr. Sydny Gluck

US International
BE Productions, Inc.,
601 West 50th str. Suite 500, NYC 10019

Mr. Thomas Osborne
Mr. John Buonpone
Mr. Ed Silverman
Mr. Mark Brodie

Utah Navajo Downwinders
P.O. Drawer 450, Montezuma Creek
UT 84534, USA

Ms. Hazel Merritt
Mr. Robert Billie Whitehorse Sr.
Ms. Arlene Whitehorse
Mr. Tom Fred Jones

Ms. Bessie N Jones

Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC)
Baird House, 15-17 St. Cross Street, London ECIN 8UW, United Kingdom

Mr. Oliver Meier

Veterans for Peace
429 Sterling Place #4R
Brooklyn NY 11238, USA

Mr. Michael John Carley
Mr. Don Darling

Voice of Women
109 Wilton Street
Toronto Ontario M5A 4A3, Canada

Ms. Eryl Court
Ms. Lillian Rosen

Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University
1737 Cambridge St., Cambridge, MA 02130

Mr. Henning Riecke

Western States Legal Foundation
1440 Broadway #500, Oakland, California 94612

Ms. Jacqueline Cabasso
Mr. Andrew Lichterman
Dr. Theodore Taylor
Dr. Andreas Toupadakis
Mr. Phyllis Olin
Mr. William Olin
Ms. Patrice Sutton
Ms. Michelle M. Xenos

Women of Vision and Action
PO Box 4433, Walnut Creek, CA 94596

Ms. Ruth Garbus

Women's Action for New Directions (WAND)
691 Massachusetts Ave. Arlington, MA 02476, USA

Mr. Sayre Sheldon
Ms. Lane Stone
Ms. C. Eldridge Moran
Ms. Susan H. Shaer

Women's Environment and Development Organization (WEDO)
New York, NY

Ms. Pamela Ransom

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
UN Office, c/o Jane Addams Peace Center
777 UN Plaza, 6th floor, New York, NY 10017

Ms. Stephanie Fraser
Ms. Dorothy Epstein
Ms. Estelle Epstein
Ms. Susan George
Ms. Felicity Hill
Ms. Mary Kiernan
Ms. Sylvia Knight
Ms Molly Klopot
Ms. Rhoda Lyman
Mr. Scott Turner
Ms. Jan Harwood
Ms. Loise Bodhi
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Ms. Pearl Atkin
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Ms. Ellen Barfield
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Ms. Kay Camp
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Ms. Ruth Zalph
Ms. Elizabeth Arend
Ms. Robin Lloyd
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Ms. Rachel Coen
Ms. Diane Goerge
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Ms. Harriet Wasserman
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Ms. Warren Fraser
Ms. Marilyn Clement
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Ms. Trudy Orris
Ms. Leo Orris
Ms. Phil Sillman
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Ms. Christina Sidoti
Ms. Yoshiko Ikuda
Ms. Gillian Gilhool
Ms. Helen Kusman
Mr. Terry Carter
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Ms. Elizabeth Richter
Ms. Judi Dorschel
Ms. Florence Schlitzky
Ms. Suzy Cane
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Ms. Margaret Lloyd
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Ms. Joane Brooking
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Ms. Edith Ballantyne
Ms. Padma Manchala
Mr Harish
Ms. Heather Alperin
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Ms. Florence Schklowsky
Ms. Nancy Gnaenberg
Ms. Alma Rachel Benkowitz
Ms. Caryl Marie Brendle
Ms. Marguerite Kahal
Ms. Joane Brooking

Ms. Lucille Nichol
Ms. Nelly Sidoti
Ms. Claire H. Vogel
Ms. Sylvia Zisman

World Conference of Mayors for Peace through Inter-City Solidarity
C/o Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation
1-2 Nakajima-cho, Naka-ku, Hiroshima 730, Japan

Mayor Iccho Itoh of Nagasaki
Deputy Mayor Koshi Morimoto of Hiroshima
Mr. Yuji Sumida
Mr. Noboru Tasaki
Mr. Tomihisa Taue
Ms. Sakiko Narikawa
Ms. Satoko Utsunomiya
Ms. Atsuko Fujimatsu
Ms. Daisuke Okazawa
Mr. Hajime Sugita

World Conference on Religion and Peace
777 U.N. Plaza 9th floor, New York NY 10017, USA

Rev. Gijin Sugitani
Ms. Myrna Pena
Rev. K. Suzuki

World Court Project - UK
67 Summerheath Road, Halisham,
Sussex UK, BN27 3DR

Mr. George Farebrother
Mrs. Jean Farebrother

World Federalists Association

Mr. Brice Friedman
Ms. Erin Diane Swartz

World Federalists Movement
777 UN-Plaza, 12th Fl, New York, NY

Mr. William R. Pace
Mr. Aaron Knight
Ms. Roseann Rife

Mr. Steven P. Miller
Mr. John Hoof
Ms. Erin Schwartz

World Government Institute
6 Ledoux Terrace, South Burlington
Vermont 05407

Mr. Gary Davies

World Policy Institute
65 5th Avenue, #413, New York NY 10003

Ms. Frida Berrigan
Ms. Michelle Ciarrocca
Dr. William Hartung
Ms. Bridget Moix

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